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PRESENTED BY 



THE WORLD WAR 



A Short Account of the Principal Land Opera- 
tions on the Belgian, French, Russian, 
Italian, Greek and Turkish Fronts 



Colonel g/j. 'fiebeger 




West Point, N. Y. 
United States Military Academy Printing Office 

1921 



^ 



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CONTEXTS 



CHAPTER I. 

Armies and Plans at the Beginning of the World War. 

General Plans. — Concentration on the West Front, — French Army, — British 
Army, — Belgian Army, — German Army 1 

CHAPTER n. 

From the Frontier to the Marne. 

Liege, — Operations in Alsace-Lorraine, — Movements of the 3d, 4th and 5th 
French Armies, — Advance of the German Armies, — Battle of Charleroi, — 
Battle of Mons,-^Battle of Ardenne-Meuse, — Second Plan of General 
Jcffre, — Battle of Le Cateau, — The Battle of St. Quentin-Guise, — Von 
Kluck's March on Paris, — Retreat to the Marne, — Operations of the 3d 
and 4th French Armies, August 25-September 1, — Third Plan of Genei'al 
Joff re 14 

CHAPTER III. 

From the 3Iarne to the Channel. 

Battle of the Aisne, — First Battle of the Somme, — Battle of Arras, — British 
Operations South of the Lys River, — Battle of Flanders, — Battle of the 
Yser, — Dixmuide, — Battle North of Ypres, — Battle South of Ypres 52 

CHAPTER* IV. 
Operations on the Russian and Serbian Fronts. 

The Gernian-Austi'ian-Russian Boundary in 1914, — Plans, — Battle of Tan- 
nenberg, — Russian Invasion of Galicia, — Operations in West Poland, — 
Operations in Serbia in 1914, — Turkey 62 

CHAPTER V. 

General Plans and Operations on the West Front in 1915. 

Operations on the West Front. — The Battle of Neuve Chapelle, — German 
Attacks on Ypres. — Battles of Festubert and Artois in May, — Battles of 
Loos, Artois and Champagne in September, — The Argonne, — St. Mihiel 
Salient, — Vosges Front 75 

CHAPTER VI. 

Operations on the Russian. Serbian and Italian Fronts in 1915. 

Winter Operations in East Prussia, — Winter Operations in the Carpathian 
Mountains, — Operations in Galicia March to June, — Operations in the 
Baltic Provinces March to June, — Operations on the Russian Front July- 
September, — Operations in Serbia, — Operations on the Italian Front. ... 90 

CHAPTER VIL 

Operations in Turkey in 1915. 

The Armenian Front, — Mesopotamia, — Egypt, — Dardanelles 106 

CHAPTER VIII. 

General Plans and Operations on the West Front in 1916. 

Verdun, — Somme Drive 120 



CHAPTER IX. 

Operations on the Italian, Russian, Rumanian and Greek 

Fronts in 1916. 

Operations on the Russian Front During the Attack on Verdun, — Austrian 
Attack in the Trentino, May-June, — Advance of Southern Group of Rus- \ 
sian Armies June-August, — Operations on the Italian Front August- 
December, — Salonika, — The Rumanian Campaign 138 

CHAPTER X. 

Operations in Turkey in 1916. 

Armenia, — Mesopotamia, — Egyptian Front 150 

CHAPTER XL 
General Plans and Operations on the West Front in 1917. 

Attack and Defense, — Allied Plans for 1917, — Retreat of the German 
Armies on the West Front, — British Attack near Arras, — French Attack 
Along the Aisne, — British Operations in Flanders or Third Battle of 
Ypres, — Messines Ridge, — Battle of Passchendale Ridge, — Verdun, — 
Renewal of Battle of Passchendale Ridge, — French Attack on the Aisne, — 
Battle of Can[ibrai 156 

CHAPTER XII. 

Operations on the Russian, Rumanian, Italian and Salonika 

Fronts in 1917. 

Russian Front, — Rumanian Front, — Italian Front, — First Italian Attack, 
May-June, — Second Italian Attack, August-September, — Austro-German 
Counter- Attack, October-December, — Salonika Front 177 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Operations in Turkey in 1917. 

Palestine, — Mesopotamia 185 

CHAPTER XIV. 

General Plans and Operations on the West Front in 1918. 

Allied Plans, — German Plans, — Selecting the Front of Attack, — Allied Line 
in the West, — Battle Zone, — Forward Zone, — Rear Zone, — The Attack, — 
American Troops in France, — April Attack on West Front, — May- 
June Attack on the West Front, — Last German Offensive, — July 
Counter-Attack, — Haig's Counter-Attack, August 8-15, — Haig's Counter- 
Attack, August 21-September 1, — Petain's Counter-Attacks in August, — 
German Retreat on the Somme, — Haig's Counter-Attack of September 
2, — German Retreat from Somme and Lys Salients,— Oapture of the St. 
Mihiel Salient, — The Final Campaign, — Offensive in Flanders, — The 
Cambrai-St. Quentin Offensive, — Retreat of the Germans between the 
Oise and Reims, — Attack on the Hermann Line, — German Retreat be- 
tween the Lys and Sensee Rivers, — The Champagne-Meuse Offensive, — 
First Phase, — Second Phase, — Last Phase and Pursuit 192 

CHAPTER XV. 
Operations in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy and Turkey 

in 1918. 
Russia, — Rumania, — Bulgaria, — Italy, — Turkey 250 

CHAPTER XVI. 
Strategy of the War. 

Diplomatic Strategy, — Military Strategy 261 



CHAPTER I. 

ARMIES AND PLANS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 

WORLD WAR. 

Shortly after the outbreak of the World War, eight nations be- 
came involved in its military operations; these were Belgium, 
France, Great Britain, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro on the one 
side and Germany and Austro-Hungary on the other. Operations 
were at once begun on three fronts : on the west front the greater 
part of the German Army became engaged with the Belgian, French 
and British armies ; on the east front a small part of the German 
Army and the greater part of the Austrian Army became engaged 
with the Russian Army ; on the south front, the smaller part of 
the Austrian Army became engaged with the armies of Serbia and 
Montenegro. 

The Belgian Army was reorganized in 1913 when universal con- 
scription was adopted instead of conscription with substitution. 
Under the new organization the army was to be made up of 6 
divisions, 2 cavalry divisions and 1 cyclist battalion. Each infantry 
division was made up of three mixed brigades of two regiments 
of infantry and 3 four-gun batteries. The divisional troops con- 
sisted of 2 field batteries and 4 field howitzer batteries, 1 regiment 
of cavalry, engineers, etc. The cavalry divisions were made up of 
3 two-regiment brigades and 3 four-gun batteries. Half the bat- 
talions of infantry had machine gun sections of two guns. The 
total strength of the field army was about 125,000 men and each 
division about 20,000 men. In addition to the field army, it was 
necessary to provide garrisons for the three great fortresses of 
Liege, Namur, and Antwerp. 

The peace strength of the army was only 43,000 men. Its ex- 
pansion at the outbreak of the war necessitated the enrollment of 
a large number of reserves who had been long separated from the 
army and the course of events gave no time for their proper 
training. 

The French Army was the most important Allied force on the 
west front at the outbreak of hostilities, it had a peace strength 
of 660,000 men. It was composed of the Metropolitan and Colonial 
armies. The Metropolitan Army had 45 divisions organized into 
21 army corps ; of these all but one were permanently stationed 
in their corps districts in France. The 19th corps had its 4 divi- 



sions in Algieria, Tunis and Morocco, but was to be brought to 
France at the outbreak of the war. The Colonial Army had 12 
regiments in France and the remaining regiments in the French 
colonies other than those of North Africa; only the regiments in 
France were available at the outbreak of the war and from them 
was formed the Colonial Corps. Attached to the army corps for 
administrative purposes were 10 cavalry divisions and 32 bat- 
talions of chasseurs. > 

As the system of universal conscription had been in operation 
in France since 1872, the army had a large supply of trained 
reserves. At the outbreak of the war, service in the French Army 
was 3 years with the colors, 11 in the Reserve, 7 in the Territorial 
Army and 7 in the Territorial Reserve. The Reserve was to fur- 
nish the men for recruiting the regular army to a war footing and 
to furnish in addition reserve divisions of which 25 seem to have 
been formed on the mobilization of the army. The Territorial 
Army, composed of men from about 35 to 40 years of age, was 
also to form a large number of divisions for fortress garrisons, etc. 
A number of these divisions took an active part in the early part 
of the war. The Territorial Reserves, organized only in small 
units, were employed to guard railways, etc. 

At the beginning of the war, the French division was usually 
composed of 12 battalions of infantry and a regiment of 9 four- 
gun batteries of field artillery. Two divisions formed an army 
corps which had in addition a regiment of cavalry, 12 four-gun 
batteries of field artillery, a battalion of engineers and special 
arms. There was no heavy artillery attached to the corps as this 
was army artillery. Some of the chasseur battalions were at- 
tached to corps and others formed chasseur divisions. The cavalry 
division consisted of 6 regiments of cavalry, 1 bicycle company and 
2 four-gun batteries ; it was formed into 3 brigades. When cavalry 
corps were organized, they usually consisted of 3 divisions. Each 
infantry battalion and each cavalry brigade had a machine gun 
section with 2 guns. The strength of the division was about 15,000 
men and the army corps of 2 divisions about 33,000 men. 

At the beginning of the war, the French Army was able to mobi- 
lize 45 divisions of the active army, 2 divisions of Colonial troops, 
a division of chasseurs and 25 divisions of reserves, or 73 divisions 
in all. Besides the corps cavalry, there were available 10 cavalry 
divisions. 

The Regular Army of Great Britain had a strength of about 
250,000 men distributed as follows: 



Home establishment 125,000 

Indian establishment 75,000 

Colonial establishment 45,000 

245,000 
Army reserve 145,000 

390,^00^ 

On mobilization, there was to be formed from the Home Estab- 
lishment and the Army Reserve, the Expeditionary Force. All the 
plans for the mobilization of this force were completed and it could 
be placed on a war footing in a short time. It was composed of 6 
infantry divisions, a cavalry division and army troops. Each in- 
fantry division had 12 battalions of infantry organized into 3 
brigades, 1 squadron of cavalry, 3 battalions of field artillery each 
composed of 3 six-gun batteries, 1 battalion of field howitzers com- 
posed of 3 six-gun batteries, 1 heavy battery of four guns, engi- 
neers, signal troops, etc. Each battalion of infantry had a machine 
gun section. The entire division had therefore about 12,000 in- 
fantry, 76 guns and howitzers, and 24 machine guns; its total 
strength was about 18,000 men. The cavalry division had four 
brigades of cavalry of 3 regiments of 3 squadrons each, and four 
six-gun batteries besides engineers, etc. Its total strength was 
about half that of an infantry division. The army troops consisted 
of an infantry brigade, a cavalry brigade and the usual train troops. 
The total strength of the Expeditionary Force was about 120,000 
men. 

The Expeditionary Force, for which replacements could be fur- 
nished by the Army Reserve, was the only British force available 
for the early operations of the war. No other trained troops would 
be available until regulars were withdrawn from the colonies and 
new divisions organized or divisions were brought from India. 
Other troops formed from volunteers, the Special Reserve and 
from the Territorial Army would require a long period of training. 

The Russian Army had a peace strength of about 1,200,000 men. 
It was distributed throughout the empire in the following manner : 

Russia 27 army corps formed of 53 divs. and 8 rifle brigades. 
Caucasia 3 " " " " 5 " "4 " 

Turkestan 2 " " " " — " "6 '' 

Siberia 5 " " " " 10 " " — " 

37 " " " " 68 " " 18 " 



4 

Two rifle brigades are equivalent to a division. 
The cavalry divisions were distributed as follows: 

Russia 19 divisions and 2 independent brigades. 

Caucasia 4 " " — 

Turkestan 1 " "2 

Siberia — " " — 

24 " • " 4 " " 

The division had 16 battalions of infantry and 6 eight-gun bat- 
teries with a total strength of about 18,500 ; the rifle brigade 8,500 ; 
and the cavalry division 4,000. The army corps had a strength of 
about 40,000 and was made up of 2 divisions and a brigade of 
cavalry. 

Since 1912 service in the Russian Army had been 3 years with 
the colors, 7 years in the First Reserve, 6 years in the Second 
Reserve and 5 years in the home defense contingent. The annual 
recruit class numbered about 400,000 men. At the outbreak of the 
war 2,000,000 men of the first reserve were called into service to 
recruit the army to war strength, form reserve divisions and 
supply replacement troops. The Russian program provided for the 
formation of 32 reserve divisions in Russia proper from the 
reserves. 

As a result of the reforms introduced into the Russian Army 
after the Russo-Japanese War, the regular divisions of the Russian 
Army took the field well armed and equipped but there were not 
sufficient reserves of arms or equipments to replace the material 
lost in campaign and it was difl!icult to secure these supplies from 
the Allied and neutral countries. 

The Serbian Army had been recently engaged in two wars in 
which it had gained valuable experience but had lost a large num- 
ber of men. It was thought however that it could place in the 
field about 200,000 more or less trained men. The army was re- 
cruited by universal conscription, the periods of service in the First 
Ban being IVo years with the colors and 8I/2 years in the reserve. 
The army was small and only about 20,000 recruits were taken in 
each year. In time of peace the army consisted of 5 divisions each 
composed of 12 battalions of infantry and a regiment of artillery 
composed of 9 four-gun batteries; on mobilization each regiment 
was to receive another battalion of infantry making the organiza- 
tion similar to the Russian division but with fewer guns. In ad- 
dition to the divisions, there was a cavalry division, a regiment of 
mountain artillery, a regiment of field howitzers, and a regiment 



of heavy artillery. Five additional divisions were authorized in 
1913, but these could not have been fully organized at the beginning 
of the war. They were probably completed at the outbreak of the 
war by volunteers and men from the Reserves of the First Ban, 
thus giving a field army of about 200,000 men. 

A second reserve or Second Ban was composed of the men who 
had finished their service with the colors and corresponded in age 
limits to the Territorial Army of France. It was not organized in 
time of peace. These men would serve as replacement troops. The 
Third Ban corresponded to the Territorial Reserve of France but 
was not organized. As the Serbian Army was fighting on its own 
soil in 1914 it may be assumed that every able bodied veteran of 
the recent wars was in the ranks. 

The strength of the Montenegrin Army was estimated at about 
30,000 to 40,000 partially trained men organized into small battalions 
of infantry. It had 25 four-gun batteries and a number of machine 
guns. The army was equipped for mountain warfare but not for 
general field service, and will not be considered in estimating the 
strength of the Allied forces. 

At the outbreak of the war, the peace strength of the German 
Army was about 780,000 men. It was organized into 25 army corps 
of which 3 were from Bavaria, 2 from Saxony, 1 from Wurtemberg 
and the remainder from Prussia and the smaller States. Each 
corps was composed of 2 divisions whose normal composition was 
12 battalions of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry, 1 brigade of field 
artillery, 72 guns, and a battalion of engineers. Some of the divi- 
sions had three brigades or 18 battalions of infantry. Each infantry 
regiment had a machine gun company of 6 guns, or 2 per battalion. 
Each army corps had a regiment of heavy artillery of 8 batteries 
of 4 guns or howitzers each. 

The German Army had 110 regiments of cavalry of which 50 
would serve as divisional cavalry and 60 would form 10 cavalry 
divisions of 3 brigades each. The cavalry division had 3 six-gun 
batteries and a machine gun section. 

Of special infantry, corresponding to the French chasseurs, the 
German Army had 18 battalions of rifles each with a machine gun 
company and a bicycle company. In addition there were 36 ma- 
chine gun companies unattached. 

The German Army was especially strong in trained reserves as 
the army was recruited by universal conscription, its enlisted 
strength was kept at about one percent of the population, and the 
service with the colors was two years. The periods of service 
were 2 years with the colors, 5 in the Reserve, 5 in the 1st Land- 



6 

wehr, 5 in the 2nd Landwehr and 7 in the Landsturm. The 
Reserve and 1st Landwehr corresponded to the French Reserves, 
the 2nd Landwehr to the Territorial Army, and the Landsturm to 
the Territorial Reserve. About 300,000 recruits were taken into 
the army each year. 

On mobilization the Germans could probably form from the 
Reserve and 1st Landwehr about twice as many divisions as the 
French could from their Reserve, or about 50 divisions. It may 
be assumed therefore that she formed early in the war about 100 
divisions. 

The Austro-Hungarian or Austrian Army had a peace strength 
of about 350,000 men. There were 15 army corps of 2 divisions 
and 1 of 3 divisions. In addition there were 16 divisions of 
Austrian and Hungarian Landwehr who had a shorter term of 
service than the regular army and had not served regularly with 
the colors. One of these was assigned to each corps. The normal 
composition of the division was similar to the Russian division; 
16 battalions of infantry, 1/2 regiment of cavalry, 2 regiments of 
field artillery with 48 guns and 2 six-inch howitzers. Each army 
corps had in addition 2 battalions of heavy artillery, 8 howitzers, 
and a battalion of engineers. 

In the regular cavalry there were 19 brigades and in the land- 
wehr 7 brigades from which there were to be formed 8 regular 
and 8 landwehr cavalry divisions with 3 four-gun batteries each. 
Like the Russian cavalry, the Austrian cavalry regiment had 6 
squadrons and 4 regiments formed a cavalry division. 

The army was recruited by universal conscription; the periods 
of service were 2 years with the colors, 8 years with the reserve, 
and 2 years in the landwehr. At the outbreak of the war, the 
strength of the army may be assumed as 39 divisions of infantry 
and 10 of cavalry. 

In one respect the Austrian Army was weaker than any of the 
others; it was made up of men of many different races speaking 
different languages. The Germans and Hungarians who ruled the 
empire furnished only half the strength of the Austrian Army; 
the other half was made up of Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, Jugo- 
slavs and Italians who had little interest in fighting for the 
Empire. 

The following gives a rough estimate of the field forces that 
were ready to begin operations at the end of period of mobilization. 
This does not include French Territorials or German units corre- 
sponding to them. After the first operations, the available means 
of the various States in men, material resources, neutral assist- 



ance, etc., became factors which grew in importance as the war 

was prolonged. 

Infantry Divisions. Cavalry Divisions. 

Belgium 6 1 

France 73 10 

Great Britain 6 1 

Russia proper 57 20 

Russia, reserves, estimated. 32 — 

Siberia 5 1 

179 33 

Germany 100 10 

Austria 39 10 



139 



20 



The following table gives the composition of the army corps in 
the five principal armies on mobilization in 1914: 





Infantry 


Cavalry 




Artillery 








field 




heavy 


British . . . 


24 battalions 


1/4 regiments 


144 pieces 


8 pieces 


French . . . 


<( 


1 


120 


<< 




German. , . 


(< 


2 


144 


it 


32 " 


Russian.. . 


32 


1 brigade 


96 


<< 




Austrian.. 


32 


V2 regiment 


96 


<< 


10 " 



Although the Central Powers were relatively weak in the num- 
ber of divisions, their central position with their excellent railway 
systems and the more thorough preparation of Germany did much 
to counter-balance the weakness in numbers. 

GENERAL PLANS. 

From the formation of the offensive and defensive alliance be- 
tween France and Russia, the General Staff of each country had 
been working on a joint plan of operations in case of war with 
the central allied States of Germany, Austria and Italy. Since 
the problem first presented itself it had been simplified by diplo- 
matic means, as the German Navy was neutralized by an under- 
standing with Great Britain, and the neutrality of Italy was as- 
sured if Germany and Austria assumed the offensive. As the 
Central Powers might assume the offensive on either front while 
remaining on the defensive on the other, it was desirable that both 
the French and Russian armies should be concentrated as rapidly 



8 

as possible on the frontier, and each should attack in order to re- 
lieve the pressure on the other and thus compel the Central Powers 
to divide their forces more evenly between the eastern and western 
fronts. 

The problem of mobilizing the French Army and concentrating 
it on the frontier was an easy one because of the excellent system 
of French railways; but the Russian problem was more difficult. 
The great extent of that country required a wide distribution of 
her army corps, and the thin network of railways made it impos- 
sible to mobilize her corps and transport them to the frontier as 
rapidly as France or the Central Powers. To meet the situation, 
as strong a force as was deemed possible was concentrated in the 
three frontier districts whose headquarters were Wilna, Warsaw 
and Kiev. In these three districts were stationed about one-half 
of the Eussian European corps and three-fifths of the Russian 
cavalry divisions. The advance posts of the Wilna district were 
on the frontiers of East Prussia and those of the Kiev district on 
the frontier of Galicia. From the Warsaw district troops could 
be moved either into East Prussia or into Galicia. In the Warsaw 
district the army corps were all east of the Vistula River, two 
hundred miles from the frontier, as it was deemed dangerous to 
station them in West Poland; this territory was occupied by 
cavalry divisions only. 

The second line districts had their headquarters at Petrograd, 
four hundred miles from Wilna, at Moscow seven hundred miles 
from Warsaw and at Odessa four hundred miles from Galicia. In 
these districts there were 11 army corps and 3 cavalry divisions, 
designed to reinforce the frontier district as soon as railway con- 
ditions would permit. 

In the event of war between Russia and France and the Central 
Powers it was planned to concentrate the great mass of the 
German Army on the west front to seek a decision with France 
while the Austrian Army was concentrated on the eastern front 
against Russia. This would draw the main Russian force to the 
Austrian front and remove the danger of an immediate invasion 
of East Prussia by a large Russian force. Before Russia could 
concentrate her troops on her frontier to overwhelm the Austrian 
Army, it was assumed that German troops could be withdrawn 
from France. 

At the outbreak of the war, the situation was however changed 
by the fact that Austria was already at war with Serbia and had 
mobilized a large part of her army on the Serbian front. The 
whole Austrian Army was therefore not available for operations 



9 

against Russia. This was probably the cause of the prompt de- 
claration of war August 1 by Germany against Russia as soon as it 
was ascertained that secret orders had been given for the mobiliza- 
tion of the Russian armies by the Minister of War. 

Concentration on the West Front. 

French Army.— In order to understand the French scheme of 
concentration it must be remembered that in the Franco-German 
War, both France and Germany had respected the neutrality of 
Belgium and it was generally admitted that the invasion of that 
State would lead to complications if not war with Great Britain. 
Since that war, Belgium had constructed the fortifications of 
Liege and Namur which made invasion along the line of the rail- 
way from Cologne to Paris more difficult. If Germany should 
violate the neutrality of Belgium the probabilities were that she 
would move through the territory south of Liege and Namur. 

It was the ardent desire of every Frenchman to recover the lost 
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and therefore an invasion of 
these provinces would meet with universal approval in France. 
However, on making the plan it was necessary to consider the 
possibility of an invasion of south Belgium by the German armies. 
Should Russia carry out her part of the joint plan, it was not 
probable that the German force on the west front would at the 
end of the concentration period greatly outnumber the French 
force, and it might even be less strong. An offensive campaign 
was therefore deemed practicable. 

The general plan of concentration contemplated the formation 
of six armies from the active corps and reserve divisions. 

Army of Alsace First Army Second Army 

General Pau General Dubail General Castelnau 

2 corps 4 corps 5 corps 

1 division chasseurs 2 reserve divisions 5 reserve divisions 

2 reserve divisions 

Third Army Fourth Army Fifth Army 

General Ruffey General Langle General Lanrezac 

4 corps 4 corps 3 corps 

3 reserve divisions 3 reserve divisions 
2 cavalry corps Army Troops 

Of the ten cavalry divisions, three formed the 1st cavalrv corps, 
three the 2d corps, two were attached to the 4th Army, one to the 
3d Army and one to the Army of Alsace. 

The Army of Alsace was to be formed in the area around 
Belfort for the invasion of southern Alsace. The 1st Army was 



Id 

formed in the area northeast of Epinal and was to be the right 
wing of the main invading force. The 2d Army was formed in 
the area at Toiil and Nancy and was to be the center of the main 
invading force; to it was attached the 2d cavalry corps. The 3d 
Army was formed on the left of the 2d, east of Verdun, and was 
to be the left wing of the invading force. The 4th Army was con- 
centrated in the area behind the 2d and 3d armies as a general 
reserve. The 5th Army was concentrated in the area to the left 
of the 3d Army, and was facing the boundary of southern Belgium. 
Still further west, at Verviers near Hirson, was a group of three 
reserve divisions also available on the Belgium front. Other re- 
serve divisions were in the fortified curtain extending from 
Verdun to Toul. 

The concentration was designed to meet two situations. If the 
Germans concentrated all their forces on the Franco-German fron- 
tier the advance into Lorraine would be made by the 1st, 2d, 3d, 
and 5th armies with the 4th Army in support. If the Germans 
invaded southern Belgium, leaving only a part of their forces in 
Alsace and Lorraine, the 5th Army was to move to the left 
m.aking room for the 4th, and the 3d, 4th and 5th armies were 
to cross the Meuse and attack the German armies in southern 
Belgium, while the 1st and 2d attacked in Lorraine. In both cases 
the Army of Alsace would advance into southern Alsace. 

The mobile garrison of the fortress of Maubeuge, 25,000 men, 
and the group of reserve divisions at Hirson would prevent any 
raiding operations between Maubeuge and the Meuse River. 

The concentration did not provide for a German movement in 
force through Belgium north of the line Namur and Maubeuge, 
since it was not believed that the Germans would extend their 
army so far north, and if they did, they must weaken their line 
in southern Belgium and in Lorraine, where if the French won a 
victory, any German forces north of that line would be obliged to 
retreat. It is possible that the British and Belgians were expected 
to hold the line of the Meuse below Namur. 

The French armies were commanded by General Joifre, who 
had since 1911 been assigned to the command in case of war in 
addition to his duties as Chief of Staff of the French Army. The 
commanders of the armies and corps were made on his recom- 
mendation. 

British Army. — Great Britain did not declare war until the 
German troops invaded Belgium. The Expeditionary Force was 
at once mobilized and the first troops reached France about the 
middle of August. The force sent over consisted of the cavalry 



11 

division, 4 infantry divisions forming the 1st and 2d army corps, 
1 brigade of infantry for the line of communications, and 1 brigade 
of army cavalry. Two divisions were temporarily detained in 
England. At the request of the French commander, the British 
Army was concentrated around Maubeuge with headquarters at 
Le Cateau, instead of around Amiens as originally planned. 

The command of the British Expeditionary Force was given to 
Sir John French, an officer of wide experience who had been ap- 
pointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1911. 

Belgian Army. — The mobilization of the Belgian Army was 
ordered in the last days of July and at once one of the six divisions 
was sent to Liege and another to Namur. The other four divisions 
were prepared for field orperations, 

German Army. — The German Army was mobilized at the same 
time as the French, and at about the same time it began entraining 
for the frontier. The problem that confronted the German mili- 
tary authorities when preparing for this war was not so simple 
as that which confronted General Moltke in 1870, for then the 
German Army was nearly twice as strong as the French Army, 
the former having 475,000 men and the latter 250,000 men. In 
preparing the German plan it was not possible to count on great 
numerical superiority. After the Franco-German War, the French 
had greatly strengthened their eastern frontier by the construc- 
tion of fortifications. These consisted of the fortified curtains of 
Verdun-Toul and Epinal-Belfort, each consisting of two great 
fortresses connected by a continuous line of barrier forts at in- 
tervals of seven to ten miles. Although these barriers were con- 
structed a quarter of a century before, and the forts could no longer 
be considered proof against the recently constructed howitzers, the 
barriers would however greatly strengthen the resistance of the 
French armies if an attempt were made to penetrate France from 
Alsace and Lorraine. 

On the Belgian front, France had also constructed fortifications 
at the same time she constructed the barrier curtains in the east. 
With the exception of Maubeuge these however had long been 
neglected as Belgium had since fortified Liege and Namur, and 
with her Russian alliance and her reorganized army, France was 
no longer as weak as she was immediately after the Franco- 
German War. 

It was possible to avoid the barrier curtains of France by an 
advance through Belgium ; the farther the northern flank was from 
Verdun, the more difficult it would be for the French armies to 



12 



oppose the movement. It was therefore decided to invade not only- 
southern but also northern Belgium and enter France both north 
and south of the Sambre River and the fortress of Maubeuge. It 
involved the probability of war both with Belgium and Great 
Britain, but in view of the weakness of the forces these two 
countries could mobilize at the beginning of the war, it was prob- 
ably thought such an accession to the armed strength of France 
would not prevent a successful campaign. 

In making his plans, the German Chief of Staff had given little 
weight to the effect that the unwarranted invasion of Belgium 
would have on the world in general, which did not consider that 
the alleged military necessity was any excuse for disregarding the 
rights of a small state. As it turned out it proved to be a strategic 
blunder. 

The plan of concentration therefore provided for the formation 
of seven armies, five of which were to invade Belgium and two to 
defend the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine against the first at- 
tempts of the French armies. 



First Army 


Second Army 


Third Army 


General Kluck 


General Bulow 


General Hausen 


4 active corps 


3 active corps 


3 active corps 


2 reserve corps 


2 reserve corps 


1 reserve corps 


3 landwehr brigades 


2 landwehr brigades 


1 landwehr brigade 


Fourth Army 


Fifth Army 


Sixth Army 


Crown Prince of 


German 


Crown Prince of 


Wurtemberg 


Crown Prince 


Bavaria 


3 active corps 


3 active corps 


4 active corps 


2 reserve corps 


2 reserve corps 


1 reserve corps 


2 landwehr brigades 


5 landwehr brigades 

Seventh Army 
General Heeringen 

2 active corps 
2 reserve corps 
landwehr divisions 


landwehr brigades 



Two independent cavalry corps of 3 divisions each under German 
G. H. Q. were to operate with the I and II armies, a cavalry corps 
with the IV and V armies and cavalry divisions with the others. 
The landwehr brigades were to protect the communications. 

Shortly after the armies began the campaign one corps was de- 
tached from the II Army, one from the III Army, and a cavalry 
division from the I cavalry corps and sent to East Prussia which 
was being invaded. This left five corps in the II Army and three 



13 

in the III Army. One reserve corps and the landwehr brigades of 
the I Army were later detached to form the army of occupation of 
Belgium, leaving five corps for the invasion of France. 

The I Army was concentrated in the extreme north close to the 
Holland frontier and was to form the right of the invading force. 
The II Army was concentrated in an area farther south. The III 
Army was concentrated in the northern part of Luxemburg. The 
IV Army was concentrated in the middle of Luxemburg. The V 
Army was concentrated in the southern part of Luxemburg and 
between Luxemburg and the fortress of Metz. These five armies 
constituted the great invading force that was to move through 
Belgium and Luxemburg, cross the frontier and make a great 
wheel to the south around the fortress of Verdun to envelope the 
French armies. The VI Army was concentrated in Lorraine be- 
tween Metz and Saarburg, and the VII Army was concentrated in 
Alsace. These armies were to be temporarily on the defensive but 
were to assume the offensive when a favorable opportunity of- 
fered by the withdrawal of the French forces to meet the main 
attack. Southern Alsace was then to be occupied by landwehr 
divisions which were being mobilized. 

After the withdrawal of the German forces sent to East Prussia 
and those retained in Belgium, the Germans had 34 regular and 
reserve corps of about 69 divisions and perhaps 5 landwehr divi- 
sions on the west front. The French could concentrate 45 active 
and 25 reserve divisions and 2 divisions of the Colonial corps. As 
the British sent 4 divisions to France at once, the number of op- 
posing divisions was about the same. As the German divisions 
were stronger than the French, the Germans had numerical supe- 
riority but it was not very great. Their immediate advantage lay 
in their more extended deployment due to their invasion of 
northern Belgium. 

The command of the German armies was exercised by the 
Emperor, who had with him the Chief of Staff of the German 
Army, General von Moltke, a nephew of the famous field marshal. 
The plan of concentration however was drawn up by his prede- 
cessor in the position of Chief of Staff. 



14 



CHAPTER II. 
FROM THE FRONTIER TO THE MARNE. 

On July 25, Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia 
and orders were given for the mobilization of half the Austrian 
active army. It is probable that from this date preparations began 
to be made for a possible war in all the interested countries which 
later made it possible to shorten the periods of mobilization and 
concentration. 

Although the general order for mobilization was not issued in 
France and Germany until the afternoon of August 1, the concen- 
tration of the French armies on the frontier was completed on the 
18th, and that of the German armies a few days later. On August 
14, orders were issued for the French advance into Alsace and Lor- 
raine, and on the 16th for the German advance into Belgium. 

While the armies were being mobilized and concentrated, there 
occurred minor operations by the covering forces along the frontier. 
In the south the French invaded Alsace and captured Mulhausen 
but were compelled to withdraw to the frontier. In Lorraine there 
was also a French advance followed by a withdrawal. The Germans 
occupied Luxemburg and advanced into Belgium and captured Liege. 

Liege. — The capture of Liege was essential to the German plans, 
and when the request for permission to march their forces through 
Belgium was refused, three divisions with covering cavalry were 
hastily sent to effect its capture. Liege was considered a very 
strong fortress and was surrounded by a girdle of five large and 
five small forts at commanding points about five miles from the 
center of the city. The principal arm.ament of the large forts con- 
sisted of six 15cm. and 12cm. guns and the smaller ones four. Be- 
sides these guns, there were one or two mortars and three or four 
rapid fire 55mm. guns in each fort. All of these pieces were in 
armored turrets and the garrison of each fort, about 400 or 500 
men, was amply protected by concrete casemates from light and 
heavy field artillery. With its forts and the field force of about 
25,000 men, Liege was a formidable place to attempt to capture by 
surprise or assault even though the Belgians had no time to 
thoroughly intrench the intervals between the forts. 

From the German accounts it would appear that six German 
brigades with field artillery invested the girdle of forts on the north, 
east and south on August 4 and 5, and on the night of the 5th 



15 

attempted to capture Liege by penetrating the intervals between the 
forts to capture them from the rear. All succeeded in penetrating 
the line but only one remained within this line on the 6th ; all the 
others retired because of heavy losses. Not appreciating the situa- 
tion, the 3d Belgian division was withdrawn on the night of the 
6th, and that night the German brigade captured the bridges over 
the Meuse and the town itself on the 7th. However, the forts still 
held out and the Germans brought up the entire VII, IX and X 
corps with siege and seacoast artillery to effect their capture. The 
last fort surrendered on the 16th. Until the forts were taken the 
Germans could not advance as the VII, IX and X corps were to 
form part of the first line. 

After August 7 the Belgian Army took up a position about 30 
miles from Liege covering Brussels and its own line of retreat to 
Antwerp, and the German cavalry established a screen between it 
and Liege to cover the concentration of the I German Army. The 
II cavalry corps. General Marwitz, of three divisions was thus em- 
ployed. The I cavalry corps of three divisions formed •% screen 
south of Liege and moved westward toward Namur and Dinant. 
This screen was prolonged southward by the IV cavalry corps at- 
tached to the IV and V armies concentrating in rear. The cavalry 
was supported by rifle battalions with machine guns. 

As soon as it was known that the Germans had invaded Belgium, 
the 1st French cavalry corps of three divisions. General Sordet, 
supported by an infantry brigade was sent into southern Belgium 
to reconnoiter the country east of the Meuse, and one corps of the 
5th Army was sent northward to hold the line of the Meuse south of 
Namur. The French cavalry was unable to penetrate the German 
screen to secure information and therefore recrossed the Meuse and 
took station in the vicinity of Dinant. 

Operations in Alsace-Lorraine. — Before the concentration of the 
French armies was completed, it was evident that the invasion of 
Alsace-Lorraine by all the French armies was no longer practicable, 
and that the 3d, 4th and oth armies must be retained to meet the 
German forces concentrating in Belgium and Luxemburg. The in- 
vasion of Alsace-Lorraine must be carried out by the 1st and 2d 
armies and the Army of Alsace. 

On August 14, the French concentration was nearly enough com- 
pleted to permit the advance of the three southern armies, and the 
invasion of Alsace and Lorraine was ordered. It was designed to 
develop the German concentration in those provinces and perhaps 
to draw German forces to this front. 



1& 

The 1st and 2d armies, Generals Dubail and Castelnau, were to 
advance together forming a line extending from the Vosges Moun- 
tains south of St. Die northward to Pont-a-Mousson. Castelnau 
had the 9th, 13th, 14th and 20th corps and the 2d cavalry corps, 
and Dubail the 8th, 15th, 16th and 21st corps. The 18th corps re- 
mained in Toul and the reserve divisions protected the flanks of the 
line. On the 18th the combined armies without much opposition 
reached a line running from Pont-a-Mousson through Chateau Sa- 
lins to Sarreburg and thence southward along the eastern slopes of 
the Vosges Mountains in the direction of Colmar. At this point the 
9th corps was withdrawn from the line to be sent to the 4th Army 
and was replaced by reserve divisions. On the 19th, the German 
VI and VII armies were found in front in a strongly intrenched posi- 
tion backed by field and heavy artillery. This position was as- 
saulted with considerable loss and when the Germans counter-at- 
tacked on the 20th, the French were compelled to retreat and even- 
tually fell back to their original position along the Meurthe River 
and its tributary the Mortagne, with the left resting on the heights 
north of Nancy, known as the Grand Crown, and the right on the 
Vosges Mountains near St. Die. Here the French armies were re- 
inforced and defended their line against many assaults and guarded 
the gap in the French frontier fortresses between Toul and Epinal 
until the battle of the Marne had been won and the two German 
armies retired back toward the frontier. In these battles the VI 
German Army was composed of the I, II and III Bavarian corps, the 
XXI corps and the I Bavarian reserve corps ; the VII Army con- 
sisted of the XIV and XV active corps and reserve corps. Later 
these armies were reinforced by a division of the XVI reserve corps 
and landwehr troops. The prolonged struggle between the 1st and 
2d French armies and the VI and VII German armies was the first 
of the three great battles on the frontier and was called the battle 
of Lorraine. 

Although neither side could claim a victory in the battle of Lor- 
raine, the French armies fulfilled the more important mission, since 
they prevented the junction of the VI and VII German armies with 
the other five German armies, while they themselves remained in 
touch with the other French armies and were able to detach two 
corps to assist in the battle of the Marne. 

The Army of Alsace, commanded by General Pau, consisted of the 
7th corps, a chausseur division and a number of reserve divisions. 
In its front was a group of German Landwehr brigades or divisions. 
General Pau recaptured Mulhausen on August 19 and was then to 



17 

advance northward, but the retreat of the 1st and 2d French armies 
on the following day halted his further advance. A few days later 
General Joff re decided to withdraw this army and sent several of its 
divisions to other points. One division of the 7th corps was left at 
Belfort while the other with a reserve division formed a provisional 
7th corps which was sent to Amiens to form the nucleus of the new 
6th Army. Some of the reserve divisions were sent to the 1st 
Army. 

Movements of the 3d, 4th and 5th French Armies. — With the 
capture of Liege, and the concentration of large German forces 
on the Belgian frontier in the second week of August, it became evi- 
dent that the Germans were preparing to invade northern Belgium 
with a strong force ; this necessitated a change in the French plan. 
The 5th French Army was now ordered to the Sambre River be- 
tween Namur and Maubeuge to advance into northern Belgium 
while the 4th and 3d armies alone were to advance against the Ger- 
mans in southern Belgium. As soon as practicable, the British 
Army was to form line on the left of the 5th French Army. 

On August 15, the two remaining corps of the 5th Army started 
from the vicinity of Mezieres to march up into Belgium into the 
angle between the Sambre and Meuse rivers. On the same day, the 
I German cavalry corps appeared in the vicinity of Dinant on the 
Meuse and endeavored to seize the bridges. This attempt was frus- 
trated by the 1st corps of the 5th French Army which had been 
sent to guard the Meuse the preceding week. 

As the 5th Arrny was thus assigned a more difficult task it be- 
came necessary to strengthen it. Two divisions of the 19th corps 
en route from Algeria to the Army of Alsace were therefore 
diverted and railed to Hirson, and the 18th corps, in reserve at Toul, 
was entrained for Maubeuge. Some days later the 1st cavalry corps 
and the three reserve divisions near Hirson were also assigned to 
this army. When the last of the reinforcements would reach it, 
about August 23, the 5th Army would have six and a half corps and 
a cavalry corps. 

The 4th Army was directed to occupy the line of the Meuse be- 
tween Dun and Givet preparatory to an advance into southern Bel- 
gium. This army was reinforced by a division from the 9th corps 
of the 2d Army and the Moroccan division of the 19th corps together 
forming a provisional 9th corps, and a corps from the 3d Army. In 
its new position, it would have seven corps and two cavalry divisions. 

The 3d Army was to evacuate the area south of the Verdun-Metz 
road and concentrate its three remaining active corps with its cav- 



18 

airy division to cooperate with the 4th Army. Its three reserve di- 
visions, forming the Army of Lorraine, were left in front of Metz. 

Since a raid by German cavalry was now deemed possible through 
northern Belgium a barrier was formed extending along the Belgian 
frontier from Maubeuge to the English Channel. This barrier was 
to be guarded by four Territorial divisions with a general reserve 
consisting of two reserve divisions posted near Arras. These troops 
were under the command of General d'Amade. 

On the 16th of August, the British commander. General French, 
visited General Joffre at his headquarters at Vitry le Francois on the 
Marne and was informed of the military situation as it appeared 
to the French G. H. Q. 

On the 18th General French imparted this information to his corps 
commanders at Le Gateau. (1914 by Sir John French.) 

"Between Tirlemont (to the east of Louvain) and Metz, the enemy 
has some thirteen to fifteen army corps and seven cavalry divisions. 
A certain number of reserve troops are said to be engaged in the 
offensive of Liege, the forts of which are believed to be still intact, 
although some of the enemy's troops hold the town. 

"These German corps are in two main groups, seven to eight 
corps and four cavalry divisions being between Tirlemont and Givet. 
Six to seven corps and three cavalry divisions are in Belgian Luxem- 
burg. 

"Of the northern group, it is believed that the greater part — 
perhaps five corps — are either north and west of the Meuse, or being 
pushed across by bridges at Huy and elsewhere. 

"The general direction of the German advance is by Waremme 
on Tirlemont. Two German cavalry divisions which crossed the 
Meuse some days ago have reached Gembloux, but have been driven 
back to Mont Arden by French cavalry supported by a mixed 
Belgian brigade. 

"The German plans are still uncertain, but it is confidently be- 
lieved that at least five army corps and two cavalry divisions will 
move against the French frontiers southwest, on a line between 
Brussels and Givet. 

"The 1st French corps (5th Army) is now at Dinant, one cavalry 
and one infantry brigade opposing the group of German corps south 
of the Meuse. The 10th and 3d corps (5th Army) are on the line 
Rethel-Thuin south of the Sambre. The 18th corps is moving up 
on the left of the 10th and 3d. 

"Six or seven French reserve divisions are intrenched on a line 
reaching from Dunkirk on the coast, through Cambrai and La 
Capelle to Hirson. 

"The Belgian Army is intrenched on a line running northeast and 
southwest through Louvain." 

His own instructions to his corps commanders were as follows : 

"When our concentration is complete, it is intended that we should 



19 

operate on the left of the 5th French Army, the 18th corps being on 
our right. The French cavalry corps of three divisions will be on 
our left and in touch with the Belgians. As a preliminary to this, 
we shall take up an area north of the Sambre, and on [Monday 
(August 24) the heads of the Allied columns should be on the line 
Mons-Givet, with the French cavalry corps on the outer flank. 

"Should the Germans attack in the manner expected, we shall 
advance on the general line Mons-Dinant to meet it." 

The principal error in the estimate was the under-estimate of the 
German forces. From Givet northward, the Germans were about 
to operate with nine active and at least four reserve corps (exclu- 
sive of those left in Belgium) in all thirteen instead of seven or 
eight. Between Givet and Metz, the IV and V German armies had 
eleven corps instead of six or seven, as estimated. 

While General French was visiting General Joffre's headquarters, 
the 3d and 10th corps of the 5th French Army were marching 
rapidly northward and reached the vicinity of the Sambre River 
on the 19th. The two divisions of the 19th corps joined in southern 
Belgium and were attached as third divisions to the 3d and 10th 
corps, the 18th corps from Toul was beginning to entrain for Mau- 
beuge to form on the left. From the three reserve divisions south 
of Hirson, one was ordered to pass in rear of the army to relieve 
the 1st corps on the Meuse, the other two were ordered up to form 
on the left of the 18th corps when it arrived. The 1st cavalry corps 
crossed the Sambre River on the 17th, west of Namur, and its 
advance guard reached Gembloux. It was to get in touch with the 
Belgian Army and cover the advance of the 5th French Army across 
the Sambre River. 

Advance of the German Armies. — On the 17th of August, im- 
mediately after the fall of the last forts of Liege, the I and II 
German armies which had been crossing the Meuse above and below 
that fortress, got into position for the forward movement. On the 
right was the I Army, General Kluck, composed of the II, IV, III 
and IX corps in the first line followed by the III and IV reserve 
corps and the landwehr brigades. Covering the right flank of the 
army was a division of the II cavalry corps. On the left was the 
II Army, General Bulow, with the VII, X reserve, X and Guard 
corps in the front line followed by the Guard reserve corps and a 
division of the VII reserve corps; the other division 'of the VII 
reserve corps remained at Liege. The front of the II Army was 
covered by the other two divisions of the II cavalry corps. The 
order contemplated a wheel on a wide front about the fortress of 
Namur changing front from west to south. The I Army if possible 



20 

to turn the northern flank of the Belgian Army and cut it off from 
Antwerp. 

On the 18th the movement began ; the center of the I Army moved 
on Louvain and Brussels and the center of the II Army on Gembloux. 
That night the Belgian Army retired to Antwerp, to which the 
government had retired, offering only rear guard actions; on the 
20th, the center of the I Army was at Brussels and that of the II 
at Gembloux. 

While the I and II armies were moving north of the Meuse, the 
III Army composed of the XI, XII, XII reserve and XIX corps. 
General Hansen, was moving from northern Luxemburg westward 
to reach the Meuse between Namur and Givet to cooperate with 
the II Army. 

On the 20th, Bulow was informed by German G. H. Q. that there 
were two and possibly three French corps along the Meuse between 
Namur and Givet, two corps on the Sambre between Namur and 
Charleroi, and possibly three moving north toward the Sambre still 
further west and more than a day's march from the river. The I, 
II and III armies were ordered to engage these forces, and at the 
same time begin the siege of Namur. The location of the British 
Army was not known but it was advisable to assume that it might 
land at Boulogne. As the II cavalry corps would be needed on the 
flank of the I Army, the I cavalry corps was relieved from the front 
of the III Army and ordered to join the II Army. 

On the 21st, the wheel of the I and II armies was continued and 
the III Army marched toward the Meuse. The I Army left the 
corps of its second line to protect its communications from the 
Belgian Army. The left wing of the II Army reached the Sambre 
between Namur and Charleroi, while the right wing reached the 
line Nivelles-Charleroi. The leading corps of the I Army extended 
this line through Hal on the Brussels-Mons railway. 

Battle of Charleroi. — It was not the intention of General Bulow 
to cross the Sambre until the I Army and his right wing were 
further advanced ; therefore, for the 22d he simply ordered his right 
wing to advance to the Charleroi-Mons road. In front of this wing 
was the 1st French cavalry corps which had retired westward as the 
Germans advanced. About noon, however, Bulow learned that the 
Sambre between Namur and Charleroi was only ligHtly held and 
some of the crossings were already in possession of his troops. He 
therefore decided to advance the Guard and X corps of his left 
wing to the high ground south of the river and secure it before the 
French occupied it in force. 



0pp. page 20 
German Operation Order of August 20. 

"I and II armies will form on the line reached August 20 covered 
by protection against Antwerp. The attack of Namur will be begun 
as soon as possible. 

The details of the impending attack on the enemy west of 
Namur in cooperation with the attack of the III Army on the line 
of the Meuse between Namur and Givet must be left to the two 
commanders (Bulow and Hausen). 

In|.he development of future operations a strong force of cav- 
alr^Aof the Meuse is essential. The I cavalry corps will therefore 
retire from the front of the III and IV armies and begin its march 
around the north of Namur. When it reaches the north bank of 
the Meuse it will come under the orders of the commander of the 
II Army," 

At this time the I and II armies were under the command of 
General Bulow. General Hausen commanded the III Army. 



21 

South of the river General Lanrezac had not yet received all the 
troops that had been assigned to his army but was preparing for 
his advance. On the 22d only the 8d and 10th corps were on the 
Namur-Charleroi front and a brigade of the 3d corps had been sent 
to assist the cavalry north of the Sambre. The corps were not in- 
trenched as they were expecting to advance. The attack of the two 
German corps was unexpected, and that night the Germans had 
secured a strong position south of the Sambre. 

The battle was renewed on the 23d, Bulow's object being to drive 
the French back and form a junction with the III German Army 
whose right was to cross the river that day just south of Namur. 
Lanrezac's object was to drive the Germans back across the Sambre. 
The battle extended itself toward the west where the X reserve 
corps engaged the 18th corps which had just arrived. On Lanrezac's 
right was the 1st corps which had been guarding the Meuse and 
which prevented the right of the III Army from crossing the river ; 
its division around Dinant had been relieved the day before by a 
reserve division from Hirson, and in the morning the commander of 
the 1st corps was concentrating his corps with a view of making a 
counter-attack on the left flank of the Guard early in the after- 
noon. Just before this attack culminated. General Lanrezac was 
informed that the center of the III German Army had forced the 
Meuse at Dinant in his rear and he was obliged to detach the 1st 
corps to this new danger spot. About the same time, he learned 
that the British Army on his left had been attacked about noon by 
the I German Army and was retreating southward. To protect his 
flanks he ordered his army to withdraw on the 24th to the line 
Maubeuge-Givet. 

The retreat of the 5th French Army began on the 24th did not 
stop on the 25th as the left of the III Army crossed the Meuse 
south of Givet. The Army continued its retreat therefore across 
the Belgian frontier. 

During the 23d, the VII corps fought its way southward from 
Binche to the Sambre opposed by the 1st French cavalry corps 
assisted by a brigade of infantry. That night the French cavalry 
corps crossed the river and the next day bivouacked at Avesnes 
south of Maubeuge. The VII corps now reinforced by the I cavalry 
corps crossed the river and invested Maubeuge on the east. In 
its front were the two reserve divisions from Hirson which joined 
the 5th Army that day. 

In the battle of Charleroi, the Germans claim to have captured 
4,000 men and 35 guns. The other casualties were about equal, 
11,000 on each side. 



22 

During the battle of Charleroi, the Guard reserve and XI corps 
were conducting the siege of Namur assisted by the heavy artillery 
brought from Liege. By the morning of the 23d, the forts were so 
badly shattered that it was decided to withdraw the 4th Belgian 
division that morning. These troops passed to the rear through the 
5th French Army and were railed to Antwerp. 

Battle of Mens. — The British Army on leaving the French ports 
was detrained in the vicinity of Maubeuge and on August 22d de- 
ployed along the position which had been selected for it. The line 
ran along the canal from Conde due east to a village three miles 
east of Mons ; from this village it ran southward at right angles to 
the Sambre River where it connected with the 5th French Army. 
The canal line was held by the 2d corps, General Smith-Dorrien, 
while the 1st corps. General Haig, was echeloned along the ^line 
that ran toward the Sambre. Four brigades of cavalry were on the 
left, one on the right, cavalry patrols were out to the front. The 
only evidence of the enemy was a column of the VII German corps 
of the II German Army, which compelled the cavalry on the right 
to evacuate Binche, and cavalry patrols encountered by the British 
cavalry five miles north of Mons. 

The British commander knew that Brussels had been occupied by 
the Germans on the 20th and that they would probably make their 
first appearance at Mons where the main road from Brussels inter- 
sected his front. This particular part of the line formed a salient, 
as the canal makes a semi-circle to the northward around Mons. One 
division of the 2d corps was assigned to the salient and the canal 
on its left ; the other division was along the canal on its left. The 
left flank of the British line at Conde was insecure, but General 
French was expecting the 1st French cavalry corps, which was then 
on his right, to take post on his left when relieved by the 18th corps. 
During the day, August 22, he learned of the German attack on the 
5th French Army and was requested by the commander of that 
army to assist him next day by attacking in the direction of Binche, 
in view of the German forces probably moving towards his own 
front, he was unable to comply with the request. 

On the night of the 22d, the commander of the I German Army 
was still in the dark as to the location of the British Army which it 
was thought might have been landed at Boulogne and Calais and 
would advance via Lille. The II cavalry corps was advancing to- 
ward Tournai to clear up this point. He was however under orders 
to keep in touch with the left of the II Army and invest Maubeuge 
on the north and northwest. His orders for the 23d were for the 



23 

IX corps to march through and east of Mons on Maubeuge; the 

III corps on its left was to cross the canal iwest of Mons ; the IV 
corps was to halt on the road Ath-Conde five miles north of the 
canal ; the II corps, a day's march in rear, was to reach Ath ; the 

IV reserve corps was to remain at Brussels. 

In the battle of Mons therefore the German attack fell on the 
right wing and center of the 2d British corps beginning at the 
salient at Mons about' 1 p. m. The British made a stubborn resist- 
ance, but in the course of the afternoon evacuated the salient and 
canal line in front of the IX and III corps and fell back to position 
some miles to the rear. The IV corps becoming aware of the battle 
continued its march beyond its halting place and reached the canal 
between Conde and the III corps about dark. Here the British also 
retired to the new line. 

During the day General French, learning of the withdrawal of the 
2d corps, selected a line extending westward from the fortress of 
Maubeuge, about twelve miles south of the canal, upon which to 
fall back if necessary. During the night he was informed from 
French headquarters of the proposed retreat of the 5th French 
Army and that probably three German corps and two cavalry divi- 
sions were moving down on the British Army. Under the circum- 
stances, it was necessary to withdraw before his flanks were 
endangered ; the army was therefore directed to retreat to the new 
line on the following day. 

Mons-Charleroi was the second of the great battles on the 
frontier. 

The battle of Mons convinced General Kluck that the main 
British force was in his front. His orders for the 24th were for 
the II cavalry corps to move southward to the Scheldt River mid- 
way between Conde and Cambrai to cut off the retreat of that army 
to the west while the IV, III and IX corps endeavored to drive it 
eastward on Maubeuge. The II and IV reserve corps, then in rear, 
were to start at dawn, the former marching to Conde, the latter 
from Brussels in the same direction. 

Kluck's plan for the 24th was defeated by General French's deci- 
sion to withdraw that day to the Valenciennes-Maubeuge road. 
The German IV and HI corps attacked the 2d British corps early in 
the morning, but with assistance sent by the 1st corps and a counter- 
attack of that corps the engagement was broken off and the 2d corps 
retired to new position some five miles further south. The 1st corps 
now broke off the engagement and retired to the Valenciennes- 
Maubeuge road where it was joined by the 2d corps. At Valenci- 



24 

ennes there was a French Territorial division about to retire to 
Cambrai, 

On the night of the 24th, the British and 5th French armies 
were on the line Valenciennes-Maubeuge-Givet. 

As the 5th French Army was under orders to continue to retreat, 
on the afternoon of the 24th, General French ordered his army to 
retreat on the 25th as far as the Cambrai-Le Gateau road, 15 miles 
to the south, where the 4th division of the 3d corps of the Expedi- 
tionary Force which had just arrived from England was detrained 
that day. 

On the 25th therefore the retreat was continued. The 2d corps, 
covered by the cavalry, retired through the open country in its rear 
and reached the new line in the evening. The 4th division of the 
3rd corps advanced to Solesmes to cover its flank and then took 
position on its left and rear. The French Territorial division re- 
tired to Cambrai. On account of the Mormal forest in its rear, the 
1st corps was obliged to retreat between the Mormal forest and 
Maubeuge and recross the Sambre River at Landrecies. It had a 
long march to make and its leading brigade reached Landrecies after 
dark. The last brigade was far in rear. One division was attacked 
on the eastern edge of the Mormal forest after dark by troops of the 

III German corps and the brigade at Landrecies by troops of the 

IV German corps. 

General Kluck's plan for the 25th was made on the assumption 
that the British would await an attack on the Valenciennes-Mau- 
beuge road. When he found that the British Army was retreating, 
his movements were hampered by the order of General Bulow to 
invest the west front of Maubeuge. The IX corps therefore re- 
mained on the north and west of Maubeuge, while the III corps 
moved through the Mormal forest to reach the Sambre River to 
the south of the fortress. The IV corps pursued the 2d British 
corps and reached Solesmes with the main body while one column 
moved to Landrecies. The II cavalry corps and the II corps reached 
a point midway between Conde and Cambrai to the right and rear 
of the IV corps. By his retreat this day. General French had 
escaped the encircling movement of the German cavalry. 

On this day, the 5th French Army recrossed the Belgian frontier 
and was on the line Avesnes-Rocroi that night. In the fortress of 
Maubeuge the French left a garrison of 35,000 men, mostly Ter- 
ritorial troops. The 1st French cavalry corps began its march 
around the rear of the British Army to reach its left flank. The 
II German Army pursued the 5th French Army with its right corps 
east of Maubeuge. 



25 

Battle of Ardenne-Meuse. — It will be remembered that on August 
15, as a part of his general plan, the French commander had directed 
that the 4th and 3d French armies be concentrated along the 
Belgian-Luxemburg-German frontier, from Givet south to the 
vicinity of Thionville, to advance into southern Belgium and Luxem- 
burg to attack the German armies that were probably concentrating 
to invade that section. The concentration was completed on the 20th 
and the forward movement began on the 21st. The 4th Army 
between Mezieres and Dun consisted of a division of the 9th corps 
and the 11th, 12th, 17th, Colonial and 2d corps. The Moroccan 
division of the 9th corps had not yet joined. Above Mezieres and in 
reserve there were two reserve divisions and two cavalry divisions 
attached to the 4th Army. The Sd Army consisted of the 4th, 
5th, and 6th corps, and the three reserve divisions forming a sepa- 
rate group called the Army of the Lorraine. At that time it was 
believed that the German force consisted of six or seven divisions 
with three cavalry divisions. It was later found that the German 
force consisted of the IV Army, VIII and XVIII active and VIII 
and XVIII reserve corps ; and the V Army, the V, VI, XIII and XVI 
active and the V and VI reserve corps. The XVI reserve corps 
held the fortress of Metz and engaged one division. 

On the 22d, the second day of the battle of Charleroi, the oppos- 
ing forces marching north and west in southern Belgium and vicin- 
ity, came in contact with an extended front along which, because of 
the broken and wooded character of the Ardenne region of Belgium, 
the various corps fought almost independently at Paliseul, Bertrix, 
Neufchateau, Jamoigne, Tintigny and Arlon in Belgium; and 
Longwy and Audun le Roman in France. The following is the 
French review of the battle of Ardenne-Meuse. 

"On August 21, our offensive in the center began with ten army 
corps. On August 22, it failed. The reasons for it are complex. 
There were in this affair individual and collective failures, impru- 
dence committed under the fire of the enemy, divisions ill-engaged, 
rash deployments, a premature waste of men, and finally, inadequacy 
of certain of our troops and their leaders ; both as regards the use of 
infantry and artillery. In consequence of these lapses, the enemy 
turning to account the difficult terrain, was able to secure the 
maximum of profit from the advantage which the superior number 
of his minor units gave him." 

On the day following the battle all the French corps were with- 
drawn to the line from which they had advanced to be reorganized 
for a new advance. On the night of the 23d, however, the 5th 
French Army began its retreat and General Joffre did not deem it 
wise to renew the attack and run the risk of having the enemy 



26 

penetrate the interval between the 4th and 5th armies. The 4th 
and 3d armies began therefore to withdraw towards the Meuse. 

The battle of Ardenne-Meuse was the third of the great battles 
on the frontier. 

Thus far the French plans of invasion in Lorraine, in southern 
Belgium and on the Sambre, had all failed, and the three army- 
groups had retired across the frontier. That some of the failures 
were due to bad tactical leadership is evident from the following 
circular from French headquarters August 24, 1914: 

"It appears from information 8:leaned from the battles fought, 
that attacks are not executed with an intimate combination of in- 
fantry and artillery. 

"Every complete operation is made up of a series of detailed 
actions whose object is to secure points of support. Whenever it is 
desired to capture a point of support it is necessary to prepare the 
attack with artillery, retaining the infantry and sending it forward 
to the assault only from such a distance that it is certain to reach 
its objective. 

"Every time the infantry has been launched to the assault from 
too great a distance before the fire of the artillery has been felt, the 
infantry has fallen under the fire of machine guns and suffered 
losses which should have been avoided. 

"The infantry seems ignorant of the necessity of organizing itself 
for a prolonged contest. 

"Throwing at the outset into the line numerous and dense units 
exposes them immediately to the fire of the adversary, decimates 
their ranks, stops short their offensive and leaves them often to the 
mercy of counter-attack. 

"It is by means of a line of skirmishers, sufficiently spaced and 
continually fed, that infantry supported by artillery, should conduct 
the combat, thus making it last until the moment when an assault 
may be judiciously ordered. 

"German cavalry divisions are always preceded by some bat- 
talions transported in automobiles. Until now, their main bodies 
have never allowed ours to approach them. They move behind 
their infantry and launch small cavalry units (patrols and recon- 
noitering parties) who seek the support of their infantry as soon as 
approached; our cavalry pursues these elements and hurls itself 
against barriers solidly held. Our cavalry divisions must always 
have infantry supports to assist them and augment their offensive 
qualities." 

Second Plan of General Joffre.— On August 24, General Joffre 
became convinced that his right was secure, as the armies of 
Generals Castelnau and Dubail had made a firm stand and expressed 
themselves able to hold their position. The central armies, the 3d 
of General Ruffey and the 4th of General Langle, had not been able 
to carry out their offensive, but there was no reason to believe that 
they would not be able to hold on a shorter line and eventually be 



2'; 

able to renew the offensive under more favorable conditions. The 
weak point was the left group which in its present condition was 
liable to have both flanks turned. It was necessary to close the gap 
between the 4th and 5th armies and protect the left flank of the 
British Army. It was for the latter purpose that, at the request 
of the British commander, General Joffre ordered the 1st French 
cavalry corps to that flank. 

On the night of August 25 General Joffre with a better knowl- 
edge of the position and composition of the various German armies 
than he had on August 15, issued instructions of which the follow- 
ing is an extract: 

"The proposed offensive maneuver having been found impossible 
of execution, future operations will be regulated in a manner to 
reconstitute on our left by the junction of the 4th, 5th and British 
armies and new forces drawn from the eastern region, a mass 
capable of resuming the offensive. The other armies will in the 
meantime resist all efforts of the enemy. 

"In their retrograde movements the 3d, 4th and 5th armies will 
each observe the movements of its neighboring armies and keep 
in touch with them. The movement will be covered by rear guards 
left on favorable sites so as to utilize all the obstacles to arrest or 
at least retard the march of the enemy by short and fierce counter- 
attacks in which the artillery will play the main part." 

The line along which General Joffre hoped to check the German 
advance was the line of the Somme River from its mouth eastward 
to La Fere on the Oise, thence in an almost straight line to Verdun. 
The Territorial divisions with -two reserve divisions under General 
d'Amade were to form the barrier along the Somme from Amiens 
to its mouth. The 6th Army was to be formed along the Somme 
between Amiens and Peronne, with the British Army on its right 
connecting with the 5th French Army. The 5th, 4th and 3d French 
armies would extend the line to Verdun. 

With the 6th, British and 5th armies, it was hoped to renew the 
offensive and turn the flank of the German line as was attempted 
later in the battle of the Marne. 

When these instructions were issued, the situation as it probably 
appeared at the French G. H. Q. was as follows: 

On the morning of the 25th the British Army would be occupying 
the position that had been prepared for it along the Cambrai-Le 
Gateau road with five divisions. At Can?brai there would be a 
French Territorial division and at Arras the 61st and 62d reserve 
divisions, under orders to march on Cambrai. The 1st French 
cavalry corps was en route to Cambrai to reach the left flank of the 
line. The line Cambrai-Le Cateau ought therefore to be held for 



28 

some days by the British and d'Amade'p force and the 5th Army 
in line to the east, while the 6th Army was being organized. 

If this line could be held a few days, the entire line could fall 
back slowly to a new position running through St. Quentin which 
would be occupied by the left of the 5th French Army while the 
right held the line east of the Oise connecting with the 4th French 
Army. The 4th and 3d French armies would shorten their front 
by retiring to the line Rethel- Verdun and the 3d Army could then 
give up a corps and two of its reserve divisions to form with the 
7th corps from Belfort, the new 6th Army, for which other reserve 
divisions could be found elsewhere. When the 6th Army was 
formed, it with the British Army and left wing of the 5th French 
Army would form "a mass capable of resuming the offensive." 

The success of the plan depended on the ability of the British 
Army with the assistance of such French reserves and Territorials 
as were on its left, to delay the advance of the I German Army, in 
order to bring from other fronts the divisions designed for the new 
6th Army. 

Unfortunately there was not on the morning of the 26th, between 
Cambrai and Le Gateau, a force strong enough to retard the t 
German Army as planned. As previously stated, the 2d British 
corps reached this position in the evening of the 25th, but because 
of its circuitous march the leading brigade of the 1st corps had only 
reached Landrecies, a town eight miles east of Le Gateau, and the 
remainder of the corps was still between Landrecies and Maubeuge. 
The three divisions of the 2d and 3d corps along the Gambrai-Le 
Gateau road were therefore separated from the 1st corps and from 
the Territorial division at Gambrai by about the same distance, 
eight miles. At Gambrai was only the Territorial division ; the 61st 
and 62d reserve divisions and the 1st French cavalry corps could not 
reach it before evening. 

While General Joffre desired a delaying action fought by the 
British Army this day, the situation on the night of the 25th con- 
vinced General French that it was not practicable, as his army was 
not united and the French cavalry corps which was to protect his 
left was still on his right south of Maubeuge. He therefore directed 
his two corps commanders to retreat still farther south on the 26th. 
General French realized that he had in his command the greater 
part of the Regular British Army, and he was unwilling to risk a 
battle under such unfavorable conditions. 

On the 26th, therefore, the 1st corps continued its retreat in the 
direction of Guise on the Oise River, but the commander of the 2d 



29 

corps instead of retreating sent word that it was necessary for him 
to remain in position that day to rest his troops. General French 
was at his headquarters at St. Quentin and did not know of this 
decision until the morning of the 26th. 

Battle of Le Cateaii. — From his orders given the night of August 
25, it is evident that General Kluck was not expecting a battle on 
the 26th. 

"The Army Order issued at 11:50 p.m. on the 25th announced 
that the First Army would be called on to do another long march 
in pursuit of the retreating enemy. The II corps was to march 
through Cambrai towards Bapaume ; the IV reserve corps, making 
an early start, was to march to Cattenieres; the IV corps was to 
move from Solesmes and Landrecies to Vandhuille ; the III corps was 
allotted the Landrecies-Le Gateau road and was to march as far 
as Maretz ; the IX corps was to protect the communications of the 
Army from the west and southwest fronts of Maubeuge and any 
remainder of the corps was to follow the III corps through 
Landrecies. * * * Representatives of the different corps would 
receive orders about noon at Solesmes." — "March on Paris in 1914." 

Cattenieres is southwest of Cambrai just south of the Cambrai- 
Le Cateau road ; Vandhuille is ten miles due south of Cambrai ; and 
Maretz is about seven miles southwest of Le Cateau. 

From the decision of General Smith-Dorrien, commanding the 
2d corps, to remain in position on the 26th, and the marching order 
of the I Army there resulted the battle of Le Cateau. 

The British occupied an eight-mile front extending from the 
Roman road west of Le Cateau via Caudry to Haucourt. The 
cavalry brigades attached to it were on the left and the Army 
reserve brigade on the right. The line was only slightly intrenched. 

The attack began on the left where the II German cavalry corps 
moving southward east of Cambrai encountered the British cavalry 
and the 4th division of the 2d corps. The 2d corps was farther to 
the east and was attacked by the IV corps. The attack was opened 
in the course of the morning by the German artillery and the fire 
was kept up for several hours ; the infantry began its attack about 
noon. It is probable that some of the artillery of the III and IX 
corps took part in the attack as the British artillery was unable to 
adequately reply. 

About noon General Kluck arrived on the field and ordered the 
III and IV reserve corps to hasten their marches to turn the flanks 
of the British line. The battle was decided probably by the arrival 
of the head of the III corps at Le Cateau early in the afternoon when 
the right of the British line was turned and the order for retreat 
was given. The withdrawal was executed with difficulty as some 



30 

of the battalions remained in line after others had withdrawn and 
suffered severe loss. When at last all the troops were under way, 
they marched southwestward late in the night. Order could not be 
restored until two days later when the troops were behind the Oise. 
The prompt withdrawal probably saved a greater disaster, as a 
further delay would have enabled the Germans to employ the full 
strength of the III and IV reserve corps on the flanks of the posi- 
tion. The losses however were severe and the British Army was 
unable to give General Joffre any further assistance until the losses 
were replaced. 

General French says: 

"It was during Friday the 28th that I fully realized the heavy 
losses we had incurred. Since Sunday the 23d this had reached in 
officers and men, the total of upwards of 15,000. The deficiency in 
armament and equipment was equally serious. Roughly some eighty 
guns, and a large proportion of our machine guns, besides innumer- 
able articles of necessary equipment, and a large quantity of trans- 
port had fallen into the enemy's hands." — 1914. 

Most of these losses had fallen on the 2d corps. The 1st corps 
which took no part in the battle retreated southward toward Guise ; 
on the 27th and 28th it continued its retreat through St. Quentin 
to La Fere. 

Toward the close of the battle of Le Cateau, the 1st French 
cavalry corps by a forced march reached Cambrai and protected the 
left flank of the British in their retreat. On the following days it 
retreated toward Peronne to join the 6th French Army. 

Besides being a critical day for the British Army, August 26 was 
a critical day for the Germans, as the decisions made that day by 
German G. H. Q. had an important bearing on the later operations 
of the campaign. That day it was decided to withdraw two corps 
and a cavalry division from the western armies and send them to 
the Russian front, and also to relieve Kluck from the orders of 
Bulow. The two corps relieved were the Guard reserve and the XI 
corps which had conducted the siege of Namur and were now in 
reserve in the II and III armies. The cavalry division was taken 
from the I cavalry corps. 

According to the plan of General Joffre, the 5th French Army ^ 
retreated in a southwesterly direction keeping in touch with the 
British Army and closing in toward the west. The gap thus made 
between the 5th and 4th armies was thinly held by cavalry but was 
to be closed by the retreat of the 4th Army. The II German Army 
pursued in the same direction, but the commander of the III Army, 
who was confronted by the choice of keeping in touch with the II 



31 

Army or of gaining touch with the IV Army, decided on the latter 
and on the 26th a gap was opened between the II and III armies. 
The II Army reduced to three and a half corps, as one division of 
the VII corps was still at Maubeuge, was no longer supported on its 
left. On the night of the 26th Kluck informed Bulow that he would 
march in a southwesterly direction toward the bend of the Somme 
to prevent the British from retreating westward. Not wishing to 
lose contact with both adjoining armies, Bulow decided to keep in 
touch with Kluck which compelled him to order the I cavalry corps 
with one division of the VII corps and X reserve corps down the west 
side of the Sambre-Oise canal while the X and Guard corps remained 
on the east side. Due to Kluck's decision, the II Army ^yas now 
pursuing both the British and 5th French armies while in front of 
Kluck were only French reserves and Territorials with the 1st 
French cavalry corps. 

The Battle of St. Quentin-Guise.— On the 26th of August, Gen- 
eral Joffre visited General French at his headquarters at St. Quentin 
and promised him that the 5th French Arm.y which was about to 
reach the line of the Oise between Guise and Hirson would be halted 
to make a counter-attack to take off the pressure on the British 
Army. On the 27th, he notified General Lanrezac to prepare for 
battle and the 28th was spent in moving the troops into position. 

On the 27th, the II German Army reached the line of the Oise 
and on the 28th the cavalry corps, the division of the VII corps and 
the X reserve corps pushed on through St. Quentin in pursuit of the 
British, while the X and Guard Corps attempted to cross the Oise. 
at Guise and to the east. It was now discovered that the 5th French 
Army had halted and the X and Guard corps were stopped at the 
Oise after the X corps succeeded in gaining a bridgehead near Guise. 

Lanrezac's plan for the 29th was for the left wing of his army 
extending from Guise to La Fere to face in the direction of St. 
Quentin, cross the Oise and capture that town ; in the meantime, the 
right wing was to remain on the defensive. The chances of success 
were good, as there was a wide gap between the X and X reserve 
corps. The battle of the 29th was mainly an offensive one on the 
part of the French. The French troops crossed the Oise but were 
eventually compelled to retire. The gap between the X and X re- 
serve corps was filled by the timely arrival of the division of the 
VII corps left at Maubeuge. During the night of the 29th, one 
division of the IX corps of the I Army reached St. Quentin at the 
request of Bulow and on the morning of the 30th the Germans 
attacked but also without success. Bulow had called on the III 



32 

Army to attack the right of the 5th Army but its commander re- 
ported that it was fighting near Mezieres. In the afternoon, the 5th 
French Army broke off the battle as General Joffre had decided to 
retreat still further south as an offensive from the Somme front was 
no longer practicable. 

In the battle of the 29th, the X and Guard corps made a desperate 
attack on the Fi ench right wing to relieve the pressure on the German 
right wing. In this they were successful but the losses in these corps 
wery heavy and their attack was repulsed. 

Von Kluck's March on Paris. — On the 27th and 28th, the I Army 
marched from the front Cambrai-Le Gateau in a southwesterly 
direction toward the front Albert-Ham ; three of the corps with the 
cavalry reached the bend of the Oise on the latter day. In these two 
days they had encountered mainly French reserves marching from 
Bapaume to Peronne which they drove westward. The 1st French 
cavalry corps retired in their front across the Somme. There had 
not been sufficient time to form the 6th French Army as the 7th 
corps had just detrained at Amiens and two reserve divisions from 
the Verdun front were just arriving in the area northwest of Paris. 

Kluck says the situation was summed up at his headquarters on 
the night of the 28th as follows : 

"The left wing of the main French forces is retreating in a south- 
erly direction in front of the victorious Second and Third Armies. 
It appears to be of decisive importance to find the flank of this force, 
whether retreating or in position, force it away from Paris and out- 
flank it. Gompared with this new objective the attempt to force 
.the British Army away from the coast is of minor importance. 

"At mid-day on the 28th, on the basis of this appreciation, it was 
proposed to the Gommander of the Second Army that a wheel in- 
wards should be made by the two armies toward the Oise, the First 
Army moving on Compiegne-Noyon". March on Paris in 1914. 

Evidently since the battle of Mons, General Kluck had been ma- 
neuvering under the hypothesis that the British Army would at- 
tempt to retire westward. Since his right wing encountered only 
French forces after the battle of Le Gateau, he now knew his 
hypothesis was wrong. He was undoubtedly right in his conclusion 
that his army should now wheel to the east against the flank of the 
5th French Army, fortunately he was diverted from it by instruc- 
tions received from the German G. H. Q. that evening. He gives 
the substance as follows: 

"It expected renewed opposition by the French and British 
forces on the Aisne, with their left wing advanced abreast of a line 
St. Quentin-La Fere-Laon, also later on the Marne with the left 
flank resting on Paris. A concentration of fresh forces on the lower 



0pp. page 32 
German Operation Order of August 20. 

"The French — at least the northern and middle group — are in 
full retreat in a southwesterly and westerly direction, that is, to- 
ward Paris. They will undoubtedly attempt to offer strong resist- 
ance in new positions in their retreat. All information received 
from France indicates that the fighting is to gain time, and that the 
object is to keep as many German forces on the west front as pos- 
sible in order to lighten the task of the Russians in the east. 

The I Army with the II cavalry corps will march west of the 
Gise towards the lower Seine. It must be prepared to assist the II 
Army in its battles. In addition its tasks are to act as a flank guard 
of the armies and to prevent the organization of new hostile units 
in its operation zone. 

The II Army with the I cavalry corps under its orders will cross 
the line La Fere-Laon moving on Paris. It will also invest and 
capture Maubeuge and later with the III Army Laon. The I cavalry 
corps will reconnoiter on the front of the II and III armies. 

The III Army will cross the line Laon-Guignicourt in the direc- 
tion of Chateau Thierry. 

The IV Army will advance through Reims on Epernay. 

The IV cavalry corps assigned to the V Army will also recon- 
noiter on the front of the IV Army. The VI corps is transferred 
to the V Army. 

The V Army will advance across the line Chalons-Vitry le Fran- 
cois. By means of echeloning to the left and rear it must protect 
the flank of the armies until the VI Army has crossed the Meuse. 
Verdun is to be invested. 

The VI Army, the VU Army and III cavalry corps with flank 
resting on Metz are to prevent the advance of the enemy into 
Lorraine and upper Alsace. Should the enemy retire, the VI Army 
with the III cavalry corps will cross the Moselle between Toul and 
Epinal and move in the general direction of Neufchateau. In 
that case it will protect the flank of the armies. 

The VII Army will for the time being be under the orders of the 
VI Army. Should the latter cross the Moselle, the VII Army will 
be independent and will prevent the enemy from advancing between 
Epinal and Switzerland." 

This order assumed a more rapid and unopposed advance of the 
central group (III, IV and V armies) than was found possible 
during the 28th, 29th and 30th of August. 



33 

Seine was also considered possible/ An immediate advance of the 
German Armies on Paris was to prevent the French Army getting 
rest and stop the formation of fresh concentrations. The First 
Army, with the II cavalry corps under its orders, will march west 
of the Oise tov/ard the lower Seine. It will be responsible for the 
protection of the right flank of the Armies, and will take steps to 
prevent any new enemy concentration in its zone of operations. 

"The Second Army, with the I cavalry corps under its orders, will 
advance across the line Laon-La Fere toward Paris. It will invest 
and capture Maubeuge and later La Fere, as also Laon in co-opera- 
tion with the Third Army. 

"All the Armies will mutually co-operate with one another and 
support each other during the fighting. The strong resistance which 
is expected on the Aisne and later on the Marne may necessitate 
a wheel inwards of the Armies from a southwesterly to a southerly 
direction." 

Bulow says these same instructions were brought to him by a 
Staff ofl!icer and covered the operations of the seven armies. 

Kluck rightly says : 

"These directions implied that the I Army would continue its ad- 
vance in a southwesterly direction for the time being. They did not 
exclude the possibility of a wheel inward toward the south, such as 
the Army Commander contemplated, should the general situation 
make it appear necessary. 

"The directions quoted above did not admit of any slowing down 
of the operations of the First Army and a good rest could not there- 
fore be given the long-suffering troops." 

On the 29th, while the battle of St. Quentin was in progress, the 
I Army crossed the Somme and marched in the direction of the 
lower Seine. On that day one of its corps engaged the 7th French 
corps near the Somme and it with other scattered detachments in 
this area retreated toward Montdidier where General Manoury, who 
was in command of the 6th French Army, had established his head- 
quarters. The I Army continued its march until it reached the front 
Amiens-Roye which it reached on the 30th, the second and last day 
of the battle of St. Quentin-Guise. 

About 6 p. m. the following message was received by wireless from 
the II Army: 

"Enemy decisively defeated to-day ; strong forces retiring on La 
Fere. The British who were barring the Oise southwest of La Fere 
are also retreating in a southerly, and some in a south-easterly direc- 
tion. The enemy in front of the Third and Fourth Armies is also 
in retreat. The Second Army will rest on the 31st August except 
that the bombardment of the forts of La Fere will be carried on." 
And a half hour later: 

"To gain full advantage of the victory, a wheel inwards of the 
First Army pivoted on Chauny towards the line La Fere-Laon is 
urgently desired." 



34 

As a matter of fact, the battle of St. Quentin-Guise might rather 
be called a French victory in that it stopped the advance of the II 
German Army for three days and inflicted severe losses on the X 
and Guard corps who were obliged to sacrifice themselves to prevent 
a real defeat. It is true that the French Army evacuated the field 
on the 30th and retired to the Serre River in preparation for a 
further retreat. 

Kluck promptly replied: 

"I Army has driven the enemy across the Avre (near Roye) with 
its right wing; will advance to-morrow to the Oise between Com- 
piegne and Chauny." 

Later that night, the general instructions from the German G. 
H. Q. rescinded the orders of the 28th and directed the I and II 
armies to move in a more southerly direction than before with the 
left of the II Army directed on Reims. After receiving the new 
instructions Kluck reported: 

"The I Army has wheeled round toward the Oise and will advance 
to exploit the success of the II Army." 

On the following morning he received the following: 

"The movement begun by the I Army is in accordance with the 
wishes of the Supreme Command." 

Retreat to the Marne. — On the 30th the British Army which had 
been reorganized along the Oise, retreated to the Aisne, and the 5th 
French Army began its retreat from the Serre to the Aisne the fol- 
lowing day. On the latter day the left wing of the I German Army 
consisting of the II cavalry corps, the III corps and the IX corps, 
crossed the Oise between the mouth of the Aisne and La Fere. The 
I cavalry corps of the II Army had crossed the preceding day and 
was en route for Soissons. There was therefore a cavalry corps on 
each flank. The IV and II corps with the IV reserve, a day's march 
on the flank and rear, were still west of the Oise. 

On September 1, the British and 5th French armies continued 
their retreat. As the German cavalry corps was at Soissons and on 
the Soissons-Chateau Thierry road, the French were obliged to re- 
treat to the east of it. 

On the same day, the II German Army took up the pursuit ; the 
left wing of the I Army crossed the Aisne and the IV and II corps 
crossed the Oise at and south of Compiegne. There was some minor 
actions with British rear guards at Nery and Villers-Cotterets that 
day but as the main columns of the British Army were farther 
south attempts to turn its flank failed. 



0pp. page 34 

German Instructions August 30. 

"Ill Army has wheeled south towards the Aisne, attacks on the 
line Rethel-Semoy and will pursue in a southerly direction. 

The combined movements of the I and II armies meet with the 
views of the Supreme Command. 

The left flank of the II Army will move in the direction of Reims 
to cooperate with the III Army." 

The march on Paris ordered on the 28th was changed because 
of the resistance met by the central group (III, IV and V armies). 



35 

Operations of the 3d and 4th French Armies, August 25-Sep- 
tember 1. — In accordance with General Joffre's second plan, after 
their battle on the Belgian frontier, the 3d and 4th French armies 
fell back slowly to the Meuse pursued by the IV and V German 
armies. On the Meuse the German armies were joined by the III 
German Army which did not join in the pursuit of the 5th French 
Army but took the road from southern Belgium to Rethel on the 
Aisne River. A delaying action was fought south and west of 
Mezieres by the 4th French Army with the III and IV German 
armies on August 28 and the French armies then fell back on the 
line Rethel- Verdun. At this point, the left wing of the 4th French 
Army consisting of the 9th and 11th corps, two reserve divisions 
and a cavalry division were formed into a separate command under 
General Foch who had been in command of the 20th corps of the 
2d Army. When the 3d Army reached the Meuse one of the three 
divisions of the 6th corps was also sent to him. The 4th corps of 
the 3d Army was entrained for Paris. As the 5th French Army fell 
back from the Aisne, the armies to the east fell back with it. In 
order to maintain his position on the Aisne until the 5th Army 
reached it. General Foch fought a delaying action at Rethel with 
the III German Army. 

Third Plan of General Joffre. — After the battles of Le Cateau 
and St. Quentin-Guise, it became evident that a new plan must be 
made based on an offensive still further to the rear. This plan was 
given in a new set of instructions issued September 1. 

1. "Notwithstanding the tactical successes of the 3d, 4th and 5th 

armies secured in the region of the Meuse and Guise, the turn- 
ing movement effected by the enemy around the left flank of 
the 5th Army compels our whole to pivot around our right. 

2. "The movement to the rear may cause the armies to retire in a 

general direction south for some time. 

"The 5th Army, forming the marching wing, must, under no cir- 
cumstances allow the enemy to attack its left ; the other armies 
less pressed in the execution of their movements may halt, 
face about and seize every favorable occasion for inflicting a 
check. 

"The commanders of the armies will so conduct operations as not 
to expose the flanks of the neighboring armies, remaining in 
constant liaison with them and sending them constantly all the 
information they may secure. 

3. "In the zone of the 4th Army the detachment Foch will be in 

constant touch with the 5th Army. The interval between this 
detachment and the main body of the 4th Army will be 
guarded by the 7th and 9th cavalry divisions taken from the 
4th Army and supported by detachments of infantry furnished 
by that army. 



36 

"The 3d Army will effect its movement under the protection of 
the heights of the Meuse. The Verdun-Toul fortified curtain 
held by four reserve divisions. 
4. "The limit of the retrograde movement may be assumed to be 
when the armies will be in the positions given below, without 
however assuming that this limit will be actually attained. 

(a) A cavalry corps of new formation in the rear of the 

Seine south of Bray (south of Provins). 

(b) The 5th Army in rear of the. Seine to the south of 

Nogent-sur-Seine. 

(c) The 4th Army, detachment Foch, in rear of the Aube 

to the south of Arcis-sur-Aube ; the main body in rear 
of the Ornain to the south of Vitry. 

(d) The 3d Army to the south of Bar-la-Duc. The 3d Army 

will at this time be reinforced by the reserve divisions 
who will abandon the heights of the Meuse to engage 
in the offensive movement. 

If circumstances permit, fractions of the 1st and 2d 
armies will be called at an opportune time to partici- 
pate in the offensive. 

Finally, the mobile troops of the intrenched camp of 
Paris may also be able to take part in the general 
action." 

These instructions were followed by a note the next day explaining 
the purpose of the French commander-in-chief. 

The general plan of operations aims to secure the following 
objects : 

(a) "To relieve the armies of the pressure of the enemy and en- 

able them to reorganize and intrench themselves in the 
zone where they find themselves at the end of the retreat. 

(b) "To establish our entire force on a general line marked by 

Pont-sur-Yonne-Nogent-sur-Seine-Arcis-sur-Brienne le 
Cateau-Joinville, on which they can be recruited by re- 
placement troops from the depots. 

(c) "To reinforce the left by two corps drawn from the armies 

of Nancy (2d) and Epinal (1st). 

(d) "At this moment pass to the offensive on the whole front. 

(e) "Protect our left wing with all the disposable cavalry between 

Montereau and Melun (on the Seine south of Paris). 

(f) "Request the British Army to participate in the maneuver. 

1. Holding the Seine from Melun to Juvisy (on the left 

of the cavalry). 

2. Debouching on this front when the 6th Army begins to 

attack (just south of the Marne). 

(g) "Simultaneously the garrison of Paris will act in the direc- 

tion of Meaux (north of the Seine) . 

Under this plan the Allied armies were to retreat night and day 
if necessary until they were in contact with each other from Paris 
eastward. The 5th French Army was to retreat in a southwesterly 



37 

direction to close the gap between it and the British Army and the 
detachment of Foch in the same direction in contact with the 5th 
Army. 

In view of the possible evacuation of Paris, the government was 
moved to Bordeaux September 2. The defense of Paris was left 
to its military governor, General Gallieni, who had at his command 
as a mobile force, four Territorial divisions and an Algierian divi- 
sion. The two reserve divisions, 61st and 62d, who had been operat- 
ing in the triangle Arras-Cambrai-Amiens were en route to Paris 
to cover the north front. 

As will be seen later, the French and British armies did not re- 
tire as far as the line selected as the opportunity for an offensive 
occurred sooner than expected. The 6th French Army did not cross 
the Marne and was united with the mobile garrison of Paris; the 
British Army did not reach the Seine ; only a part of the 5th French 
Army crossed the Seine at Nogent; the detachment Foch did not 
reach the Aube but halted midway between the Marne and Aube; 
the 4th Army halted on the line Vitry le Francois-Revigny and the 
3d Army on a line running from Revigny northeast to the Meuse. 

On the night of September 1, the entire I German Army was south 
of the Oise and Aisne rivers except the IV reserve corps which was 
to cross the Oise at Creil the next day. On the night of the 1st, 
General Kluck still hoped to strike the British Army between the 
Oise and Ourcq rivers before it crossed the Marne. His orders were 
therefore for his corps to advance south-westward on the 2d against 
the British Army. The IX corps on his left was to move down the 
valley of the Ourcq. On the morning of the 2d however he learned 
that the British had escaped and were crossing the Marne ; the only 
troops encountered were French troops of the 6th Army retreating 
through Senlis on Paris. 

It v;as probably about noon that he received the following mes- 
sage possibly from the air service and possibly from the I cavalry 
corps of the II Army which was at and south of Soissons: 

"Strong enemy columns in retreat, about 11 a. m., from Braine 
(on the Aisne) through Fere en Tardenois (on the Ourcq) on 
(Chateau Thierry (on the Marne) and east of it. West of Fere en 
Tardenois large bivouacs still occupied at 11 a. m." 

The troops seen belonged to two reserve divisions that formed the 
flank column of the 5th French Army retreating to the Marne 
which they were to cross before daylight on the 3d just east of 
Chateau Thierry. 

General Kluck now thought he saw an opportunity of striking the 
5th French Armv in flank. 



38 

"A chance of dealing a decisive blow against the British Army- 
was now no longer to be hoped for, and it was decided to move two 
corps on the left wing, the III and IX, in the general direction of 
Chateau Thierry against the flank of the French retreating on 
Chateau Thierry-Dormans in front of the Second Army. 

"In co-operation with the Second Army it might be possible to 
damage the French western flank very considerably. The First 
Army by its deep formation was in a position both to cover the flank 
and rear of such an attack and also hold in check the garrison of 
Paris and the British. 

"In the Army orders issued at 1:15 and 2:00 p.m. from Com- 
piegne, the corps were kept well informed of the current events, and 
the latter stated that the II Army was to cross the Aisne that day 
with its right flank moving through Soissons, and that the IX corps 
would incline towards Chateau Thierry in order to take the retreat- 
ing enemy in flank; the III corps would also make for Chateau 
Thierry and advance as far as possible." 

The II and IV reserve corps were to continue operations against 
the French around Senlis, and the IV reserve, II and IV corps were 
to reach a front between the Oise and Ourcq running from south of 
Senlis to the junction of the Ourcq and Marne. The II cavalry corps 
was to reconnoiter toward Paris on both banks of the Oise. The 
IX corps referred to was the division that had remained with the 
I Army ; the other division was a day's march in rear marching on 
Soissons. 

On the night of the 2d, General Kluck drew up his orders for the 
operations of the 3d. They were simply a further development of 
his plan of the preceding afternoon. The area around Senlis was 
assigned to the IV reserve corps, the area midway between the Oise 
and Ourcq to the II corps, and the area on the Ourcq to the IV corps. 
The II cavalry corps as it returned from the reconnaissance was to 
rest in rear of the II corps. 

"The IX corps will continue its attack against the flank of the 
enemy retreating in front of the Second Army through Fere en 
Tardenois on Chateau Thierry. The III corps will advance south 
of the IX corps in the direction of Chateau Thierry. Cavalry and 
artillery, machine guns, and infantry in carts will be sent on ahead 
to attack the enemy when he crosses the Marne. 

"The III and IX corps will communicate with one another regard- 
ing the procedure of this attack. If contact is not gained with the 
enemy both of these corps will at once clear off to the westward 
off the road of advance of the right flank of the Second Army, VII 
corps, from Soissons-Chateau Thierry. The III corps will also re- 
connoitre towards the front La Ferte sous Jouarre-Chateau Thierry 
and report on river crossings." 

The IV corps was to reconnoitre the Marne between Meaux and 
La Ferte. 



39 

"Air reconnaissance will be made by the III, IV and II corps 
across the Marne in the directions allotted to the corps." 

Some time that night Kluck received the following wireless mes- 
sage from German G. H. Q. : 

"The intention is to drive the French in a south-easterly direction 
from Paris. The First Army will follow in echelon behind the 
Second Army and will be responsible for the flank protection of the 
Armies." 

When General Kluck received this message, he realized that the 
intent implied in the first sentence was at variance with the order 
in the second due to lack of correct information as to the exact posi- 
tions of the corps of the two armies. His own army was in advance 
of the II Army and was the only army that could act on the flank 
of the French. If he halted until the II Army was in advance, the 
opportunity would be lost. His orders already issued for the 3d, 
were designed to carry out the intent of the German G. H. Q. and he 
decided to let them stand although they were not in compliance with 
the direct order. It does not appear however that he informed 
German G. H. Q. until two days later. 

When the head of the leading division of the IX corps reached the 
vicinity of Chateau Thierry on the night of the 2d, it was probably 
already in possession of the I cavalry corps of the II Army which 
had been skirmishing all day with the French column reported to 
Kluck. This column crossed the Marne east of Chateau Thierry in 
the morning of the 3d, the 2d French cavalry corps, consisting of 
two divisions drawn from the 2d Army and one from the right of 
the 5th Army, took its place on the left of the 5th Army to cover 
that flank. All the corps of the 5th French Army crossed the Marne 
this day and retreated towards Nogent. 

In his estimate of the situation that night given in his orders for 
the 4th Kluck states : 

"The leading division of the IX corps has been in action on the 
high ground southeast of Chateau Thierry with the enemy retreat- 
ing from Chezy on Montmirail. During the evening the enemy has 
extended his position through Courbon-Viffort towards Viels 
Maisons. There are signs of the beginning of great disorder among 
the retreating columns. The enemy reported on the march from 
Meaux to Coulommiers, apparently British, bivouacked this evening 
north of Coulommiers. The area between Coulommiers and the 
neighborhood of Viels Maisons reported by airmen to be free of the 
enemy. British cavalry was encountered this afternoon north of 
Le Ferte sous Jouarre. The Second Army has reached the Marne, 
with its right flank immediately east of Chateau Thierry. Tomor- 
row it is to advance with the right flank moving from Brasles 
through Confremaux and Corrobert and the I cavalry corps from 
Chateau Thierry." 



40 

The enemy referred to as extending from Courbon,east of Chateau 
Thierry-Montmirail road to Viels Maisons west of it was the French 
cavalry corps covering Montmirail and the retreating 5th Army. 
Corrobert the destination of the VII corps of the II Army is north- 
east of Montmirail. The orders for the I Army were: 

"The First Army will continue its march across the Marne to- 
morrow so as to force the French Army eastwards. If the British 
offer opposition they are to be driven back. 

"The IX corps, co-operating with the VII corps, will advance 
* * * towards Montmirail. 

"The III corps will move * * * by way of Viels Maison. 

"The IV corps will cross the Marne at La Ferte sous Jouarre and 
Saacy and advance in the general direction of Rebais. 

"The II corps, protecting itself toward Paris, is to reach the Marne 
west of La Ferte sous Jouarre, and send its advance guards as far 
as the road Meaux-La Ferte sous Jouarre. 

"The IV reserve corps in conjunction with the II corps will ad- 
vance to the vicinity of Nanteuil la Haudouin and east of it. It will 
be responsible for protecting the flank and the communications of 
the Army against Paris, and be ready to take part in the movements 
of the Army on the 5th of September on the right flank. The 
brigade left behind at Brussels will probably arrive at Compiegne 
on the 5th of September. 

"Two divisions of the Cavalry Corps will march to La Ferte sous 
Jouarre. With regard to a later crossing of the Marne, it will com- 
municate with the IV corps, and if necessary, with the III corps. 
The Cavalry Corps will have one division opposite the northeastern 
front of Paris; this division will remain to-morrow in its present 
billets, and will be under the orders of the general commanding the 
IV reserve corps. 

"The demolition of the railways leading towards Paris from the 
north, north-west and west is to be begun to-morrow. The cavalry 
will also relieve the outposts of the IV reserve corps near Creil, and 
along the southern edge of the Forest of Senlis." 

All the corps movements ordered were executed on the 4th with 
no other opposition than that offered by the French cavalry corps 
and the flank guard of the nearest retreating corps. The French 
and British armies were still retreating according to the plan of 
General Joffre. The 5th French Army was moving from the front 
of the II German Army to that of the I Army and its place in front 
of the II Army was being taken by the detachment Foch which 
became the 9th Army on the 5th. 

General Kluck had now definitely committed himself to a very 
ambitious and dangerous operation and on the morning of the 4th 
he began to worry about it and as a result sent a wireless to the 
German G. H. Q. which contained these sentences: 

"The message of the Supreme Command, No. 2220, in accordance 



41 

with which the First Army was to follow in echelon behind the 
Second, could not be carried out under the circumstances. The in- 
tention to force the enemy away from Paris in a south-easterly 
direction was only practicable by advancing the First Army. The 
necessary flank protection weakens the offensive strength of 
the Army, and immediate reinforcements are therefore urgently 
needed." 

This probably was the first intimation that German G. H. Q. had 
of the movement of the I Army since sending the previous message. 
A wireless reply was sent at 4 :30 that same day but it was not re- 
ceived until 7:15 'a.m.. the following morning when the orders for 
the 5th were already being executed. The message said: 

"The First and Second Armies are to remain facing the eastern 
front of Paris; The First Army between the Oise and the Marne, 
occupying the crossings west of Chateau Thierry ; the Second Army 
between the Marne and the Seine occupying the crossings between 
Nogent and Mery inclusive. The Third Army will march towards 
Troyes and east of it." 

The orders for the I Army which were in process of execution on 
the 5th when this message was received, were: 

"The IX corps, after forcing the enemy back from Montmirail, will 
move with its right flank * * * to about Esternay; it will avoid 
the Montmirail-Sezanne road which belongs to the Second Army. 

"The III corps will advance with its right flank * * * as far 
as Sancy. 

"The IV corps to the vicinity of Choisy (a day's march south of 
Rebais). 

"The II corps will cross the Marne and advance to the lower 
reaches of the Grand Morin below Coulommiers, covering the flank 
of the Army from the eastern front of Paris. 

"The IV reserve corps will advance to-morrow to the area 
Marcilly-Chambry north of Meaux. It will be responsible for the 
protection of the Army north of the Marne from the northeastern 
front of Paris. 

"The 4th cavalry division on the right flank will remain under the 
orders of the IV reserve corps to-morrow. The remainder of the 
II cavalry corps will advance west of the IV corps, and then in the 
direction of Provins. Its duty will be to attack the French flank 
while crossing the Seine." 

General Kluck- says : 

"These movements were executed without difficulty. Three corps, 
the IV, III, and IX, with the Cavalry Corps, formed the strong wing 
of attack to force the enemy in a south-easterly direction, and two 
corps, the II and IV Reserve, with the 4th cavalry division towards 
the north, constituted the covering flank against Paris. In addition, 
the II corps was in a position to attack the British, who were be- 
lieved to be south of Coulommiers and the Grand Morin, should 
they make a stand there." 



42 

As to the wireless received that morning he says: 

"To carry out the wireless orders of the Supreme Command would 
mean breaking away from the enemy, and making a two or three 
day retreat. As regards the state of the enemy, First Army G. H. Q. 
had the impression that, although much exhausted by the fighting 
in which he had suffered severely, he had none the less been able 
to retire in tolerable order. Should the pursuit be stopped, he would 
be able to halt and regain freedom of maneuver, as well as offensive 
spirit. Taking this in consideration, it seemed preferable first to 
force him back over the Seine, and postpone till then, the wheeling 
of the First and Second Armies to face the eastern front of Paris. 
Before the enemy forces could be sufficiently strong and ready for 
battle, there would be time to finish the offensive toward the Seine. 

"Accordingly, the suggestion set forth above was submitted both 
to the Supreme Command and to Second Army Headquarters ; pre- 
parations, however, were made for carrying out next day, the 6th 
of September, the wheel ordered by the Supreme Command. The 
pursuit ordered for the day, the 5th of September, would be con- 
tinued, since it had already started and fighting was in progress 
in places. The IV Reserve Corps and the Cavalry Corps would be 
halted * * *, 

"The IV Reserve Corps, on getting the order to halt at 10 a. m. 
had already reached its objective, its leading divisions being in the 
area Marcilly-Chambry with the 4th Cavalry Division on its ex- 
treme northern flank. Air reports confirmed the fact that the 
enemy was continuing his retreat on the whole front from Paris 
to the Sezanne-Romilly road." 

On the evening of the 5th, a staff oflScer from German G. H. Q. 
gave General Kluck the full text of the order of which the wireless 
was an extract. It was: 

(a) The enemy has escaped the enveloping attacks of the I and 

II German armies and has secured by detachment its 
liaison with Paris. 

(b) Reports lead to the conclusion that the enemy has withdrawn 

troops from the line Toul-Belfort. He is withdrawing also 
certain units from the front of the 3d and 5th armies. 

(c) In consequence, the driving of the whole French Army to- 

ward the Swiss frontier is no longer possible. 
It is inferred that the enemy is transporting important forces 
and forming new organizations in the region of Paris with 
a view of protecting the capital and menacing the right 
flank of our army. 

(d) Consequently the I and II armies must remain in front of 

Paris. Their mission is to take the offensive against en- 
terprises of the enemy based on Paris and must render each 
other mutual support. 

(e) The IV and V armies are still in contact with the important 

bodies of the enemy's troops. They must increase their 
efforts to push these troops continuously south. By this 
means the road will be cleared for the VI Army on the 



43 

Moselle between Toul and Epinal, It is not possible yet 
to predict whether or not an action combined with the VI 
and VII armies in this gap will permit the driving of im- 
portant forces of the enemy to the Swiss frontier. The 
immediate role of the VI and VII armies is to retain the 
enemy's forces in their front. The attack on the Moselle, 
between Toul and Epinal, masking those two places, is to 
be made as soon as possible. 

(f ) The III Army will take Troyes-Vandeuvre as the directrix 

of its march. According to circumstances it will support 
either the I or II armies on the Seine or take part in the 
action of our left wing in a southerly or southeasterly 
direction. 

(g) In consequence His Majesty orders: 

I. The I and II armies will remain before the east front of 
Paris to assume the offensive against every attempt 
of the enemy to debouche from Paris; the I Army 
between the Oise and Marne; the II Army between 
the Marne and Seine. The II Cavalry Corps at the 
disposition of the I Army ; the I Cavalry Corps at the 
disposition of the II Army. 
II. The III Army marches in the direction Troyes-Van- 
deuvre (Arcis road). 

III. The IV and V armies by a steady advance must open 

the road to the upper Moselle to the VI and VII 
armies. Right of the IV Army in the direction of 
Vitry, right of V Army, Revigny. The IV Cavalry 
Corps will reconnoiter the front of the IV and V 
armies. 

IV. Mission of VI and VII armies unchanged. 

General Kluck says: 

"From the detailed instructions it appeared that the enemy was 
transporting troops from the front Belfort-Toul westwards, and also 
withdrawing troops from the front of our Third, Fourth and Fifth 
armies. The Supreme Command, therefore, calculated that very 
strong enemy forces were being concentrated near Paris to protect 
the capital and threaten the German right flank. The bearer of 
instructions gave a verbal account of the general situation, and to 
the amazement of the First Army Headquarters, who believed all 
the armies to be advancing victoriously, it appeared that the left 
wing of the German armies — namely the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh 
armies — was held up in front of the French eastern fortresses, so 
much so that it could scarcely pin the enemy in front of it to his 
ground. There was consequently a possibility that the enemy would 
move troops by rail from his eastern wing to Paris. 

"A very different aspect was thus given to the situation confront- 
ing the First Army. It was intensified by a report which arrived 
late in the evening of the presence of strong enemy forces about 
Dammartin, to the northeast of Paris." 



44 

Through the failure of liaison between the German G. H. Q. and 

the I Army, and the optimism of General Kluck, he now found him- 
self in a perilous situation. The failure of liaison was due probably 
to the anxiety of G. H, Q. over the operations of the V, VI, and 
VIII armies and the belief that the operations of the I and II armies 
were progressing satisfactorily, as well as to the practical difficulties 
of keeping touch with a rapidly moving army in a hostile country 
in which all telegraph lines had been destroyed. 

On the night of September 5, the order was issued for the corps 
of the I Army to retreat on the routes followed in the advance. 

"The II corps was to reach the Marne in the bend northeast of 
Meaux. During the night a subsequent order directed it cross the 
Marne to support the IV reserve corps. , 

"The IV corps, from south of Rebais, was to reach the Marne in 
the bend northeast of La Ferte sous Jouarre. Later it was to re- 
cross the Marne. 

"The III corps, from the west of Esternay, was ordered back to 
La Ferte Gaucher on the Petit Morin. This movement was pre- 
vented by the battle next morning. 

"The IX corps was ordered to remain in position around Esternay, 
and send its trains back to the north bank of the Marne. 

"The two cavalry divisions south of the Marne were to make a 
demonstration toward Rozoy southeast of Paris and southward of 
Coulommiers. 

"The II and IV corps were to leave weak rear guards on the Grand 
Morin, and the II, IV, III and IX corps were to strongly occupy the 
bridges over the Marne from Meaux to Chateau Thierry." 

The march of the I German Army from the Oise to the Marne 
had not escaped the notice of the French and British air services 
and had been reported to General Gallieni in Paris who took means 
to ascertain their correctness. He then requested permission to at- 
tack the German flank from Paris. 

On the night of September 4, General Joffre decided that he had 
retreated far enough and the time had come to assume the offensive. 
Both the French and British armies had been strengthened by re- 
placements. He therefore issued the following order: 

1. "It is advisable to profit by the very exposed position of the 

First German Army, to concentrate on it the efforts of the 
allied armies of the extreme left. 
"All the dispositions will be taken during the 5th of September 
with a view of attacking on the 6th. 

2. "The dispositions to be made on the 5th before night are: 

(a) All the disposable forces of the 6th Army to the north- 
east of Meaux ready to cross the Ourcq between 
Lizy sur Ourcq and May en Multien in the general 



45 

direction of Chateau Thierry. The disposable ele- 
ments of the 1st cavalry corps will be placed under 
the orders of General Manoury for this operation. 

(b) The British Army, established on the front Changis- 

Goulommiers, facing east, ready to attack in the gen- 
eral direction Montmirail, the 2d cavalry corps will 
connect the British and 5th armies. 

(c) The 5th Army closing up slightly on its left will es- 

tablish itself on the general front Courtecon-Ester- 
nay-Sezanne ready to attack in the direction south- 
north. 

(d) The 9th Army (General Foch) will cover the right of 

the 5th Army holding the southern exits from the 
marsh of St. Gond moving a part of its forces on the 
plateau north of Sezanne. 

3. "The offensive will be taken by the different armies at dawn 
September 6." 

On the morning of the 5th he issued the following instructions to 
the 4th and 3d armies: 

"4th Army — To-morrow September 6, our armies of the left will 
attack in front and flank the First and Second German armies. The 
4th Army will cease its movement south, face the enemy, conform 
its movements to that of the 3d Army, which debouching to the 
north of Revigny will take the offensive bearing to the west. 

3d Army — The 3d Army, protecting itself to the northeast will 
debouche toward the northwest attacking the left flank of the armies 
which are marching to the west of the Argonne. It will conform its 
action to that of the 4th Army which has received orders to face 
the enemy." 

The battle of the Marne really consisted of three almost distinct 
battles. The battle of the Ourcq fought northeast of Paris between 
the I German Army and the 6th French Army reinforced by the 
mobile garrison of Paris ; the battle of St. Gond fought around the 
site of a former marsh of that name between the II German Army 
reinforced by a part of the III Army and the 9th French Army re- 
inforced by a part of the 5th Army ; the battle of the Orne and Aire 
fought between Vitry le Francois and the Meuse River between the 
IV German Army reinforced by a part of the III Army and the V 
German Army against the 4th and 3d French armies. 

In the battle of the Ourcq, neither army was fully concentrated 
at the beginning of the battle and the troops reached the front on 
both sides day by day to the close of the battle. Numerical superior- 
ity alternated from day to day but the total forces were probably 
nearly equal. In the order of arrival they were: 



IV 


reserve 


corps 




II 


corps 






IV 


corps 






III 


corps 






IX 


corps 








brigade of IV reserve 


corps 




from 


Brussels. 





46 

French— General Monoury. Germans — General Kluck. 

55th and 56th reserve divisions 

Moroccan brigade 

7th provisional corps 

45th Algierian division 

61st reserve division 

7th division, 4th corps 

62d reserve division 

8th division, 4th corps. 

Cavalry 
Paris brigade IV cavalry division, II cavalry 

1st cavalry corps, 3 divisions corps. 

The battle began at noon on the 5th as the 55th and 56th reserve 
divisions with the Moroccan division, forming the right wing of the 
6th Army, were moving eastward north of the Paris-Meaux road. 
This movement having been seen, the IV reserve corps formed for 
battle and an indecisive action took place that afternoon. 

The operations of the 6th were only a prelude to the battle of the 
7th. The IV reserve corps retired to the vicinity of the Ourcq and 
the right wing of the 6th Army reinforced by the 45th division 
made some progress against it but was checked by the arrival of a 
division of the II corps on the left of the IV reserve corps. The left 
wing of the 6th Army consisting of the 7th corps and 61st reserve 
division got into position on the left of the right wing extending the 
line northward to Nanteuil. On the German side, the line was also 
extended by the arrival of the other division of the II corps and the 
IV corps. 

In the battle of the 7th, which was obstinately fought all along the 
front, the 61st reserve division forming the extreme left of the 
French line was driven back and the line was outflanked. During the 
night the 7th division of the 4th corps was sent from Paris by taxi- 
cabs and train to the vicinity of Nanteuil to restore the flank, which 
now faced northward. On the German side one division of the III 
corps was placed in reserve behind the German left and one reached 
the extreme right that evening. A brigade from Brussels also 
reached the Oise northwest of Nanteuil. 

The battle of the 8th was fiercely contested but without material 
gain to either side. 

On the morning of the 0th, Kluck expected to encircle the left 
wing of the French Army with the IX corps while the brigade from 
Brussels attacked from the Oise. That morning the left of the 6th 
French Army was reinforced by the 62d division from the north of 
Paris and the 8th division of the 4th corps which had been south of 
the Marne was now north of it and marching to join the 7th division. 



47 

The battle of this day was not fought to a conclusion as the general 
situation of the I and II German armies was such that the staff 
officer from the German G. H. Q. who had brought the instructions, 
directed the I Army to break off the engagement about noon and 
retire to the Aisne. 

While General Manoury had been unable to cross the Ourcq as 
planned by General Joffre, he had compelled General Kluck to bring 
most of his forces to this front and leave but a weak curtain con- 
necting his army with the II German Army. 

The battle of St. Gond began on September 6th. At the beginning 
of the battle the troops engaged were : 

French. German. 

5th Army — General d'Esperey I Army — General Kluck 

1st corps III corps first dav only 

2d corps IX corps " "^ " 

10th corps 

18th corps II Army — General Bulow 

19 corps, 2 divisions VII corps 

51st, 53d, and 59th reserve divs. X corps 

X reserve corps 

9th Army — General Foch Guard corps 

9th provisional corps 

11th corps III Army — General Hausen 

42d division 6th corps 

52d and 60th reserve divisions XII reserve corps 

The second regular division of XII corps, 1 division 

the 9th corps arrived on the The other divisions of the XII 

7th. corps arrived on the 9th. 

Cavalry. 

2d cavalry corps, 3 divisions I cavalry corps, 2 divisions. 

9th cavalry division with 9th Army. 

When at noon on September 5, the II German Army, which had 
crossed the Marne between Chateau Thierry and Epernay reached 
the road running eastward from Montmirail, its commander was 
surprised to find in his front not the 5th French Army which he had 
been pursuing but a new army of whose existence he had not been 
aware; it was not really a new army as the 9th Army had been 
formed some time before. Of the 5th Army only a single corps was 
on his front and that in front of his extreme right. That day he re- 
ceived his orders to face Paris between the Marne and Seine ; to do 
this meant to advance his left. 

On the evening of this day, the 9th and 5th French armies oc- 
cupied a line running from the Chalons-Arcis road on the right to 
Provins on the left. On the extreme right was the cavalry division 
of the 9th Army attempting to close the gap between the 9th and 



48 

4th armies. Then came the 11th and 9th corps with the division 
of the 6th corps on the extreme left. The two reserve divisions 
were in reserve. The line ran generally along the south side of the 
Petit Morin and St. Gond marsh but strong detachments were north 
of this line. The line of the 5th Army ran from the left of the 9th 
Army southward around Esternay and west to the Aubetin north 
of Provins where the 2d cavalry corps was facing the I cavalry corps. 
From right to left the 10th, 1st, 3d, and 18th corps were in the 
front line. 

On the 6th, the 5th Army attacked the III and IX corps endeavor- 
ing to turn both flanks and the VII corps came to the assistance of 
the I Army by attacking the 10th corps. The X reserve, X and 
Guard corps were attacked by the 9th Army and in counter-attack 
succeeded in gaining the north bank of the Petit Morin and the 
swamp. There was no decision that day and that night Kluck who 
had gone to supervise his right, requested Bulow to take command 
of the III and IX corps. These were ordered to retire to the line 
of the II Army on the Petit Morin. On this day the British Army 
was engaged in getting into position on the Aubetin River connect- 
ing with the French cavalry. Between its left and the Marne was a 
gap which was filled by the 7th division of the 4th French corps. 

On the 7th, the 5th French Army with the exception of the 10th 
corps which was placed under Foch's orders was not engaged as it 
was following up the retreat of the III and IX corps. On the right 
however there was a strong attack made by the II Army on the 9th 
Army in which the Germans succeeded in crossing the St. Gond 
marsh. Like the 5th Army the British advanced this day to the 
Grand Morin with little opposition as there was in their front only 
the two cavalry divisions of the II cavalry corps and detachments 
left by the IV corps. 

On the 8th, Bulow was reinforced by two divisions of the III 
Army and continued his attacks on the 9th Army in an endeavor to 
drive back its right and rest his flank on the Seine. On his right he 
was engaged mainly in protecting his flank from attacks and en- 
veloping movements. On this day he was obliged to release the 
III corps at noon and the IX corps at night which required constant 
changes in his line. That night the 5th French Army captured 
Montmirail. The British Army as well as the left of the 5th French 
Army reached the Grand Morin river. 

On the night of the 8th, Bulow drew back his right behind Sur- 
melin tributary of the Marne to prevent its being turned. He had 
been informed that Kluck was still heavily engaged west of the 



49 



Ourcq and that strong columns of Allied troops were marching 
almost unopposed to the Marne between La Ferte and the mouth of 
the Surmelin. To the staff officer of German G. H. Q. then at his 
headquarters he recommended that the I and II armies retreat be- 
hind the Aisne in order to close the gap between them. His views 
were accepted and he began to make preparations for his retreat. 
To cover his retreat he made a last attack on the morning of the 
9th with his left which was now reinforced by three divisions of 
the III Army. At noon that day the II Army began its retreat on 
Reims followed at 1 p. m. by the divisions of the III Army retreating 
on Chalons. 

The retreat was begun just in time as the British cavalry with 
two corps crossed the Marne this day and one corps of the 5th 
French Army reached Chateau Thierry. 

The battle of the Orne and Aire was fought on the line Vitry le 
Francois-Revigny prolonged to the Meuse. There was no decision 
here and the German Armies retired with the II and III armiies 
further west. During the battle here a part of the V corps made 
an attack from Metz on Fort Troyon south of Verdun but was de- 
feated in its attempt to capture the fort and retired on Metz. 

The forces engaged in this battle were: 



«, German. 

IV Army — C. P. of Bavaria 

VIII corps 
XVIII corps 

VIII reserve corps 
XVIII reserve corps 

XIX corps of III Army. 

V Army — German C. P. 
VI corps 

, XIII corps 
XVI corps 
VI reserve corps 

V reserve corps was pro- 

tecting communications 
from Verdun garrison. 

The opening campaign on the west front from August 14 when 
the French began to advance in force into Alsace and Lorraine, until 
September 9, when the Germans began their retreat to the Aisne, 
is perhaps the most interesting operation of the World War, since 
the British, French and German troops and leaders were the product 
of years of training and the plans the result of careful study of the 
General Staff of each of these countries. The invasion of Belgium by 



French. 

4th Army — General Langle 

2d corps 

12th corps 

17th corps 

Colonial corps 

21st corps joined at its close. 

3d Army — General Serrail 

5th corps 

6th corps 

65th, 67th and 75th reserve divs. 

15th corps joined during battle 



50 

the German armies in case of war with France had been openly dis- 
cussed for many years and had been thoroughly considered by the 
French General Staff; several French othcers of high standing dif- 
fered with the General Staff in its conclusions that the invasion 
would take place south of the Meuse only. 

By their initial concentration, the Germans secured a decided 
military advantage and had General Joffre followed the example of 
the French commanders in 1870 and allowed the Germans to profit 
by this concentration to overwhelm the Allied armies on the frontier, 
the Germans would undoubtedly have won a decisive victory. In 
withdrawing his armies, even at the sacrifice of territory. General 
Jofire deprived them of their initial advantage and eventually fought 
the battle of the Marne with all the conditions in his favor. The 
Germans probably counted on the French commander reducing the 
strength of the 1st and 2d armies in order to reinforce his left and 
thus enable the VI and VII armies to break through the eastern 
frontier into the valley of the Marne but in this they were mis- 
taken for General Joffre appreciated the necessity of holding Nancy- 
Epinal gap and would not weaken this front. 

The turn of the tide in favor of the Allies began on August 26th 
when two corps were withdrawn from the II and III German armies 
to be sent to Russia. This weakened the force available for the con- 
tinued attack of the 5th French Army which occupied the critical 
position in the French line. The situation of this army was still 
further improved when on the following days the III Army lost 
touch with the II Army and the I Army moved off to the west to 
prevent the British Army from retiring toward the coast. Had 
Kluck turned eastward on the 29th, as he had proposed, he might 
still have been in time to act on the flank and rear of the 5th French 
Army but when he turned on the 31st, he was too late. It is probable 
that a better cooperation of the German armies against the Allied 
left wing would have resulted had the three armies been placed 
under the command of General Bulow instead of having been re- 
tained by German G. H. Q. which did not keep in touch with the 
military situation as it developed from day to day. 

It is evident from the description of the operations that General 
Joffre, who did not remain at his headquarters at Vitry le Francois, 
had throughout the period covered by the campaign a better grasp 
of the entire situation than the German G. H. Q. and to this better 
understanding his success was due. After the failure of the plan 
carefully prepared in time of peace, he evolved new plans based on 
the actual situation as he saw it from time to time of which the 



61 



central thought seems to have been to prevent the destruction of his 
armies in detail and to resume the offensive as soon as practicable 
The rapid advance of the German armies prevented his carrying 
out his second plan and it became necessary to retreat behind the 
Marne before the favorable opportunity occurred. Although the 
retreat caused the abondonment of a large territory it had its com- 
pensating advantages in that it weakened the German armies by 
requiring large detachments to lay siege to fortresses and guard the 
communications while the French and British armies were strength- 
ened by replacements assembled south of the Marne. 

The success of the Allied troops was largely due to the fortresses 
of Paris and Verdun which prevented any outflanking operations of 
the German armies after this line was crossed. 



62 



CHAPTER III. 

FROM THE MARNE TO THE CHANNEL. 

Battle of the Aisne. — On the morning of September 9, the Ger- 
mans acknowledged defeat in the battle of the Marne and orders 
were issued by I, II and III armies to begin the retreat. It became 
necessary to withdraw to some line in rear in order to close the gap 
which had been opened between the I and II armies. The line 
selected was the Aisne River, which flows from east to west through 
Soissons and empties into the Oise. On the line of heights on the 
north bank of the river the I Army withdrew, leaving rearguards to 
check the Allied armies and destroy bridges ; the II Army retreated 
on Reims and the III Army on Chalons. The IV and V armies con- 
tinued the battle a day or two longer until their right flanks were 
uncovered. Eventually all the German armies halted and intrenched 
on a line which began on the Oise south of Noyon, followed the 
ridge north of the Aisne to the Laon-Reims road where it crossed 
the Aisne, skirted Reims and Suippe on the north, crossed the 
Argonne Forest and reached the Meuse north of Verdun. 

On the 10th the order was given for pursuit, in which the 6th 
French, the British and 5th French armies were to cover the ter- 
ritory between the Oise River and Reims and the 9th, 4th and 3d 
French armies the country between Reims and Verdun. At first it 
was thought that the German armies would retire to the Meuse, but 
on the 13th it was definitely known that they had halted and in- 
trenched on the line described and that reinforcements with heavy 
artillery had been received from Maubeuge, which surrendered 
September 7, and from other points. The VII reserve corps from 
Maubeuge and the XV corps from the VII Army joined at this time 
and occupied the line between the I and II armies forming a new 
VII Army under General Heeringen. The I, VII and II armies were 
placed under the command of Bulow. 

The 6th French Army west of Soissons and the British Army 
east of Soissons succeeded in crossing the Aisne but were unable to 
break the German line, and the Germans began to counter-attack. 
It soon became evident that neither side would be able to advance 
and although there was fighting here throughout the year, the lines 
became practically stabilized by the middle of September. 

First Battle of the Somme.— In Lorraine, the VI and VII German 
armies began to withdraw toward a new intrenched line near the 



63 



frontier when the Germans retreated from the Marne, thus releas- 
ing the pressure on the 1st and 2d French armies. When it became 
evident that the German positions on the Aisne line could not be 
successfully attacked, the greater part of General Castelnau's 2d 
Army was railed to the north of Paris to assist the left wing of the 
6th Army to outflank the German line from the west bank of the 
Oise. The Germans however were intent on the same maneuver; 
the IX reserve corps from Belgium arrived at Lassigny followed by 
a corps from the VI Army from Lorraine and the opposing armies 
began a series of battles around Lassigny and Roye, which were ex- 
tended northward west of Peronne and terminated with the left of 
Castelnau's army at Albert on the Ancre River. These operations 
began about September 20, and terminated with the lines stabilized 
about October 1. Noyon, Lassigny, Chaulnes, Peronne and Bapaume 
remained in possession of the new German II Army, but Castelnau 
had succeeded in turning the line northward instead of westward in 
continuation of the Aisne line. 

It was in the latter part of September, after the withdrawal of 
the 2d French Army from Lorraine, that the Germans advanced 
from the Moselle and captured the St. Mihiel salient south of Ver- 
dun, which they held until it was captured by the Americans in 1918. 

Battle of Arras. — As soon as it became evident that Castelnau 
could not outflank the German line, General Joffre withdrew more 
troops from his center and right and formed the 10th Army under 
General Maud'huy, formerly commander of the 18th corps, north of 
Amiens to advance through the valley of the Scarpe on either side 
of Arras in the direction of Douai to turn the German flank. To 
coordinate the operations of the 2d and 10th armies, General Foch 
was placed in command of the two armies and eventually of the 
group of French armies between the Oise River and the English 
Channel. When the 10th Army advanced from the vicinity of 
Amiens in the first week of October and reached Arras, the German 
troops were already at the gates of the town, and while Maud'huy 
was able to hold the town he was unable to advance from it. With 
the accession of new troops the French line was extended north- 
ward to the west of Lens and the French cavalry extended the line 
to the Lys River northwest of Lille which was held by a French 
Territorial detachment. Maud'huy's resources did not permit of 
him to extend his infantry to Lille and occupy it in strength. The 
Germans also extended their line northward and occupied Lens. 

In the operations north of the Oise, both the French and German 
cavalries operated on the northern flank of the line. The French 



64 

cavalry, consisted of the 1st and 2d cavalry corps, Generals Mitry 
and Conneau, and the Germans of the I and II cavalry corps. Gen- 
erals Richthofen and Marwitz, each of three divisions. At the close 
of this period, about October 10, the German cavalry with its rifle 
battalions and bicycle companies occupied a line running roughly 
Bassee-Merville-Hazebrouck. 

British Operations south of the Lys River. — At the end of Sep- 
tember the British Army was on the Aisne River east of Soissons, 
between the 6th and 5th French Armies. As the army was far from 
its base and was expecting reinforcements which would enable it to 
take up a larger front. General French requested that his army be 
relieved from its present position and moved up in the neighborhood 
of the Channel on the left of the 10th French Army where it could 
be more easily supplied. As active operations on the Aisne front 
had ceased, General Joifre consented to this plan and beginning 
about October 2, the British forces were carefully withdrawn from 
the line so as not to attract attention and entrained for the new 
front. 

On the Aisne, the last of the six divisions of the Expeditionary 
Force joined the British Army and the 3d corps was completely 
organized under General Pulteney. During September, the first 
British reinforcements to the Expeditionary Force arrived at Mar- 
seilles in the form of an East Indian corps of two divisions and an 
Indian cavalry corps. The brigades in the corps consisted of one 
British and three native battalions. Early in October the Indian 
troops were ready to be moved to the front. Additional reinforce- 
ments were also ready in England ; these consisted of the 7th regular 
division, made up of troops withdrawn from various overseas gar- 
risons, and the 3d cavalry division. 

The British cavalry started on its march to the new front on 
October 2 and the 2d corps began to entrain for Abbeville on the 
following day. In a conference between Generals Foch and French 
at the former's headquarters at Doullens, the British plan of opera- 
tions was decided. The 2d British corps was to be deployed along the 
Bethune-Aire canal and as soon as the 3d corps arrived to protect 
its left, it was to advance and close the gap between Lille and the 
10th French Army. The 3d corps was to advance immediately after 
between Lille and the Lys River in the direction of Roubaix. The 
1st corps, which would arrive a week later, was to prolong the Eng- 
lish line to the northeast. 

The 2d British corps was in position on October 11, and the 3d. 
arrived at St. Omer and advanced to Hazebrouck shortly after. On 



55 

the 13th, the 2d British corps began to advance its left covered by 
Conneau's French cavalry corps, against the German cavalry south 
of the Lys River. By this time, however, the situation in its front 
had changed. One German corps was between Lens and Lille and on 
the very day the 3d corps started forward another German corps 
compelled the French Territorial division to evacuate Lille. The 
2d British corps was therefore brought to a standstill at Auber ridge 
about midway between Bethune and Lille. It intrenched there on 
the left of the 10th French Army with Conneau's French cavalry 
on its left. 

The 3d British corps next advanced north of the Lys River covered 
by British cavalry, now forming a corps of the 1st and 2d divisions 
under General Allenby, and Mitry's French cavalry corps. The 
German cavalry north of Lys was driven back, recrossed the Lys 
near Menin and guarded the river crossings. The 3d corps advanced 
as far as Armentieres where one division crossed the Lys to con- 
nect with Conneau's French cavalry corps and the other deployed 
along the north bank. The right division of the 3d corps was unable 
to advance on Lille and the left division was unable to cross the 
river in its front strongly held by German infantry. Although there 
was severe fighting on the British front south of Lys until the close 
of active operations on the west front and the British troops were 
reinforced by the East Indian corps, the lines were practically 
stabilized on the 20th of October. 

Battle of Flanders. — In preparation for further military opera- 
tions, during the month of September, the Germans formed six and 
half new corps, the XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII re- 
serve corps and the VI Bavarian reserve division. These corps 
were ready to take the field early in October. Although they were 
urgently called for by General Hindenburg on the east front, it was 
decided to send him only one, the XXV, and employ the others in an 
attempt to outflank the Allied line and secure the Channel ports 
of Dunkirk and Calais. As a preliminary operation, it was decided 
to capture the fortress of Antwerp and thus protect the communica- 
tions from attack in force by the Belgian Army such as had been 
attempted during the Marne campaign. 

Antwerp was the strongest fortified place in Europe and was 
surrounded by three lines of works. The outer line, which had been 
but recently completed formed a girdle about 10 miles from the city 
and consisted of forts similar to those at Liege and Namur but of 
more recent construction. They were however not proof against 
the fire of the great German and Austrian howitzers. When this 



56 

line was penetrated, the other lines of much older construction were 
incapable of offering any serious resistance. The commander of the 
III reserve corps who had under his orders the army of occupation 
was directed to capture Antwerp in the shortest possible time, and 
the heavy howitzers Were sent to him from Maubeuge and Namur. 
Not having sufficient forces to invest the place, the operations were 
confined to an attack on the outer line of forts southeast of the city. 
The bombardment was begun on September 28 and on October 6, 
the Belgian Army began to evacuate the town moving westward on 
Ostend. The town itself was surrendered on the 9th. 

As soon as the attack on Antwerp began, the Allied governments 
organized an army for its relief which was to be landed at Zeebrugge 
and Ostend. The British contingent consisted of two naval brigades 
and the 4th corps of Regulars then consisting of the 7th division 
and 3d cavalry division. The French contingent was to consist of 
a marine brigade of 8,000 men and two Territorial divisions. The 
siege progressed so rapidly that only the British naval brigades 
reached Antwerp before its surrender ; the 4th British corps and the 
French marine brigade got no further than Ghent and Bruges where 
they remained to cover the retreat of the Belgian Army and then 
fell back with them, the 4th corps to Ypres and the French Naval 
Brigade to Dixmuide. The two French Territorial divisions landed 
at Dunkirk and went to Ypres. The III German reserve corps took 
up the pursuit of the Belgian Army which retreated on Ostend. 

Shortly after the fall of Antwerp, the XXII, XXIII, XXVI and 
XXVII reserve corps of the German Army were entrained for the 
west front and established themselves on the line Ostend-Courtrai 
on the left of the III reserve corps to form with it the IV German 
Army under the Crown Prince of Wurtemburg. The German plan 
was for this army to advance westward with the III reserve corps 
in advance to clear the coast and eventually to wheel round to the 
left. On the 18th of October, the IV German Army was on the 
general line Ostend-Courtrai. The XXIV reserve corps and the VI 
Bavarian reserve division were en route to join the new VI German 
Army between the Scarpe and Lys rivers. 

While the IV German Army was being formed. General French 
reached his new front and found the situation different from that 
upon which his original plan was based. Neither the 2d nor the 3d 
British corps were able to advance as far as had been planned. The 
7th division and 3d cavalry division had fallen back on Ypres and 
now formed the 4th corps under General Rawlinson ; the 8th division 
of this corps was being formed in England. General French knew 



57 

that the Germans had advanced west of Bruges in pursuit of the 
Belgians but in what strength he did not know. It was assumed that 
it was the force that had conducted the siege of Antwerp which was 
known to consist mainly of the III reserve corps. He directed the 
4th British corps to advance at once and capture Menin on the Lys 
River to the left of the 3d corps and secure its bridges if its com- 
mander deemed it practicable but the latter thought it best to await 
the arrival of the 1st corps which was to reach Ypres on October 19. 

It was finally decided by Generals Foch and French that as soon 
as the 1st British corps arrived at Ypres to employ the Belgian 
Army, the French troops of the Antwerp relieving army and the 
1st British corps to drive the Germans between the Channel and the 
Lys River back on Bruges in order to permit the flanking opera- 
tions on the Lys to be carried out without danger of attack in rear. 
This plan however could not be executed because the German forces 
were much stronger than had been estimated and the Allies found 
it necessarj^ to fight a defensive battle. 

On the 18th of October, the German IV Army began to move 
westward. The III reserve corps of three divisions moved from the 
vicinity of Ostend to cross the Yser River between the Channel and 
Dixmuide to clear the coast. The XXII reserve corps southwest of 
Bruges was to pass to the north of Thourout and march on Dix- 
muide on the Yser River; the XXIII reserve corps farther south 
was to pass to the south of Thourout and march for the Ypres canal 
between Dixmuide and Ypres ; the XXVI reserve corps was to march 
through Roulers on Ypres; the XXVII reserve corps, forming at 
Courtrai, was to cross the Ypres-Commines canal south of Ypres. 

At this time the main body of the Belgian Army was behind the 
Yser River between the Channel and Dixmuide with strong rear 
guards in villages and intrenchments on the east bank. Dixmuide 
east of the canal, was held by the French marine brigade of 8,000 
men strongly supported by artillery. The two French Territorial 
divisions were along the Ypres canal between Dixmuide and Ypres 
with Mitry's cavalry corps well in advance toward the Thourout- 
Roulers road. The 4th British corps occupied the front between 
Roulers and the Lys and was under orders to march to Menin on 
the 19th. One division of the 3d British corps was along the Lys 
from Armentieres to Warneton with the 1st and 2d cavalry divisions 
extending the line northward toward Ypres where the 1st corps was 
expected on the 19th. 

Because of the extent of the front, the battle of Flanders natur- 
ally divided itself into a number of almost distinct operations. 



58 

These were the battle of the Yser, the attack and defense of Dix- 
muide, the battle north of Ypres and the battle south of Ypres. 

Battle of the Yser. — When the III German reserve corps of three 
divisions advanced on the 18th to cross the Yser it found the 
Belgians strongly intrenched on the east bank and their front 
covered by the fire of British monitors. It was therefore not until 
the 20th, that the Germans were able to reach the Yser and their 
plans of crossing the river close to the Channel had to be aban- 
doned. On the night of October 21st, the Germans succeeded in 
getting a bridge over the Yser and by the 25th, two divisions of the 
III reserve corps were on the west bank. The Belgians now re- 
tired to a railway embankment about two miles from the river 
where they were reinforced by a division of French troops. The 
Germans now advanced slowly west of the river under heavy artil- 
lery fire and it was not until the 30th that they were able to take 
the town of Ramscappelle on the railway. This ended their ad- 
vance on this front as the Belgians had opened sluice gates that 
flooded the country between the railway and river and the Ger- 
mans were compelled to withdraw. The attack along the Yser had 
failed. 

Dixmuide. — Dixmuide held by the French marines supported by 
the 5th Belgian division was attacked on the 20th by the XXII 
reserve corps, one division from the northeast and another from 
the southeast. It was most obstinately defended during the 20th, 
21st, 22d and 23d and the Germans were unable to take it. On the 
24th, it was brought under the fire of the great German mortars 
while one division of the XXII corps threw bridges over the Yser 
to the north to attack it from the northwest. On the 25th the 
Germans made another desperate attempt to take Dixmuide from 
the east and were again repulsed. Attempts to take it from the 
west bank on October 31st and November 1st also failed and the 
German troops were withdrawn across the river as the area was 
being flooded. The town was now kept under fire until the morn- 
ing of November 10, when after a fierce bombardment of artillery 
and trench mortars, it was finally captured by a division of the 
XXII reserve corps. At Dixmuide the French marine brigade dis- 
tinguished itself by its obstinate defense which prevented the 
Germans from taking it until the great battle of Flanders was 
practically over. 

Battle North of Ypres.— On the 19th of October the XXIII and 
XXVI corps fought their way across the Thourout-Roulers road 



59 

where many of the villages were strongly held by outposts of 
Mitry's French cavalry division which delayed their march. On 
the 20th they renewed their advance and while the XXIII corps 
found its advance opposed only by cavalry, the XXVI corps was 
held up in the afternoon by the 1st British corps which had reached 
Ypres and taken up a position with its right on the Roulers-Ypres 
railway at Zonnebeke. The two French Territorial divisions were 
now concentrated on the front of the XXIII corps. On the 21st, 
the XXVI corps attacked the British in front while one division of 
the XXIII corps attacked in flank. To relieve the pressure the two 
Territorial divisions made a counter-attack. There was very severe 
fighting on this front during the 22d and 23d without any advance 
on the part of the Germans. On the night of the 23d, the 1st 
British corps was relieved by the 9th French corps, and a French 
division reinforced the Territorials. The 9th corps at once took up 
the ofi'ensive and the Germans had to send to this front all the 
IV Army reserves. Operations on this front were exceedingly 
active up to the end of the battle of Flanders. In the final attack 
on this front on November 10, the XXIII reserve corps reached the 
Ypres canal and a few troops succeeded in crossing but were soon 
thrown back. 

Battle South of Ypres. — On the morning of October 19, the 3d 
British cavalry division was covering the front between the French 
cavalry and the 7th division whose left brigade was at Becelaire 
on the ridge east of Ypres and about six miles from the town. The 
right brigade of the 7th division was at Zandvord between the 
Menin road and the Ypres-Commines canal. The 1st and 2d cavalry 
divisions extended the line to the left of the 3d corps which was 
west of Warneton. The German cavalry was on the front of the 
British troops from Warneton to the Menin road and the XXVII 
reserve corps was advancing from Courtrai. 

In accordance with previous orders, the left brigade of the 7th 
division began to advance on Menin on the 19th and encountered 
the advance guard of the XXVII reserve corps on the Menin- 
Roulers road. As the Germans were in great strength, the brigade 
fell back on Becelaire and the 7th division intrenched its line. Dur- 
ing the following days the pressure on the southeastern front was 
increased and the 3d cavalry division, being relieved by the 1st 
corps on the 20th, took its position on the right of the 7th division 
where the line was weak. Until the 24th, the 7th division was 
heavily engaged and had to fall back ; on the 24th, however, the 1st 
corps come to its support, having been relieved by the 9th Fi;ench 
corps, and the German advance on this front was checked. 



60 

On October 27, the German Chief of Staff, General Falkenhayn, 
visited this front. At that time, the III reserve corps was still 
advancing in the north but all the other corps of the IV Army had 
been brought to a standstill. He decided to strengthen the attack 
just north of the Lys by extending the line of the VI German Army 
to the north bank of the Lys and make this wing of the VI Army 
as strong as possible. During the following days five divisions of the 
VI Army were transferred to the north bank and besides their divi- 
sional artillery, some 70 field and siege howitzers were collected to 
prepare their attack. The attack was to be launched on the morn- 
ing of October 30 and the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII reserve corps 
of the IV Army were to attack at the same time. To prevent the 
transfer of British troops to the north of the Lys, a simultaneous 
attack was to be made south of the Lys. 

October 30 to November 1 were critical days for the British 
Army as the attack of the newly organized right wing of the VI 
Army fell on the British line between the Menin road and Lys 
River which was held in the center by the cavalry corps and on the 
wings by a brigade of the 7th division and the left division of the 
3d corps. The im,portant centers of Messines and Wytschaet on the 
high ground south of Ypres were the main objectives and these 
were held by the cavalry and a few battalions of infantry. In a 
series of desperate attacks Messines was taken on October 31st 
and Wytschaet on November 1, and the Germans were confident 
that they had at last broken through the Allied line. On the 1st 
of November, however, the French 16th corps reached the field and 
with a division of the 9th corps and other French troops took over 
the line from the Menin road to the left of the 3d British corps. 
The 3d corps had been attacked mainly by German cavalry and had 
held its line. 

In the early days of November, the Germans made their prep- 
arations for the last general attack. Because of the inundations, 
the main body of the the main body of the III reserve corps was 
moved to the center of the line; one of its divisions was assigned 
to assist a division of the XXII reserve corps in an attack on Dix- 
muide, while the remaining two divisions were interpolated in the 
line between the XXIII and XXVI reserve corps to attack the Ypres 
front. The detachment of the VI Army north of the Lys was re- 
inforced by four additional divisions and its front extended to the 
east of the Menin road where a division of the Guards was placed 
in line. 

The final attack of the IV Army was made on November 10, when 



61 

Dixmiiide was taken by the XXIII reserve corps reinforced by a 
division fo the XXII corps reached the Ypres canal several 
miles north of Ypres where some of its troops crossed the canal. 
The detachment of the VI Army made its final attack on the 11th 
but now the Allied line was too strong and the attack was repulsed. 
Minor operations continued until November 20th, when the lines 
were finally consolidated for the winter. 

In the battle of Flanders, north of the Lys River, the Germans 
employed from the beginning to the end 25 divisions of active, re- 
serve, and landwehr troops and 6 cavalry divisions. The Belgians 
employed 5 divisions and 1 cavalry division, the British 4 divisions 
and 3 cavalry divisions, and the French 13 divisions and 8 divisions 
of cavalry. In addition to the above, the British reinforced their 
lines north of the Lys by brigades from the south of the Lys and 
also received a number of Territorial battalions during the battle. 
The French had in addition the marine brigade, battalions of 
zouaves, Senagalese and other detached troops. There was prob- 
ably no great difference between the forces engaged on the entire 
front by the Allies and Germans but the latter had the advantage 
of executing a plan prepared in advance. 

Appreciating the necessity of preventing the Germans from reach- 
ing the Channel ports, both Generals Joffre and Foch were present 
at the battle and personally directed the employment of French re- 
serves during the battle. The French troops on this front were 
organized as the 8th Army under General d'Urbal. 

The battle of Flanders was the third serious check met by the 
Germans on the west front in 1914; the others were the battles of 
Lorraine and the Marne. Due to the long period covered by the 
battle and the almost continuous fighting the losses were heavy 
on both sides. At the time of the battle, the German G. H. Q. 
estimated the combatant strength of the Germans on the west 
front as 1,700,000 and the Allies as 2,300,000 men. No data is 
given upon which the estimates are based. 



62 



CHAPTER IV. 

OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN AND SERBIAN 

FRONTS. 

The German-Austrian-Russian Boundary in 1914. — All the 

operations on the east front in the world war were governed by the 
peculiar form of the boundary of Russia and Austro-Germany, 
which made certain provinces of each peculiarly vulnerable. 

The Russian base for operations against East Prussia and the 
line of defense to which its armies could retire in case of defeat, 
was the line formed by the Nieman River between Kovno and 
Grodno, and the Narew and its main tributary, the Bohr, from 
Grodno to Novo Georgievsk at the junction of the Narew and 
Vistula. On the Nieman were the three great fortified railway 
bridgeheads of Kovno, Olita and Grodno, all about fifty miles from 
the frontier. On the Bohr was the fortified railway bridgehead of 
Osowiec, and on the Narew the fortified bridgeheads of Lomza, 
Ostrolenka, Rozan, Pultusk, Sierok and Novo Georgievsk. The 
country bordering the Bohr and Narew is marshy, which added 
strength to this line of defense. The province of East Prussia was 
necessarily the first objective of the northern Russian armies since 
no advance could be made with safety through West Poland as 
long as the Germans occupied this province. 

The main German base of operations in the north was the Vis- 
tula River between the Baltic and the fortress of Thorn, separating 
the provinces of East and West Prussia. East Prussia was par- 
ticularly vulnerable since it had no natural frontier line of defense 
and could be invaded from the east and south. For its defense, 
Germany had to rely upon her troops aided by her excellent net- 
work of railways which permitted their rapid transfer from point 
to point. In East Prussia there was the fortress of Konigsberg 
which must be captured or masked by the Russians before they 
could cross the Vistula. East Prussia would not be safe from in- 
vasion so long as the Russians could concentrate their forces be- 
hind the Nieman and Narew rivers ; therefore the first great objec- 
tive of the German armies in the north must be the capture of the 
fortified bridgeheads on these two rivers. 

Limited by the Vistula River on the north and east, by the Prus- 
sian province of Posen and Silesia on the west and by the Austrian 
province of Galicia on the south, was an important part of the 



63 

Russian province of Poland. It was peculiarly open to invasion by 
German and Austrian armies which could by their numerous rail- 
ways be concentrated at any single point on the frontier. In their 
defensive scheme, the Russians had recognized the difficulty of 
holding this territory at the beginning of a war with the Central 
Powers, and had established their main line of defense on the 
Vistula River two hundred miles from the German boundary. On 
this river they had constructed the gr^at fortified railway bridge- 
heads of Novo Georgievsk, Warsaw and Ivangorod to be supple- 
mented by smaller ones in time of war. It was a line on which the 
Russian armies could be readily concentrated for defense and it 
could be easily held, so long as the Nieman-Narew line was held on 
the north and the Austrians could be prevented from advancing on 
its rear from Galicia. Considering the size of West Poland it had 
few railroads and like Russian railroads they were of wider gauge 
than those of Germany and Austria. In the north was the rail- 
road from Thorn to Warsaw via Lowitz. Further south was the 
railroad from Kalisz to Warsaw via Lodz and Lowitz. From the 
southeast corner of Germany railways ran to Warsaw and Ivan- 
gorod, which were connected by a transverse line from Lodz. 

For the protection of the Prussian provinces of Poland and 
Silesia from invasion from the Russian base on the Vistula, Ger- 
many had to rely as in the north on her armies and railways. The 
frontier was open and the only important fortress was Posen. 

In the south between the Carpathian Mountains and the Russian 
territory were the Austrian provinces of Galicia and Bukowina. As 
Austrian armies in the eastern part of Galicia territory threatened 
the rear of the Vistula line, its possession by Russian troops was 
even more essential than East Prussia. Russian troops in Galicia 
would however never be quite secure without the possession of the 
passes in the Carpathian Mountains. If these were held, not only 
would their communications be secure but they would threaten an 
advance into Hungary. These passes would therefore constitute 
a second objective. 

That part of Galicia east of the San River and Bukowina were 
peculiarly open to invasion by Russian armies. The natural line of 
defense of Austria was, like that of Germany in the north, behind 
her frontier provinces in the passes of the Carpathian Mountains. 
In order to limit the advance of the Russian armies in Galicia, 
Austria had organized a secondary line on the San River, a tribu- 
tary of the Vistula, on which she had constructed the fortress of 
Przemysl and bridgeheads at Jaroslau and Radymo which were to 



64 

be supplemented by other bridgeheads in time of war. At the ex- 
treme west end of the province of Galicia was the fortress of 
Cracow, which covered the wide mountain gap which was the gate- 
way to Vienna. 

Plans. — The Russian plan of concentration was based on the 
simultaneous formation of two groups of armies. The northern 
group was to invade the province of East Prussia, drive the Ger- 
man troops beyond the Vistula River and lay siege to the fortress 
of Konigsberg. The southern group was to invade the province of 
Galicia, drive the Austro-Hungarian troops over the Carpathian 
Mountains and the San River, secure the mountain passes and lay 
siege to the Austrian fortress of Przemsyl. Having thus cleared 
the flanks as far as the line of the Vistula and San, an advance 
could be made on Cracow and through West Poland. The com- 
bined armies were under the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas 
whose father had commanded the Russian armies in the Russo- 
Turkish war of 1877-1878. 

The German plan was simply to defend East Prussia with the 
available troops until reinforcements were received from France. 
The Austrian plan was more ambitious since it contemplated an in- 
vasion of Poland east of the Vistula to destroy the railways and 
thus prevent rapid concentration of the Russian armies. 

Battle of Tannenberg. — For the invasion of East Prussia, the 
Russian plan provided for the formation of two armies, mainly 
from the troops in the two frontier districts of Wilna and Warsaw. 
The 1st Army or Army of Wilna, under General Rennencamp, con- 
sisted of four corps, a rifle division and two cavalry divisions of 
the Wilna District, the Guard cavalry corps of Petrograd and 
a number of reserve divisions. The 2d Army, or Army of the 
Narew, under General Ssamsanow, consisted of the three corps and 
three cavalry divisions of the Warsaw District, one corps from 
Petrograd and one from the Moscow District. 

The only obstacle to an invasion of East Prussia from the east 
is a series of large lakes extending from north to south between 
Angerburg and Johannisburg on a front of over forty miles. The 
lakes are separated by narrow strips of ground, easily defended, 
of which one is protected by a permanent barrier fort. Small gun- 
boats were on these lakes. The lake barrier made it necessary for 
the two armies to invade East Prussia along separate lines with 
a view of uniting west of the lakes. The Army of Wilna would 
naturally follow the Wilna-Konigsberg railroad as a directrix as 



65 

far as Insterburg; the Army of the Narew would follow the line 
Ostralanka-Ortelsburg-Allenstein as a directrix. Contact between 
the two armies would be made in the region of Rastenburg. This 
seems to have been the general plan adopted by the Russian 
G. H. Q. A reserve army, the 10th Army, was being formed at 
Grodno from a rifle corps from the Petrograd District, reserve divi- 
sions, and a Serbian rifle corps. 

The German G. H. Q. had left for the defense of East Prussia 
but three active corps, the I, XVII and XX corps and the I cavalry 
division. In addition there were mobilized the I and II reserve 
corps, a landwehr corps and other reserve landwehr and landsturm 
troops. Besides the formation of this VIII Army, it was necessary 
to provide garrisons for the fortresses of Konigsberg, Thorn, 
Dantzig and the smaller forts on the Vistula between Thorn and 
Dantzig. The VIII German Army was divided into two wings ; the 
left wing, which was to resist invasion north of the lakes, was 
composed of two corps, three reserve divisions and the cavalry 
division ; the right wing, which was to resist invasion south of the 
lakes, was composed of one corps, a landwehr corps and local land- 
sturm troops. 

German G. H. Q. had hoped that Russian mobilization and con- 
centration would be slow and that a favorable decision would be 
reached in the west before East Prussia was seriously threatened. 
These hopes were not realized as the cavalry of the Wilna Army 
crossed the frontier on the very day that the German armies in 
the west began to move. The main Wilna Army followed its cavalry 
on a wide front brushing away the small detachments sent to delay 
its march. When it reached the Gumbinnen front, August 20, it 
was attacked by the left wing of the VIII Army with some success, 
but immediately thereafter this wing was withdrawn, as the Narew 
Army was moving up from the south and threatening to get in its 
rear. The right wing of the VIII Army was too weak to prevent 
the advance of this army. 

As the Narew Army was the more dangerous it was decided to 
strengthen the right wing of the VIII Army at once from the left 
and retire the remainder of the left wing until the army was 
united. If necessary it w^as decided to evacuate all of East Prussia 
and retire behind the Vistula. This latter decision was announced 
to the German G. H. Q. by the commander of the VIII Army 
August 22, immediately after the Narew Army crossed the fron- 
tier and while the left wing was still east of Insterburg. As the 
moral effect of such a retirement would be very great, German 



66 

G. H. Q. was unwilling to permit it and sent a message to General 
Hindenburg who was acquainted with the country and offered him 
command of the VIII Army. Hindenburg had been retired some 
years before and been given no command at the outbreak of the 
war; he accepted the responsibility offered him. General Luden- 
dorff was assigned to assist him as chief of staff. Ludendorff was 
an officer of the General Staff who was familiar with the general 
plans for the war. He was present at Liege on the night of August 
5 and when the commander of one of the brigades was wounded, 
he assumed command of the brigade, led it through the line of 
forts and captured the town on August 7th. Hindenburg with 
Ludendorff reached the east front August 23. The situation was 
then as follows: 

The XVII corps and I reserve corps with the cavalry and mobile 
troops of the Konigsberg garrison were facing Rennencamp's army. 
The I corps had been withdrawn from the left and the III reserve 
division from the right to assist the right wing of the VIII Army. 
Rennencamp was advancing slowly on Insterburg and Tilsit and 
Ssamsanow was advancing with three corps on Allenstein with one 
corps in echelon in rear of each flank advancing on Soldau and 
Seeburg. The commander of the right wing of the VIII Army 
had called to his assistance the mobile garrison of the fortress of 
Thorn. 

Hindenburg and his chief of staff decided that their only hope 
of success was to take immediate advantage of the position of the 
troops and attack the Army of the Narew with all available forces 
in order to win a prompt and decisive victory. The only important 
change made was to order up all available troops from the Vistula 
defenses. The plan adopted involved risk, as the two corps of the 
left wing were to turn their backs on Rennencamp's army and be 
protected from it by a thin cavalry screen while engaged with 
Ssamsanow. Should Rennencamp push forward with vigor, these 
corps would find themselves "between the two Russian armies. The 
mobile garrison of Konigsberg was left with the cavalry screen. 

It took three days before all the troops were in position for the 
attack. During that time Rennencamp had advanced to the line 
Angerburg-Insterburg-Tilsit. Here he stopped while his cavalry 
felt for the right flank of the Narew Army from which he was 
separated by the XVII corps and I reserve corps. Ssamsanow's 
advance corps were in possession of Allenstein from which the 
Germans had withdrawn. On the morning of the 27th Hinden- 
burg's troops were in position. His right wing south of Allenstein 



67 

consisted of a landwehr division from Thorn and the I and XX 
corps, his center behind Allenstein consisted of a landwehr corps 
and a reserve division ; his left consisted of the XVII corps and I 
reserve corps. Cavalry was on the extreme right and left. 

The German line was not long enough to outflank the Narew 
Army, so the plan was to drive through with the I corps and XVII 
corps, cut off the two Russian flank corps and surround the three 
advance corps. It took three days of severe fighting to accom- 
plish his object; on the 29th the 13th, 15th and 23d Russian corps 
were practically captured or destroyed. Ssamsanow was found 
dead on the field and two of his corps commanders with about 
90,000 men were captured. The Russian Army lost the artillery 
and trains of these corps as well as those belonging to the army. 
The 1st corps on the left and the 6th on the right escaped with 
ordinary losses. The battle was called Tannenberg in honor of a 
battle fought in 1409 between the German Knights and the allied 
Poles and Lithuanians near a village of that name between Osterode 
and Soldau. 

During the battle, Rennencamp advanced his right so that he 
occupied the line Wehlau-Gerdauen-Angerburg, where he in- 
trenched. He' was now facing southwest. A part of the 6th corps 
of the Narew Army retired south of the lakes to the vicinity of 
Lyck, where it was joined by the greater part of the 10th Army 
from Grodno; the 1st corps retired to the Narew River. 

After the battle of Tannenberg, Hindenburg was reinforced by 
the XI and Guard reserve corps and a cavalry division from 
Belgium and he now made preparations to drive Rennencamp's 
army across the Nieman. Several days were required to rest the 
troops and get them in position, and he was not ready to attack 
until September 7. At that time the Guard reserve, the I reserve, 
the XI and XX corps faced Rennencamp's main line ; the XVII corps 
with two cavalry divisions was to advance between the lakes; the 
I corps, a reserve division and the landwehr corps were to advance 
south of the lakes. It was not Rennencamp's purpose to remain 
in East Prussia but time was necessary to withdraw his supplies, 
etc. From the 7th to the 10th of September he repelled all attacks 
on his main position, and then began to retreat. In the meantime 
some of his reserve divisions with the 6th corps and the 10th army 
had some severe fighting in protecting his left flank. Hindenburg 
hoped that his right and center would be able to cut off Rennen- 
camp's retreat, but in this he was disappointed. Eventually 
Rennencamp withdrew across the Nieman. The Germans claimed 



68 

to have taken 45,000 prisoners in this last campaign which ter- 
minated about the middle of September. The Germans call the 
operations against Rennencamp the first battle of the Masurian 
Lakes. 

Russian Invasion of Galicia. — In the south the Russian armies 
had an easier task although the Austrian forces were larger. At 
the beginning of operations five of the sixteen active corps of the 
Austria-Hungarian Army were still on the Serbian frontier, and 
four of these remained during the year. The landwehr divisions 
of Austria and Hungary, which were incorporated in the armies, 
had not the training of the reserves and landwehr of Germany. 
Italy had declared her neutrality, but it was doubtful if she would 
long remain out of the war and therefore all the troops could not 
be withdrawn from that frontier. Austria was also obliged to keep 
troops on the Rumanian frontier. 

The Russian plan was to invade Galicia and Bukowina along the 
entire front from the Vistula around to Rumania. Two armies 
were organized under Generals Ewerts and Plehve at Lublin and 
Kolm to advance across the frontier between the Vistula and Bug 
rivers. These armies were under General Ivanov one of the suc- 
cessful corps commanders of the Russo-Japanese war. Two armies 
under Generals Russky and Brusilov, were to cross the frontier be- 
tween the Bug and Dniester into Bukowina. 

The Austrian plan prepared by the Chief of Staff, General Con- 
rad von Hotzendorf, was an ambitious one considering the means 
available. The forces were divided into three armies of which the 
I and IV were to invade Poland between the Vistula and Bug rivers 
while the III Army defended the eastern frontier of Galicia ; a part 
of the latter army was left as a general reserve at Lemberg. 

The I and IV Austrian armies crossed the frontier while the 
Russians were still concentrating, and on August 25 and 26 won 
some engagements with advanced troops of the armies of General 
Ivanov on the roads to Lublin and Kolm, but were unable to reach 
their objective, which was the railway through these towns. In 
the meantime the III Army was trying vainly to resist the Russian 
armies in the east, which began to cross the frontier on August 
22d. The Russian armies under Russky and Brusilov advanced 
slowly but irresistably. Lemberg was evacuated on September 1, 
and the Russians occupied it on the 3d. The Austrians made a last 
attempt to halt the invading armies by taking a stand on the ridge 
between the San and Bug rivers between Rawaruska and the 



69 

Dniester River where the III and IV armies were concentrated. 
Here the Austrians were reinforced by the two corps withdrawn 
from the Serbian frontier. 

The great battle of Rawaruska-Grodek was fought during the 
week of September 7-14, on the same days that Hindenburg was 
attacking Rennencamp in East Prussia and the Germans were re- 
treating from the Marne ; it was finally won by the Russian armies 
by turning the left flank of the Austrians at Rawaruska. 

After this battle all the Austrian armies retreated westward 
across the San to the Wisloka River. The Austrian losses in this 
first campaign were very heavy. Besides the usual casualties, 
whole units either deserted or allowed themselves to be captured. 

After the battle of Rawaruska-Grodek and the first battle of the 
Masurian Lakes, there was a change in the Russian commands. 
General Russky was assigned to the command of the northern 
Russian armies and General Ivanov assumed command of the 
armies operating against the Austrians. Ivanov's forces advanced 
to the San River pushing cavalry as far as the Wisloka River and 
Cossacks over the Carpathian Mountains into the valleys of Hun- 
gary ; the fortress of Przemysl was invested. The advance into 
Galicia was temporarily halted in order to relay the Austrian rail- 
ways, whose gauge differed from that of the Russian railways, and 
to bring up supplies. 

The first period of the war on the Russian frontier closed with 
the first battle of the Masurian Lakes in the north and with the 
battle of Rawaruska-Grodek and the investment of Przemysl in the 
south. The Russian plan of invasion had failed in East Prussia 
but had been successful in Galicia. At the end of this period the 
German Chief of Staff estimated the situation on the east front as 
follows: (General Headquarters, 1914-1916, Falkenhayn.) 

Germans Austrians Total Russians 

East Prussian frontier. . . 140,000 140,000 160,000 

Western Poland and along 

the Vistula (troops not 

in touch) 40,000 40,000 138,000 

Galicia 16,000 367,000 383,000 652,000 



563,000 950,000 

Operations in West Poland. — The second period began with the 
attempt of the Germans to assist the Austrians to drive back the 
Russians in Galicia and recover the lost territory and raise the 
siege of Przemysl. 



70 

During the first period of the operations on the east front, the 
territorj^ limited by the Vistula River on the north, east and south 
and the Silesian boundary on the west was occupied by a large 
force of Russian cavalry only ; the infantry was employed mainly 
in the two invasions. This territory is about the size of the state 
of Ohio being about 200 miles square. There are few good roads 
in West Poland and the railways were therefore of great importance 
as lines of supply. 

The German troops near the frontier at once occupied the fron- 
tier towns of Kalicz and Czenstochau and toward the end of August 
a German landwehr corps advanced through Kalicz and a division 
from Czenstochau to assist the I Austrian Army. In the general 
retreat across the San these troops remained astride the Vistula 
and formed the left of the Austrian line. 

The Austrian armies behind the Wisloka were more or less de- 
moralized and fearing a Russian advance on Cracow the Austrian 
G, H. Q. appealed to the German G. H. Q. for assistance. As a 
result it was decided to send the greater part of the German VIII 
Army from East Prussia to the Prussian province of Silesia to 
operate on the left flank of the Austrian Army. This became the 
IX Army and Hindenburg with his chief of staff, Ludendorff, took 
personal command of the new army. The remaining troops of the 
VIII Army intrenched a position between the Nieman and Bohr 
rivers and the frontier and constructed a second line at the lakes. 
This army was gradually strengthened by the mobilization of new 
reserve and landwehr divisions and by the newly organized XXV 
reserve corps. The IX Army consisted of four corps from the 
VIII Army, a reserve division, a landwehr corps, and a cavalry 
division. It was concentrated on the Silesian frontier between 
Kalicz and Galicia with the cavalry corps on the left. 

The general plan seems to have been to advance through south- 
ern Poland to the Vistula River and hold it. This would draw 
Russian forces to this front from Galicia and the Austrians would 
then be able to relieve Przemysl, and, it was hoped, turn the Rus- 
sian left and force the Russians to retreat from the San. East of 
the Vistula and Narew there were only the remnants of Ssamsa- 
now's army which was being reorganized. 

The IX Army began to advance from the Silesian frontier in the 
last days of September and on the 4th of October it was in line 
with the Austrians on the Wisloka and all moved forward together. 
The center of the IX Army moved on Ivangorod, the left on War- 
saw, and the right on the Vistula above Ivangorod ; the left wing of 



71 

the Austrians attacked the Russian corps west of the San River, 
and the right wing attacked the Przemysl investing force from the 
Carpathian front. As the IX Army moved eastward working 
parties were detailed to relay the railways to the German gauge 
and improve the roads which were in an almost impassable con- 
dition due to the rainy weather. 

While the IX Army was moving eastward, the Russian com- 
mander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, began shifting troops from 
the East Prussian front and from Galicia to the Vistula front where 
Siberian troops and other troops were arriving from the interior. 
The IX Army reached the Vistula about October 12, encountering 
mainly Russian cavalry en route. South of Warsaw the left wing 
encountered a Siberian corps which retired on Warsaw. The forti- 
fied bridgeheads of Warsaw and Ivangorod were however strongly 
held by Russian troops. It was the intention of Hindenburg to 
hold the line of the Vistula while the Austrians on his right drove 
the Russians back from the San and recaptured Przemysl and Lem- 
berg. The Austrians were barely able to relieve Przemysl and 
were brought to a standstill on the San. In the meantime, the 
Russians brought forward their troops from the interior and from 
Siberia and began to concentrate at Novo Georgievsk, Warsaw, 
Ivangorod and generally along the Vistula. To meet concentration 
around Warsaw, the IX German Army was obliged to close toward 
the north and the Austrians extended their line to Ivangorod and 
weakened their front. 

About the 20th of October, the Russians crossed the Vistula and 
San and assumed the offensive. Although both the German and 
Austrian forces had been reinforced, they were now compelled to 
retreat. With only rear guard actions the IX Army retired almost 
back to the Silesian frontier, destroying the railways and bridges 
as it retreated. In Galicia and West Poland, the Austrians re- 
treated almost back to Cracow and lost most of the passes in the 
Carpathian Mountains. 

About the 1st of November, the situation of the armies of the 
Central Powers on the east front was critical. In the West, the 
German armies were engaged in the battle of Flanders and could 
spare few more troops. Four cavalry divisions, the XXV reserve 
corps and landwehr formations were sent to Hindenburg who was 
now placed in command of the entire east front. General Mack- 
ensen of the XVII corps succeeded to the command of the IX 
Army. The 10th and 1st Russian armies along the Nieman and 
Narew rivers had been reinforced and again assumed the offensive ; 



72 

the VIII Army was compelled to retire across the frontier to the 
lakes and the Russians were preparing to invade East Prussia as 
before. The main danger was however in West Poland where the 
Russian armies v/ere threatening to invade Silesia and separate 
the German and Austrian forces. 

To compel the retreat of these armies, it was finally decided to 
leave only a screen composed of Austrian forces, landwehr and 
landsturm troops along the Silesian frontier south of the Warta 
River and concentrate as large a force as possible on the Polish 
frontier between the Vistula and Warta rivers and advance south- 
eastward parallel to the river against the Russian right wing. By 
this means a superiority of forces could be secured for the front 
of attack. Mackensen was able to concentrate a force of six and a 
half corps with five cavalry divisions for his ofi'ensive. 

On November 11, when the campaign opened, the Russian armies 
had reached the line passing through Wloclawac on the Vistula, 
Sieradz on the Warta and thence southeastward parallel to the 
frontier and east of Cracow. A Russian cavalry column had already 
crossed the frontier north of Kalicz, 

The IX German Army attacked the Russian front between the 
Vistula and the Warta rivers, broke through the front and com- 
pelled the right wing of the Russian armies under Russky to re- 
treat. The Russians made a final stand at Lodz and it was not 
until the middle of December, after the IX Army had been strongly 
reinforced from the west front after the close of operations there, 
that the Russians could be dislodged.* Russky then fell back to the 
Bzura and Rawa rivers and there repulsed all attacks. In the 
southern part of Poland, Ivanov's forces fell back behind the Nida 
River and in western Galicia, the Russians at the close of the year 
held the line of the Dunajec River. 

An incident of Mackensen's campaign gave the Allies high hopes 
for a few days. In endeavoring to outflank the Russians in the 
north at Lodz, the left wing of the IX Army, consisting of three 
divisions and two cavalry divisions was east and southeast of Lodz 
when the Russians suddenly advanced northward from Lodz and 
cut this wing off from the main body. At the same time it was 
attacked in rear by a strong Russian force advancing from War- 
saw. For two days it was believed that this force would be com- 
pelled to surrender as it was between hostile forces but it eventu- 
ally escaped and joined the main body. 

The military situation at the end of the year is given by the 
German Chief of Staff as follows: 



73 

Germans Austrians Total Russians 

On the East Prussian fron- 
tier 105,000 105,000 320,000 

West Prussia 385,000 140,000 525,000 847,000 

Galicia and Bukowina 12,000 513,000 525,000 521,000 

These estimates cover only combatant troops. 

On the whole, the German campaign in West Poland had not im- 
proved the situation of the Central Powers on the Russian front and 
the Russians were stronger and occupied a more advanced position 
than they had at the end of the first campaign. In East Prussia 
they occupied all the country as far west as the lakes; in West 
Poland they tiad a strong position west of the Vistula; in Galicia 
they were not far from Cracow and had possession of the Carpathian 
passes, Przemysl was again invested, and the Russians occupied 
Bukowina. In view of the stubborn resistance offered by the Rus- 
sians in West Poland and their successes in Galicia, the outlook for 
the Central Powers in 1915 did not look promising. ■ 

Operations in Serbia in 1914. — War was declared by Austria on 
Serbia June 28, 1914, and at once Austrian forces began to concen- 
trate on the Serbian frontier. 

The Austrian plan was to invade the northwest corner of Serbia ; 
one corps was to cross the Save River at Shabatz and three were 
to cross the Drina River from Bosnia. The campaign began August 
12 and on August 24 the Austrians were back on the frontier. The 
Austrians only penetrated the mountainous region of northwest 
Serbia about twenty miles, and being overconfident exposed their 
columns to separate attacks by the Serbians who were thoroughly 
acquainted w^th the country. 

On the 1st of November the Austrians again invaded Serbia from 
the same frontier with two armies. The campaign was made with 
four active corps and reserve divisions. Resting the left flank on 
the Save River, the left army of the Austrians fought its way down 
the river against strong opposition until it reached Belgrade the 
Serbian capital, which was occupied by the Austrians about the 1st 
of December. The right Austrian army had a more difficult task, 
since it was obliged to advance through the mountains with its 
right flank more and more exposed. After the fall of Belgrade the 
Serbian commander-in-chief took advantage of this situation and 
concentrated his troops to attack the exposed flank of the Austrian 
line which was in the valley of the west branch of the Morava 
River. As a result the Austrian right was broken and soon the 
entire right army was retreating through the difficult mountain 



74 

roads relentlessly pursued. Eventually the entire Austrian forces 
retired across the frontier and the Danube and Belgrade was re- 
occupied by the Serbians December 15. 

It is difficult to understand the object of Austria's operations in 
Serbia during 1914 when she needed all her troops on the Russian 
front. It was highly improbable that the Serbians would cross 
the Danube and an invasion of the mountainous provinces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina could have been easily defeated by the local corps 
stationed there. It was to her interest to remain on the defensive 
on this front. 

Turkey. — Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central 
Powers about the end of October and made a naval raid in the 
Black Sea. The Russian forces in Caucasia at once prepared to 
invade Turkish Armenia and the Indian government landed a force 
in Mesopotamia. The operations on these fronts however belong 
properly to 1915. 



75 



CHAPTER V. 

GENERAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS ON THE WEST 

FRONT IN 1915. 

After the close of operations on the west front in the latter part 
of November, the Germans sent several corps from the v^^est to the 
east front to drive the Russians in West Poland back across the 
Vistula. This they failed to accomplish and as the situation on the 
east front w^s very unsatisfactory at the close of the year, the 
German G. H. Q. decided to remain on the defensive in the west 
where the lines were strengthened and renew the offensive on the 
east front in 1915. 

There were several good reasons for such a course of action. On 
the west front it would be some time before the British Army 
would appear in force ; the seven regular divisions and three cavalry 
divisions that had borne the brunt of the fighting in 1914 had lost 
very heavily and few of the Volunteer and Territorial divisions 
which were hereafter to form the bulk of the army were ready 
to be sent to the front. At the close of 1914, the French were 
still holding all the west front except a short part of the line in 
Flanders, and until the British extended their line the French would 
not have sufficient reserves to make a strong attack on any part 
of the line. Furthermore both the British and French armies were 
deficient in heavy artillery and artillery ammunition without which 
the German defenses on the west front could not be broken. 

On the east front, the Austrian armies were greatly demoralized 
and would give way before the Russians in the spring unless they 
were strongly supported by German troops. The fortress of 
Przemysl would, unless relieved, be reduced by starvation before 
spring which would release the Russian investing army. Cracow 
would be the next objective and the Russians would then separate 
the Germans and Austrians and could either invade Silesia or move 
across the mountains into Hungary. There had been many deser- 
tions from the Austrian Army; in some cases whole units had 
surrendered without cause, because the races from which they 
were drawn had no sympathy with the Austrian government. This 
was having a discouraging effect on the entire army. 

The military situation on the east front was bound to have a 
great influence on the governments of the Balkan states that were 
still neutral, with all of whom negotiations were in progress by 



76 

both the Allied and Central Powers. Should the Balkan states 
join the Allies, Turkey would be wholly cut off and would be com- 
pelled to surrender. This would open the Dardanelles and permit 
Russia, which was also deficient in ammunition and heavy artillery, 
to receive supplies by that route. At present these could reach her 
only through Archangel and Vladovostock. 

It was not the intention of the Germans to remain wholly on 
the defensive in the west, but the offensive operations were to be 
conducted on narrow fronts, mainly at Ypres and in the Argonne 
Forest. 

Both the French and British expected that the principal advance 
in 1915 would be made by the Russian armies. It was expected that 
the Russian Army would be concentrated in full strength on the 
east front by the spring, and the great Russian steam roller — as 
it was popularly called — would crush all before it and advance into 
Germany and Austria. It was recognized that there was a deadlock 
in the west not easily broken and perhaps the best the Allies could 
hope for was to assist the Russians by preventing the Germans 
from transferring many troops from this front. 

The principal task of Great Britain was to raise an army com- 
mensurate with the requirements of the war. Strenuous efforts 
had been made by Lord Kitchener, who was placed in charge of the 
War Department at the beginning of the war, to recruit, equip and 
train forces for foreign service, but time was essential. From the 
overseas garrisons, troops of the Regular Army were brought back 
to England to form the greater part of four additional divisions. 
The divisions of the Territorial Army intended primarily for home 
defense were recruited, equipped and trained for foreign service. 
From volunteers recruited for the war there were formed the divi- 
sions of the New Army. Additional troops were organized in India, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand and South Africa. Lord 
Kitchener, who looked for a long war, had decided to place in the 
field at least seventy divisions which was a force equal to the forty- 
five divisions of the active French Army and the twenty-five divi- 
sions of French Reserves available at the beginning of the war. 

During the winter of 1914-1915, the 8th regular division of the 
4th British corps reached the front, and to reinforce the first seven 
divisions, in addition to replacements from the Army Reserve, a 
battalion of new troops was sent to each of the brigades. Toward 
the end of winter two additional divisions of Regulars and the 1st 
Canadian division were sent; in the spring divisions of the New 
Army and Territorials followed. 



77/ 

The outbreak of war with Turkey about the 1st of November, 
1914, had somewhat diverted the attention of the British govern- 
ment from the west front. The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt 
was declared terminated and it was constituted a British protect- 
orate. It became necessary therefore to strengthen the British 
forces there. Troops were sent to Egypt from India, the Anzac 
corps was sent from AustraHa and New Zealand, and a Territorial 
division was sent from England. The Indian government also sent 
an expedition to the mouth of the Tigris River in Mesopotamia to 
protect the British oil fields in southwest Persia. The British Navy- 
sent a fleet to blockade the Dardanelles which bombarded the forts 
at the entrance in November, 1914. 

Because of her millions of Mohammedan subjects, it was very 
important for Great Britainto compel the Turkish government to 
make peace. This would be most easily accomplished if the Balkan 
states Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece would unite with Serbia and 
form a league against Turkey. Negotiations to this effect were 
begun with Bulgaria, Greece and Rumania and it was naturally 
argued that successful operations against the Turks in connection 
with the Russians on the east would have a great effect on the 
neutral Balkan states. There arose therefore two parties in the 
British cabinet : those who considered that the west front in France 
was the important front upon which all the available British troops 
should be concentrated and the troops in Egypt should be just 
sufficient for defense, and those who considered that offensive opera- 
tions against Turkey gave greater promise of results than those on 
the west front. The government naturally took a mean course be- 
tween the two plans advocated. The British force in France was 
reinforced, but operations were also undertaken against Turkey. 

The French plan for operations was to keep the Germans en- 
gaged all along the west front to prevent troops from being sent 
to the east front, and, as soon as the British extended their front, 
to employ the French reserves in attacks in the north between Lille 
and Arras in connection with the British, and in Champagne east of 
Reims. If the German line could be broken at either of these points, 
the Germans would have to evacuate a great part of the French 
territory they then occupied. 

Operations on the West Front. — At the beginning of 1915 the 
opposing armies on the west front were intrenched from the Chan- 
nel to Switzerland. As a result all operations on this front were of 
the nature of siege operations. Occasionally an attempt would be 
made to advance on the wide front after a more or less prolonged 



78 

preparation by artillery fire, but along the remainder of the line 
and between these attempts the operations were confined to small 
fronts on which the troops made their advance by the process of 
sapping, mining, night attacks, surprise, etc. The object of these 
smaller operations was to harass the enemy and keep up the fight- 
ing spirit of the troops by the capture of a short line of trench, an 
advance post, a wood or a village. It became a kind of a war of 
attrition. 

In this trench warfare, many old methods of warfare were resur- 
rected and new ones were introduced. Improvised hand-grenades, 
trench mortars, and periscopes soon made their appearance, to be 
replaced by more efi'ective types as soon as they were invented and 
manufactured. Machine guns, originally two per battalion, made 
their appearance in increasing numbers as did field and siege mor- 
tars. High explosive shells replaced shrapnel in increasing pro- 
portions. The field artillery, with which the war was mainly begun 
by the Allies, was reinforced by heavy mortars and guns in ever 
increasing numbers. Underground shelters of all kinds were in- 
troduced, from those that would protect from splinters only, to the 
deep out-and-cover and mine shelters proof against the siege and 
heavy mortars. Successive lines of intrenchments were constructed 
connected with each other and with the country far in rear with 
deep communicating trenches. Telephone wires were strung along 
the trenches, so that constant communication could be preserved 
throughout the front line and reserve unit of infantry and artillery, 
and the various command posts in rear. Wire entanglements were 
constructed on an unprecedented scale, paralled, oblique and perpen- 
dicular to the front. Every possible device that could be thought of 
was utilized to strengthen the defense and further the attack. 

This trench warfare necessitated a change in the organization of 
the armies. It was found that the permanent type of organization 
which existed at the beginning of the war, in which as a rule each 
corps was composed of two permanent divisions, would no longer 
suffice. Divisions had to be withdrawn from the front after every 
great attack and sent either to rest areas or to quiet fronts. In 
both the German and French Armies, in order to increase the num- 
ber of divisions, the divisions were generally reduced from four to 
three regiments and at the same time the artillery of the divisions 
was increased. The corps was now composed of a number of divi- 
sions suitable to the front it was required to hold and these were 
not always the same divisions. The number of corps in an army 
was also varied with the front to be held and the armies them- 



79 

selves were combined into groups. In the French Army in addition 
to the northern group under General Foch, the eastern group under 
General Dubail and the central group under General Castelnau 
were created. Heavy guns were added to the corps and army 
artillery. 

New organizations, such as trench mortar sections and companies, 
were introduced and the machine gun companies were largely in- 
creased. Many infantry battalions of the French Army were 
obliged to give up one of their companies to form these new units. 
For trench warfare a new system of tactics was introduced. The 
infantry was also equipped with a small type of cannon for com- 
batting machine guns. 

The air service, which began mainly with small scouting planes, 
dirigible and fixed balloons, developed rapidly \^y the introduction of 
aerial photography, bombing planes, artillery observation planes, 
fighting planes and their organization into squadrons. 

For the movement of supplies and troops, motor transport was 
developed on a gigantic scale, and light railways were constructed 
to carry supplies between the rail heads on the standard gauge 
railways and the advance depots or dumps. 

These changes were introduced and gradually developed with the 
continuance of the deadlock on the west front during succeeding 
years. 

It would be impossible to touch upon all the operations on the 
west front in 1915, and therefore only the more important ones 
will be mentioned. The principal operations were perhaps the Ger- 
man attacks on the Ypres salient and in the Argonne, and the com- 
bined British and French attacks in March, May and October. 

The Battle of Neuve Chapelle. — The battle of Neuve Chapelle 
was the first attack made by the British Army on the enemy's in- 
trenched line. In March, 1915, the British force in line in France 
consisted of five British and one Indian corps, consisting of ten 
divisions of regulars, the 1st Canadian division and the two Indian 
divisions. It was organized into two armies of three corps each 
under Generals Haig and Smith-Dorrien, and held the line from a 
point northeast of Ypres to the 10th French Army south of the 
Bethune-Bassee canal. 

The main attack was to be made by the 4th and Indian corps of 
the 1st Army on the German line on the Auber Ridge west of Lille 
with its advance line through the village of Neuve Chapelle. The 
village was first to be taken and then the reserves were to advance 
on Aubers Ridge. The attack on the village was to be preceded by 



80 

bombardment of field and heavy guns, most of the latter furnished 
by the French. 

After a severe bombardment of the advanced trenches of about 
thirty-five minutes, the guns were turned on the village and the in- 
fantry advanced to the assault. It was thought that the bombard- 
ment had destroyed the enemy's wire entanglements entirely, but 
one of the three brigades in the attacking party found itself stopped 
under fire and was unable to advance. The German artillery fire 
had cut many of the telephone wires upon which the British com- 
manders relied for directing operations and they lost control of 
operations. As a result the British troops were able only to cap- 
ture the village of Neuve Chapelle which they held against all 
counter-attacks but were unable to reach the main German position 
on Auber Ridge. The losses were very heavy for the slight advance 
made but the lessons of the attack were valuable. 

The French made an attack north of Arras at the same time and 
captured some lines of trenches but the details are not known. 

German Attacks on Ypres. — The principal attack on the Ypres 
salient began in April and closed in May of 1915. At that time the 
British 2d Army, consisting of the 2d, 3d and 5th corps held the 
line on the east and south of Ypres to and across the Lys River. 
The French 8th Army held the line north of Ypres to Dixmuide 
where the inundated area began. The left of the British line was 
held by the Canadian division of the 5th corps and the right of the 
French by a native Algerian division. It was the first attack in 
which gas was employed by the Germans. It is probable that a 
gas attack had been planned on the entire front of the Ypres salient, 
but the direction of the wind, being from the north, was such that 
it could be utilized only against the east and west line north of 
Ypres, which was held mainly by the Algerian troops. 

Preceded by a cloud of chlorine gas released from cylinders, the 
attack was made late in the afternoon of April 22 and in a short 
time the entire Algerian division was either overcome by the gas 
or had evacuated the lines and taken refuge behind the Ypres canal. 
Had the attack been quickly followed up, it is possible that Ypres 
might have been taken, but this was not done and the French and 
British commanders were able to close the gap before the Germans 
had penetrated far enough to compel the evacuation of the lines 
east of the town. The struggle thus initiated lasted about a month. 
The British were compelled to withdraw their line closer to Ypres 
and at one time the Germans were across the canal north of Ypres. 
They were however later driven back across the canal by (the 



.'?' ' 81 • 

French. Toward the end of May the pressure of the British and 
French farther south compelled the Germans to cease their attacks. 
South of Ypres the Germans made no advance although gas attacks 
were made in this sector after the attack in the north. The Cana- 
dian troops distinguished themselves in checking the advance of 
the Germans in their first attack north of Ypres. 

Battles of Festubert and Artois in May. — The battles of Festu- 
bert and Artois were the joint efforts of the British and French 
to pierce the German intrenched line from the west of Lille and 
north of Arras. They were also designed to relieve the pressure on 
Ypres and test the German line in the west from which troops 
had been sent to reinforce the Russian front where a great attack 
by the Austro-German armies had just been begun. 

The British attack was made by the 1st Army north of the 
Bassee-Bethune canal to capture the German line west of Lille. 
The attack began about 6 a. m. May 9th after a preliminary bom- 
bardment of nearly an hour. Although one of the corps reached its 
objective, the other two were held up by the German second line, 
which had not been sufficiently destroyed by artillery and all the 
troops were withdrawn that night. On ]\^ay 15 the attack was 
renewed south of Neuve Chapelle around Festubert by a night 
attack. Some progress was made and the battle was continued up 
to the 20th when the position gained was finally consolidated. In 
his report General French states: 

"In the battle of Festubert, the enemy was driven from a position 
which was strongly intrenched and fortified and ground was won on 
a front of four miles to a depth of 600 yards." 

The French attack was made on a salient in the German lines 
terminating in the villages of Carency and Ablain St. Nizaire, west 
of the Arras-Bethune road, whence the lines ran northeastward 
to the vicinity of Loos and southeastward to a village east of Arras. 
The attack on this 10-mile front was made under the personal 
supervision of General Foch by the 10th French Army of about 
seven corps under the command of General d'Urbal who had been in 
command of the 8th French Army north of Ypres. Over 1,000' 
pieces of field, heavy and trench artillery had been assembled for 
this attack and about 300 rounds per gun had been provided for the 
opening bombardment. The German lines were unusually strong, 
and besides the fortified villages there were in places three to five 
successive lines. Mines were constructed to blow up parts of the 
German lines. 

At 6 a. m. May 9, the same day the attack was begun by the 



82 

British farther north, the French artillery opened and the mines 
were blown up. For three hours an intense fire was kept up at 
the end of which time the infantry attack was launched. It was 
reported that 20,000 shells had been fired into the village of Carency. 
Notwithstanding: the heavy bombardment the progress of the at- 
tack was slow because of the strength of the intrenched positions. 
Although some parts of the line were carried in the first assault 
the battle soon developed in a series of assaults on isolated posi- 
tions followed by regular siege operations. Carency was taken on 
the 12th. Ablain St. Nizaire was not wholly captured until the 
28th, and the struggle continued on through June. At the salient, 
the French lines were advanced about two and a half miles but the 
attempt to make a break in the German line had failed. In this 
kind of warfare the casualties are necessarily heavy on both sides 
as attacks are usually followed by counter-attacks. 

Battles of Loos, Artois and Champagne in September. — During 
the summer, plans were made for a simultaneous attack by British 
and French troops in the vicinity of Lens and between Reims and 
the Argonne in Champagne, in order to relieve the pressure on the 
Russian armies and if possible to break the German lines in the 
west. The 1st and 2d British armies had now relieved all the French 
forces from a point northeast of Ypres to a point west of the town 
of Lens, and the 3d British Army had relieved the 2d French Army 
on the right of the 10th French Army in the basin of the Somme 
valley. 

In the simultaneous attacks in the north, the main British effort 
was to secure the ridge occupied by the German lines to the north 
of Lens, and the main effort of the 10th French Army was to secure 
the ridge occupied by the Germans south of Lens, where they had 
attacked in May. If the attacks were successful, the important 
mining town of Lens would be retaken and the Allies could press 
onward in the direction of Douai. 

In the previous attacks made by the British Army, the Germans 
had been able to concentrate troops for counter-attack very quickly 
because the attacks had been made only in one place. The main 
attack of the 25th of September was to be combined with simultane- 
ous minor attacks at Ypres, Armentieres, Neuve Chapelle and along 
the north side of the Bethune-Bassee canal and with bombardments 
along the Belgian coast by the British fleet. These demonstrations 
it was thought would prevent the Germans from sending local re- 
serves from these points to the main point of attack. 



83 

The 1st Army, assigned to make the main attack, was composed 
of three corps of three divisions each, two corps in the first line and 
one in reserve. In the main attack between Lens and the Bethune- 
Bassee canal on a front of about ten milies there were five divisions 
in the front line. The British and Indian cavalry corps were as- 
sembled in rear to take advantage of any break in the enemy's line. 
A new feature in the British attack was the use of gas and smoke 
clouds. 

The German line to be attacked was a very strong one on which 
the Germans had been at work for nearly a year. It consisted of 
several lines of trenches, all well wired, organized villages, redouts, 
etc., and was provided with well constructed shelters. The whole 
position was organized for strong defense with machine guns. It 
was much stronger than any position heretofore attacked by British 
troops. 

In order to make use of smoke and gas it was necessary to wait 
for a favorable wind. On September 24, the wind which had been 
in the east, veered to the west and the attack was set for the 25th. 
The west wind however was accompanied by rain which interfered 
with artillery observation. The artillery opened on the morning of 
the 24th and the bombardment was kept up all day. At night 
machine guns and field artillery kept the German trenches under 
fire to prevent their repair. 

On the morning of the 25th, the artillery again opened at 4 :30 
and kept up its fire for two hours. "At 5:30 the smoke and gas 
clouds were released but during the night the wind had changed 
into the southwest and it was evident that as a screen the cloud 
would be less effective than had been hoped. At 6:30 the infantry 
attack was launched from the trenches one hundred to five hundred 
yards from the enemy's line. The artillery was then for a half hour 
turned on the enemy's rear positions while the infantry advanced. 

On their left, the British encountered strong resistance and made 
but little progress ; in the center, they were more successful and ad- 
vanced farther, but were unable to reach their final objectives ; on 
the right the troops captured the town of Loos and actually passed 
beyond their final objective, which was a hill overlooking Lens on the 
north, but they failed to organize it for defense and were later com- 
pelled to give it up as there were not sufficient reserves on hand to 
hold it. Loos, however, remained in the possession of the British. 
Two divisions of the general reserve, which were far in rear, reached 
the field that night and took up the attack on the following day 
but were unable to carry the line forward. On the following day, 



84 

the British Guard division of the general reserve was engaged and 
later a division withdrawn from another part of the Hne. By this 
time, however, the Germans had been able to reinforce the line and 
the attack was practically over October 1, when, because of the 
heavy losses in the British force, a French corps took over the lines 
about Loos. The Germans made a strong but unsuccessful counter- 
attack about a week later. 

Along a part of their front the British had advanced about two 
miles and in the vicinity of Loos they were within two miles of 
Lens; they had, however, been unable to compel the Germans to 
evacuate Lens. The casualties on both sides were heavy, those of 
the British were later given as 60,000. 

After the battle of Artois in May and June, in which the villages 
of Carency and Ablain St. Nizaire and the German line to the 
north and south were captured, operations by the 10th French Army 
in this section partook of the nature of regular siege operations. 

About two miles east of Carency on the Arras-Bethune highway 
was the village of Suchez, and between them the cemetery and a 
sugar refinery. On the southern outskirts of Suchez was a chateau 
and a small inn. All of these positions had been strongly organized 
by the Germans and their possession had been strongly contested 
for months. It was this small group, covering an area of about one 
square mile, which was the objective of the siege operations. 

The September attack in Artois of the 10th French Army, about 
the same strength as in May, was preceded by a five days' bom- 
bardment of the German lines; the infantry attack was launched 
on the 25th several hours after the British attack farther north. 
In the three days' attack the French succeeded in capturing Suchez 
and advancing their lines to the north and south but they failed to 
secure Vimy Ridge which was their objective, and they were not 
in a position to attack Lens from the south or compel the Germans 
to evacuate it as had been hoped. 

The greatest French attack on the west front in 1915 was the 
September attack in Champagne between Reims and the Argonne, 
where the 4th French Army was facing the III German Army. In 
the spring of the year General Castelnau was relieved of the com- 
mand of the 2d Army north of the Oise by General Petain and was 
placed in command of the armies between the Oise and the Meuse. 
It was under his supervision that the preparations for the attack 
were made during the summer, and it was under his direction that 
it was executed. The Army of General Petain which was relieved by 
the 3d British Army in the summer was also moved to this front 
to assist in the attack. 



86 

The German trenches attacked covered a front between fifteen 
and sixteen miles and a depth of from two to three miles. They 
had been constructed on a ridge more or less broken by ravines and 
covered with woods which had a general slope toward the French 
lines in front. The first line consisted of a network of trenches and 
approaches having at least the usual front line, support and reserve 
trenches, each protected by its wire entanglement. The second line 
could not be seen from the front, as it was on the rear slope of the 
ridge near the summit, but it was almost as strong as the first line. 
The area between the two lines was nearly everywhere organized 
for defense with wired redouts, machine gun positions, auxiliary 
trenches, underground shelters, trench mortars and batteries. The 
heavy batteries were behind the second line. 

The preparations for the attack naturally took a considerable 
time, so the attack could not have been a surprise. 

The nature of the attack may be judged from the following ex- 
tracts from the French descriptions of the attack: 

"For three days our guns bombarded the German positions. We 
set at work the latest types of our artillery and we have seen in 
the captured trenches their fearful effects. On certain points the 
leveling was complete. The entrances of underground shelters 
were filled up ; as to the wire entanglements, they were either brokert 
or swept away. 

"Our fire covered the entire extent of the first position while our 
long range pieces reached the roads, railways and railway stations 
(in rear). Thus certain German units were cut off from their sup- 
plies and remained for forty-eight hours without provisions. 

"The moral effect was not less powerful ; even the pauses in the 
bombardment added to the nervousness of the enemy who released 
uselessly his barrage and rifle fires, 

"The clearness of the air on the 22d and 23d permitted precision 
in directing the fire by ground and aerial observation. The 24th 
was cloudy but not so dense but that the aviation service could carry 
on its work. 

"On the 25th the rain clouds were very low. At 9 o'clock it began 
to rain. At 9:15, the hour fixed, the assault took place. 

"This human wave, which on this front of 25 kilometers, with 
the same movement and with the same spirit threw itself on the 
enemy's trenches and covered them, comprising Frenchmen from 
all parts of France. ***** Zouaves and rifles represented 
northern Africa." 

Unfortunately this attack met the fate of all other attacks thus 
far made by the Allies on the west front. In some parts of the front 
the trenches were so well battered that the attack penetrated far 
into the position without opposition, only to be taken in flank by 
machine guns and counter-attacks from neighboring sectors in 



86 

which the front line or some intermediate had not been made pass- 
able. At the end of three days it was definitely known that the 
attack had been held up in the most advanced parts by the German 
second line, whose thorough organization had not been suspected; 
in other parts the second line was not reached. Although progress 
was made in some sections long after the main attack ceased on 
September 28, the attack practically ended on that day. 

On October 5, General JofFre reported the capture of about 25,000 
prisoners and 150 guns. The French casualties were however very 
heavy. 

Of the September attacks by the British and 10th French armies 
on the VI German Army, and the 4th French Army on the III Ger- 
man Army, General Falkenhayn, Chief of Staff of the German 
armies, says: 

"In Flanders and Artois, on the front of over 50 miles as the crow 
flies, the VI Army of Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, held the line 
with sixteen divisions from the south of \'pres, immediately east of 
Armentieres, west of Lens, east of Arras, to a point 10 miles from 
the latter town. 

In Champagne, the III Army under General von Einem, with 
seven and a half divisions, held on a front of fully 30 miles, positions 
which ran from the north of Reims to Messiges. In touch on the 
left, extending to the Argonne, was the right wing of the V Army 
of the German Crown Prince with two divisions in line. 

On the 21st of September drum fire began against the VI Army, 
and on the 22d against the III Army and right wing of the V Army, 
of an intensity similar to that which we had for the first time em- 
ployed on a large scale at Gorlice-Tarnow. (In Galicia in May, 
1915.) 

Reinforcements from the scanty general reserve had already been 
sent the threatened armies and were now sent in greater numbers. 
The III and VI armies received heavy batteries and one infantry 
division each, the III Army having a brigade of infantry in ad- 
dition. 

The bombardment raged with almost undiminished fury in Cham- 
pagne until the 24th, and in Flanders until the 25th of September. 
On those days the infantry attacks began on both fronts. 

Although the terrible gunfire had caused hitherto unheard-of 
destruction both in and far behind our positions, in addition to very 
heavy losses in men, the French were unable to gain any vital ad- 
vantage on the 24th in Champagne. The British, on the other hand, 
by the employment of gas, succeeded in occupying our foremost 
positions at Loos over a breadth of 71/2 miles. They were however 
unable to develop their success. Incessant counter-attacks of the 
brave defenders not only prevented this, but also recovered sub- 
stantial portions of the lost positions. The French, who attacked 
the VI Army on both sides of the Scarpe in conjunction with the 
British, achieved no success worthy of mention. 



87 

The position in Champagne on the 25th of September was much 
more serious. Continuing their offensive, the French on this day, 
on the east of the Souain-Somme Py road, with seventeen divisions, 
drove the remnants of two German divisions, on a front of 15 miles 
with a depth of 2^2 miles, back to their rear positions, which un- 
fortunately had been shot to pieces, A serious crisis arose, leading 
the Staff of the III Army to consider the advisability of a further 
withdrawal of the whole army front. Such a step would of neces- 
sity lead to very serious consequences, firstly, in the moral effect 
which would inevitably be general ; secondly, in the tactical results 
on the neighboring fronts, and finally, by giving space to the enemy 
masses, which were crowded helplessly together against our present 
positions, to escape from their momentarily intolerable situation. 

Fortunately the proposed withdrawal was never carried out. On 
the urgent advice of the Chief of Staff of the neighboring V Army, 
the consideration of the matter was adjourned until the arrival of 
G. H. Q., who were on their way to the western front, and after 
their arrival at noon on the 25th of September, there was no further 
question of any voluntary withdrawal. There were still reserves 
available. They at once threw into Champagne one of the last divi- 
sions of the general reserve from Alsace and the X Army corps, 
the Guard corps going to the VI Army. Both these corps had just 
reached Belgium from the East. In addition, the forward reserves 
of General von Heeringen's VII Army, on the Aisne, where it was 
clear that no attacks were in prospect, were withdrawn and sent to 
the III Army. 

This additional strength sufficed to some extent to break the 
weight of the enemy's first attacks on the fighting fronts, but was 
insufficient to repel the whole offensive which lasted for many days. 
The heavy fighting wore down the strength even of formations 
freshly thrown in, all the more quickly because heavy rain had set 
in on the evening of the 25th turning the shell-torn battlefield into 
a marsh. True the difficulties thus caused were no doubt even more 
noticable in attack than in defense. The enormous numerical supe- 
riority against which we had to contend is well illustrated by the 
fact that there were thrown against the III Army no less than 25 
divisions, with 2,000 heavy and 3,000 field guns. Behind them 
were many cavalry divisions, of which considerable proportions 
actually took part, ready to attack. 

Accordingly in the first half of October, G. H. Q. had many worn 
troops replaced by fresh divisions drawn from quiet sectors of the 
front, until the arrival of further forces from the East relieved 
them of the task. Apart from the modest initial successes above 
mentioned, the enemy had no further advantages worthy of record 
to record. The fighting did not, however, die down in Flanders until 
the 13th, or in Champagne until the 20th of October." — General 
Headquarters, 1914-1915 — General von Falkenhayn. 

This statement of the German Chief of Staff shows how nearly 
the French came to penetrating the German front in Champagne 
in 1915. 



8$ 

The Argonne. — To the east of the Champagne battlefield, be- 
tween the Aisne River and its tributary the Aire, is the Argonne 
ridge or forest, five to eight miles in width east and west and 
twenty-five miles long, extending southward from Grandpre. When 
the German armies retreated from the Marne in 1914 the French 
3d Army secured possession of all but the northern end of the ridge 
which was held by the Germans, As the possession of this ridge 
was essential to operations against the fortress of Verdun, as early 
as September, 1914, the V German Army began operations to drive 
the French southward. The French position was strongly organized 
and the operations were conducted in a manner similar to a regular 
siege, the advance progress being measured by yards. It was in the 
Argonne that the methods of trench warfare were first developed 
by the employment of hand grenades, trench mortars, saps and 
mines. In the earlier stages artillery was not employed, but later 
artillery was also employed. During 1914 and 1915 the Germans 
succeeded in gaining about one half the ridge and reached a posi- 
tion around Vauqois from which they could observe and take under 
fire the double-track railway running west from Verdun. 

St. Mihiel Salient. — During 1915 the 1st French Army reinforced 
by several corps in the spring made a desperate attempt to drive 
the Germ.ans out of the St. Mihiel salient by attacks at various 
points between the Meuse and Moselle on the south side and be- 
tween the Meuse and town of Etain on the north side. The fighting 
was particularly severe in Apremont woods near the Meuse and in 
the Pretre woods along the Moselle near Pont a Mousson on the 
south, and at the village of Eparges on the north. No material 
changes were effected in the general line. 

Vosges Front. — The French troops on the Vosges front were again 
organized in the spring of 1915 into the 7th French Arir-y under 
General Maud'huy and were engaged during the year with some 
success in securing a more thorough mastery of the mountain crest 
and the passes. The 1st and 7th armies with the fortresses from 
Verdun to Belfort were under the command of General Dubail. 

On the whole the operations on the west front in 1915 did not 
result in any material change of the lines as they existed at the 
close of 1914. Neither the Allies nor the Germans were able to 
make any substantial gains on this front due to the thorough way 
in which the lines were intrenched. During 1915, the defense was 
stronger than the offense and a practical deadlock existed. The 
allies however were making studies of the tactics, equipment, etc.. 



89 

for breaking this deadlock. With each month the strength of the 
British Army increased and the artillery arm of the Allies became 
more powerful. The air services were also becoming more effective. 
In September, 1915, at the time of the great attacks, German 
G. H. Q. estimated the combatant strength of the Germans on the 
west front as 1,970,000 and the Allies as 3,250,000. No data is given 
upon which the estimates are based.* 



90 



CHAPTER VI. 

OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN, SERBIAN AND 
ITALIAN FRONTS IN 1915. 

Winter Operations in East Prussia. — As a result of the transfer 
of the best troops of the VIII German Army to Silesia and the re- 
inforcement of the Russian Armies on the Nieman and Narew 
rivers in September and October, 1914, the Russian Armies ajrain 
advanced from their base on these rivers in the latter part of Octo- 
ber, 1914, and at the close of the year the 10th Russian Army in 
the north occupied a line running? north and south through the 
Masurian Lakes from the Nieman River on the north to the Narew 
River between Lomza and Ostralenka on the south. The 1st Rus- 
sian Army occupied the greater part of the territory between East 
Prussia and the Vistula River. 

During the autumn of 1914, the Germans organized three new 
reserve corps, the XXXVIII, XXXIX and XL, to reinforce their 
forces in East ^Prussia then consisting of the I and XXI corps with a 
number of Landwehr divisions. The IV cavalry division was also 
sent from the west to reinforce the cavalry. From the forces in 
East Prussia, General Hindenburg organized the VIII and X armies 
each consisting of about four corps and a cavalry division and made 
plans for driving the 10th Russian Army out of East Prussia and 
across the Nieman and Bohr rivers. As operations on a large scale 
were impracticable in this territory until the ground was frozen 
when it might be deep in snow, thousands of sledges were assembled 
and preparations made for mounting the ordinaiy transport wagons 
on runners. 

As in the Tannenberg operations, the plan contemplated the en- 
circling of the Russian Army by attacks made on its extreme right 
along the Memel or Nieman River by the X Army and south of the 
lakes through Lyk by the VIII Army ; the left and center of the 
VIII Army was to advance eastward through the lake region. The 
attack was begun by the VIII Army south of the lakes on February 
7 and was taken up by the X Army on the following day. The cam- 
paign lasted two weeks and was carried out in severe winter weather 
with frequent blinding snow storms which rendered the operations 
diflicult for ])oth sides. The Russians made a desperate but un- 
successful defense and a number of divisions were eventually sur- 
rounded in the Augustowa forest where a large number of troops 



91 

were captured and the remainder retreated across the Nieman and 
Bohr rivers. The Germans took over 100,000 prisoners including 
a corps and three division commanders and 300 guns. The Rus- 
sians were pursued to the Nieman and Bohr rivers whose bridge- 
heads again saved them. The Germans brought up heavy guns and 
attempted to capture fortified bridgeheads at Ossoviec but were un- 
successful. They again intrenched a line between the Nieman River 
and the East Prussia boundary. The battle with the 10th Russian 
Army is known as the second battle of the Masurian Lakes. 

While the operations against the 10th Russian Army were in 
progress, one or two German corps advanced into the territory be- 
tween East Prussia and the Vistula against the advanced detach- 
ment of the 1st Russian Army there. The Germans reached the 
line Plock-Prasnysz in this sector, intrenched in the winter of 1914, 
but were unable to reach the Narew River as the 1st Russian Army 
was too strongly intrenched in its front. At the close of the opera- 
tions General Russky was relieved of the command of the north 
front by General Alexiev who had been in command of the 9th Army 
in the south. 

Winter Operations in the Carpathian Mountains. — When the 
Russians made their last advance in Galicia in 1914, the 8th and 
9th armies secured all the passes in the Carpathian Mountains as 
far west as the Dukla Pass at the headwaters of the Wislok River 
southeast of Tarnow, and north of the mountains the 3d Army ad- 
vanced almost to Cracow. The 3d Army was later compelled to re- 
treat to the vicinity of Tarnow, where it intrenched a line between 
the Vistula and the Carpathians. The fortress of Przemysl where 
the Austrians had left a large garrison was again invested. General 
Ivanov had besides the armies mentioned above, the army of invest- 
ment at Przemysl and the 4th and 5th armies on the Nida River in 
West Poland. 

The Austrian G. H. Q. considered it very essential that the passes 
in the Carpathians should be wrested from the Russians both to per- 
mit the relief of Przemysl and to prevent Russian columns from in- 
vading Hungary in the spring. As the Austrian armies were alone 
unable to accomplish this the German G. H. Q. sent to Hungary 
three divisions withdrawn from the west and formed the Austro- 
German Carpathian Army under German command. 

The Carpathian Mountain range between Galicia-Bukowina and 
Hungary is a wide range whose peaks and passes are about half the 
elevation of those in the Alps. The lowest part of the range is that 
called the Beskides, which, in a length of about one hundred miles, 



92 

contains the Dukla Highway Pass, the Lupka Pass on the railway 
to Sanok, the Uzsok Pass on the railway to Sambor, the Verezcke 
or Beskides Pass on the railway to Strij ; farther east is the Delatyn 
Pass on the railway to Halicz and Kolomea. In addition to the main 
passes there are numerous minor passes in this range. A railway 
also runs through the Stiol Pass in the mountains between Hungary 
and Bukowina and there are also several minor passes in this part 
of the Carpathian range. 

At this time the 8th Russian Army, under General Brusilov, v/as 
occupying the mountain passes from the Dukla Pass on the west, 
where there was one or two Russian corps already on the south 
slope of the mountains, eastward to include the Lupka, Uzsok and 
Beskide passes. The 9th Russian Army extended the line eastward 
holding the passes through which the railways ran to Haliez ; a de- 
tachment of this army occupied Bukowina. 

The HI and H Austrian armies in the Carpathian Mountains were 
assigned the task of recapturing the range including the Dukla, 
Lupka and Uzsok passes while the Austro-German Carpathian Army 
was assigned the task of retaking the range including the Beskide 
and Delatyn passes. The VH Austrian Army was assigned to the 
task of driving the Russians out of Bukowina. 

The winter campaign of the Central Powers was only partially 
successful. The Austrians were barely able to recapture the Lupka 
and Uzsok passes and were unable to advance from them to relieve 
Przemysl. The Russians south of the Dukla Pass could not be dis- 
lodged. The Austro-German Carpathian Army was more success- 
ful but did not make much progress north of the mountain crest. 
Bukowina was recovered as far as the Pruth River. 

At the close of the winter operations in the Carpathian Mountains 
the situation in Galicia was still very unsatisfactory to the German 
and Austrian G. H. Q., as it was realized that Przemysl would soon 
fall releasing the investing army, which would probably reinforce 
the Russian armies in the Carpathians and enable them to retake 
the passes. In Italy there were strong indications that the country 
would soon enter the war on the side of the Allies and compel the 
transfer of troops to that front. 

It was essential to strike a decisive blow at the Russians in Galicia 
and it was realized that this blow must be struck by selected troops 
under an able commander. General Mackensen, who had been in 
command of the XVII corps and then of the IX Army, was selected 
and he was given the XI Army consisting of troops transferred 
from the west front in the latter part of April. These were the 



93 

Guard corps, the X corps and two reserve corps, to which was added 
an Austrian corps. The blow was to be struck at the 3d Russian 
Army occupying the Hne between the Vistula River and the Car- 
pathian Mountains and in the southern part of its line to compel the 
Russians to evacuate the mountain passes and permit the Austro- 
German armies south of the mountains to cooperate in the 
campaign. 

At this time the 3d Russian Army, under General Dmitrieff, oc- 
cupied the east bank of the Dunajec River from the Vistula south- 
ward beyond Tarnow and thence the line crossed over a high ridge 
of hills to the Biala, a tributary of the Dunajec, at Gromnik. From 
Grommik the line followed the east bank of the Biala to Bobova 
and thence again crossed a high range of hills to the Ropa River, a 
tributary of the Wisloka, and thence to the Carpathians. The line 
had been occupied for about four months and had been organized 
in the customary way with trenches and wire entanglements, but 
did not compare in strength with the lines constructed on the west 
front at the same time. There were few overhead shelters to pro- 
tect against hov/itzer fire, few machine gun emplacements, and the 
entanglements were of inferior construction. The strength of the 
first line consisted in the successive lines of shelter trenches on the 
slopes of the hills. 

The Russian position extended backward as far as the Wisloka 
River, twenty miles to the east, but there were no continuous lines 
in rear of the first. The second, third and fourth lines consisted 
of isolated heights organized for defense. The entire position was 
intersected by two railways, one running east from Tarnow and the 
other from Grybow to Jaslo. This latter followed the deep valley 
of the Ropa River. It was along this latter railway in the foothills 
of the mountains that the main blow was to be struck. 

Operations in Galicia March to June. — The fortress of Przemysl 
surrendered about the middle of March and the investing army was 
sent to the 8th Russian Army which captured the Lupka and Uzsok 
passes. This compelled the Germans to send three additional divi- 
sions to the Austrian Army on that front; these divisions formed 
the German Beskide Corps . With these reinforcements the Russian 
advance was checked just as Mackensen was ready to attack. 

In the latter part of April, Mackensen's XI Army relieved the 
Austrian troops and was deployed along the front of the left wing 
of the Russian 3d Army between the Dunajec River and the Car- 
pathian Mountains ; the IV Austrian Army extended the line north- 
ward along the Dunajec to the Vistula. The IV and XI armies were 



94 

probably stronger than the 3d Russian Army and were well equipped 
with heavy artillery to destroy the Russian defenses. 

On the afternoon of May 1, Mackensen's aHillery opened the most 
intense fire that had thus far been employed on any front. The 
weather conditions were favorable for his air service and for ground 
observation. The Russian defenses crumbled under the overwhelm- 
ing fire and the batteries were silenced. The fire was kept up during 
the night to prevent the Russians from repairing their works, with 
intervals of cessation to allow the engineers to cut the wire entangle- 
ments. At 6 a. m. on May 2 an intense bombardment was kept up 
for four hours and then the range was lengthened and the infantry 
assault was launched. On that day Mackensen's army penetrated 
the Russian first line to a depth of two and a half miles on a front 
of ten miles. The Austrians attacked on his left in the hills south 
of Tarnow between the Dunajec and Biala rivers. That night the 
IV Austrian Army by moonlight crossed the Dunajec between 
Tarnow and the Vistula and secured a bridgehead. The Russians 
fought stubbornly, and had they had a good second line upon which 
to retreat, Mackensen might possibly have been held until reinforce- 
ments reached them, but in their isolated second, third and fourth 
positions they were unable to prevent his advance. By May 4, the 
entire Russian 3d Army was in full retreat for the Wisloka River 
pursued by the Austro-German armies. 

The Russians made no attempt to hold the line of the Wisloka, 
but destroyed its bridges and retreated eastward leaving strong rear 
guards to cover the retreat. Having bridged the river the two 
Austro-German armies crossed the river on the 6th and took up the 
pursuit. Mackensen's right wing found the bridge at Zymigrod in- 
tact and crossed on the 5th and cut off the retreat of part of the 
Russian forces that had been south of Dukla Pass and were now 
trying to withdraw pursued by the left wing of the III Austrian 
Army which was on that front. 

The 8th Russian Army now began to withdraw also from the 
Lupka Pass to concentrate in the vicinity of Sanok. This released 
the right wing of the III Austrian Army and German Beskide Corps 
at that pass, which also took up the pursuit. 

From the Wisloka River and the Carpathians the Austro-German 
armies advanced to the line Rzeszow-Sanok, which was reached on 
the 11th after severe fighting, especially in the vicinity of Sanok 
where the Russian Army made a strong stand. The left wing now 
advanced to the San River between Jaroslau and its mouth, while 
the right wing advanced on Przemysl and Sambor. This compelled 



95 

the 8th Russian Army to evacuate the Uzsok Pass and released the 
left wing of the II Austrian Army there, which took up the pursuit. 
On May 15 Mackensen's troops captured Jaroslau and the right wing 
entered Sambor. In two weeks he had advanced about eighty miles. 

Between the 15th and 28th of May Mackensen's army secured 
both banks of the San River for a stretch of twenty miles north of 
Jaroslau and began to throw bridges across the river. Any further 
advance required the capture of the strong bridgehead at Radymno, 
a short distance above Jaroslau, and the fortress of Przemysl in 
order to secure the right flank of the advancing armies. This neces- 
sitated the bringing up of the heavy howitzers and nearly a week 
was employed in organizing the lines of supply from the rear and 
bringing up these guns. In the meantime the 8th Russian Army 
had withdrawn from the Uzsok Pass and took up a strong position 
around Strij. This released the right wing of the II Austrian 
Army and it also took up the pursuit. 

The bridgehead at Radymno was bombarded on the 23d and taken 
on the 24th ; the attack on Przemysl was begun on the 29th and the 
fortress was evacuated by the Russians by June 2. Strij was taken 
by the Austrians about the same time and the Russians retired to 
the Dniester River. 

To relieve the pressure on the Russians in Galicia, Italy declared 
war on May 23 just as the attack on Radymno was begun. This 
compelled the Austrians to detach divisions to that front and also to 
send troops from the Serbian front ; the latter were replaced b>- 
German troops. The Italians were unable to save the situation in 
Galicia but the absence of the Austrians sent from the Galician 
front was felt later in the campaign. 

Due to the losses suffered by Mackensen's troops and the rein- 
forcements received by the Russian armies from Caucasia, Turkes- 
tan and from the Vistula, it became necessary to reinforce his army 
before a further advance and two and a half additional divisions 
were sent him from the west front. Although the Russians had 
suffered severe losses, they had been able to protect their flanks, 
and the losses after the first attack had been due mainly to rear 
guard actions. The 9th and most of the 8th Army were still intact 
and with the reinforcements received were still capable of strong 
resistance. 

With the fall of Przemysl and the bridging of the San River the 
Austro-German armies were ready to advance on the Galician 
capital, Lemberg. The advance from the San River began about 
the middle of June and the Russian rear guards fell back on the 



96 

position that had been selected and organized for defense while the 
Austro-German armies remained on the San River and were en- 
gaged in the reduction of Radymno and Przemysl. This position 
was the ridge between the basins of the San and Bug Rivers west 
of and parallel to the Lemberg-Rawaruska railway and was known 
as the Rawaruska-Grodek line. It was the same position on which 
the Russians defeated the Austrians in September, 1914. The left 
rested on the Dniester River and extended eastward along that river. 

The Russian line was penetrated by the army under General 
Mackensen on the 18th of June south of Rawaruska, which com- 
pelled the Russians farther south to retire from Grodek and the 
Dniester where the line was being held against the Austrian forces 
at Strij. Lemberg, which was surrounded by field works, was held 
for a few days but was evacuated on June 21 and an Austrian Army 
entered the following day. 

After the fall of Lemberg the IV Austrian Army with Macken- 
sen's XI Army marched northward in pursuit of the Russians who 
had withdrawn into Poland while the III and II Austrian armies 
advanced eastward against the Russians who were retiring in that 
direction to force them to evacuate the lower Dniester River and to 
retire across the frontier. The Austro-German Carpathian Army 
and the Austrian Army in Bukowina cooperated with them. 

It had been planned by the Austrian and German commanders 
that the Austro-German forces east of Uzsok Pass with the VII 
Austrian Army in Bukowina were to break through the 9th Rus- 
sian Army and cut off the retreat of the Russians west of Lemberg, 
but this encircling movement was frustrated by the 9th Russian 
Army which fought stubbornly in the foothills of the mountains 
and on the Dniester River until all danger was over. 

Shortly after the fall af Lemberg, the progress of the Austro- 
German armies on the Polish frontier of Galicia was temporarily 
stopped. Mackensen with his two armies crossed the frontier into 
Poland between the Vistula and Bug rivers and found the forces 
in his front reinforced by the Russian forces that had retired from 
the southern part of West Poland and were recrossing the Vistula 
River. Against the new forces he was unable to advance and was 
even for a time forced to retreat. It was not until a month later 
that the partial withdrawal of these forces permitted him to renew 
his offensive. 

The 8th and 9th Russian armies which retreated eastward from 
Lemberg made a stand on the Zlota Lipa River, a tributary of the 
Dniester, and also resisted all attempts to drive them eastward for 
a month or more. 



97 

Operations in the Baltic Provinces March to June. — North of 
the Nieman River there were no operations during 1914, but about 
the middle of March, 1915, some Russian raiding columns appeared 
in this section and captured the Baltic seaport of Memel and some 
villages north of Tilsit. These columns were soon driven back out 
of East Prussia. About the first of April two cavalry divisions 
came from the west and with a cavalry division of East Prussia 
and three reserve divisions a German Army was formed for opera- 
tions in the Russian Baltic provinces. During April, May and June 
while Mackensen was advancing in Galicia this army captured the 
Baltic port of Libau and advanced to the line of the Wildau and 
Dubissa rivers. There were numerous engagements in this section 
but none of great importance. Eventually a Russian Army was 
formed on this front. 

Operations on the Russian Front July-September. — By the end 

of June, it became evident that the drive through Galicia had come 
to a stop. On the 2d of July there was a conference at Posen to 
determine a new plan of operations. General Hindenburg advised 
an advance in the far north between Kovno and the Baltic with a 
view of turning the fiank of the Russian line. This however was 
deemed by German G. H. Q. as too bold a plan as the two wings of 
the attack were too far separated and would require too much time 
to secure decisive results. It was finally decided that the main 
attack in the north should be made between the Vistula River and 
the East Prussian boundary where the Russians still occupied the 
advanced line through Prasnys-Plock, some twenty miles in advance 
of the Narew River, which they had intrenched in the winter of 
1914-1915. The aim of the attack was to penetrate the advanced 
Russian line on a broad front on either side of Prasnys and eventu- 
ally cross the Narew River between Ostralenka and Sierok. If suc- 
cessful it would threaten the Warsaw-Petrograd railway and cause 
the Russians to evacuate the line of the Vistula ; this would enable 
Mackensen to continue his advance. While the main attack was in 
progress pressure would be exerted on the entire front from the 
Baltic to the Dniester River. 

In view of the strength of the front to be attacked, a new army 
was organized, the XII, of some 9 corps which included most of the 
reserves of the northern and central groups. The VIII Army was 
to protect the left of the XII Army and advance with it. 

The Russian front attacked consisted of several successive posi- 
tions strongly intrenched in advance of the Narew River and a num- 
ber of large bridgeheads covering the crossings themselves at Pul- 



98 

tusk, Rozan and Ostralenka. All of these lines seem to have beer, 
strongly held as the Russians appreciated the value of the Narevv 
line. The attack began on the morning of July 13, and it was not 
until ten days later, July 23-24, that the Germans were able to effect 
a crossing of the Narew at Ostralenka, Rozan and Pultusk. As this 
advance threatened the rear of the Russian troops west of Warsaw, 
they at once evacuated the Bzura-Rawa line and fell back on the 
bridgehead of Warsaw. Farther south the Russians also fell back 
to the Vistula holding the bridgehead of Ivangorod. 

With the fall of Ostralenka, Rozan and Pultusk, the Narew line 
was lost to the Russians who now made a stubborn resistance on 
the Bug River and to the north to cover the retreat of the armies 
on the Vistula. 

The general retreat of the Russian armies from the Vistula River 
now began and during the last days of July the Austro-German 
Army in West Poland crossed the Vistula both south and north of 
Ivangorod, and Mackensen renewed his attacks and reached Lublin 
and Kolm. On the 4th of August the last of the Russians left 
Ivangorod, and on the 5th, Warsaw; Novo Georgievsk was not 
evacuated and a force of 80,000 Russians was left in the fortress. 
The bridgehead of Sierok was evacuated on the 8th and Novo 
Georgievsk became isolated. A specially equipped besieging force 
from the IX and XII armies was at once organized to attack this 
fortress which fell on the 19th after a short bombardment. 

The Russian retreat was fairly well conducted and the retreating 
corps were covered by strong rear and tlank guards. All the bridges 
over the Vistula and Narew and all the railway and other bridges 
were destroyed to delay pursuit. 

After the XII Army was across the Narew the VIII Army at- 
tacked the Russians farther north and captured the bridgehead of 
Lomza on August 10 and Osoviec on the 22d. The VIII Army then 
joined in the pursuit but was not in time to head off any of the 
Russian columns. 

Farther north the great fortress of Kovno, the strongest of the 
Nieman line, was attacked between the 6th and 17th of August 
by the X Army and was evacuated on the latter date. Olita farther 
south was evacuated on the 22d and there remained but the bridge- 
head of Grodno, toward which the VIII Army was marching. In 
the south Mackensen's troops advanced from Lublin and Kolm on 
the Russian fortress of Brest Litovsk: this was evacuated on 
August 25th. The Austro-German armies from West Poland ad- 



99 

vanced between Hindenburg and Mackensen. From Brest Litovsk 
Mackensen advanced to Pinsk one hundred miles to the east. 

From Kovno the X German Army advanced on Vihia to cut off 
the Russians retreating toward the northeast. At the same time 
the VIII Army advanced on the fortress of Grodno which was evac- 
uated on the 2d of September. In the Baltic provinces the German 
Baltic Army had been reinforced and advanced with those farther 
south, captured Mitau and advanced to the Dwina River where it 
succeeded in forcing a crossing between Riga and Dwinsk but was 
unable to develop this bridgehead. 

On the 5th of September shortly after the fall of Grodno, the 
Czar assumed personal command of his armies with General Alexieff 
as chief of staff. The Grand Duke Nicholas was sent to command 
the Russian troops operating against Turkey and General Russky 
returned to the command of the northern group. 

General Russky made a desperate attempt to hold Vilna but was 
compelled to evacuate it September 18 when the Germans threat- 
ened to surround that place. The German cavalry was already well 
to the east when the retreat began and the Russians were obliged 
to cut their way through it. 

The great Russian retreat ended about the time of the great at- 
tacks in the west of Loos, Arras and in Champagne September 25, 
1915. A part of the Austro-German troops had already left to 
carry on a campaign in Serbia and two German corps had returned 
to the west front just in time to meet the attack in Champagne. In 
the north the Germans had reached the Dwina River, but the right 
bank with Riga and Dwinsk still remained in the possession of the 
Russians. South of Dwinsk the German line was far east of Vilna 
and the important railway from Dwinsk via Wilna to the railway 
junction of Baranovitchi was in their possession. South of this 
junction they had failed to secure the railroad across the Pripet 
Marshes to Rovno which would have greatly strengthened their 
position. 

In the south, the Austro-German forces had captured the for- 
tress of Lutsk on the Rovno-Kovel railway and Dubno on the Rovno- 
Lemberg railway but the Russians had successfully defended the 
important railway junction of Rovno. Farther south the Russians 
had been obliged to retire to the Sereth River in eastern Galicia, 
but by a counter-attack later secured the line of the Strypa, a tribu- 
tary of the Dniester. The south bank of the Dniester and Buko- 
wina remained in the possession of the Austrians. 

The Austro-German campaign on the Russian front removed the 



100 

dangerous situation which had existed at the beginning of 1915 and 
dealt the military forces of Russia a severe blow from which they 
were unable to recover. It had however not succeeded in forcing 
the Russians to make peace. Its most important immediate effect 
was that of inducing Bulgaria to join the Central Powers and thus 
form a connecting link between Austria and Turkey. 

The blame for the great Russian retreat fell on the Minister of 
War who was accused of neglect in not properly supplying the 
armies with food, arms and ammunition, and in not calling into ser- 
vice and training sufficient reserves to replace casualties in the 
armies ; for his neglect he was removed. The removal of Grand 
Duke Nicholas from the supreme command was generally deplored, 
as he was considered an able commander sacrificed by an incompe- 
tent war department. 

Operations in Serbia. — From the beginning of the war both Allied 
and Central Powers sought the assistance of the Balkan States by 
various promises of concessions and assistance. In 1883 Rumania 
had entered into an alliance with the Central Powers when she be- 
lieved that she was in some danger from Russia's ambitions in the 
Balkan Peninsula ; since that time, however, conditions had changed. 
In 1913 she took part in the second Balkan war on the side of Serbia, 
which was the Balkan State most closely allied to Russia and 
Rumania was therefore on friendly terms with that power. The 
King, a Hohenzollern prince but not of the reigning family, declared 
himself bound to assist the Central Powers but the government did 
not agree with him and in August declared the neutrality of 
Rumania; on the death of King Charles, two months later, public 
opinion in Rumania became more and more favorable to the Allies, 
but no decision was reached before the great Russian retreat and 
the failure of the Gallipoli operations made immediate intervention 
inadvisable. 

Bulgaria occupied an important position in the Balkan Pen- 
insula, because its control by the Allies would cut Turkey from all 
railway communication with the Central Powers upon whom she 
relied for war materials. Unlike Rumania, Bulgaria had no desire 
for any of the territory of the Central Powers except a small part of 
Turkey but did want the return of territory of which she claimed 
she was unjustly deprived by Serbia, Rumania and Greece in the 
second Balkan war. This made negotiations with her very dif- 
ficult on the part of the Allies, as Serbia was already an ally, 
Rumania was inclined to the Allied side, as was also a strong party 
in Greece. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the 



101 

Allied negotiations with Bulgaria failed and that after the great 
Russian retreat and the failure of the Gallipoli campaign, Bulgaria 
declared war against her old enemy Serbia. There was now no 
danger to Bulgaria of immediate intervention of Rumania on the 
side of the Allies. 

Having failed to win over Bulgaria, the Allies turned to Greece 
as Greece had a treaty with Serbia which provided that in case 
Bulgaria renewed the Balkan war and attacked Serbia, Greece would 
come to her assistance. The prime minister, Venizelos, gave the 
Allied Powers to understand that Greece would carry out this treaty 
if Bulgaria declared war, but insisted that as the Serbian Army 
might be destroyed before the Greek Army was ready, the Allies 
must furnish the 150,000 men that Serbia was to furnish under the 
treaty. He consented to the occupation of Salonica by the Allies in 
case it should become evident that Bulgaria was contemplating war. 

In the latter part of September, the HI Austrian and XI German 
armies, seven divisions each, were beginning to concentrate on the 
northern and western frontiers of Serbia and the Bulgarian Army 
was mobilized. The Greek Army was mobilized and relying on their 
agreement with Venizelos the Allies sent French and British troops 
to Salonica without waiting for Greece to declare war. 

It now turned out that the King and his government considered 
this a violation of the neutrality of Greece, as war had not been de- 
clared and Venizelos was required to resign. When Bulgaria finally 
declared war the Allies were unable to furnish the 150,000 men 
promised to Venizelos and furthermore Greece held that her agree- 
ment was for attack by Bulgaria alone and, instead of declaring war 
still remained neutral. Serbia was therefore left to face invasion 
without receiving any material aid from her former allies Rumania 
and Greece. 

There were no operations in Serbia from the close of the second 
Austrian invasion in December, 1914, until October, 1915. In the 
latter part of September, 1915, an Austro-German force, under the 
command of General Mackensen, appeared on the Danube and Drave 
rivers, Austrian forces were concentrated in Bosnia, and the Bul- 
garian Army was mobilized. In the second Balkan war, the Bulga- 
rian force was estimated at 300,000 men ; the peace strength of the 
army however consisted of but 9 divisions. 

The invasion of Serbia began about October 6 and 7, by the bom- 
bardment of the capital, Belgrade, and the crossing of the Danube 
and Save rivers both to the east and west of it. The Bulgarians 
crossed the frontier on the 11th after the Austro-German troops 



102 

were south of the Danube. The Austro-Gernian forces were to drive 
the 1st and 3d Serbian armies slowly southward while the main 
Bulgarian efforts were made in the direction of Nish the temporary 
capital, at the junction of the Beljrrade-Constantinople and the 
Nish-Salonica railways, and in the direction of Uskub on the Nish- 
Salonica railway farther south with a view of cutting- off the retreat 
of the Serbian armies. The Nish sector was defended by the 2d 
Serbian Army while a detachment, which it was hoped would be 
aided by the Allies from Salonica, defended the Uskub' sector. 

In the face of such overwhelming odds the defense of the country 
was out of question and, upon the advice of the Allied governments 
the aim of the Serbian commander-in-chief, General Putnik, was 
simply to prevent the capture of his armies. As it was impossible 
to escape to Salonica, his plan was to retire through Montenegro 
and Albania to Skutari and Durazzo. The point of concentration of 
the three armies was in the region of Prisrend and Mitrovitza on the 
Montenegran and Albanian frontier; to which the 1st and 2d armies 
in the north were to retire without lighting any but rear guard 
actions. By destroying bridges and railway rolling stock it was 
thought that the enemy could be delayed long enough to permit the 
movement, as the roads of Serbia were in a very bad condition. The 
2d Army was in the meantime to check the Bulgarians as long as 
possible in the Nish sector and then fall back to Prisrend. The 
troops in the Uskub sector were to do the same. 

The Bulgarians captured l^skub on October 22 but as they w^ere 
threatened by three French divisions who had moved up from 
Salonica they did not advance on Prisrend in force. Nish was cap- 
tured November 5 but by this time the northern armies were sufhci- 
ently near to prevent the advance of the Bulgarians westward. The 
three Serbian armies were concentrated in the latter part of Novem- 
ber on the Montenegran and Albanian frontiers and early in Decem- 
ber began the march across the snow-covered mountains to the 
Adriatic. On account of the condition of the roads, all wheeled 
vehicles of the army were destroyed at the foot of the mountains 
and the old commander-in-chief who was unable to ride a horse, 
was carried over the mountain roads in a sedan chair. By rapid 
marching the Adriatic could be reached in seven days, but due to the 
crowded condition of the roads many units were much longer on the 
way. The army reached the Adriatic with about half the strength 
with which the operations were begun and was eventually taken in 
transports to the island of Corfu to be reorganized. Austrian 
columns at the same time invaded and occupied Montenegro. 



103 

The Biilgrarians pursued into Albania but did not attack the troops 
along the coast. When the Serbian Army went to Corfu, the Bul- 
garians moved down to the Greek boundary to join the Bulgarians 
already there. Most of the Cerman antl Austrian troops were with- 
drawn after the Serbs crossed the mountains but a few divisions 
joined tiie Bulgarians on the frontier of Greece. 

While operations in Serbia were in progress, the Allied troops 
landed at Salonica from Gallipoli were reinforced and at the end of 
the year there were three French and hve British Divisions at that 
point. A strong intrenched camp was constructed to serve as a 
base for future operations. 

Operations on the Ilalian Front. — As a result of agreement be- 
tween Great Britain, France and Italy, now known as the Pact of 
London, Italy declared war on Austria May 23, 1015. 

The Italian Army on a peace footing consisted of 12 army corps 
or 25 infantry divisions, which at war strength without reserves 
would give an army of about 875.000 men. The division consisted 
of two brigades of infantry, about 12,000 men. and one regiment of 
field artillery with thirty guns. Each regiment of infantry had a 
section of two machine guns. The cavalry consisted of 29 regiments 
which were to furnish the corps cavalry and independent cavalry 
divisions. Of heavy artillery there were 4 regiments or four bat- 
teries each, equipped with G-inch howitzers which were to be as- 
signed to armies. 

The Italian Army entered the campaign with an insufficient equip- 
ment of artillery which was gradually increased in the course of the 
war. 

At the outbreak of the war, which had been anticipated for some 
time, the army was already concentrated on the frontier. The entire 
force was divided into four armies of which the 1st and 4th were 
to defend the Italian territory against attacks from the north while 
the 2d and 3d assumed the offensive toward the east. Until the 
campaign in Russia was terminated it was evident that the Austrian 
troops would be obliged to remain on the defensive. The Italian 
Army was commanded by the King and the operations were directed 
by the Chief of Staff General Cadorna. 

The strategic frontier of Austria against the operations of the 
2d and od Italian armies was along the Isonzo River from the Predil 
Pass south of Tarvis to the Adriatic Sea. The country east of the 
Isopzo is naturally divided into three distinct sections by the valleys 
of the tributaries of the Isonzo coming from the east. The northern 
section extends from Tarvis to Tolmino, near the mouth of the 



104 

Idria ; in this section lie the Julian Alps through which operations 
eastward from the river are extremely difficult. The only Italian 
objective in this sector was the highway in the valley which runs 
southward from Tarvis and was one of the lines of supply of the 
Austrian forces. Three highways ran from the Italian territory 
in the west to Isonzo in this section reaching it at the Predil Pass, 
Saga and Carporetto. The middle section lies between Tolmino and 
Gorizia or between the valleys of the Idria and Vippaco rivers. It 
is high plateau with a mountain range along its southern border. 
The southern section lies between Gorizia and the Adriatic. In this 
section is the barren Carso plateau about seven miles wide, between 
the Vippaco River and the Adriatic, which overlooks the Isonzo from 
Gradisca to Monfalcone and skirts the Adriatic to Trieste less than 
twenty miles from Monfalcone. This plateau rises from the Isonzo 
eastward. The town of Gorizia on the east bank of the Isonzo lies in 
the broad valley between the Carso plateau and the plateau to the 
north. The Austrian territory extended west of the Isonzo forming 
a belt varying in width from two miles at Canale to ten miles at 
Monfalcone. The most important part of this belt was the ridge 
which was parallel to and a mile from the river all the way from 
Canale to Gorizia. This ridge te^rminated in Mount Sabbatino in 
the north and Podgora hill in the south. Between Podgora hill and 
the Carso plateau is the Gorizia gap three miles wide. 

The Austrian line of defense may be said to have been the Isonzo 
River from Predil Pass to the bend of the river south of Canale 
where it crossed the river and was on the Sabbatino ridge west of 
the river as far as Gorizia. South of Gorizia it followed the western 
edge of the Carso plateau. 

It was natural that the Italian G. H. Q. should select for its main 
objective the Carso plateau, since the possession of this would lead 
to the fall of Trieste, a very important objective. Although taken 
somewhat by surprise, nature came to the temporary relief of the 
Austrians as the Isonzo, which was usually low at this season of the 
year, was in flood in the latter part of May and was very wide south 
of Gorizia. The Italian cavalry had been ordered to capture the 
bridge west of Monfalcone but hesitated and the Austrians de- 
stroyed it, thus preventing any possibility of securing a footing on 
the Carso by surprise. It was not until June 7, two weeks after 
war was declared, that the 3d Italian Army reached the foot of the 
Carso at Monfalcone and it was not until three weeks later that the 
Italians succeeded in getting a second bridge at Sagrado farther 
north where repeated attempts had been made. In the meantime 



105 

the Austrians had been strongly reinforced. The attack of the 
Carso plateau on the front Sagrado-Monfalcone continued through- 
out the year with siege operations alternating with assaults, but at 
the end of the year the Italians had barely gotten a footing on the 
edge of the plateau. 

Toward the end of May the Italian 2d Army attempted to take 
the Sabbatino ridge north of Gorizia on the west bank of the river 
by assault but the position was found to be strongly intrenched and 
resisted all efforts. 

The great assault on the Sabbatino ridge as well as on the Carso 
plateau was made in October after a prolonged bombardment, but 
like the June assault it failed and the heights remained in the pos- 
session of the Austrians at the close of the year. 

At Plava, in the bend of the Isonzo south of Canale, the Italians 
succeeded in securing a bridgehead in June, but were unable to ad- 
vance from it during the year. Still farther north the Italians had 
captured Caporetta on the first day of the war but it only served 
to secure the valley road at this point. On the northern front from 
Switzerland to the Isonzo there were no important operations during 
the year although the Italians gained ground at various points. 

On the whole the campaign on the Italian front had been disap- 
pointing as it had little effect on the operations of the Austro- 
German armies. The difficulties that confronted the 2d and 3d 
Italian armies had apparently not been appreciated when war was 
declared ; the Italians had had no previous experience in trench 
warfare. 



106 



CHAPTER VII. 

OPERATIONS TN TURKEY IN 1915. 

War was begun by Turkey on Russia October 31, 1914, but the 
first formal declarations between Turkey and the Allied Powers was 
made by Russia on November 3, and shortly followed by the other 
powers. 

Accordinjj: to the best information available the Turkish Army 
was made up of 13 army corps of 3 divisions and two regiments of 
cavalry each. The division contained 3 regiments, each with a 
machine gun company, a battalion of rifles and a regiment of field 
artillery with 24 guns. There were two additional divisions not 
included in the corps. The country was divided into four military 
districts with headquarters at Constantinople, Erzingan in Armenia, 
Damascus in Syria, and Bagdad on the Tigris River in Mesopo- 
tamia. The strength of the army on a peace footing was estimated 
as about 250,000 men. The term of service was three years with 
the colors and six in the reserve. 

Attempts had been made to reorganize and train the Turkish 
army between 1909 and 1912 by German officers but with little 
apparent success, as was shown in the first Balkan war in 1912, in 
which eight of its corps were engaged. True to its old traditions, 
the Turkish army proved strong in the defence of positions but 
weak in open warfare. Its staff services and especially its supply 
service were as inefficient as they had been in previous wars. In the 
Balkan war the Turkish Army lost much of its artillery which had 
probably been only partially replaced. 

At the beginning of the war, Allied troops appeared in two of 
its four districts. In the Caucasus district of Russia the Russian 
forces were concentrated at Kars near the frontier of Turkish 
Armenia and soon raiding columns made their way across the fron- 
tier. Ill Mesopotamia a British force landed at the mouth of 
the Tigris River and secured a base at Basra for operations in 
Mesopotamia. 

The Armenian Front. — The Armenian frontier between Russia 
and Turkey extends from the Black Sea to Mount Ararat northeast 
of Lake Van. Tlie Russian base was the fortress of Kars, about 
midway along the front and fifty miles from the frontier. It was 
on a branch of the Caucasus railway with a railhead at Sarikamish, 
fifteen miles from the frontier. The Turkish base was the fortress 



107 

of Ezerum, opposite Kars and also fifty miles from the frontier. 
Its nearest railheads were near Angora, four hundred miles to the 
west and at the end of the Bay:dad railway, two hundred miles 
to the south. Both Kars and Ezerum are about 6,000 feet above 
sea level and in winter the mountains between them are covered 
with snow. 

For operations on this front the Russians had the three corps of 
the Caucasus district with four cavalry divisions; the Turks had the 
three corps of the Armenian district and transported one corps from 
the Constantinople district which was landed at Trebizond on the 
Black Sea. 

About the middle of November, 1914, a Russian column invaded 
Turkish Armenia on the roads running from the frontier to Ezerum 
and reached a point midway between the frontier and that town. 
In the meantime the Turks concentrated their three corps in the 
vicinity of p]zerum and advanced against the Russian front while 
the corps at Trebizond attempted to reach their flank and rear via 
Kardahan. The Turks crossed the frontier early in January but 
the main column met defeat not far from the frontier and the de- 
tached corps got no further than Kardahan. The Turks recrossed 
the frontier and there were no operations on this front during the 
remainder of this year as Russian and Turkish forces were with- 
drawn to other fronts. There were some operations of minor im- 
portance in northern Persia in the vicinity of Tabriz. 

Mesopotamia. — The valley of the Tigris River was occupied by 
two Turkish corps, one at Bagdad, 300 miles from its mouth, and the 
other at Mosul, 200 miles farther north. The British operations in 
Mesopotamia were conducted by the government of India. The first 
expedition, consisting of the 6th Indian division, occupied Basra 
early in November, 1914, to protect the British oil fields in south- 
western Persia. This force was gradually increased to an Army 
corps and in April, 1915, General Nixon was sent to command it. 
He considered his force, the 6th and 12th Indian divisions and a 
cavalry brigade, sufficiently strong to cover more extensively the 
country about Basra in all directions so as to prevent surprise by 
raiding parties. 

The 6th division under General Townshend started northward 
along the Tigris River about the last of May, 1915. It was accom- 
panied by a naval fiotilla of light draft vessels and a large fleet of 
transport vessels of various types. In a little over a month it 
reached Amara about 100 miles from Basra without any serious 
opposition. 



108 

During July the 12th division started up the Euphrates and by 
the end of the month had cleared that river to Nasirieh, also about 
100 miles from Basra. 

The first operations were accomplished with so little difficulty 
that it was now decided to push on to Kut el Amara on the Tigris, 
one hundred miles south of Bagdad, and for this purpose the force 
on the Euphrates was reduced to garrison troops and the remainder 
were gradually transferred to the Tigris to form garrisons along 
the river to protect the communications. 

The advance was begun by the 6th division on August 1 and the 
vicinity of Kut was reached about the last of September. The 
weather was trj/ing, as the thermometer was 110 degrees in the 
shade and the roads were deep in dust. On account of the low water 
river navigation was also difficult. On the river south of Kut there 
was a Turkish division which was skilfully attacked and routed. 
The British captured 1,100 prisoners and 14 guns. 

The pursuit was kept up for as far as Azizieh half way between 
Kut and Bagdad on the Tigris, but after the first days it was found 
that the Turks were retiring in fairly good order and at Azizieh 
early in October it was learned that they had taken up an intrenched 
position at Ctesiphon, midway between Azizieh and Bagdad and 
were waiting an attack. It had been hoped that the Turks could be 
pursued as far as Bagdad without further serious engagements but 
this was now found to be impossible. 

As the second operation had been undertaken simply to secure an 
advance base at Kut, the question now arose as to the advisability 
of dropping back to that point and securing it properly, or of at- 
tempting to make a dash for Bagdad. General Townshend con- 
sidered any further advance hazardous and that it would be more 
prudent to await reinforcements at Kut and advance with at least 
an army corps. His own column had been much reduced by the 
fatiguing operations of the campaign and by some losses in battle. 
General Nixon, upon whom the responsibility of the advance would 
naturally fall, was tempted by the political effect which the capture 
of Bagdad would have and was influenced by the ease with which 
the Turks had been forced from their various positions on the Tig- 
ris River. He was aware of the great interest which had been 
aroused in England and India by the campaign for which he had 
received the congratulations of the King himself. The govern- 
ments of India and Great Britain, although not fully advised of local 
conditions, also encouraged him since the capture of Bagdad would 
be an offset to the failure of the Dardanelles Expedition from which 



109 

the troops were about to be withdrawn. General Nixon therefore 
gave the order for the advance on Bagdad. 

The advance from Azizieh was begun about the middle of Novem- 
ber and on the 21st, General Townshend's column, consisting of the 
6th Indian division a brigade of the 12th division and a brigade of 
cavalry, reached the Turkish position at Ctesiphon. The Turks 
were believed to have about 13,000 regular troops and a force of ir- 
regulars. Here an attack was made by General Townshend on the 
22d, but the position could not be carried. The British force re- 
mained here until the night of the 25th and then when it appeared 
that the Turks were being reinforced it began its retreat on Kut 
harassed by the Turks. That town was reached on December 2 and 
3, and it was decided to hold it until a relief column could reach it. 
The cavalry and most of the shipping were sent down the river. On 
the 8th the place was invested by the Turks and so remained at the 
olose of the year. 

Egypt. — In the autumn of 1914 the Turkish military authorities 
planned a campaign against the British troops in Egypt with a view 
probably of raising an insurrection in that country. It was a form- 
idable undertaking, involving not only the crossing of the desert of 
the Sinai Peninsula, about 150 miles wide, but also the crossing of 
the Suez Canal, defended by vessels of the British Navy and by the 
British forces in Egypt. 

The main column was composed of an army corps of three divi- 
sions which was assembled at Beersheba in the southern part of 
Palestine. It was to cross the frontier about thirty miles from the 
coast and traverse the desert to Ismalia on the Suez Canal. A smal- 
ler column of perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 was to follow the coast road 
from Gaza to El Kantara on the canal, the same route followed by 
Napoleon in his march from Egypt to Acre in 1779 which led him 
to say "Of all the obstacles which cover the frontiers of empires, a 
desert is certainly the most formidable; a chain of mountains like 
the Alps holds second rank ; rivers third." A still smaller column 
was to follow a caravan route still farther south and to reach the 
town of Suez on the canal. 

The main column left Beersheba about the middle of January, 
1915, and reached the canal about the first of February. The side 
columns reached the canal about the same time. In Egypt at this 
time there were the Anzac corps from Australia and New Zealand, 
a Territorial division from England, an Indian force in which there 
were many regular battalions, and the regular Egyptian army. At 
several points along the canal these held bridgeheads on the east 
bank. 



110 

At the canal all attacks of the Turkish forces were repulsed dur- 
ing the first days of February and the Turkish forces retired. The 
losses were insignificant as no counter-attack was made. 

When the attack at the Dardanelles was made a few months 
later most of the Turkish troops were withdrawn from this front 
and there were only raiding operations in it during the remainder of 
the year. 

Dardanelles. — The most important operation in Turkey was the 
Allied attack on the coast defences of the Dardanelles Strait, be- 
tween the Gallipoli peninsula and the Asiatic shore. 

The Dardanelles Strait connecting the Aegean Sea with the Sea of 
Marmora is the western link of the chain of waterways between 
the Aegean and Black seas and is the sea entrance to the harbor of 
Constantinople. From the entrance to the town of Gallipoli it is a 
little over thirty miles in length ; its narrowest width in this section 
is less than a mile and its greatest is about five miles. The minimum 
mid-channel depth is about 150 feet. The surface current flows 
westward at the rate of about two miles an hour. The narrows are 
about sixteen miles from the entrance and along this stretch were 
the principal batteries for the defence. From its western extremity 
at Cape Helles the Gallipoli peninsula gradually increases its width 
from a mile and a half at the entrance to seven miles at the narrows. 
The batteries were therefore everywhere within reach of heavy 
naval guns firing over the peninsula. Those on the north side were 
covered from this fire by being below the crest, but those on the 
Asiatic side were not thus protected. 

The original defenses of the Dardanelles consisted of two masonry 
castellated works built at the narrows about 1500. About the mid- 
dle of the 17th century they were supplemented by two additional 
ones constructed at the entrance. None of these were of any value 
in the defense which relied on modern barbette batteries of 6-inch to 
14-inch guns with ordinary field and siege pieces on mobile car- 
riages and fields of buoyant mines. 

At the entrance of the strait near the old forts were three bat- 
teries mounting two 6-inch, two 9-inch and four 10-inch guns in 
barbette emplacements with high traverses between the guns. On 
the south side there was a battery of four 10.2-inch guns and one of 
two 9-inch guns. Other batteries were of similar guns located in 
suitable places along the channel leading to the narrows. At the 
narrows were large batteries of 11-inch and 14-inch guns. There 
were no turrets or disappearing mounts and the guns as a rule were 
not of recent construction. All the batteries relied upon elevation 



Ill 

for protection against naval fire. The organization and direction of 
the defense against naval attack was assigned to an admiral of the 
German Navy. 

Even before war was formally declared on Turkey a British and 
French blockading fleet appeared off the entrance of the Darda- 
nelles and on Noveml)er 2 opened fire on the batteries at the en- 
trance, but only at long range. It probably served as an indication 
of what would probably follow and no doubt caused the preparation 
of the batteries for defense. 

The decision to attack the Dardanelles, secure Constantinople, 
isolate Turkey and open communication with Russia through the 
Black Sea was one of the main features of the grand strategy of the 
war decided sometime during the winter of 1914-1915 by the British 
and French governments. If successful, it would cut off" all com- 
munication between Turkey and the other Central Powers and would 
have an important effect on the neutral states of Rumania, Bul- 
garia and Greece, all of whom would probably then join the Allied 
Powers. It would permit Russia to be supplied by her allies with 
ammunition and artillery in exchange for food supplies. 

The decision was arrived at gradually and as result of the urging 
of the head of the naval department of Great Britain. Early in 
January, 1916, it was to be merely a naval demonstration made in 
aid of the Russians in the Caucasus district with the hope of draw- 
ing the Turks from that front. Later in the month it developed 
into a plan to reduce the defenses by a naval attack in order to let 
the naval forces seize Constantinople. This plan met with consider- 
able opposition, and about the middle of February it was finally 
decided to make a joint naval and land attack. However a prelim- 
inary naval attack seems never to have been wholly dropped. 

The difficulty in carrying out the last plan was to secure the neces- 
sary troops. Both the British and French armies in France had lost 
heavily in 1914 and it seemed probable that Generals French and 
Joffre would in 1915 need every man that could be spared. Neither 
was in favor of the new plan. It was not until the Turkish invasion 
of Egypt in February, 1915, failed, that Lord Kitchener then at the 
head of the War Department, was willing to consider the plan. He 
now conceded that most of the troops in Egypt were available for the 
expedition, but these were mostly new troops and it was desirable 
to have at least one division of regular troops. There was such a 
division, the 29th, being formed in Great Britain but it was not 
until the middle of March, after the failure of the British attack 
at Neuve Chapelle, that Lord Kitchener consented to let it sail. 



112 

In the meantime the naval force in the Aegean Sea was being 
constantly increased and by the middle of February there was as- 
sembled a fleet of fourteen British and four French battleships, 
most of them equipped with four 12-inch and ten to twelve 6-inch 
guns and among them the recently constructed "Queen Elizabeth" 
and "Inflexible" of the British Navy, the former carrying eight 15- 
inch guns and the latter eight 12-inch guns. For sweeping the 
mine fields there had been assembled a large fleet of North Sea 
trawlers and a minor fleet of cruisers and destroyers. 

Notwithstanding the fact that naval attacks on land batteries 
had in preceding wars usually failed to accomplish their object, the 
Admiral of the Fleet believed that with warships assembled at the 
Dardanelles he could succeed. He may have been influenced by the 
success of the British naval attack on the defenses of Alexandria, 
Egypt, in 1882. In that attack however there was no mine field to 
be passed and the batteries were located on a long sea front and 
not along a narrow channel sixteen miles long. 

The naval attack began February 19 when the batteries at the 
entrance were bombarded to permit the mine sweepers to enter the 
channel and sweep up the mines. The batteries at the entrance were 
easily silenced but they were not materially injured until the 26th 
when a landing party destroyed those at the end of the Gallipoli 
Peninsula. The batteries on the Asiatic side, some miles inside the 
entrance which interfered with mine sweepers were next bom- 
barded intermittently and while they could be silenced, as the men 
could not remain at the guns under the terrific fire, the fleet was 
unable to destroy the guns. 

On March 5, the bombardment of the batteries on the Gallipoli 
side of the narrows was undertaken by the "Queen Elizabeth" and 
"Inflexible" with their eight 15-inch and eight 12-inch guns and 
another warship with its four 12-inch guns firing across the 
peninsula. Seaplanes were employed to note the effect of the fire. 
On the following day, the bombardment was directed on the bat- 
teries at the narrows on the Asiatic side. Then the attack on these 
batteries was made from the entrance of the channel in which the 
mine sweepers had been at work every night. 

While the navy was trying to silence the batteries, the land force 
was being organized and on March 17, the commander of the land 
force, General Ian Hamilton, arrived at the advance naval head- 
quarters on the island of Tenedos off the coast south of the entrance. 

On the following day the last attempt was made by the British 
and French navies to force the entrance. The battleships entered 
the strait in squadrons in succession to batter the Turkish batteries. 



113 ' 

In the course of the day, of the four French battleships one was sunk 
and the three others badly damaged ; of the British battleships, 
two were sunk and the "Inflexible" was badly damaged ; all either 
by gun fire or by mines which had drifted down the channel. The 
other vessels were then withdrawn and the attempt to force the 
entrance by the navy ceased. 

When General Hamilton reached the Dardanelles, the transports 
with a French division and British transports with the naval divi- 
sion and a part of the Anzac corps were in the harbor of Mudros 
on the Island of Lemnos which was to l)e the base of operations. 
An inspection of the British transports showed that they had been 
hastily loaded with troops and supplies and would have to be re- 
loaded before operations were begun. The fleet therefore returned 
to Egypt. General Hamilton accompanied it and did not return until 
the 7th of April when he had an opportunity to study the problem 
of attacking the fortifications by land. In the meantime the Turks 
under German supervision had been busy in preparing for the land- 
ing which they must have known would probably follow the failure 
of the naval attack. 

The problem of the Allies was by no means an easy one as they 
were now to meet the Turks in a kind of warfare in which they 
had always shown great capacity, the defense of fortified positions. 
From Cape Helles, the end of the Gallipoli Peninsula where it ter- 
minates in bluffs one hundred feet high, the ground rises to the 
Krithia or Achi Baba ridge which extends across the peninsula about 
five miles from Cape Helles. This ridge is between 400 and 600 feet 
above sea level and terminates in a peak, Achi Baba, 700 feet. 

At the narrows, separated from the Krithia ridge by a wide valley, 
is another ridge. Pasha Dagh, extending almost across the penin- 
sula; its highest part is between 800 and 1,000 feet above sea level. 
The principal coast batteries were at the eastern end of this ridge. 

Six miles to the north of Pasha Dagh and again separated by a 
wide valley is the Sari Bair ridge, between 800 and 1,000 feet high 
which terminates at the Aegean Sea in steep bluffs and runs in a 
northwesterly direction. 

To reach the Pasha Dagh ridge, on which the main batteries 
commanding the channel from the Gallipoli side were located, an 
attack from the west would have to secure the Krithia ridge, and 
an attack from the north would have to secure the Sari Bair ridge. 

When in the latter part of April the transports arrived from 
Egypt they brought with them the 29th regular division, the Anzac 
corps made up of the 1st Australian and the Australian-New 



114 

Zealand divisions and a Royal Naval division. Some of the bat- 
talions of this last division had been in the naval brigades at 
Antwerp. The French contingent consisted of a Colonial division 
made up both of white and native troops. In all General Hamilton 
had at his disposal five divisions or about 75,000 combatant troops. 
As a possible reserve in Egypt there was an Indian brigade and the 
42d division of Territorials from England which had been sent to 
Egypt for training. 

After a careful study of his problem General Hamilton decided 
to land the 29th division at the end of the peninsula, which is only 
a mile and a half wide, to secure the Achi Baba ridge for future 
operations. The Anzac corps was to land about eleven miles from 
the end, where the peninsula is less than five miles broad, with a 
view of capturing the Sari Bair ridge and cutting off the retreat of 
the Turks eastward. To confuse the Turks, the French were to 
make a landing on the south side of the entrance and the naval 
division was to threaten a landing on the north shore near the 
end of the Gallipoli Peninsula at Bulair. 

The Turkish army of the Dardanelles consisted of six divisions 
under the command of the German General, Liman von Sanders. 
Uncertain as to the plans of the Allies, he posted one division at the 
end of the peninsula with another in reserve near Maidos ; one divi- 
sion at Bulair with another in reserve at Gallipoli ; two were posted 
on the Asiatic side to prevent landings at the mouth of the Darda- 
nelles and opposite the island of Tenedos. The two reserve divisions 
at Maidos and Gallipoli would be employed on either side of the 
strait. 

The problem of landing the Allied forces was given special atten- 
tion; in this operation the troops would have the support of the 
fire of the fleet and the use of its trawlers, launches and life boats. 
As a rule the landing battalions were loaded in the life boats and 
several boats in column were towed by the launches from the 
trawlers or other vessels by which they were brought from the base. 
At the end of the peninsula the 29th division was to make five land- 
ings; three along the bluff at the end, one in the strait about two 
miles from the end and one on the north coast about four miles from 
the end. The three landings at the end were to be made in coves 
each about half a mile wide in which the ground rose more or less 
abruptly to the plateau one hundred or more feet above the sea. 
About a battalion was to be landed at each point and at each point 
the battalion was to be reinforced as rapidly as possible. At one 
of the coves the reinforcements were to be landed from a specially 



115 

prepared collier which was to be run aground and the men were to 
leave by a door cut in the hulk near the bow. Lighters were to be 
taken along to be used to form a bridge to the shore if the water 
was found too deep to wade. It was expected that the. fire of the 
naval vessels that accompanied each party would destroy the de- 
fenses and keep down the fire so that the landing could be made 
with comparatively little loss. When sufficient troops were landed 
and the line could be formed, the troops were to advance and seize 
their objective, the Achi Baba ridge, which it was hoped to take 
the first day. The Turks had expected landings in these coves and 
had provided for them by a series of intrenchments, redouts, ma- 
chine gun positions and wire entanglements. Entanglements were 
constructed in and close to the water and near the crest of the 
slope; the coves were separated by entanglements. 

On the night of April 24, in a calm sea the vessels carrying the 
troops left the advance base at the island of Tenedos and steamed 
towards their various landing places. About 5 a. m. the bombard- 
ment of the Turkish intrenchments was begun by the battleships 
detailed for that purpose and some time thereafter the landing 
parties were towed to their destinations. The landing of the 29th 
division proved more costly and difficult than had been anticipated, 
as the naval bombardment had produced little effect on the Turkish 
intrenchments near the shore. This was particularly true at two 
of the coves at the end of the peninsula where the boats were ex- 
posed to heavy rifle and machine gun fire and as the men jumped 
out they found themselves held up by heavy wire entanglements. 
At points where the troops landed without great loss, they found 
great difficulty in capturing the positions organized by the Turks 
on the plateau above. At one point it was even necessary to with- 
draw the troops to the boats. The collier grounded in deep water 
and great difficulty was experienced in manouvering the lighters 
under fire. Notwithstanding its heavy losses, the 29th division 
succeeded in getting a foothold on the end of the peninsula for a 
base of operations. 

A part of the French division made a landing on the south side of 
the entrance on the same day and captured some works but was 
shortly withdrawn and the French division -took over the right of 
the line held bj^ the 29th division. On the return of the naval divi- 
sion from its demonstration it was also landed here. 

Early in May this front was reinforced by an East Indian brigade 
and 42d division of Territorials, both from Egypt, and by a second 
French division. In June another Territorial division, the 52d, ar- 



116 

rived from England. During this time replacement troops also ar- 
rived to replace the losses in the 29th division. 

After the first advance, warfare on this front settled down to 
trench warfare in which the casualties were heavy and little pro- 
gress was made. German howitzers soon made their appearance 
behind the Turkish lines and the whole zone was brought under 
fire. The fire of these howitzers both from the Gallipoli and Asiatic 
side was able to reach the beaches where the supplies were landed. 
In the latter part of May a German submarine arrived via the Medi- 
terranean and sank two of the British battleships. This caused 
the withdrawal of these ships and deprived the land force of their 
assistance. These were later replaced by light draft monitors. 

With the passing of each week the Turkish intrenched line be- 
came stronger and by June it became evident that there was little 
prospect of reaching the Achi Baba ridge on this front, as the 
Allied troops were not equipped with sufficient artillery for the 
purpose. 

On April 24th, the day the 29th division landed at the end of the 
peninsula, the Anzac corps made a landing in a shallow cove at the 
foot of the slopes of a spur of the Sari Bair ridge a little farther 
east than originally planned. The landing was not seriously op- 
posed and the troops pushed up the slopes at once to secure as much 
ground as possible before the Turkish reserves could arrive. On the 
first day the Anzac corps secured nearly all the ground it was able 
to take during the first three months. This was a triangle of bar- 
ren ridges and gullies measuring about a mile and a half along the 
shore and extending inward about three quarters of a mile. It was 
almost surrounded by still higher ground and was at first held with 
difficulty. A part of the beach was exposed to fire from positions 
held by the Turks to the north and south. The Anzacs were practi- 
cally without water which was brought in ships and stored in large 
reservoirs constructed at the foot and on the slopes of the bluffs 
from which it was carried to the lines on mule back or by carriers. 

It was soon evident that unless strongly reinforced this force 
could not advance, but as long as it remained it would retain a large 
Turkish force, since it threatened Sari Bair ridge. This was practi- 
cally its function during May, June and Ji^y while the main attack 
was being directed against the Achi Baba ridge. It was subject to 
frequent attacks and until thoroughly intrenched its losses were 
considerable. 

As his troops were held up on both fronts a few days after their 
landing, General Hamilton requested reinforcement by at least two 



117 

corps in addition to the troops already en route from Egypt and 
England. In July therefore there were sent him from England 
three divisions of the new army, the 10th, 11th and 13th; these 
were to be followed by the infantry of two additional Territorial 
divisions, the 53d and 54th, and the 2d Australian division. On 
August 1, he had at his disposal the 8th corps composed of the 29th, 
42d and 52d divisions; the 9th corps composed of the 10th, 11th and 
13th divisions of the new army ; the Anzac corps ; the naval divi- 
sion; the Indian brigade and the French corps. The 52d and 54th 
divisions were to arrive by August 10 and the 2d Australian divi- 
sion about the same time. 

The problem now arose as to the best disposition to be msade of 
the new reinforcements. At this time it was assumed that the 
Turks had 33,000 men in front of the western line, 25,000 in front 
of the Anzac corps, 3,000 guarding the coast to the east of the 
Anzac corps and 39,000 in reserve. The one advantage the British 
had was their ability to land at any selected point. After careful 
consideration it was decided to make the new attack on the Anzac 
front and combine with it a landing in Suvla Bay and an attack 
, on the right flank of the Turks confronting the Anzac corps. The 
troops in the west were to attack at the same time to prevent the 
Turks from withdrawing troops from this front. For the new at- 
tack the Anzac corps was reinforced by the 13th division, the East 
Indian brigade and a brigade of the 10th division. 

August 6 was selected for the attack and that night the Suvla 
Bay force was landed. The main attack was delivered by the rein- 
forced Anzac force between August 6 and 10, and although at one 
time the troops had the western end of the Sari Bair ridge in their 
possession, they were driven off before the position could be con- 
solidated and the main attack failed. The Anzac corps had however 
greatly improved its position by extending its area of occupation 
and would have been able to cooperate with the Suvla Bay force 
had that advanced as had been planned. 

At Suvla Bay, the forces were landed without any opposition and 
on the day of the landing there were few Turkish troops to dispute 
their advance. Due to lack of energy and initiative on the part of 
the British commanders here, the troops did not advance as planned 
and the advantage gained by this unexpected landing was lost as 
the Turkish commanders soon had their reserves en route for the 
new front. The troops first landed were later reinforced by the 
29th division from Helles and by the two Territorial divisions but 
the Turks were now so strong that no progress could be made. 



IIH 



l\y lilt' lirst of ScplcmlxT, it was evident Uial willioiil, lur}.^(! re- 
iiiforeemeiils willi adeiiuale artillery iiothiiijj: could he accomplished 
on the (iailipoli I'ein'nsida and the withdrawal of the force heKaii 
to he considered. As (leneral Hamilton was opposed to the with- 
drawal lie was i-eplaced hy (Jeneral IVIunro, who commanded the .'id 
Ih'itish Army in France, and who was sent to repoiM on the situa- 
tion and make a recommendation. lie recommended the evacuation 
of the peninsula and repoi-led that I he withdrawal could he efl'ected 
without serious loss. The linal decision was made \)y Lord Kitchener 
who was sent to the N(>ar lOast in Novemher. The withdi-awal was 
heifun in Decemher and compleled in eJanuary ; it was a well (ilaniied 
aiul execided optiration which involved few casual(i{!S and only a 
moderati! loss of supplies. Fven hefore the evacuation a IJiitish and 
a I'lt'iich division had been sent to Salonica al the re<iuest of the 
French Kovcrnnicnl to foi'm the nucleus of a force to assist the 
Serhs. The othei" French division joined this force but most of the 
Hritish forces were sent to Fjvypt to he distributed on the (lilfereiit 
fi'onts. 

The failure of the (Jallipoli operations may he ascribed to various 
causes, tlu? principal ones beinjj: an underestimate of the resistance 
that could l)t? olfei'ed by the Tui-ks and an overestimate of the as- 
sistance that could be renderi'd by the liritish Navy, ijike the 
Hi'it ish foires on the west front at this time, the troops were badly 
ecptipped to attaik intrenched positions. 

The following extracts are from the report of the ('hief of Artil- 
lery of I he Ih'itish forces. ((Jallipoli Diary — Sir Ian Hamilton.) 

'*The whole stoi-y of the artillery at llelles may be summed up 
in the followitu'" sentences: insulliciency of Kuns of every nature; 
insulliciency of ammunition of e\'ery nature, especially ll.I'].; in- 
sullicient pi'ovision made by the Nome Authorities for spai'e Runs, 
spare cartrid^os, s])are parts, adetpiate repairing!: workshops, or 
for a rej-'ular daily, weekly or monlhlv supply of ammunition; j^runs 
proN'ided often of an obsolete pattern and so liadly worn by p»'e\ious 
use as to be most iiuu'curate; lack of acroplaiu's, trained obsei'\t>rs 
and of all the re(]uisites for air observation; total failure to produce 
th(> Ireni'h mortars and bombs to which the clostMiess of the oj)pos- 
iiivr lines at llelles would have lent themselvt>s well — in short, total 
lack <»f oi-j-vanizat ion at home to provide e\'en the most rudimentary 
and indispensable artillei\v retpiisites for (lail.\' consumption; not to 
spt>ak (d" dowm'ij.':ht caivlessness which icsulted in wron^' slu'lls be- 
inj-v sent to the wron^ j-funs, and new t\p(>s of fuses bein^ sent with- 
out fuse keys and new ty]»es of hovvit/.er shells without ran^e tables. 
These serious faults provoked their own i)enallies in the shajie of 
tlu» heavy losses sulVered by our infantry and artillei->'. which mi^vl^t 
ha\'e been to a ^reat nuMsure avei'tt'd if suiru'iiMil l\)iet lu)U.uhl and 
attention had been devoted to the 'side show' at the Dardanelles. 



Ill) 

"The complete absence of H. E. was severely fell, as shrai)iicl 
were of little use for destroyinjx trenches, machine vrnn emphice- 
nients, etc. Thoreforo, in each and every Hritish attack, success 
was jeoparcHzed and our infantry exposed (o ci'ucl losses, hei'ause, 
iirstly, there was not sullicient amnumition to pr(>pare their attack, 
and, secondly, there was no H. E. (except for howitzers) to destroy 
the machine ^uns in their emi)lac(Mrients. The latter, therefore, in- 
llicted ).!.reat losses on our infantry in thiMr advance. 

"As for heavy artillery, practically speak injr, there was none. 
Only one G-inch howitzer battery (4 howitzers) and one ()0-])r. bat- 
tery (4 jruns) were in action at Ilelles up to ,lnly when four more 
jruns of the latter calibre* were landed. Unfoilunately, however, 
the ()0-prs. were of littU; use, as the recoil was too }j:reat for the 
carriaj?es and the latter broke down beyond repair by our limited 
nvsources ii\'\or very few rounds. At tin* b«»j^inninii: of August only 
one l)()-pr. ^un remained in action. ( 'onse(|uent ly. we had no heavy 
guns capable of replying to the Turkish heavy jifuns which enveloped 
us on three sides, and fi-om whose tire our infantry and artillery 
suffered severely. 

"As for anti-aircraft Kim-"^. <bey did not t'xist at all and the hostile 
aeroplanes used to lly over and drop bombs ad lib, without fear of 
molestation, the only saving clause being that the enemy ajjpeared 
to possess almost as few a(M'o|)lanes as the Hi'itish. 

"As regards trencii mortars, the su[)ply was hopelessly inade- 
(puite. I caimot give the exact figures, but 1 believe there were 
not a dozen at Ilelles dui'ing the whole period 1 was thei'e, and these 
were of such an indilfei-ent type as to be practically useless, and 
for this reason no one l)ot liered about them. No pi'ovision appeal's 
to have been made for the supply of such necessities of trench war- 
fare by the Home Authoi'ities. This appears to be indefensible, as 
T belit^'e very early in the opcM'ations theii* provision was specially 
asked for by (I. H. i}. The absolute failure to supply such articles 
of vital necessity eventually led to the French C-in-C. at Ilelles lend- 
ing the British two demizel tn'uch mortars and large (puuitities 
of ammunition. Th(*se were nuunied by artillery detachments, and 
by their magnificent work and the constant demand from the in- 
fantry for their services, it was conclusively proved what an invalu- 
able aid a suflicient supply of these weapons would have been." 

The British casualties have been given as about 100, ()()() and about 
an e(pial luimber were evacuated on account of sickness. The total 
Turkish casualties are also given as 200,000. 



120 



CHAPTER VIII. 

ft 

GENERAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS ON THE 
WEST FRONT IN 1916. 

The operations of 1915 had been a disappointment to the govern- 
ments and peoples of all the Allied nations. The Russian Army, 
instead of capturing Cracow and completing the destruction of the 
Austrian Army as had been confidently expected, had been com- 
pelled to withdraw even from the frontier fortified line on the 
Nieman, Narew and Vistula rivers. Neither the attacks made by 
the British and Fi-ench troops on the west front nor the accession of 
Italy to the Allied cause had been able to stop the advance of the 
Austro-German forces in the east. 

The Dardanelles operations on land and sea had failed to open 
that channel and in Mesopotamia the advance on Bagdad had re- 
sulted in the defeat at Ctesiphon and the investment of a British 
division at Kut. 

The diplomatic efforts to form a Balkan league had failed and the 
defeat of the Russian armies had caused Bulgaria to declare war 
on the side of the Central Powers. Rumania was still neutral and 
while the government was inclined to assist the Allies, it could 
hardly be expected to declare war until the Russian Army showed 
signs of recovery. Greece was also neutral and while there was a 
strong party under the late Prime Minister Venizelos in favor of 
immediately joining the Allies, the government itself was cautious 
and did not consider the military situation at the time favorable 
for action on the part of Greece. The British forces had evacuated 
Gallipoli and released the Turks, the Bulgarian armies were on the 
Greek frontier, and there was still a possibility that the Allies would 
evacuate Salonica. At the end of the year there were five British 
and three French divisions at that place. 

During the year Great Britain had made great progress in de- 
veloping her industries for war purposes and toward the close of the 
year when it became evident that she could not longer rely upon 
voluntary enlistment to recruit her armies, steps were taken to in- 
troduce conscription in England, Scotland and Wales. It was not 
however until May, 1916, that the final amendment passed that 
placed all men between the ages of 18 and 41 in the Reserve sub- 
ject to call to the colors ; under this act exemptions were permitted 
in order not to cripple important industries and for other causes. 



121 

These exemptions made it difFicult during the following years to 
furnish the replacements demanded by the field armies. Toward 
the close of 1915, General French had at his own request been re- 
lieved from the command of the armies in France and was suc- 
ceeded by General Haig who commanded the 1st corps at the 
beginning of the war and was later in command of the 1st Army. 

In France, too, great progress in the development of industries 
for war purposes had been made. Tn the course of the year there 
had also been some changes in the higher commands of the army. 
Toward the end of 1915 when the P>ench troops were sent to 
Salonica, the Army of the Orient was created and General Serrail 
was sent there in command. General Joifre was now made Com- 
mander in Chief of the French Armies in the Orient and France 
and General Castelnau was made Chief of Staff of the French Army. 
Not satisfied with the simple supervision of the two forces, General 
Joffre retained the actual command of the forces on the west front. 
In order to simplify control, the French armies on the west front 
had been divided into three groups under Generals Foch, Castelnau 
and Dubail. When Castelnau was made Chief of Staff, General 
Langle, who had commanded the 4th Army, was placed in command 
of the central group. 

In 1914 the conduct of the war had been left largely to the mili- 
tary commanders, but in 3915, in order that the governments 
might exercise more complete control there was organized at Paris 
the first Anglo-French Council which was expanded in 1916 to in- 
clude representatives from Belgium, Russia, Italy and Serbia. 

The great Russian retreat had a very serious effect upon the in- 
ternal conditions of Russia, since it led to distrust and criticism of 
the executive branches of the government; these were the first 
indications of the breaking out of the great revolution. To restore 
confidence, the Czar took personal command of the army and re- 
moved the Minister of War. Conditions in the war department were 
greatly improved, but the task of recruiting and supplying the army 
and restoring its morale was too difficult to be properly performed 
in the unsettled condition of the country. Following the precedent 
of 1812, the Russians in their retreat had destroyed villages and 
farms and the great mass of fugitives from them added to the 
difficulties of supply and general discontent. 

Although the campaigns of the Austro-German armies had over- 
come the menace of the Russian armies on the east front and had 
won the alliance of Bulgaria and rail connection with Turkey, they 
had not resulted in peace with Russia nor had they prevented Italy 



122 

from joining the Allies. The successful defense of Gallipoli removed 
all danger of a successful Allied advance on Constantinople and 
with the Russian campaign had prevented Rumania and Greece 
from joining the Allies. The campaigns of 1915 had really been 
defensive rather than offensive measures and the German G. H. Q. 
realized that -if the war were to be won it must be won on the west 
front. 

For the year 1916, the Allies decided to remain on the defensive 
until the Russian armies were reorganized and then to assume the 
offensive simultaneously on the west, east and Italian fronts. This 
plan however had to be modified due to the earlier offensive opera- 
tions undertaken by the Germans and Austrians on the west and 
Italian fronts. After much discussion it was decided to hold 
Salonica as a base for future operations although there was but 
little prospect of this force assuming the offensive during the early 
part of 1916 unless the Greek government decided to join the Allies. 
To evacuate Salonica would prevent all hope of assistance from the 
Serbs, Rumanians and Greeks. In order to regain the prestige of 
the British government with its Mahommedan subjects, it was es- 
sential to continue the operations in Mesopotamia and if possible 
relieve the force at Kut. It was also essential in view of the re- 
lease of Turkish forces at Gallipoli to prevent a successful Turkish 
advance on Egypt and if possible to assume the offensive on this 
front. In cooperation with the British forces on the Turkish front, 
the Russian Army of Caucasia now under the command of Grand 
Duke Nicholas, was again to advance into Turkish Armenia and 
draw Turkish troops to that front. 

On the European fronts, German G. H. Q. requested the Austrians 
and Bulgarians to remain on the defensive. Should the Austrians 
weaken their troops on the east front to take the offensive against 
Italy, it was feared that the Russians would break through their 
weakened lines. On the Salonica front, an advance against the 
Allied lines about Salonica had little prospect of success while it 
might cause the Greek government to declare war on the side of the 
Allies. Most of the German and Austrian forces were withdrawn 
from Serbia early in 1916 to be prepared to act against Rumania 
or to reinforce the Italian and Russian fronts. The Austrians did 
not agree to the program as outlined but determined to assume 
the offensive against Italy to relieve the pressure on their 
forces on the Isonzo. German G. H. Q. decided to remain on the 
defensive on the east front and once more attempt to secure a deci- 
sion in the west. After carefully considering the various fronts, 
it was decided to attack the fortress of Verdun. 



123 

Until the winter of 1914, the infantry arms were confined to the 
rifle and the 2 machine guns per battaHon. When the armies set- 
tled down to trench warfare, the hand grenade soon made its ap- 
pearance. In 1916 there were introduced the rifle grenade, the light 
machine gun and the 37-mm, gun. A heavy machine gun company 
with 8 to 12 guns was attached to each battalion in the French 
Army. In order to furnish the men for this service, many of the 
French regiments were reduced to three battalions. Two 37-mm. 
guns were assigned to each regiment. In 1916, the number of light 
and heavy guns per 1,000 of infantry was greatly increased and 
gas shells came into more common use. Schools of instruction be- 
hind the lines were also introduced for the training of troops with- 
drawn from the lines. 

Verdun. — From the very beginning of the war, the Germans had 
shown a desire to isolate and capture the fortress of Verdun, which 
was on the direct rai^way line from Metz to the Marne River and 
occupied a threatening position with respect to one of their main 
lines of communications, the railway from Luxem.burg and Thion- 
ville along the Belgian boundary to Mezieres. It was from the 
French lines on both sides of the Meuse north of Verdun that the 
American Meuse-Argonne drive was made in 1919 to secure this 
railway. 

The first attempt to isolate Verdun was made early in September, 
1914, during the Marne Campaign, when a column was sent from 
Metz with heavy artillery to capture Fort Troyon of the Verdun- 
Toul defensive curtain ten miles south of the fortress while the 3d 
French and V German armies were fighting between the Meuse and 
Aire rivers to the west. Fort Troyon was badly battered but a 
relief column arrived from Toul before the Germans could effect an 
entrance into the fort. 

The second attempt was made late in September, 1914, after the 
2d French Army had been sent to the north of Paris. At that time 
the Germans captured the fort near St. Mihiel about twenty miles 
from Verdun and established the St. Mihiel salient. At St. Mihiel 
the Germans were on the Meuse River and prevented all communica- 
tion with Verdun by the double-track railway along the valley of 
the Meuse. 

The third attempt was the campaign in the Argonne in the winter 
of 1914 by means of which the Germans reached a point in the 
Argonne about twenty miles almost due west of Verdun and brought 
under fire both the double-track railway running west from Verdun 
to Chalons on the Marne and the national highway which ran 



124 

through the Argonne to Verdun paraUel to the railway. Railway 
and highway communication to Verdun was thereby limited to a 
single-track railway and the highways running to Bar le Due and 
Revigny on the Paris-Toul railway. 

At the beginning of 1916 Verdun was in a reentrant curve in the 
German lines which surrounded it through an arc of 240 degrees. 
From Boureuilles on the Aire River the German line ran easterly to 
a point on the Meuse River ten miles north of Verdun, and then 
around the town via Orne and Etain and Fresnes to St. Mihiel. If 
Verdun could be taken, the German line would be much shortened 
and the dangerous St. Mihiel salient would be removed. Besides the 
reasons above given for the great German attack on Verdun, its fall 
would have a great moral effect. To the French people Verdun was 
the bulwark of their eastern system of defenses. Military men un- 
derstood that the forts were no longer proof against modern artil- 
lery, but this the people did not understand and the government 
would have found it difficult to explain its fall. 

The town of Verdun lies in the valley of the Meuse River and its 
fortifications form an important bridgehead. It was first fortified 
many centuries ago and has been repeatedly besieged. At the time 
of the Franco-German war it was simply a walled town with a 
citadel but without exterior forts. After that war it was surrounded 
by a girdle of forts on the circumference of a circle with a five-mile 
radius; this was considered a sufficient radius to protect the town 
from bombardment. With the development of artillery new forts 
were added and the existing forts strengthened by armored turrets. 
During the first year of the war it was not attacked and after the 
German retreat, the lines of the 3d French Army were developed 
in its front and the commander of the fortress commanded only the 
garrisons of the forts. Due to calls for heavy artillery, the forts 
were gradually dismantled of all but turret guns and in August, 
1915, the commander of the fortress, General Herr, took over the 
exterior lines. His command extended from the right of the 3d 
French Army in the Argonne to the left of the 1st French Army 
just north of St. Mihiel. Two divisions were west of the Meuse, 
five east of the Meuse, and about two in reserve. In his front was 
about an equal force of German troops. Under the fortress com- 
mander steps were taken to strengthen the lines previously in- 
trenched but the works were far from complete at the beginning 
of 1916. 

According to General Falkenhayn, the Chief of Staff of the Ger- 
man Army, the decision to attempt the capture of Verdun was made 



125 

early in the winter of 1915-1916 after the close of operations on 
the other fronts. It was ascertained that seventeen or eighteen 
divisions in addition to those already on this front could be made 
available for the attack and these were withdrawn from the front 
and rested and trained. The total front of attack was assigned to 
the German Crown Prince who commanded the V German Army 
who at once began the installation of the heavy artillery which was 
to be employed in the attack. The first stage of the German attack 
was designed to force the French troops out of their lines east of 
the Meuse River both above and below Verdun and across the river. 
In order to understand their plan a short description of the French 
position is necessary. 

Both north and south of Verdun there is a plateau running north 
and south six or seven miles wide which commands the river to the 
west and the Woevre plain to the east by several hundred feet. The 
plateau slopes steeply to the west and east and is cut by deep 
ravines which carry the drainage both east and west. These 
ravines break up the surface into a number of irregular ridges. 
The outer French line crossed this plateau from the Meuse River 
to the Woevre plain about 10 miles north of Verdun. This part of 
the line, six or seven miles long, consisted of a number of strong 
points formed of villages and woods organized for defense and 
formed the main line of defense of considerable depth. Its weakness 
lay in the intervals between the strong points not so strongly or- 
ganized and the lack of adequate covered communications connect- 
ing it with the country in rear. A second line had been selected 
some two miles in rear but time had not permitted of its thorough 
organization. A third position had been selected five miles in rear 
of the outer line where Fort Douaumont, a great masonry fortress 
had been constructed before the war on the highest point of the 
ridge. Fort Douaumont was designed to command the entire ridge 
to the north but like the other forts had been dismantled and left 
to a weak garrison. From the base of the plateau the French outer 
line formed an arc of circle with a 10-mile radius through the 
Woevre plain and again reached the plateau southwest of Fresnes. 

The main German attack was to be made from the north between 
the Meuse River and the plain which if successful would cause the 
French to evacuate their lines in the Woevre plain. It was then 
thought if the attack could be vigorously followed up the French 
would retire across the Meuse River. The front selected for the 
main attack was a favorable one since there were extensive woods 
behind the German front which would conceal the heavy artillery 
with which it was designed to open the attack. 



126 

The preparations made by the Germans in these woods did not 
escape the observations of the French air planes and about the 
middle of January the commander of the fortress made a report and 
requested reinforcements. About the same time, General Joffre 
sent the Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Castelnau, to 
report on the situation. Castelnau advised that the second line 
should be completed and other lines undertaken farther to the rear. 
At this time however the weather was very unfavorable for work 
and little could be effected. At this time, the 2d French Army 
under General Petain was in rest areas after the operations in 
Champagne, and in the early part of February some of its divisions 
were moved up within supporting distance of Verdun. 

During the early part of February, the three German corps as- 
signed to the main attack, were moved into line across the plateau 
north of Verdun and the lines in the Woevre plain were reinforced. 
Fogs and rain prevented the opening of the attack until the morn- 
ing of February 21 when about 7 a. m. an intense fire was opened 
from the Argonne to St. Mihiel and demonstrations were made on 
other fronts. The infantry moved forward just before dusk. 

The method of attack was a further development of the methods 
of attack employed by Foch and Castelnau in France and by Mack- 
ensen in Galicia in 1915. It is described by a French writer as 
follows : 

"The principle governing all these attacks is that of avoiding a 
struggle of men against materiel. It is by the employment of artil- 
lery alone that one must overcome the obstacles developed during 
the war of positions ; it is the artillery that must make the breach 
in the defenses. In Artois (May, 1915), we were satisfied with 
making breaches in the enemy's wire entanglements. In Cham- 
pagne (September, 1915), we went a step farther; we employed the 
artillery for three days in minutely destroying the positions them- 
selves. This method almost succeeded. What lessons did the Ger- 
mans draw from these attacks? In the first place, they shortened 
the duration of the preparation substituting greater violence making 
it at the same time shorter and more powerful. Time is half the 
value of preparations in war. To shorten the preliminary prepara- 
tions is to increase the surprise. This is further multiplied by the 
intensity of the fire; hence the inordinate increase in the number 
and caliber of the pieces. To shower in a given time a greater 
number of tons of steel and explosive is to concentrate all their 
effects. The material eft'ect is doubled by the moral effect. The 
third characteristic of the system is the depth of the zone covered ; 
no longer is there safety in a zone from fifteen to twenty kilometers 
in depth. Bridges, cross-roads, ravines, etc., are all enveloped in 
the same universal storm and the same terror. 



127 

"Finally, to complete the demoralization, the Germans added to 
the explosive shells an unknown proportion of tear and suffocating 
gas shells. At the end of some hours of this annihilating fire, even 
the forms of objects changed. Villages are effaced and seem to be 
swallowed up. In the place of woods there is only an entanglement 
of trunks and abatis. The face of nature is as strange as the land- 
scape of another world. Nothing is more German than this manner 
of operating with sovereign force producing in a few moments with 
mechanical power the ravages of a cyclone. 

"In this system it is artillery which attacks and becomes the as- 
saulting arm. The guns have the effect of a battering ram which 
levels all before it and behind marches the infantry almost without 
loss. It is this which permitted the Germans, among other novelties, 
to omit the construction of approach trenches and jumping-off 
parallels. This circumstance (it was repeated March 21, 1918), is 
one of those which served to deceive us as to the imminence of 
the attack. As long as the enemy was not seen to push forward 
his trenches to the distance for assault, there was nothing to fear. 
To jump off under artillery fire, advance through our barrage fire 
and entanglements in the open for a distance of 500 meters was a 
folly which found everyone incredulous. Now, these jump-off 
trenches were constructed in Champagne but were omitted at Ver- 
dun. The troops assembled for the attack in the front lines them- 
selves. The Germans paid dearly for this audacity ; their reserves 
had to suffer from our counter-preparation. But it was a risk to run. 
Save in a few places, the two infantries were nowheres in contact. 
The mean width of "no man's land" was 500 to 800 meters. At 
certain points, the Germans attacked at the almost incredible dis- 
tance of 1,100 meters. 

"The technique of the attack was altered to conform to this new 
employment of artillery. Each unit received a definite mission 
with an objective limited in width and depth ; before taking pos- 
session of it, it detached a wave of scouts to verify its destruction. 
If the work was not thoroughly prepared the scouts returned to the 
lines and demanded a new preparation by artillery. The waves of 
assault follow each other at a distance of 80 meters: in front a line 
of engineers and grenadiers ; next the main body in a line of skir- 
mishers; then a section of the reserve with ammunition, sandbags, 
tools, and men to fill the ranks of the first wave. This line is fol- 
lowed by a second similar one to pass the first or to receive it if it 
is repulsed and to take up the attack. At this moment the attack is 
pursued bj^ turning movements gliding through covered country 
or by ravines ; in this manner centers of resistance are made to fall. 
The advance is continually marked by rockets. Nothing is more 
impressive than this resistless march surmounted by a multitude of 
aigrets, by chaplets of multicolored fires. The chiefs of section had 
white brassards by which they could be recognized which many of 
our men took for Red Cross brassards and led to innumerable mis- 
takes. Finally, the order was not to obstinately persist in attempt- 
ing to overcome a resistance unbroken by artillery but each unit was 
to halt and await the new action of the guns." 



128 

The principal attack was made on the front held by two French 
divisions who had to sustain the attack until the night of the 23d. 
According to the French official accounts, the method employed by 
the Germans was to subject each strong point to intense artillery 
fire and then surround it with a barrage while the infantry and engi- 
neers advanced to secure and intrench it. Snow storms began on the 
22d and in very trying weather the two French divisions made 
desperate attempts to hold their first line but were slowly driven 
back. By the night of the 23d, the first line was wholly lost ; then 
two divisions of the 2d French Army took over the defense. The 
battle continued during the 24th and the French lost their second 
line and fell back to the vicinity of Douaumont. That night the 
situation seemed critical and General Langle, who commanded the 
central group, directed the French divisions in the Woevre plain 
to evacuate their lines and fall back to the plateau and intimated 
to French headquarters that it might be necessary to withdraw to 
the west bank of the Meuse. Orders were at once sent to hold the 
east side of the Meuse. General Castelnau was sent to Verdun to 
take charge of the situation and the entire 2d French Army was 
ordered to go to the support of Verdun. On the 25th the arrival of 
more French troops checked the German advance in the vicinity of 
Fort Douaumont but taking advantage of the fog, an enterprising 
lieutenant led his company to the fort and by scaling the walls took 
possession of it with little opposition. 

With the arrival of General Castelnau on the morning of the 25th, 
the French situation was clarified as it was now determined to hold 
the east bank of the Meuse and push forward troops as rapidly as 
possible to prevent the further advance of the Germans. The Ger- 
man troops first engaged were now exhausted and had to be with- 
drawn from the line in order to enable them to be reorganized and 
replace their losses. There was therefore a lull in the attack. That 
afternoon General Petain reported to take charge of the operations. 
Under his supervision the further defense was organized and the 
troops as they arrived placed in position. In a short time the 
artillery was strengthened to nearly 2,000 pieces. 

The position to which the Germans had advanced on the east 
bank of the Meuse was far in advance of the position they oc- 
cupied on the west bank and in a short time their situation was 
rendered very trying by the artillery established by Petain on the 
west bank. To relieve the situation, on March 6th, a determined 
attack was opened on the west bank between the Argonne and 
Meuse. Here the French front line followed Forges creek but in 



129 

rear of this line was a ridge of which the commanding points were 
Mort Homme or 295 meter hill and 304 meter hill. In a series of 
desperate attacks which lasted until May the Germans succeeded in 
driving the French back to the crest of the ridge but were unable to 
secure the mastery of the ridge. 

The defense was conducted by General Petain until May 1, when 
the opposing lines were more or less consolidated. Petain was now 
promoted to the command of the central group and was relieved by 
General Nivelle. Having consolidated their position on the Douau- 
mont line and at the base of the plateau, the Germans now sought 
to advance by siege methods. So little progress was made however 
that Nivelle was able to make a lodgment in Fort Douaumont in May 
and remain there a few days. Early in June the Germans captured 
Fort Vaux after a classic resistance and reached the top of the 
plateau south of Douaumont. About the last of June, by sapping 
and mining, the Germans reached Fleury about two miles south of 
Douaumont; there was still one spur between them and Verdun 
crowned by the ruins of Fort Souville. As the great British and 
French attack on the Somme began July 1, the Germans made a 
last attempt to reach Verdun on July 11 and 12. A few troops 
reached Fort Souville but were unable to consolidate their position 
and fell back to Fleury. During the period from February to July, 
about 45 German and 65 French divisions were engaged in this great 
battle. 

From the middle of July to the latter part of October, there were 
only minor operations on this front as the Somme attack absorbed 
the reserves. In the latter part of October however French opera- 
tions on the Somme died down and reserves were sent to General 
Nivelle for a counter-attack. 

On October 24, General Nivelle recaptured the Douaumont posi- 
tion with the ruins of the fort and the Germans evacuated Fort 
Vaux November 1. In December just before he was assigned to the 
command of the French armies in France General Nivelle made a 
last counter-attack and recaptured the ridge along which the sec- 
ond French line had originally been organized. 

At Verdun the Germans met with their fourth great check on 
the west front. In its effects on the morale of the two countries, it 
was probably more important even than the battles of the Marne 
and Flanders. The losses on both sides were very heavy as divi- 
sion after division was sent into the fight and withdrawn in a short 
time to be sent to a quiet sector or to a rest camp to replace its 
casualties. In the French Army these casualties were heavier in 



130 

the early stages when it was weak in artillery, and in the German 
Army in the later stages. 

When the attack began, the French were much handicapped by 
the difficulty of bringing up troops, ammunition and supplies, by the 
German, command of the two principal railways running into Ver- 
dun, As a substitute, thousands of laborers were employed in 
widening and improving the roads upon which motor truck trains 
were organized and run on a regular schedule. The road from Bar 
le Due to Verdun became famous as the "Sacred Way." Light and 
standard gauge railways were added as rapidly as possible. 

Somme Drive. — When the attack on Verdun began the British 
Army with its new divisions relieved the French TOth Army on the 
.Arras front to permit it to go to the relief of Verdun and the 
British front was made continuous from the north of Ypres to the 
Somme River. From north to south the line was held by the 2d, 
1st, 3d and 4th armies under Generals Plumer, Home, Allenby and 
Rawlinson. On the right of the British, astride the Somme River, 
was the 6th French Army, General Fayolle, and on its right the 10th 
French Army, General Micheler ; these were under the command of 
General Foch. Between January and July, 1916, the strength of 
the British Army on this front had been increased from 450,000 
bayonets and sabres to 660,000 and the artillery and ammunition 
supply was now superior to that of the Germans. 

The Somme drive was made mainly by the 4th British and 6th 
French armies although the armies on either flank also took part 
in the action. The main attack was made on a front of about 25 
miles in an air line or 30 miles measured along the trenches. 

In his report on the British operations General Haig says: 

"The principle of an offensive campaign during the summer of 
1916 had already been decided by the Allies. The various possible 
alternatives on the western front had been studied and discussed by 
General Joffre and myself and w^e were in complete agreement as 
to the front to be attacked by the combined French and British 
armies. Preparations for our offensive had made considerable 
progress; but as the date at which the attack should begin was 
dependent upon many doubtful factors, a final decision on that point 
was deferred until the general situation should become clearer. 

"Subject to the necessity of commencing operations before the 
summer was too far advanced, and with due regard to the general 
situation, I desired to postpone an attack as long as possible. The 
British armies were growing in numbers and the supply of ammuni- 
tion was steadily increasing. Moreover, a very large proportion of 
the officers and men under my command were still far from being 
fully trained, and the longer the attack could be deferred the more 
efficient thev would become 



131 

"By the end of May the pressure of the enemy on the Italian front 
had assumed such proportions that the Russian campaign was 
opened early in June, and the brilliant successes gained by our allies 
against the Austrians at once caused a movement of German troops 
from the western to the eastern front. This, however, did not lessen 
the pressure on Verdun. The heroic defense of our French allies 
had already gained many weeks of inestimable value and had caused 
the enemy heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In 
view, therefore, of the situation in the various theatres of war, it 
was eventually agreed between General Joffre and myself that the 
combined offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June." 

In his report General Haig gives an account of some of the prepa- 
rations that were made in preparing for this attack. 

"Vast stocks of ammunition and stores of all kinds had to be 
accumulated beforehand within convenient distance of our front. 
To deal with these, many miles of new railways — both standard and 
narrow-gauge — and trench railways and long causeways were built 
over marshy valleys. Many additional dugouts had to be provided 
as shelter for troops, for use as dressing stations, for the wounded, 
and magazines for storing ammunition, food, water, and engineer- 
ing material. Scores of miles of deep communicating trenches had 
to be dug as well as trenches for telephone wires, assembly and as- 
sault trenches, and numerous gun emplacements and observation 
posts. 

"Important mining operations were undertaken and charges laid 
at various points beneath the enemy's lines. 

^'Except in the river valleys, the existing supplies of water were 
hopelessly insufficient to meet the requirements of the numbers of 
men and horses to be concentrated in this area as the preparations 
for our offensive proceeded. To meet this difficulty many wells and 
borings were sunk, and over one hundred pumping plants were in- 
stalled. More than one hundred and twenty miles of water mains 
were laid, and everything was got ready to insure an adequate sup- 
ply of water as our troops advanced." 

The British were assigned the front extending from Gommecourt 
to Maricourt ; the French from Maricourt to Fouckucourt. The 
4th British Army consisting of five corps, eleven divisions, was to 
attack from Serre to Maricourt and the 6th French Army consisting 
of three corps, from Maricourt to Foucaucourt. Between Serre and 
Gommecourt the attack was to be made by a corps of the 3d British 
Army. 

The position attacked by the British troops is described by Gen- 
eral Haig as follows: 

"The enemy's position to be attacked was of a very formidable 
character, situated on a high, undulating tract of ground, which 
rises to more than 500 feet above the sea level, and forms the water- 
shed between the Somme on the one side and the rivers of south- 
western Belgium on the other. On the southeast to west-north-west 



132 

the ground falls in a series of long irregular spurs and deep depres- 
sions to the valley of the Somme. Well down the forward slopes 
of this face the enemy's first system of defense, starting from the 
Somme near Curlu, ran at first northwards for 3,000 yards, then 
westwards for 7,000 yards to near Fricourt where it turned nearly 
due north, forming a great salient angle in the enemy's line. 

"Some 10,000 yards north of Fricourt the trenches crossed the 
River Ancre a tributary of the Somme, and still running northwards 
passed over the summit of the watershed, about Hebuturne and 
Gommecourt, and then down its northern spurs to Arras. 

"On the 20,000 yard front between the Somme and Ancre the 
enemy had a strong second system of defense, sited generally on or 
near the southern crest of the highest part of the watershed, at an 
average distance of from 2,000 to 5,000 yards behind his first system 
of trenches. 

"During nearly two years preparation he had spared no pains to 
render these defenses impregnable. The first and second systems 
each consisted of several lines of deep trenches, well provided with 
bomb-proof shelters and with numerous communication trenches 
connecting them. The front of the trenches in each system was 
protected by wire entanglements, many of them in two belts forty 
yards broad, built of iron stakes interlaced with barbed wire, often 
almost as thick as a man's finger. 

"The numerous woods and villages in and between these systems 
of defense had been turned into veritable fortresses. The deep 
cellars usually to be found in the villages, and the numerous pits 
and quarries common to a chalk country, were used to provide coyer 
for machine guns and trench mortars. The existing cellars were 
supplemented by elaborate dugouts sometimes in two stories, and 
these were connected up by passages* as much as thirty feet below 
the surface of the ground. The salients in the enemy's line, from 
which he could bring enfilade fire across his front, were made into 
self-contained forts, and often protected by mine fields ; while 
strong redoubts and concrete machine gun emplacements had been 
constructed in positions from which he could sweep his own trenches 
should these be taken. The ground lent itself to good artillery 
observation on the enemy's part, and he had skilfully arranged for 
cross fire by his guns. 

"These various systems of defense, with the fortified localities 
and other supporting points between them, were cunningly sited 
to afford each other mutual assistance and to admit of the utmost 
possible development of enfilade and flanking fire by machine guns 
and artillery. They formed, in short, not merely a series of suc- 
cessive lines, but one composite system of enormous depth and 
strength. 

"Behind his second system of trenches, in addition to woods, 
villages and other strong points prepared for defense, the enemy 
had several other lines already completed ; and we had learned from 
aeroplane reconnaissance that he was hard at work improving and 
strengthening these and digging fresh ones between them and still 
farther back. 



133 

"In the area above described, between the Somme and the Ancre, 
our front line trenches ran parallel and close to those of the enemy, 
but below them. We had good direct observation on his front 
system of trenches and on the various defenses sited on the slopes 
above us between his first and second systems ; but the second 
system itself, in many places, could not be observed from the ground 
in our possession, while, except from the air, nothing could be seen 
of his more distant defenses. 

"North of the Ancre, where the opposing trenches ran trans- 
versely across the main ridge, the enemy's defenses were equally 
elaborate and formidable. So far as command of ground was con- 
cerned, we were here on practically level terms; but, partly as a 
result of this, our direct observation over the ground held by the 
enemy was not so good as it was farther south. On portions of this 
frontal the opposing first line trenches were more widely separated 
from each other ; while in the valleys to the north were many hidden 
gun positions from which the enemy could develop flanking fire 
on our troops as they advanced across the open." 

The part of the front'attacked by the French north of the Somme 
was of the same character as that just described. The front south 
of the Somme was in more level ground, but otherwise was equally 
strongly organized. 

The front attacked was held by the II German Army now com- 
manded by General Fritz Bulow and was held by five divisions north 
of the Somme and three south of it. Three divisions were in re- 
serve and a fourth resting after Verdun was farther in rear. Those 
south of the Somme later became the I Army. 

The primary object of the attack was to break the German line 
on a wide front and compel a return to open warfare. If not suc- 
cessful in this, the attack would at least relieve the pressure at 
Verdun, prevent the Germans from moving troops to other fronts, 
and wear down the strength and morale of the German forces. 

When this drive was made, the war had been in progress nearly 
two years. During that time both the French and British govern- 
ments had made up the deficiency in heavy mobile artillery and 
ammunition which had hampered their previous attacks and were 
prepared to prosecute the attack daily for months. At this time 
Great Britain had about seventy divisions besides the colonial con- 
tingents, and although all were not available on this front, the 
British commander had sufficient troops to withdraw and replace 
exhausted divisions, and continue the attack. In his description of 
the attack. General Haig mentions 45 divisions that took part in 
the attack and states that by the end of August the Germans had 
reinforced the 6 divisions originally employed by 30 divisions. 



134 

The air service now included all its various branches and had 
reconnoitering planes, artillery service planes and bombing planes. 
By the aid of reconnoitering planes, the enemy's lines had been 
carefully mapped and studied. 

The troops had been well trained in trench fighting and were well 
provided with trench mortars, bombs and machine guns, and were 
prepared to utilize gas and smoke clouds as well as gas shells. 

As in all previous attacks made by the Allies, this attack began 
with a prolonged artillery bombardment of greater intensity than 
any previously attempted, due to the more numerous and more 
powerful artillery. While General Foch employed 1,000 guns in the 
attacks of 1915, he now had 2,000 guns and some 6,500,000 shells to 
carry on this attack on the part of the French. 

"Defenses of the nature described could only be attacked with 
any prospect of success after careful artillery preparation. It was 
accordingly decided that our bombardment should begin on the 24th 
of June and a large force of artillery was brought into action for 
that purpose. 

"Artillery bombardments were also carried out daily at different 
points on the rest of our front, and during the period from the 24th 
of June to 1st of July gas was discharged with good effect at more 
than forty places along our line upon a frontage which in total 
amounted to over 15 miles. Some 70 raids, too, were undertaken by 
our infantry between Gommecourt and our extreme left north of 
Ypres during the week preceding the attack, and these kept me well 
informed as to the enemy's dispositions, besides serving other useful 
purposes. 

"On July 1st, at 7:30 a.m., after a final hour of exceptional 
violent bombardment, our infantry assault was launched. Simul- 
taneously the French attacked on both sides of the Somme, co- 
operating closely with us. 

"The British main front of attack extended from ]\Iaricourt on 
our right, round the salient at Fricourt, to the Ancre in front of 
St. Pierre Divion. To assist this main attack by holding the enemy's 
reserves and occupying his artillery, the enemy's trenches north of 
the Ancre, as far as Serre, inclusive, were to be assaulted simul- 
taneously ; while farther north a subsidiary attack was to be made 
on both sides of the salient at Gommecourt. 

"Just prior to the attack the mines which had been prepared under 
the enemy's lines were exploded, and smoke was discharged at many 
places along our front. Through this smoke the infantry advanced 
to the attack with the utmost steadiness, in spite of the very heavy 
barrage of the enemy's guns." 

As a result of the preliminary bombardment, the German first 
line on either side of Fricourt where the line could be enfiladed was 
practically destroyed, and when the British infantry attack was 
launched at 7:30 a. m. July 1st, the village of Montauban was cap- 



135 

tured on the right and farther to the left the infantry passed through 
Mametz into the valley beyond. Fricourt was surrounded and taken 
the following day. North of the Albert-Bapaume road however the 
enemy's line could not be penetrated. After the first attack had 
exhausted itself and the lines were consolidated it was found that 
the enemy's line had been penetrated over a front of six miles, the 
villages of Boisselle, Fricourt, Mametz and Montauban had been 
captured and about 6,000 prisoners taken. 

It was now decided to temporarily abandon attacks north of the 
Albert-Bapaume road by the left wing of the 4th army which later 
became the 5th army and concentrate the efforts to the south of 
that road. Between the positions captured and the German second 
line through Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval there were a number 
of strongly organized woods that offered serious resistance but were 
gradually captured during the first ten days of July. 

On July 11, the British had advanced far enough to begin the 
artillery attack on the second German line between Bazentin-le- 
Petit and Longueval. After three days' bombardment the infantry 
was launched on the 14th. 

"In the early hours of the 14th July the attacking troops moved 
out over the open for a distance of from 1,000 to 1,400 yards, and 
lined up in the darkness just below the crest and some 300 to 500 
yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered by 
strong patrols, and their correct deployment had been assured by 
careful previous preparations. The whole movement was carried 
out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. The deci- 
sion to attempt a night operation of this magnitude with an army, 
the bulk of which has been raised since the beginning of the war, 
was perhaps the highest tribute that could be paid to the quality of 
our troops. It would not have been possible but for the most care- 
ful preparation and forethought, as well as thorough reconnaissance 
of the ground, which was in many cases made personally by divi- 
sion, brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs before 
framing their detailed orders for the advance." 

The attack was successful and the second German line from 
Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval was captured. The British line now 
ran from la Boisselle via Contalmaison to Bazentin-le-Petit and 
from Longueval southward between Montauban and Guillemont. 
The Germ.ans however had well organized the ground in front and 
on either flank. It was not until the latter part of August that the 
British were able to take the village of Pozieres on the left. On 
the right, the French captured Maurepas about the same time and 
early in September Guillemont was taken. 

The Allies were now in position to attack the German third line 
north of the Somme. 



136 

"A methodical bombardment was commenced at 6 a. m. on the 
12th of September and was continued steadily and uninterruptedly 
till the moment of attack. At 6:20 a. m. on the 15th of September 
the infantry assault commenced, and at the same moment the bom- 
bardment became intense. Our heavily armored cars, known as 
'Tanks,' now brought into action for the first time, successfully co- 
operated with the infantry, and coming as a surprise to the enemy 
rank and file gave valuable help in breaking down their resistance. 

"The advance met with immediate success on almost the entire 
front attacked. At 8 :40 a. m. tanks were seen entering Flers, fol- 
lowed by large numbers of troops. Fighting continued at Flers for 
some time but by 10 a. m. our troops reached the north side of the 
village and by midday had occupied the enemy's trenches for some 
distance beyond. On our right our line was advanced to within as- 
saulting distance of the strong line of defense running before 
Morval, Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt. Our success made it possible 
to carry out during the afternoon that part of the plan which pro- 
vided for the capture of Martinpuich. 

"The result of the fighting of the 15th of September and follow- 
ing days was a gain more considerable than any which had attended 
our arms in the course of a single operation since the commence- 
ment of the offensive. In the course of one day's fighting we had 
broken through two of the enemy's main defensive systems and had 
advanced on a front of over six miles to an average depth of a mile. 
In the course of this advance we had taken three large villages each 
powerfully organized for prolonged resistance. Two of these vil- 
lages had been carried by assault with short preparation in the 
course of a few hours' fighting 

"Preparations for our further advance were again hindered by 
bad weather but at 12:e35 p. m. on the 25th of September, after a 
bombardment commenced early in the morning of the 24th, a gen- 
eral attack by the Allies on the whole front between the Somme and 
Martinpuich. The objectives on the British front included the vil- 
lages of Morval, Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt and a belt of country 
about 1,000 yards deep curving round north of Flers to a point mid- 
way between that village and Martinpuich. By nightfall all these 
objectives were in our hands with the exception of the village of 
Gueudecourt. On our right our allies carried the village of 
Rancourt." 

Thiepval on the left and Combles on the right were taken a few 
days later. 

After September the battle died down somewhat and ended about 
the middle of November when the weather made further operations 
impracticable. During the months of October and November, the 
British line was advanced to include the village of Sars on the 
Albert-Bapaume road and Beaumont Hamel north of the Ancre 
River. The French on the right advanced to the Bapaume-Peronne 
road from Sailly southward to the Tortille River. 



137 

South of the Somme River, on the first day of the great drive, 
the French had been even more successful than the British in gain- 
ing ground and on July 1, the villages of Herbecourt, Flaucourt, 
Assevillers and Fay with all the included area were captured ; after 
that the progress was slower and soon died down. From the 10th of 
July, the main attacks of the French were made by General Fayolle 
on the right of the British north of the Somme. 

The great drive of the Allies on the west front in 1916 had not 
resulted in a return to open warfare but it had been far more suc- 
cessful than the German attack on Verdun. In this great offensive 
there had been employed practically every British and German divi- 
sion that could be made available on that front. As at Verdun; the 
divisions were engaged until exhausted and then sent to quiet fronts 
or rest areas to be replaced by new divisions. The immediate effects 
of the drive had been to relieve the pressure on Verdun and permit 
the French to regain much of the ground lost, to prevent the sending 
of German troops to other fronts and to wear down the morale and 
resistance of the German Army. The full effect of the wedge driven 
into the German front did not become apparent until the following 
spring. As might be expected from the character of the fighting 
maintained for months the casualties were very heavy in all three 
armies. The British casualties have been given as about 500,000. 



<» 



138 



CHAPTER IX. 

OPERATIONS ON THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, RUMANIAN 
AND GREEK FRONTS IN 1916. 

At the beginning of 1916 the situation on the ItaHan, Russian 
and Greek fronts was as follows: 

On the Italian Isonzo front south of the valley of the Vippaco 
River, the 3d Italian Army had gained a bare foothold on the 
western edge of the Carso plateau east of the Isonzo River ; north of 
Gorizia, on the west side of the Isonzo River, the Austrians held the 
ridge of Sabotino and Podgora, about a mile wide and extending 
about five miles along the river; ten miles north of Gorizia the 
Italians had a bridgehead over the Isonzo at Plava but had not been 
able to develop it as the surrounding heights were still held by the 
Austrians. The Podgora-Sabotino-Plava front was held by the 2d 
Italian Army ; the 1st and 4th Italian armies held the mountain 
frontier between Italy and the Austrian Tyrol from the Isonzo west- 
ward to Lake Garda. The Austrians had strongly intrenched their 
Isonzo front and as the Italians had entered the war badly trained 
and equipped for trench warfare they had made little progress dur- 
ing 1915. During the winter of 1915-1916 efforts were made to 
repair these deficiencies. 

On the Russian front, the great retreat had stopped and efforts 
were made to reorganize and equip the Russian armies for a new 
campaign. The Germans were engaged in repairing roads and rail- 
ways and organizing the supply of the new front. In the north, 
notwithstanding repeated attacks, the Russians succeeded in holding 
the line of the Dwina River with the important towns of Riga and 
Dwinsk and the Germans had only a bridgehead midway between 
these towns, which they were unable to enlarge. From Dwinsk 
southward to the great marshes along the Pripet River the Russian 
line ran almost due southward to the mouth of the Styr River, 
leaving Smorgon, Baronovitchi and Pinsk in the possession of the 
Germans. Baronovitchi had been the G. H. Q. of the Russian 
armies before the retreat. From the Pripet marshes the Austrian 
line followed the Styr River through Lutsk and Dubno and passing 
to the west of Tarnopol followed the Strypa and Dniester rivers to 
the Russian frontier and along the frontier to Rumania. 

During the winter of 1915-1916 the northern group of Russian 
armies fell temporarily to General Plehve who in the spring of 1916 



139 

was succeeded by General Kuropatkin, who had been commander- 
in-chief of the Russian armies in the Russo-Japanese war. The 
central group remained under the command of General Ewert. 
General Ivanov was relieved from the command of the southern 
group during the winter and was attached to headquarters ; he was 
succeeded by General Brusilov who had commanded the 8th Russian 
Army during 1914-1915. 

Under the new Minister of War great efforts had been made to 
reorganize and equip the armies but on account of the isolated posi- 
tion of Russia and the demoralization of the railway systems this 
could only be partially effected. Large supplies of ammunition were 
however received from Great Britain and France. Confidence in the 
government had been shaken by the great retreat. Inefficiency and 
dishonesty in the War Department were believed to be largely re- 
sponsible for this retreat. 

The military situation on the Russian front had been improved 
for the Russians by the withdrawal of German and Austrian troops, 
some of whom had been sent to Serbia, some to France, and some 
to Italy. At this time the northern and central groups of Russian 
armies, which extended from Riga to the Pripet marshes were fac- 
ing the four German armies under Hindenburg, whose front ex- 
tended from Riga to the south of Smorgon, and the central group 
consisting of the IX German Army with some Austrian troops which 
prolonged the line to the marshes. The southern Russian group 
was opposed mainly by Austrian troops ; in the center was an 
Austro-German Army under German command. 

The British and French troops that had been withdrawn from 
Gallipoli and sent to Salonica had formed a great intrenched camp 
at Salonica. Here it was proposed to form a great allied army of 
French, British, Italian, Serbian and Russian troops for future 
operations in Serbia and Bulgaria. The organization of such a force 
would take considerable time and in the meantime the Allied forces 
would remain necessarily on the defensive. The Bulgarian armies 
were on the Greek frontier not daring to invade that kingdom lest 
it should lead the Greeks to join the Allies. 

Operations on the Russian Front During the Attack on Verdun. — 

When the Germans began their attack on Verdun, the Russians 
were requested to attack the Germans in the east to prevent their 
sending any troops to the west front. Attacks were therefore made 
at various points, but the main one was made by two armies of the 
central group east of Vilna in March. The attack led to some severe 
fighting and probably accomplished its purpose, but did not effect 



140 

any change in the position of the lines. While they were unable 
to assume the offensive, the Germans had strongly organized their 
lines as they desired to hold all the territory gained in order to draw 
from it supplies as the Allied blockade had cut them off from sup- 
plies through neutral states. Minor attacks were made on this front 
during the year but without material results. 

Austrian Attack in the Trentino, May-June. — As previously 
stated, the Austrian plan for 1916 contemplated an attack on the 
Italian front before the Italians had recovered from the effects of 
the campaign of 1915. The attack was delayed until May, because 
the proposed operations were to be made in the mountains which 
would not be free from snow before that time. 

When Italy declared war on Austria in May, 1915, the 1st and 
4th Italian armies were deployed along the mountain ranges that 
separated the Austrian Tyrol from Italy. The main duty of these 
armies was to prevent any Austrian forces from crossing the fron- 
tier into Italy, and especially any large body of Austrian troops that 
might attempt to reach the Italian plain and thus threaten the com- 
munications and lines of retreat of the 2d and 3d Italian armies 
that were attacking the Austrians along the Isonzo front. During 
1915 there were no important operations along the Tyrolean front 
as the reserves of both armies were needed elsewhere. There were 
however a number of minor but spectacular operations for the pos- 
session of mountain peaks. 

During the winter and spring the Austrians began to send troops 
to Trent from the Russian front, from Serbia and from the interior. 
It was proposed to organize a strong force in the province of Trent 
or Trentino and advance into Italy over the mountains limited by 
Lake Garda in the west and the Brenta River in the east. In this 
section were a number of valleys which led to the crest of the moun- 
tain boundary and thence to the plains of Italy. 

Had the Austrians been able to concentrate a sufficient force in 
Trentino the campaign might have had very important results. 
Had they been able to establish themselves in a position where they 
threatened the lines of supply of the Italian armies on the Isonzo, 
the contest between the two armies would have been drawn to this 
front. The Austrian forces were however too weak to admit of this 
concentration being made in sufficient force and it resulted merely in 
a demonstration to divert attention from the Isonzo front. 

The front that was about to be attacked was held by the 1st Italian 
Army which had but little experience in modern warfare and had 
not thoroughly intrenched the line it then occupied. Although the 



141 

concentration of Austrian troops about Trent was known, the com- 
mander of the Itahan Army was over confident and did not take the 
necessary steps to strengthen his positions. 

The attack began in the middle of May and was preceded by a 
heavy bombardment. It was the first time guns either in large 
numbers or of large calibre were employed on this front and the 
bombardment produced a demoralizing effect on the Italian troops. 
The Italian line was easily penetrated and day after day the 
Austrians advanced into the mountains until at the end of two 
weeks they were fifteen miles in advance of their original line and 
had captured the Italian towns of Asiago and Arsiero. By this 
time however the attack had exhausted itself and little further 
progress was made in the first half of June. At the request of the 
Italians, an attack by the southern group of the Russian armies was 
launched early in June and the Austrians began to recall their 
troops. 

As their advanced positions could not be held by a diminished 
force the Austrians fell back to an intermediate position between 
their original lines and their farthest advance. No serious fighting 
followed this withdrawal as the Italians returned to their attacks 
on the Isonzo front. 

Advance of Southern Group of Russian Armies June-August. — 
With the exception of the 3d Russian Army, the southern group of 
Russian armies had experienced fewer losses and less demoralization 
than the northern and central groups. On their right they had suc- 
cessfully held the important railway junction of Rovno and had late 
in 1915 recaptured Lutsk which they later evacuated. From Tarn- 
apol to the Dniester River they were still in the enemy's territory. 
They were confronted mainly by Austrian troops whom they had 
repeatedly defeated in 1914 and 1915. 

Brusilov had under his command four armies and was later re- 
inforced by a fifth from the central group. When called on in May 
to assist the Italians by a counter-attack in the east he was ready 
to act. At this time, the Russians had on the east front some 140 
divisions of infantry and 33 divisions of cavalry, probably depleted 
in strength. 

On the 4th of May after a preliminary bombardment Brusilov's 
armies were launched in an attack on a front of one hundred and 
fifty miles. In the north where two of his armies were operating 
astride the railways running from Rovno to Kovel and Lemberg, 
his success was immediate. The Austrian line was broken on a 
wide front ; Lusk twenty miles in rear of the Austrian line was cap- 



142 

tured on May 6, and Dubno a few days later. As soon as the 
Austrian line was broken, German troops were sent southward to 
reinforce that front and German commanders took charge of opera- 
tions. Two weeks after the opening of the campaign the line again 
became stabilized ; but the Russians had in the meantime driven a 
wedge into the original Austrian line on a front of about eighty 
miles and to a depth of nearly forty miles. The Russians had not 
however succeeded in reaching Kovel on the Rovno-Kovel railway 
nor had they reached Brody on the Lemberg railway. With a new 
army brought from the north of the Pripet marshes Brusilov at- 
tempted to force the crossings of the Styr River on his right but 
without success. Practically no further progress was made in the 
direction of Kovel during the months of July and August. 

Between Brody and the Dniester River the first Russian attack 
in June met with little success and the Austro-German troops suc- 
cessfully resisted all attacks on their line along theStrypa River. 
In the latter part of July, Brusilov captured Brody and compelled 
the Austro-Germans to fall back from the Strypa River to the Lipa 
River, fifteen miles to the west, during the month of August. 

In the extreme south, between the Dniester and Pruth rivers, the 
southern Russian armies penetrated the Austrian line and Czerno- 
witz, the capital of Bukowina, was captured about the middle of 
June. From Czernowitz this army advanced southward and west- 
ward capturing the greater part of Bukowina. It also advanced 
along the railway toward Lemberg as far as Stanislau at the foot of 
the Carpathians, which was reached in August. 

About the middle of August the attack of the southern Russian 
armies had exhausted itself and no farther progress was made. 

Although Brusilov had forced the retreat of the Austrian armies 
on a wide front, relieved the pressure on the Italian front, and had 
compelled the Germans to still further reduce their forces on the 
northern Russian front, the northern Russian armies made no seri- 
ous effort to take advantage of this situation, and therefore his own 
advance was stopped. 

The principal effect of his success was to cause Rumania to de- 
clare war on Austria, which she did in the latter part of August. 
To aid Rumania, Russian troops had to be sent by Brusilov to the 
Rumanian frontier of Austria and to southern Rumania thus re- 
ducing the strength of his armies and preventing further efforts 
on his own front. 

Operations on the Italian Front August-December. — Notwith- 
standing the Austrian attack from the Trentino in May and June, 



143 

the 2d and 3d Italian armies continued their operations against the 
Austrian positions immediately to the north and south of Gorizia 
and by sapping- and mining had by August- reached a position from 
which an assault could be delivered with some promise of success. 

The assault was launched both north and south of Gorizia on 
August 6, after a short preliminary bombardment of great intensity. 
On the Carso plateau the fighting was very severe and on the 9th 
the Austrian line was broken and by the 12th the Austrians had 
been driven back three miles to their second line which they held. 
During the remainder of the year the Italians made some further 
progress on this front but no important ground was gained. North 
of Gorizia, all the Austrian positions on the heights of Sabotino 
and Podgora west of the Isonzo River were captured. The town of 
Gorizia was evacuated by the Austrians on August 9 ; they retired 
to a new line on the hills overlooking the town about a mile to the 
east. This position could not be attacked from the front and it was 
necessary to maneuver the Austrians out by turning movements, 
either on the Carso plateau or from the bridgehead of Plava. 

During the remainder of 1916, as previously stated, attempts 
were made by the Italians to advance along the Carso plateau but 
the Austrian lines proved too strong. It is probable that the Italian 
success on the Isonzo in the first half of August also had its in- 
fluence on the Rumanian government and the Russian plan of 
campaign. 

Salonika. — During the winter of 1915-1916 the Allied forces at 
Salonika had been strongly reinforced by British and French troops 
and in April this force was still further increased by the arrival of 
the reorganized Serbian Army and a division of Russian troops. 
The Allies now occupied all the territory south of the Greek frontier 
from the Struma River on the east to Lake Ostrovo in the west with 
the British on the right, the French and Russians in the center and 
the Serbs on the left. The Italians occupied the country around 
Avlona on the Adriatic still farther west. There was now a large 
force at Salonika but the situation was unsatisfactory to the Allied 
Powers because the attitude of the Greek government in maintain- 
ing neutrality and the friction which necessarily resulted from the 
occupation of neutral territory. In May the Bulgarians advanced 
and occupied a Greek fort on the British front ; as the Greek govern- 
ment took no action, in June the Protecting Powers ordered the 
Greek government to demobilize the Greek Army. 

In the summer of 1916 Rumania decided to enter the war on the 
side of the Allies ; one of her conditions was that the Allied forces 



144 

at Salonika should begin an offensive campaign two weeks in advance 
of her declaration of war to prevent Bulgaria from taking part in 
operations against her. About the 1st of August, therefore, General 
Sarrail was made commander-in-chief of the Allied forces and be- 
gan operations in the center against the Bulgarians on his front. 

The Bulgarians replied by invading Greece and occupying the line 
of the Struma River and the fortress of Kavala on the coast in 
Macedonia and the town of Fiorina west of Lake Ostrovo. Not being 
able to advance in the center, Sar*rail transferred his offensive to the 
west and the French and Serbs captured Fiorina and advanced into 
Serbia capturing Monastir about the end of November. This cam- 
paign was of little assistance to the Rumanians. 

Many of the Greeks insisted that war should be declared on Bul- 
garia for the invasion of Greece. This led to the Venizelist revolu- 
tion and the establishment of a government under his control in 
Salonika and in some of the islands of Greece. For the time being 
there were two governments recognized by the Allied Powers. The 
Venizelist government reinforced the Allies with volunteer troops. 

The Rumanian Campaign. — At the beginning of the World War, 
Rumania had declared her neutrality, although her king, a former 
Hohenzollern Prince but not of the reigning family, had desired 
to declare war on the side of the Central Powers. On his death in 
the latter part of 1914 it was clear that Rumania would not join the 
Central Powers but would declare on the side of the Allies as soon as 
a favorable opportunity occurred. 

Her military strength consisted of an army of five corps of two 
regular divisions and one reserve division each, numbering in all 
250,000 rifles with the necessary complement of the other arms. The 
army was raised by conscription, the term of service being 21 years, 
of which 2 was in the active army, 7 in the reserve, 10 in the ter- 
ritorial army and 4 in the territorial reserve. The annual contingent 
of recruits ran from 45,000 to 55,000 men and it was assumed that 
she had about 500,000 trained men available for service. The last 
actual war service was in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, al- 
though the Army was mobilized and concentrated in the second 
Balkan war of 1913. 

In 1915 Rumania remained neutral awaiting the outcome of the 
Russian operations in the north and the Allied effort at Gallipoli. 
The failure of the Gallipoli campaign and the great Russian retreat 
followed by the invasion of Serbia, prolonged her period of neutrality. 
After the successful advance of the Russian armies under Brusilov 



145 

in June, the Rumanian government determined to act, but it de- 
manded of the Allies besides certain extensions of her territory, that 
the Allied Army at Salonika should first attack the Bulgarian armies 
on that front and protect her from attacks on the south ; that 
Brusilov should continue his pressure on the Austrians between the 
Pripet marshes and Rumania ; and that an adequate supply of muni- 
tions should be furnished by the Allies. 

When Rumania declared war in the latter part of August the 
situation no doubt looked favorable to the Rumanian military au- 
thorities. The Allied force at Salonika was probably stronger than 
the combined armies of their opponents in Bulgaria; the Austrian 
armies had met serious defeat on both the Russian and Italian fron- 
tiers ; the German armies had met with defeat at Verdun and were 
engaged in the great battle of the Somme in the west and in the east 
they were occupying a long front. If sufficient pressure were exerted 
by the Allied force at Salonika and by the Russians, it would be diffi- 
cult for the Central Powers to meet an invasion of Hungary where 
it was known that the passes in the mountains were held by weak 
forces of an inferior character. The principal weakness of the plan 
seemed to be the reliance on the Allies for an ammunition supply, 
since this could be furnished only by Russia, which had an inade- 
quate supply for her own armies. The Rumanian authorities did 
not realize that the Allied Army at .Salonika could make no serious 
effort to help them; that Brusilov's advance had exhausted itself; 
and that they would receive little assistance from the northern Rus- 
sian armies because of the internal dissentions in the government. 

The situation created by the Rumanian declaration of war was 
deemed a very serious one by the Central Powers. The great 
Somme drive was exhausting the German reserves on the west front, 
the reserves on the east front had been employed in checking the 
advance of Brusilov, the Austrians were being fiercely attacked 
along the Isonzo, and the Bulgarians were attacked by Sarrail's 
army. To meet the situation Hindenburg was made Chief of Staff 
of the German armies with Ludendorff as his principal assistant. 
The command of the armies of the Central Powers was centered in 
the German Emperor as far as possible and the German General 
Staff was given general direction of operations on all fronts. 

To meet the situation on the Austro-Rumanian front, it was de- 
cided to create two armies from reserves, the I Austrian Army to 
reinforce the small force guarding the mountain passes between 
Hungary and northern Rumania and the IX German Army to oper- 
ate on its right. The latter army was to be commanded by General 



146 

Falkenhayn who had just been relieved as Chief of Staff of the 
German armies. Mackensen was to organize a third army in Bul- 
garia from German, Turkish and Bulsrarian forces. 

The territory of Rumania at this time consisted of the three prov- 
inces Moldavia, Wallachia and Dobrudja: the first lies east of Hun- 
gary and is separated from it by the Carpathian Mountains ; the sec- 
ond is south of Hungary and separated from it by the Transylvania 
Alps ; the third is the territory between the Danube River and the 
Black Sea. Wallachia is separated from Bulgaria by the Danube 
River; Dobrudja has a common boundary line with Bulgaria about 
100 miles long. 

The Rumanian plan of operations provided for an invasion of the 
Hungarian province of Transylvania, now a part of Rumania, both 
from Moldavia and Wallachia in conjunction with the Russian Army 
in Bukowina. Of her four armies, the 4th was to advance from 
northern Moldavia, the 2d from the re-entrant angle of the frontier 
and the 1st from western Wallachia. The 3d army was left to pro- 
tect the southwestern boundary against operation from Bulgaria. 

War was declared on August 27 and during the following days 
the Rumanian columns advanced through all the main passes of the 
mountains between Bukowina and the Danube River. They met 
with no serious opposition at the passes as the Austrian Transyl- 
vanian detachment was small and the I and IX armies had not yet 
been formed. The Rumanians advanced slowly and three weeks 
later the different columns were still widely separated. In the mean- 
time the I Austrian Army was being concentrated at Klausenburg 
and the IX German Army at Karlsburg. 

While the Rumanian plan of operations was progressing satis- 
factorily in Transylvania, in Dobrudja the Rumanians suffered a 
serious reverse which compelled them to alter the distribution of 
their forces. Mackensen had organized an army of German, Bul- 
garian and Turkish forces and when on September 1, Bulgaria de- 
clared war, he immediately crossed the frontier. At Turtukai, on the 
Danube, the Rumanians had posted an entire division in an in- 
trenched camp with no bridge behind them. While his right wing 
moved parallel to the coast, Mackensen's left wing moved on Turtu- 
kai and captured that place with its entire garrison and about 100 
guns. This was a severe blow to the Rumanians and their G. H. Q. 
immediately detached three divisions from the northern armies and 
their best army commander to take charge of the defense of the 
Dobrudja. 



147 

Taking advantage of the confusion caused by his first success, 
Mackensen pressed forward up the Dobrudja thus consolidating his 
small army as the distance between the Danube and Black Sea 
diminishes rapidly until it reaches the narrowest part where the 
railway crosses the Danube to the Rumanian seaport Constanza. 
Here the distance is only 30 miles. By the middle of the month he 
had advanced up the Dobrudja about 50 miles and was facing the 
main Rumanian defensive position about 10 miles from the railway. 

This position was held by the 3d Rumanian Army assisted by a 
Russian corps and a division of Slavs formed of prisoners taken by 
the Russians in their operations against the Austrians who now 
volunteered for service in the Russian Army. Here Mackensen's 
Army was brought to a standstill and when the Rumanian divisions 
arrived from the north, he was driven back some 10 miles to a posi- 
tion that he had organized in the rear. Here he was obliged to 
wait the result of the operations in Transylvania which were then 
just beginning. 

When the I and IX armies were concentrated, the situation was 
as follows : The 1st Rumanian Army had one column on the Danube 
where it had just captured Orsova; another some 50 miles east 
which had emerged from the Vulcan Pass and had captured the 
frontier town of Petroseny ; a third column was some 40 miles far- 
ther east where it had emerged from the Red Tower Pass and was 
threatening an advance on Hermanstadt. The 2d Rumanian Army 
was astride of the railway running northwest from Kronstadt with 
its left flank at Fogaris about 40 miles east of Red Tower Pass. The 
4th Army was moving from the mountains through various valleys 
to the north of the 2d Army. 

The Austro-German plan was to drive the Rumanians back into 
the Vulcan Pass with superior numbers and then hold the pass with 
a small force. At the Red Tower Pass, an Alpine corps was to reach 
the pass in rear of the Rumanians by mountain paths and then the 
main body of the IX Army was to attack the detachment in front 
of the pass. Having secured both passes, the left wing of the I 
Army was to drive back the 4th Rumanian Army while its right 
wing with the IX Army attacked the 2d Rumanian Army and drove 
it back over the mountains. At the end of the first phase of the 
operations the Austro-German armies were in possession of the 
passes. The IX Army was however unable to make any headway 
south of the passes as the Russians relieved the 4th Army which was 
united with the 2d. This first phase in the north was over about the 
middle of October. 



148 

In the meantime, Mackensen's Army had received reinforcements 
and the Rumanians in his front had been obliged to send assistance 
to the north. He now resumed the offensive and drove the forces in 
his front across the railway and captured Constanza. The Ru- 
manians destroyed the bridge over the Danube. Mackensen's ad- 
vance was again stopped by the arrival of Russian troops and he 
was again compelled to intrench his position which was some miles 
east of the railway. 

It was originally planned to unite the IX Army with Mackensen's 
Army in eastern Wallachia and thus cut off the 1st Rumanian Army. 
The resistance offered by both armies made this impossible and a 
new plan was formed in which the junction was to be made west of 
Bucharest. Toward the end of October the IX Army made an at- 
tempt to cross the mountains by surprise between the Red Tower 
and Vulcan passes. The left wing at the Red Tower Pass succeeded 
in gaining some ground south of the pass but attempts farther west 
were defeated. A carefully planned attack on the Vulcan Pass on 
November 10 succeeded and the right wing of the IX Army fought 
its way down to the plain where Craiova was taken on November 23. 

To conform to this plan, Mackensen turned over the defense of his 
line in Dobrudja to the Bulgarians and withdrew the German and 
Turkish troops and moved them to Sistova where the Russian Army 
crossed the Danube in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. On 
the same day the northern army entered Craiova, Mackensen taking 
advantage of a thick fog got a footing on the north bank of the 
Danube by ferrying his troops. This enabled him to bridge the river 
and cross his troops. His operations here were assisted by Austrian 
gunboats on the river. 

The Rumanians now endeavored to hold the IX Army on the Aluta 
River, which flows southward from the Red Tower Pass and empties 
into the Danube west of Sistova, while they concentrated on Mack- 
ensen's Army. To prevent it, the right wing of the IX Army at- 
tacked from Craiova while the left wing attacked from the Red 
Tower Pass and Mackensen from the south. After several days of 
fierce fighting, the Rumanians were compelled to retreat to the 
Sereth River abandoning their capital, Bucharest, which was forti- 
fied in the manner of Liege and Mackensen took possession Decem- 
ber 5. 

The Russo-Rumanian forces now evacuated the Dobrudja and 
concentrated in front of Mackensen and eventually the Bulgarians 
were drawn to the same front. The campaign closed early in Janu- 
ary when the Rumanians had retired behind the Sereth River where 



149 

they could not be easily attacked. Here the Rumanians were re- 
lieved by the Russians and the Rumanian Army was reorganized 
and trained by French officers. 

While the campaign had temporarily disposed of the Rumanian 
Army, the victory had not been decisive and a large number of troops 
of the Central Powers under Mackensen had to be left on this front. 
The principal gain was the capture of food supplies found in 
Wallachia which is the most fertile plain of Rumania; these were 
of great value to the Central Powers. 



150 



CHAPTER X. 

OPERATIONS IN TURKEY IN 1916. 

Armenia. — As previously stated, there were no important military 
operations on the Armenian front in 1915 after the first months of 
that year. It was during this period that occurred the disarming, 
deportation and massacre of the Armenians who were accused of 
assisting the Russians. 

In September, 1915, the Grand Duke Nicholas, former commander 
in chief of the Russian armies, was assigned to the command of the 
Russian troops on this front and he immediately began to reorganize 
the troops for an offensive campaign. It was not however until 
1916 that operations actually began on a large scale. In the latter 
part of 1915 a part of the Turkish troops on this front had been 
moved to Mesopotamia to form a covering army for the troops be- 
sieging Kut where a British relieving army was expected. 

Early in 1916, the Russian forces under General Yudenitch ad- 
vanced across the frontier on a wide front extending from the Black 
Sea to Lake Van, and a separate detachment under General Baratoff 
crossed the Persian frontier east of Lake Van to drive the Turks out 
of northern Persia. The first important success of the Russians was 
the capture of Ezerum'about the middle of February, where the sur- 
rounding forts were taken by assault. Shortly thereafter the Rus- 
sian column on the left captured the towns of Bitlis and Mush near 
Lake Van. .The next important success was the capture of Ti'ebi- 
zond, the most important Turkish port on the Black Sea, in April. 
This was captured by the Russian right column. From Ezerum and 
Trebizond the Russians advanced on Erzingan, the headquarters of 
the Turkish Armenian district, which was captured in July. 

In the meantime, Baratoff 's column had advanced through Persia 
as far south as Kermanshah where he turned his column in the 
direction of Bagdad and reached the frontier in May. By this time 
however the British forces in Kut had surrendered, and the Turks 
were able to utilize a large part of the force that had been con- 
centrated there. Baratoff did not cross the frontier, but sent a 
small Cossack force to open communication with the British on the 
Tigris River below Kut, This force soon returned to the main 
column. 

Had the British been able to relieve Kut and advance northward, 
the Russians would probably have attempted to make a junction 



151 

with them at Mosul, but the failure of the Kut relief expeditions 
prevented any cooperation. 

In August the Turks began a counter-offensive, based on Mosul 
on the Tigris River to drive the Russians back from Lake Van uid 
threatened the' communications of the Russian center at Erzingan. 
There was severe fighting around Lake Van and the Turks recovered 
the towns of Mush and Van. From the Tigris River a Turkish 
column also invaded Persia and compelled the retreat of Baratoff's 
column from Kermanshah and Hamadan back towards the Russian 
frontier. In the latter part of 1916, the main effect of the Russian 
invasion of Armenia was to hold a strong Turkish force on that 
front. 

Mesopotamia. — At the close of 1915, the 6th Indian division under 
General Townshend was invested in Kut el Amara by several Turk- 
ish divisions that had vainly attempted to carry his lines by assault 
and to force the British to surrender by bombardment. The town 
being almost surrounded by the Tigris River made it possible to de- 
fend it with a small force against a much larger one. The Turks 
were finally compelled to resort to starvation and in the meantime 
hold off any relieving force. For the latter purpose they constructed 
lines of intrenchment and intrenched positions on both sides of the 
Tigris below Kut. 

About the middle of December, General Nixon was relieved of the 
command of the British troops in Mesopotamia by General Lake, 
who began to organize a relief expedition. At the time there was 
only the 12th Indian division available but additional Indian troops 
were sent from India and Egypt and the 3d and 7th divisions form- 
ing the Indian corps in France were en route from Marseilles. The 
relief expedition was gradually organized at El Gherbi on the Tigris 
about 50 miles in an air line from Kut, and upon the arrival at that 
place of the 7th Indian division it was decided to push on to Kut 
although the relief force was numerically weak for the purpose and 
was inadequately equipped with transportation, artillery and medi- 
cal transport. The haste was due to fear that Townshend might not 
be able to hold out much longer and to confidence in the superiority 
of the British troops over the Turks. 

On the 4th of January the advance began and on the 7th and 8th 
the relief force met its first check at Sheik Saad, about 25 miles from 
Kut, where the Turks were strongly intrenched. Here the British 
force was repulsed with heavy loss in an attempt to carry the Turk- 
ish position which was however evacuated by the Turks on the 9th. 
The relief force advanced up the river successfully some six miles 



152 

farther, but was eventually forced to halt on January 21, at the 
Turkish position at Umm-el-Hanna which was assaulted but could 
not be taken. This position was unusually strong, since the trenches 
on both sides of the river were flanked by marshes. At this point 
the British were compelled to resort to trench warfare while await- 
ing reinforcements. 

During the latter part of January and February, the 3d division 
arrived and occupied the line on the south bank of the river while 
the 7th division remained on the north bank. In the meantime the 
operations were placed under the supervision of the British General 
Staff. 

The next attempt to, advance was made early in March. From 
Sheik Saad, which is almost due east of Kut, the Tigris River makes 
a bend to the north and the plan was to concentrate a force of about 
20,000 men including the 3d division near Sheik Saad and by a night 
march turn the positions along the river and strike the Turkish outer 
defense line about 5 miles south of the river. This defense line was 
about 8 miles from Kut and ran from the Tigris to a point south of 
Kut. On the night of March 8-9, six brigades moved out and on the 
9th assaulted the Turkish lines in the vicinity of the Dujaila redout, 
but without success. As it was not intended to begin trench war- 
fare on this front, the troops were withdrawn to the old front. 

During March, the 13th British division of the New Army under 
General Maude, which had been at Gallipoli, reached the Sheik Saad 
and in April the third attempt was made to reach Kut. In these 
operations the 13th and 7th divisions were to operate on the north 
bank and the 3d with the other troops on the south bank. By means 
of siege work, the British had secured a position close to the Turkish 
trenches at Umm-el-Hanna. On the morning of April 5th the 13th 
division carried the strong position of Umm-el-Hanna and a second 
position a mile in rear ; the 3d division advanced the same distance 
on the west bank. The Turks had however only retreated to a still 
stronger line at Sannaiyat a mile in rear, where they were strongly 
reinforced. Attempts to carry this position by the 7th and 13th 
divisions between the 8th and 18th failed. The struggle was kept up 
until the garrison of Kut surrendered due to starvation, on April 
29th ; some advance was made on the west bank but the main Turk- 
ish line attacked in March still remained intact. Toward the end of 
the siege some supplies were landed in Kut by airplanes but not 
enough to materially prolong the defense. An attempt made by a 
gunboat to run the gauntlet of the Turkish works also failed. 



153 

When finally compelled to surrender, the siege of Kut had lasted 
143 days ; the force surrendered consisted of about 10,000 men of 
whom 3,000 were British regulars. About 1,200 men were killed or 
died of wounds or deserted during the siege. 

After the fall of Kut there was no further attempt to advance but 
the positions secured were held by the British troops. To meet 
Baratoff 's Russian column, in May the Turks withdrew one of their 
divisions and at the same time evacuated their advance line west of 
the Tigris and fell back on lines nearer the town. The British then 
advanced to the old Turkish line which they had attacked in March. 

The failure of the relief expeditions was due to various causes 
one of the principal being the uncertainty of the length of time the 
British garrison could hold out. Had it been known that Townshend 
could hold out until the 13th division arrived, a larger force could 
have been concentrated for the opening operations which would have 
had a material effect on the operations. Over confidence, bad 
weather, inadequate transportation and inadequate equipment for 
trench warfare also contributed here as at Gallipoli to the failure. 

As the heat of the summer in Mesopotamia made operations on a 
large scale impossible, the following months were spent in organiz- 
ing for the advance on Bagdad which was to begin at the end of the 
year. The river transport system was thoroughly organized and 
hugely expanded. Standard gauge and light railways were con- 
structed at points to supplement the river transportation. The 
troops were more thoroughly organized, equipped and trained. In 
August General Lake was relieved of the command of the Meso- 
potamia district by General Maude who had been in command of the 
13th division. 

The second advance on Bagdad was not begun until the last of 
December and properly belongs to the operations of 1917. 

Egyptian Front. — A large British force was assembled in Egypt 
in the winter of 1915-1916 from Gallipoli, as it was feared that 
after the withdrawal from Gallipoli the Turks might return to their 
project of invading Egypt. The Russian invasion however deflected 
most of the available Turkish troops to that front. In the spring 
therefore most of the British troops brought back from Gallipoli 
were sent to other fronts. 

The operations of the British troops on the Egyptian front were 
mainly defensive and consisted in holding or destroying all the 
desert wells in a belt extending about 30 miles east of the canal. In 
the north, however, along the coast road, preparations were made 
for an advance. As a preliminary step it was decided to occupy the 



154 

Katia oasis, about 30 miles from the canal and connect it with the 
railway system of Egypt by a standard gauge railway. To supply 
any large body of troops operating along this line it was necessary 
also to construct a pipe line parallel to the railway. In order to 
guard the railway construction a number of small posts mostly held 
by mounted troops were established in advance and on the flank. 

The first attempt to interfere with the construction of the rail- 
way was made in April, when a number of these posts were attacked 
by a small Turkish column which advanced along the coast road. 
The British suffered some casualties, but the work was not seriously 
interfered with. 

The second attempt was a more serious one and was made in 
August when the railway had been constructed to a point about 25 
miles east of the canal. The Turkish column that advanced along 
the shore road was estimated at 15,000 to 18,000 men. The British 
railhead was covered by a strong line held by a Territorial division 
with one flank resting on the sea, where it was protected by moni- 
tors, and the other protected by the mounted troops. The Turkish 
movement had been observed about two weeks before the attack was 
made and the British were prepared for it. The result was that the 
Turks were repulsed with heavy loss and in the pursuit that followed 
the British captured some 4,000 prisoners, mountain artillery, ma- 
chine guns and stores. 

After this second attack, the Turks made no further attempts to 
interfere with the construction of the railway, which was now 
pushed forward at the rate of 20 miles per month and at the close of 
the year was within 15 miles of El Arish, the most advanced of the 
Turkish strongly held positions. The construction of this railway 
and its water supply system was the most important operation on 
the Egyptian front during the year and indicated the intention of 
the British commander to transfer the theater of operations from 
the Suez Canal front to the Turkish province of Palestine. The 
water was drawn from the Nile, brought across country, carried 
under the Suez Canal by siphon and filtered giving a supply of one 
half million gallons daily. Reservoirs and pumping plants were con- 
structed at intervals of 24 miles and the water forced forward 
through steel pipes. Tank cars were employed along sections under 
construction and on side lines. 

An important event on this frontier was the revolt of the Arabs 
against Turkish rule in Hedjaz, a strip of territory on the east side 
of the Red Sea extending from the vicinity of Mecca northward. 
Through it ran the Pilgrim or Hedjaz railway from Medina to 



155 

Damascus and Aleppo passing to the east of the Dead Sea and the 
Jordan River in Palestine. After the Kingdom of Hedjaz was pro- 
claimed and recognized by Great Britain and France, Prince or Emir 
Faisal organized the forces of the new kingdom and made himself 
master of all the territory of the new kingdom south of Medina by 
capturing the small Turkish garrisons. At the close of the year, he 
was prepared to operate against the Turkish posts along the Hedjaz 
railway on the flank of the British column. The aim of the British 
in inciting the insurrection was to detach the Arabs from the Turk- 
ish Empire and replace the Sultan of Turkey by the Sherif of Mecca 
as the protector of the Mohammedans. 



156 



CHAPTER XL 

GENERAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS ON THE WEST 

FRONT IN 1917. 

Although they had led to no decisive result, the operations of the 
Allied Powers were far more successful in 1916 than in the preced- 
ing year and gave promise of a more complete success in 1917 pro- 
viding there was vigorous action upon the part of all the Allies. On 
the west front the German attack on Verdun had been repulsed and 
much of the ground gained in the first rush had been recovered. In 
the Somme drive the Allies had shown that the most elaborately 
constructed defensive lines could be penetrated by determined 
troops well supported by artillery and that in their tanks the British 
had a military engine which gave promise of being of great assist- 
ance to attacking infantry. At the close of 1916 on the west front 
the morale had apparently passed from the German Army to the 
Allied armies who were now confident of ultimate victory. In Italy 
while the Austrian offensive had come to naught the Italians had 
crossed the Isonzo at Gorizia and had advanced some miles on the 
Carso plateau. At Salonika the Allied force had begun its advance 
into Serbia and had recaptured Monastir from the Bulgarians. The 
menace of the Greek Army in its rear was removed by the demand 
made by the Allied Powers that the Greek Army be demobilized ; 
the order was issued in June. This was followed in October by the 
Venizelos revolution and the establishment of the revolutionary 
government at Salonica where an army in sympathy with the Allies 
was organized. Although the government at Athens still remained 
neutral it was powerless to interfere with the plans of the Allies. 
In Turkey the British forces operating from Egypt had almost 
reached the boundary of Palestine with their railway and were ready 
to begin an invasion of Turkish territory. In Mesopotamia where 
the British operations had been paralyzed by lack of transportation 
the transportation problem had been solved and the British force 
was thoroughly equipped to renew its advance on Bagdad. The Rus- 
sian armies under the Grand Duke Nicholas were well within 
Armenia and although they might not be able to advance much 
farther on account of the difficulties of transportation they could 
at least neutralize a large part of the Turkish Army. In Rumania 
the army had been greatly strengthened by Russian troops and 
while it might not be able to renew the offensive it could like the 



157 

Russian Army in Armenia neutralize a large force of the armies of 
the Central Powers. The situation on the Russian front was the 
least satisfactory. The Government was becoming more and more 
unpopular and was more interested in preserving its power than in 
carrying on the war. Should the government fall its effect on the 
army as in all revolutions was uncertain. What was desired by the 
British and French was a vigorous prosecution of the war on all 
fronts simultaneously as soon as the weather would permit. 

In June, 1916, the British War Minister, Lord Kitchener, was lost 
at sea while en route to Russia; he was succeeded by Mr. Lloyd 
George. Late in the year a change in the ministry made Lloyd 
George Prime Minister and he organized a War Cabinet of five mem- 
bers with himself as chairman to conduct the war. In a sense, Mr. 
Lloyd George became the dictator of the British government. The 
exemptions under the first conscription act were found unsatisfac- 
torj^ and modifications were introduced giving a greater number of 
men available ^t the front. In France there was also a change in the 
ministry in which General Layautey became Minister of War and 
a War Cabinet was appointed similar to that in Great Britain. To- 
ward the close of 1916 General Joffre was retired from active com- 
mand and became Technical Adviser of the War Cabinet with the 
rank of Marshal of France. Upon his recommendation General 
Nivelle who had been in command at Verdun during the summer and 
autumn and had recovered much of the ground taken by the Ger- 
mans was placed in command of the armies of France. 

At the close of 1916 the situation from the point of view of the 
Central Powers was anything but reassuring. The lines of the Ger- 
man and Austrian armies had been so greatly extended that it was 
necessary to bring Turkish troops to Galicia and Rumania although 
they were greatly needed in Turkey. The heavy losses at Verdun 
and in the Somme attack as well as the effect of the stringent 
blockade were having a depressing effect on the German people. 
The people of all the Central Powers were very anxious for peace. 
The long fronts held by the armies of the Central Powers reduced 
them to the defensive and their reserves were at a low ebb. On 
account of the U-boat warfare the relations between Germany and 
the United States were becoming more and more strained. In both 
Germany and Austria there were changes of ministry showing dis- 
satisfaction as in Great Britain and France ; in Austria there was a 
change of rulers due to the death of Emperor Francis Joseph. It 
was the unsatisfactory military and food situation that led the Ger- 
man G. H. Q. to consent to the unrestricted U-boat warfare in Feb- 



158 

ruary, 1917, that led to war with the United States in April. The 
German Navy hoped to force Great Britain to make peace in six 
months. 

Attack and Defense. — During 1917 the British and French relied 
mainly on their superiority in all types of artillery for preparing the 
way for an infantry attack although both employed tanks to assist 
the infantry. Guns varied in calibre from the very heavy artillery 
mounted on railway carriages and designed to reach the areas well 
in rear of the enemy's positions to the small infantry guns designed 
to attack machine gun nests. Both high angle and flat trajectory 
pieces were employed. For short range trench mortars portable 
and fixed were used. Mapping from aereal photographs was relied 
on for the preliminary study of the enemy's dispositions and air- 
planes assisted the artillery in the actual attack in locating targets 
and in bombing the rear areas ; the maps were often supplemented 
by relief models. After a careful study of the map lines were drawn 
on showing the successive fronts that were to be reached at definite 
times after the attack began so that no unit should get out of hand 
and be subjected to flank attacks by the enemy. Each unit com- 
mander studied the zone assigned him and assigned its separate 
objectives to his subordinates down to the platoon commander. In 
a similar manner the work of the artillery was assigned to the units 
of the various branches so that each unit might be prepared for its 
special work. Liaison between unit commanders of the same arm 
and of the different arms was provided by all the various means that 
had, been devised. A great attack was usually begun by a prolonged 
and intense artillery fire of destruction aimed at batteries, intrench- 
ments and concentration points in order to lighten the task of the 
infantry. The attacking troops were preceded by a rolling barrage 
of the short and medium range artillery while the long range guns 
sought to prevent the assembly of reserves, the movement of troops 
and ammunition in the rear area as well as to keep down the artillery 
fire. The disadvantage of the prolonged bombardment was that it 
informed the enemy of the probable front of attack; to avoid this 
fire was opened simultaneously on other fronts but as a rule the 
enemy was able to discover which was the real attack. Another dis- 
advantage of a prolonged artillery preparation was that at its close 
the infantry attack had to be launched regardless of weather; not 
infrequently bad weather set in just at this time. 

In the defense the Germans had discovered that trench lines reg- 
ister very accurately on an aereal photograph and are not easily 
camouflaged. This led them to rely more on machine gun defense 



159 

combined with entanglements and artillery fire and employ the in- 
fantry for counter-attack. The zones of defense became deeper and 
greater use was made of natural cover to conceal their dispositions. 
Extensive use was made of concrete machine gun casemates or "pill 
boxes" which would resist field artillery and were difficult to hit by 
heavier artillery farther in rear. The German G. H. Q. failed to 
appreciate the possibilities of the tank in attacking machine gun 
nests and in running over wire entanglements and trenches and 
failed to provide any special means of defense save armor-piercing 
bullets and small rapid fire guns. They did not realize the extent 
to which tanks would be developed and employed. In 1917 the Ger- 
mans were still superior in the use of gas having brought into use 
the mustard gas shell which was not used by the Allies until the 
following year. 

Allied Plans for 1917. — In November at the close of the operations 
on the west front in 1916 there was a conference of the commanders 
of the Allied armies or their representatives at headquarters of 
General Joffre. It was there agreed that to secure decisive results 
in 1917 the offensive must be assumed simultaneously on all fronts, 
British, French, Italian, Russian, Rumanian and Salonikan and the 
attacks must embrace wide sectors. In order to prevent the Central 
Powers from taking the initiative as in 1916 it was decided that all 
the armies should be prepared to take the offensive by the middle 
of February, 1917, and unless circumstances prevented it the of- 
fensive should begin promptly at that time. 

For the west front, Generals Joffre and Haig planned a renewal 
of the battle of the Somme on an enlarged scale in which the front 
of attack was to extend from Lens in the north to the Oise River in 
the south and involve the 1st, 3d, 5th and 4th British armies and 
the northern group of the French armies. A secondary attack was 
to be made by the central group of French armies north of Reims. 
In December when General Nivelle had replaced Marshal Joffre in 
command of the armies this plan was revised by Nivelle and his 
own substituted for it. Influenced by his successes at Verdun Gen- 
eral Nivelle was not satisfied with a partial success such as would 
result from a renewal of the battle of the Somme even on a wider 
front. He believed that the Allies had reached the point where the 
operations in the west should aim at nothing less than the destruc- 
tion of the German arm.ies and the reconquest of the invaded ter- 
ritories in Belgium and France. To effect this he contemplated in 
addition to an attack between Lens and the Oise River an attack 
from the south between Soissons and Reims in the direction of 



160 

Hirson which should turn the German hnes both to the east and 
the west. General Haig was directed by the British government to 
cooperate with Nivelle and at the latter's request during January and 
February took over the French lines as far south as Roye thus re- 
leasing the 6th and 10th French armies which were to attack on 
the new front. Before the offensive could be resumed by the Allies 
the Germans retreated from their great salient in the west which 
caused a further delay. 

Retreat of the German Armies on the West Front. — As early 
as September, 1916, as a result of the progress made by the Allies 
in the great Somme drive, German G. H, Q. decided that it might be 
necessary to shorten the lines in the west and evacuate the great 
salient west of the line Arras-St. Quentin-Missy sur Aisne. Work 
on a strong defensive position on the new line was therefore begun ; 
it was called by the Germans the Siegfried line but was usually 
known to the Allies as the Hindenburg line. The positions to be 
evacuated were held by the army group, VI, II and I armies, under 
the Crown Prince of Bavaria who was directed to make plans not 
only to remove the supplies and stores but also to destroy the high- 
roads, villages, towns and wells to prevent the Allies from estab- 
lishing themselves in force in the near future in front of the new 
line. 

The withdrawal of the stores began on February 9 and the general 
retreat with its program of destruction began on March 16. The 
withdrawal to the new line having been carefully prepared in ad- 
vance was effected without loss. The retirement was greatest op- 
posite Roye where the new line was about twenty-five miles in rear 
of the old one. 

As a result of the retreat of the German armies the task assigned 
to General Haig had to be modified. The 5th and 4th British armies 
were now on the front Bapaume-St. Quentin far in advance of their 
original line and it would take months to improve the communica- 
tions in their rear and bring up supplies and munitions for an attack 
on the Hindenburg line. All that could be expected of them was to 
keep up the pressure on the Germans in their front to prevent them 
from withdrawing troops. The British attack had to be made by 
the 3d Army which was astride of the Scarpe River at Arras and 
the 1st Army whose right was south of Lens. 

In one respect the German retreat was an advantage to General 
Nivelle as it shortened the French line north of the Oise River and 
he was enabled to withdraw more troops for his main attack. Be- 
tween St. Quentin and the Oise he left the 3d Fr^ench Army under 



161 

General Humbert whose mission was similar to that of the 4th 
British Army on his left. This was the only remaining army of the 
northern group of French armies which was under the command of 
General d'Esperey who had relieved General Foch in December, 1916. 

For his principal attack from the south General Nivelle had 
organized a new group of armies called the reserve group the com- 
mand of which he had offered General Petain and when he declined, 
it was assigned to General Micheler. It consisted of the 6th French 
Army, General Mangin ; the 5th French Army, General Mazey, and 
the 10th French Army, General Lachene. General Petain who still 
commanded the central group east of Reims was directed to co- 
operate in the attack with the 4th Army between Reims and the 
Suippe River. 

What General Nivelle hoped to effect was a break-through by the 
British in the direction of Douai and the turning of the German 
lines to the north and south ; a break-through by the French between 
Soissons and Reims into the Laon region and the turning of the 
German lines both to the west and east. This would compel the 
Germans to retreat and it was hoped that their armies could be de- 
stroyed by rapid advance all along the line from the Channel to the 
Argonne. 

According to German accounts the German G. H. Q. became aware 
of Nivelle's plan some time in February through the capture of an 
order and it probably hastened the withdrawal from the salient. As 
soon as the armies were behind the Hindenburg line the I German 
Army was detached and sent to the Aisne front and inserted be- 
tween the VII and III armies which were holding that front between 
the Oise River and the Argonne. This group was under the German 
Crown Prince. Steps were also taken to strengthen this front by 
additional lines and works. 

The promotion of General Nivelle over the heads of many senior 
officers of greater experience created dissatisfaction in the French 
Army and in addition there were many general officers who did not 
share his optimistic views as to the result of his plan of attack. 
This created some uneasiness among members of the French cabinet 
and especially in the mind of the new Minister of War who was ap- 
pointed about the middle of March. In view of the changes that 
had occurred since the plan was first proposed, the revolution in 
Russia, the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the United 
States and Germany, and the shortening of the German line in the 
west, the Minister had some doubts as to the advisability of an 
offensive on a grand scale. A series of discussions followed from 



162 

which it appeared that General Haig was in favor of a vigorous 
offensive with all possible strength and the French group com- 
manders while not opposed to the attack were of the opinion that 
a break-through was improbable beyond the second German line 
and that an attack with a limited objective promised greater suc- 
cess. The final conference on April 6 in which the President, the 
Minister of War, General Nivelle and the four group commanders 
took part did not result in any material change in General Nivelle's 
plan for which he issued the directive on April 4 to General Haig 
and his group commanders; on the 5th he notified General Haig 
that the British infantry was to advance on April 9. The reserve 
group of French armies was to advance three days later. Unfor- 
tunately for General Nivelle, the weather which had been fair dur- 
ing the first days of April changed on the 9th and there were 
intermittent storms of rain and snow throughout the period of the 
offensive. The French attack was postponed from the 12th to the 
16th but without any improvement in the weather and the troops 
suft'ered severely in the concentration areas while waiting for the 
advance. 

British Attack Near Arras. — For several miles on either side of 
the Scarpe River, which flows eastward through Arras, the German 
front line trenches ran parallel to and from one to two miles from 
the roads that ran northward from Arras to Bethune and south- 
ward from Arras to Bapaume. In general the ground rose gradually 
from the front line trenches to a ridge which at the northern ex- 
tremity of the battlefield, Vimy Ridge, was a short distance from the 
front line, and at the southern extremity some four miles from it. 
This ridge commanded a view of the country both west and east. 
The possession of this ridge was the objective of the British attack 
although the British commander was prepared to follow up his at- 
tack should the conditions resulting from the attack warrant it. The 
northern part of the field was that in which the French had made 
their attacks in May and September, 1915. . 

The main attack was made by the 3d British Army, General 
Allenby, who had at his disposal for the opening attack four army 
corps, 16 divisions, and a cavalry corps. On his left the Canadian 
corps of the 1st Army was to attack Vimy Ridge. Eight tanks 
were assigned "to the Canadian corps and forty to the 3d Army. Ad- 
vantage was taken of a large system of quarries and cellars in Arras 
and its suburbs to assemble a large force close to the front. In 
case a break-through was accomplished the reserve corps and 
cavalry would advance through the gap and the 1st and 5th armies 
on the flanks would assist in the exploitation. 



163 

The German line was held by the VI Army ; it had been occupied 
practically since the autumn of 1915 and had been strengthened by 
intrenchments, redouts, concrete and other machine gun emplace- 
ments, wide fields of wire entanglements and ample tunnel and other 
shelters. In general it consisted of three lines of defense each well 
wired and reinforced by elaborately constructed strong points. Not- 
withstanding the strength of their position, in view of the success 
of the British in 1916 in their attack farther south, the Germans 
were already constructing a new line some miles in rear of the ridge 
to which they could retire if necessary. 

The following extracts from the report of General Haig give 
some of the salient features of the attack : 

*'The great strength of these defenses demanded very thorough 
artillery preparation and this in turn could only be carried out ef- 
fectively with the aid of the air service. 

"Our activity in the air, therefore, increased with the growing 
severity of the bombardment. A period of very heavy air fighting 
ensued, culminating in the days immediately preceding the attack, 
in a struggle of the utmost intensity for local supremacy in the air. 
Losses on both sides were heavy but the offensive tactics most gal- 
lantly persisted in by our fighting aeroplanes secured our artillery 
machines from serious interference and enabled our guns to carry 
out their work effectively. At the same time bombarding machines 
caused great damage and loss to the enemy by a constant succession 
of successful raids directed against dumps, railways, aerodomes and 
billets. 

"Three weeks prior to the attack the systematic cutting of the 
enemy's wire was commenced while our heavy artillery searched the 
enemy's back areas and communications. Night firing, wire cutting 
and bombardment of hostile trenches, strong points and billets, 
continued steadily and with increasing intensity on the whole battle 
front till the days immediately preceding the attack, when a general 
bombardment was opened. 

"During this latter period extensive gas discharges were carried 
out and many successful raids were undertaken by day and night 
along the whole front to be attacked. 

"Organized bombardments took place also on other parts of our 
front, particularly in the Ypres sector." 

The wire cutting, etc., began in the third week in March ; the gen- 
eral bombardment opened on the 4th of April and lasted until the 
8th on which day preparations were made to support the assault 
scheduled at 5:30 a. m. on the 9th. 

"The attack on the front was planned to be carried out by a suc- 
cession of comparatively short advances, the separate stages of 
which were arranged to correspond approximately with the enemy's 
successive systems of defense. As each stage was reached a short 
pause was to take place to enable the troops detailed for the attack 
on the next objective to form up for assault. 



164 

"Tanks, which on many occasions since their first use in Septem- 
ber of last year had done excellent service, were attached to each 
corps for the assault and again did admirable work in co-operation 
with our infantry. Their assistance was particularly valuable in the 
capture of hostile strong points." 

The general attack was launched at 5:30 a. m. on April 9th after 
an intense preliminary bombardment of about an hour. The weather 
was favorable for the opening attack as there was rain followed by 
snow which was driven into the faces of the enemy by a west wind. 
It was however unfavorable for artillery observation and air opera- 
tions and the ground became hourly more difficult for the movement 
of infantry, artillery and tanks. The infantry advanced covered by 
an effective barrage and within forty minutes had carried the Ger- 
man first line of trenches. 

At 7:30 the advance was renewed against the second objectives 
where greater opposition was met but by noon these were carried 
on a front of about seven miles. 

Shortly after noon the advance was renewed for the third objec- 
tives and met with still greater opposition as the wire had not been 
thoroughly destroyed along part of the front. This required further 
action by the artillery which was with difficulty moved up for this 
purpose. It was this wire and the assistance of some strong points 
in the third line that prevented the use of the cavalry corps which 
had moved up to the vicinity of Arras. 

"At the close of the day our troops were established deeply in the 
enemy's position on the whole front of the attack. We had gained a 
firm footing in the enemy's third line on both banks of the Scarpe 
and had made an important breach in the enemy's last fully com- 
pleted line of defense. North of the Scarpe little remained to be done 
to complete the capture of our objectives. South of the river we 
still required to gain the remainder of the German third line." 

After the first day the operations of the British troops were much 
hampered by the bad weather which continued stormy for many 
days with heavy falls of snow and squalls of wind and rain. The 
first period of the attack ended about April 13th when the divisions 
most heavily engaged were withdrawn from the line and the cavalry 
corps was sent to the rear. A break-through had not been effected 
but north of the Scarpe the British were in possession of the much 
coveted ridge and were advancing down its slopes. South of the 
Scarpe River the attack had not been so successful as the Germans 
still had possession of most of the high ground. During this first 
attack the British captured 12,000 prisoners and 200 guns. 



165 

Had the weather been more favorable for the movement of troops 
and artillery the success of the British would undoubtedly have been 
far greater. Ludendorff says: 

April 10, and the following days were critical. The consequences 
of a break-through of twelve to fifteen kilometers wide and six or 
more kilometers deep are not easy to meet. In view of the heavy 
losses in men, guns and ammunition resulting from such a break- 
through, colossal efforts are needed to make good the damage. It 
was the business of General Headquarters to provide reserves on a 
large scale. But it was absolutely impossible with the troops at our 
disposal and in view of the military situation to have a second divi- 
sion immediately behind every division that might fall out. A day 
like April 9 threw all calculations to the wind. Many days had to 
pass before a new line could really be formed and consolidated. The 
end of the crisis, even if troops were available, depended very 
largely, as it generally does in such cases, on whether the enemy 
after his first victory, would attack again, and by further success 
aggravate the difficulty of forming a new line. Our position hav- 
ing been weakened, such victories were to be won only too easily." 

He also says: 

"The battle of Arras was at its height in the second half of April 
and was swallowing up a liberal supply of reserves and material, 
when on April 16, the French also opened their formidable offen- 
sives on the Aisne and in Champagne." 

During the French attacks between Soissons and Reims, April 16 
to May 4, the British kept up their pressure to prevent the with- 
drawal of German troops and made several successful attacks in the 
vicinity of Lens and south of the Scarpe River where their advance 
had been checked in the first attack. At the end of this period the 
lines were consolidated. The British had succeeded in advancing 
their line about 4 miles east of Arras and had possession of most of 
the high ground south as far as the Sensee River near Croisilles. 

During the entire period covered by these operations the 5th and 
4th armies were engaged in attacking advance positions of the Hin- 
denburg line to prevent the withdrawal of troops. During the 
month's fighting between Lens and St. Quentin the British captured 
some 20,000 prisoners, 257 guns and a large number of trench mor- 
tars and machine guns as well as valuable war material. The British 
casualties were also heavy and numbered over 175,000 men. 

French Attack Along the Aisne. — In the Aisne area between the 
Oise and the Argonne General Nivelle had concentrated a force of 
1,200,000 men and 5,000 guns. After the retreat of the Germans 
to the Hindenburg line he had prolonged the front of attack origin- 
ally to be made between Soissons and to the Suippe River east of 
Reims. 



166 

The German front ran due south from the Ailette River to the 
Aisne at the junction of the Vesle and thence along the south bank 
for a few miles where the Germans had a bridgehead captured in the 
winter of 1914-1915 ; thence the line crossed the river to the Chemin 
des Dames ridge between the Ailette and Aisne rivers and along 
that ridge to Craonne. From Craonne the line ran southeast to 
some heights commanding Reims and thence over the Moronvilliers 
ridge between the Suippe and Vesle rivers to the Suippe. The at- 
tack was to be delivered over this entire front by the reserve group 
of armies from the Ailette to Reims and by the 4th Army of the 
central group east of Reims. 

The 6th French Army had one corps facing the German front 
between the Ailette and Aisne and four corps facing the Chemin 
des Dames ridge east of Soissons; it was to attack on both fronts 
and if possible cut off the retreat of the German forces in the salient. 
The 5th Army with six corps was to attack the German front be- 
tween Craonne and Reims. The 5th and 6th armies were expected 
to carry the four German lines and reach the heights to the north 
of the Ailette the first day. The 10th Army and the cavalry were 
held in reserve but were to be pushed forward the second day and 
reach Laon. The attack was to be prepared by a prolonged artillery 
bombardment which as in the German attack at Verdun was to 
cover a deep area. 

Unfortunately for General Nivelle's plan the artillery had hardly 
opened fire when on April 9th a storm of snow and rain began which 
lasted about two weeks and interfered with airplane and ground 
observation. The infantry assault was postponed from the 12th to 
the 16th in the hope of better weather but was finally launched on 
the morning of the 16th under very unfavorable weather conditions. 
As a result, although the German lines were penetrated at various 
points along the front, only the first of the German lines could be 
captured and held on the Chemin des Dames ridge and to the east. 
At the close of the first day it was evident that there would be no 
break-through but the struggle was continued until the night of the 
21st. During these days the 6th Army succeeded in capturing the 
German salient and the Germans retired from it to the ridge north 
of the Aisne with heavy loss. At the close of the battle, the French 
had advanced their lines at various points but as a whole the attack 
of the 6th and 5th armies had not been a success. East of Reims, 
the 4th French Army, four corps, under General Anthoine, had been 
Tliore successful and in its attack had by April 30th captured the 
Moronvilliers ridge which gave the French an outlook to the north 



167 

and deprived the Germans of their excellent observing stations. 
After the 21st of April there was a lull in the battle west of Reims 
until May 4, when the 6th, 10th and 5th armies attacked and the 
10th captured the town of Craonne. This was an attack with 
limited objectives. 

As General Nivelle had not succeeded in winning the confidence of 
his government by this attack, on April 29 General Petain was made 
War Department Chief of Staff with supervising control over all 
operations; at the request of General Nivelle, General Maistre re- 
lieved General Mangin of the command of the 6th Army. 

The failure of the great attack by General Nivelle had a demoral- 
izing effect on the French Army; although it had captured some 
20,000 prisoners and a large number of guns its own casualties were 
about 120,000 and its general advance west of Reims had been slight. 
In this battle the heavy French tanks had been employed for the 
first time but without much success. Of some 132 tanks, nearly 
half advanced well beyond the infantry and were destroyed by Ger- 
man artillery while the others became stalled in the field. The ease 
with which this tank attack was defeated deceived the Germans as 
to the value of these new engines. 

On the 15th of May, General Petain succeeded General Nivelle in 
command of the French armies and General Foch, who had been 
without any important duty since the preceding December, became 
Chief of Staff at the War Department. 

British Operations in Flanders or Third Battle of Ypres. — Gen- 
eral Haig had planned to make Flanders his main field of operation 
in 1917 for the purpose of securing if possible the Belgian coast 
line and the German submarine base at Zeebrugge. He was how- 
ever delayed in undertaking operations here by his instructions to 
cooperate with the French in their attack on the Aisne. When in 
May it became evident that the French attack had closed, without 
wholly ceasing his attacks farther south he made preparations to 
carry out his original plan. The French again took over most of 
the front from Cambrai to St. Quentin. 

The line occupied by the opposing troops between the English 
Channel and the Lys River had not changed materially since the 
second battle of Ypres when the British lines had been drawn back 
to a distance of two miles from the ruins of the town due to the 
first gas attack of the Germans in April, 1915. North of the town 
the Allies were behind the Ypres canal and the Yser River as far as 
the coast where they had a narrow bridgehead on the east side of 
the river. South of Ypres the Germans occupied a great salient on 



168 

the ridge occupied by the towns of Wytschaete and Messines. The 
southern end if their line rested on the Lys River between Armen- 
tieres and Warneton. 

Messines Ridge. — While making his preparations and concentrat- 
ing his troops for the main attack General Haig decided to recapture 
the German Wytschaete-Messines ridge with the three corps of the 
2d Army which was then holding the line between the Lys River 
and Ypres. This ridge was held by troops of the IV German Army 
which occupied the line between the Lys River and the Channel. 
This ridge which commanded the British line had been held since 
October, 1914, when it was taken from the dismounted British 
cavalry and had been strongly fortified. 

One of the most interesting features of the attack on the 
Messines-Wytschaete Ridge was the extent to which military mines 
were employed in the attack. The mining operations were begun 
in January, 1916, and most of the work was finished that year. The 
mines were of great depth and were executed by special mining com- 
panies organized from practical miners in Great Britain, Canada 
and Australia. In the course of these operations 8,000 yards of 
galleries were constructed leading to twenty-four great mine cham- 
bers. Nineteen of these chambers were under the front to be at- 
tacked and in condition when the assault was made. Over a million 
pounds of ammonel were used in the charging of the mines. 
. Like all similar operations the attack was preceded by the usual 
artillery preparation which began on May 27 and continued until 
the morning of the assault, June 7. On that morning the mines 
were exploded at 3:10 and soon thereafter the three corps assigned 
to carry the position moved out. The mines had been very effective 
in destroying the enemy's first line, one of them forming a crater 
140 yards wide and 70 feet deep. Due to the demoralization of the 
German troops caused by the mines and the destruction of the works 
caused by the artillery preparation, the position was taken and con- 
solidated before the Germans could launch a counter-attack. This 
when made was repulsed with heavy loss to the attacking troops. 

The attack was a complete success and resulted not only in the 
capture of the position but also in the capture of over 7,000 pris- 
oners, 67 gims and a large number of trench mortars and machine 
guns. From the ridge the Germans fell back three miles to a line 
selected in advance. Due to the demoralization of the Germans by 
the mine explosions and the fact that the attack was coincident with 
the relief of the German division then holding the front, the British 
losses were relatively small. 



169 

Battle of Passchendale Ridge. — In the meantime, the 1st and 3d 

British armies extended their fronts to occupy the line as far as the 
Scheldt canal south of Cambrai where the 3d Army connected with 
the French. The 5th and 4th armies which had been on the right 
of the 3d Army were brought to the north where the 5th, General 
Gough, was to make the main attack on the Ypres front and the 4th, 
General Rawlinson, was to be employed near the Channel. The 1st 
French Army, General Anthoine, inserted between the 5th British 
and the Belgian Army was to attack with the 5th Army. As it 
turned out the more ambitious aim of securing the Belgian coast 
had to be abandoned and the ultimate objective of the campaign 
was the low ridge east of Ypres which extends from the Messines 
ridge via Gheluvelt, Zonnebeke, Passchendale to Stadenburg. The 
village of Passchendale is between five and six miles east of the line 
then occupied by the British. The watershed is less than 60 feet 
above sea level and much of the ground between the objective and 
the British line is less than 20 feet above sea level. It is an exceed- 
ingly difficult country for operations in a season of heavy rains such 
as that covered by the period of the attack. Infantry and artillery 
movements were difficult due to the blocking of the rpads and tanks 
were almost useless. 

On the front of attack the Germans had three general lines of 
defense : one close to the Allied line, another a mile or so in rear, and 
a third a mile and a half still farther to the rear behind a sluggish 
stream, the Steenbeck, which was generally parallel to the lines. 
On account of the nature of the country the Germans relied for de- 
fense mainly on strong points organized with wire and machine guns 
many of them in concrete casemates. These were for passive de- 
fense; for active defense they relied on counter-attacks by shock 
troops. Shell holes were also organized for defense. 

The preparations for the attack were completed during the month 
of July and the date for the launching of the infantry attack was 
finally set for July 31. As in the Arras attack the assault was pre- 
ceded by a battle in the air to gain control and a prolonged artillery 
bombardm.ent to destroy the enemy's batteries and his works. Dur- 
ing this bombardment the Germans withdrew from their front line 
along the Ypres canal where they faced the French which enabled 
the French to cross the canal and construct bridges which facilitated 
their first attack. The hour selected for the assault was 3 :50 a. m. 
when it was preceded by a discharge of drums filled with oil and 
ignited by thermite ; the troops were protected by the usual rolling 
barrage. 



170 

The attack of the 5th British Army was made by nine divisions 
in the front Hne and extended from the Ypres-Commines Canal on 
the south to the Ypres-Thourout railway on the north. Two French 
divisions attacked on the left and the 2d British Army on its right 
as far as the Lys River. The attack of the 5th British and 1st 
French armies was to be the main attack as it was desired to advance 
mainly in the direction of Roulers and Thourout. 

The opening attack was successful as the French right and British 
left reached the Steenbeck stream that day and in general the first 
and second German positions were carried over the entire front of 
the two armies. The 2d British Army also reached its objectives 
which involved only a slight advance. At this stage the weather 
prevented General Haig from following up his success and gave the 
Germans time to recover. 

"The weather had been threatening throughout the day and had 
rendered the work of our aeroplanes very difficult from the com- 
mencement of the battle. During the afternoon while fighting was 
in progress, rain began, and fell steadily all night. Thereafter, for 
four days, the rain continued without cessation, and for several days 
afterward the weather remained stormy and unsettled. The low- 
lying, clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden by rain, turned to a 
succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked over- 
flowing streams were speedily transformed into long stretches of 
bog, impassable except by a few well defined tracks, which became 
marks for the enemy's artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk 
death by drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting on 
several occasions both men and pack animals were lost in this way. 
In these conditions operations of any magnitude became impossible, 
and the resumption of our offensive was necessarily postponed until 
a period of fine weather should allow the ground to dry. 

"As had bee'n the case in our Arras battle, this unavoidable delay 
in the development of our offensive was of the greatest service to 
the enemy. Valuable time was lost, the troops opposed to us were 
able to recover from the disorganization produced by our first attack, 
and the enemy was given the opportunity to bring up reinforce- 
ments." — Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches. 

This condition of affairs was very disappointing to General Haig 
but there was nothing to do but to wait until the ground was again 
in condition for military operations. As the ground was flat the run- 
off in the streams was slow and it was over a month and a half before 
the attack could be continued. In the meantime the final position 
gained was consolidated and such operations as were possible were 
made for continuing the attack at the earliest possible moment. 
Some minor operations were undertaken in the latter part of August 
in which parts of the Allied line were advanced. 



171 

Verdun. — In the latter part of August, while the attention of the 
Germans was fixed on their extreme right in Belgium, the French 
made a very successful attack at Verdun. Both the French govern- 
ment and the Army had been greatly depressed by the failure of 
General Nivelle's great attack which was to break the German front. 
It was the task of General Petain to restore the confidence of both 
which he did by two very successful attacks made in the last half 
of 1917 ; the first of these was at Verdun. 

North of Verdun the 2d French Army, General Guillaumat, faced 
the V German Army. Although General Nivelle while in command 
at Verdun had regained a part of' the territory north of Verdun on 
the east side of the Meuse, the Germans were still in advance of 
their original line. West of the Meuse they still occupied the line 
on 304-Meter Hill and Mort Homme to which they had advanced 
from Melancourt and Forges creek. It was the aim of General Petain 
to force them back to their original position by a series of advances 
to limited objectives and prevent the possibility of a renewal of the 
attacks on this front. 

The attack was begun by a powerful three-day bombardment and 
was followed at dawn on August 20 by the advance of the infantry 
on successive objectives. In seven consecutive days the enemy was 
driven back from line to line until he was practically back in his 
original position. The attack was not contemplated to break through 
the German line but was made mainly to show that the French had 
not lost their fighting spirit. The operations on this front ceased 
early in September. 

Of the attacks in Flanders and Verdun to the end of August 
Ludendorff says: 

"The costly battles in Flanders and at Verdun imposed a heavy 
strain on the western troops. In spite of all the concrete protection 
they seemed more or less powerless under the enormous weight of 
the enemy's artillery. At some points they no longer displayed that 
firmness which I, in common with the local commander, had hoped 
for. 

"The enemy contrived to adapt himself to our methods of employ- 
ing counter-attack divisions. There were no more attacks with un- 
limited objectives such as General Nivelle made in the Aisne- 
Champagne battle. He was ready for our counter-attacks and pre- 
pared for them by exercising restraint in the exploitation of 
success." 

Renewal of Battle of Passchendale Ridge. — General Haig says: 

"At the beginning of September the weather gradually improved, 
and artillery and other preparations for my next attack proceeded 
steadily. Both the extent of the preparations required, however, 



172 

and the need to give the ground time to recover from the heavy- 
rains of August rendered a considerable interval unavoidable before 
a new advance could be undertaken. The 20th of September was 
therefore chosen for the date of our attack " 

This attack was made on the same front as before but the left 
wing of the 2d British Army whose commander, General Plumer, 
was now in command of the entire British forces engaged, took 
over the difficult sector between the Ypres-Roulers railway and the 
Ypres-Commines canal. Notwithstanding unfavorable weather the 
Allies' line was advanced from one to two thousand yards and was 
held during succeeding days against furious counter-attacks. On 
October 4 another general attack was made and the greater part 
of the coveted ridge was taken as far north as the Ypres-Roulers 
railway. By local attacks the British advanced to Passchendale 
village which was taken by the Canadians November 6 ; this closed 
the operations in Flanders for the year. 

Of the attacks of September 30, October 4 and later operations 
Ludendorff says: 

"After a period of profound quiet in the West, which led to hope 
that the battle of Flanders was over, another terrific assault was 
made on our lines on September 20. The main force was directed 
against the Passchendale-Gheluvelt line. Obviously the British 
were trying to gain the high ground between Ypres and the Roulers- 
Menin line which affords an extensive view in all directions. These 
heights were also exceptionally important for us, as they afforded 
us ground observation posts and a certain amount of cover from 
hostile view. 

"The enemy's onslaught on the 20th was successful, which proved 
the superiority of the attack over the defense. Its strength did not 
consist in tanks. We found them inconvenient, but put them out of 
action. The power of the attack lay in artillery, and in the fact 
that ours did not do enough damage to the hostile infantry as it was 
assembling, and, above all at the actual time of the assault. 

"The actions in the third battle of Flanders had presented the 
same set-piece characteristics as those in the second and the fight- 
ing at Verdun. The depth of penetration was limited so as to secure 
immunity from our counter-attack and the latter was then broken 
up by massed artillery." 

As a result the German tactics were revised ; the front line was 

strengthened and counter-attacks were made locally by a division 

of the second line behind- each division of the first line. 

"Early in October the artillery action revived and on the 2d and 
third artillery engagements of great violence took place. The in- 
fantry battle commenced on the morning of the 4th. It was ex- 
traordinarily severe and we came through it only with enormous 
loss. It was evident that holding the front line more densely, 
adopted at my last visit in September, was not the remedy. I now 



173 

recommended the IV Army to form an advanced zone — that is a 
narrow strip between the enemy's front line and the line which our 
troops were to hold by mobile defense. The enemy would have to 
cross this strip in makinj^ his attack and our artillery would have 
time to jret into action on him before he could reach our main line 
of resistance. The great dilliculty lay in withdrawing our troops 
from the advanced zone in case of attack and bringing the barrage 
back to our own line. 

"There were further severe engagements on October and 12. 
The line held better than on the 4th although in some places the 
enemy penetrated to a considerable distance. The wastage in the 
big actions of the fourth battle of Flanders was extraordinarily 
great. 

"The fifth act of the great drama in Flanders opened on October 
22. Enormous masses of ammunition, such as the human mind had 
never imagined before the war, were hurled upon the bodies of men 
who passed a miserable existance scattered about in mud-filled shell- 
holes. It was no longer life at all. It was unspeakable suffering, and 
through this world of mud the attackers dragged themselves slowly 
but steadily and in dense masses. Caught in the advanced zone of our 
hail of fire they often collapsed and the lonely man in the shell hole 
breathed again. Then the mass came on again. Rifle and machine 
gun jammed with mud. Man fought against man, and only too often 
the mass was successful." 

In his review of this battle General Haig says: 

"This offensive, maintained for three and a half months under the 
most adverse conditions of weather, had entailed almost superhu- 
man exertions on the part of the troops of all arms and services. 
The enemy had done his utmost to hold his ground, and in his en- 
deavors to do so had used up no less than seventy-eight divisions of 
which eighteen had been engaged a second and third time in the 
battle after being withdrawn to rest and refit. Despite the magni- 
tude of his efforts, it was the immense natural difficulties, accentu- 
ated manifold by the abnormally wet weather, rather than the 
enemy's resistance, which limited our progress and prevented the 
complete capture of the (Passchendale) ridge. 

"What was actually accomplished under such adverse conditions 
is the most conclusive proof that, given normally fine August, 
the capture of the whole ridge, within the space of a few weeks, 
was well within the power of the men who achieved so much. 
They advanced every time with absolute confidence in their power 
to overcome the enemy, even though they had sometimes to struggle 
through mud up to their waists to reach him. So long as they could 
reach him they did overcome him, but physical exhaustion placed 
narrow limits on the depth to which each advance could be pushed, 
and compelled long pauses between advances. The full fruits of 
each success were consequently not always obtained. Time after 
time the practically beaten enemy was enabled to reorganize and 
relieve his men and to bring up reinforcements behind the sea of mud 
which constituted his main protection. 



174 

"Notwithstanding the many difficulties, much was achieved. Our 
captures in Flanders since the commencement of the operations at 
the end of July amount to 24,065 prisoners, 74 guns, 138 trench 
mortars and 941 machine guns. It is certain that the enemy's losses 
greatly exceeded ours." 

In this prolonged struggle probably at least two-thirds of the 
British divisions in France were engaged one or more times and ac- 
cording to General Haig, a still greater number of German divisions. 
The casualties in killed and wounded were very heavy on both sides ; 
those of the British are given as 450,000. 

French Attack on the Aisne. — While heavy fighting was going on 
in the north. General Petain launched his second successful attack 
October 22. The attack was made by the 6th French Army, General 
Maistre, at the salient of the German line northeast of Soissons and 
just south of the Ailette River. After a careful artillery preparation 
the infantry attack was launched and resulted in the capture of 
some 11,000 prisoners and the retreat of the Germans across the 
Ailette. Of the attack Ludendorff says: 

"The French attacked simultaneously. For this they selected 
the favorable salient southwest of Laon known as the Laffeaux cor- 
ner. We discovered their intention early in October ; the army took 
full measures for defense, and was supplied with everything that 
was necessary. In spite of other advice, it wished to hold the salient, 
feeling confident of success. 

"The French attack on October 22 was successful. One division 
succumbed to the effects of an exceptionally heavy gas bombard- 
ment, and gave way before the hostile attack. The enemy advanced 
toward Chavignon and so caused a narrow but deep penetration in 
the salient. This forced us to order its evacuation. The losses were 
very serious; once more several divisions were destroyed. 

"This withdrawal of our line inevitably entailed the evacuation of 
the Chemin des Dames ridge. 

"As at Verdun in August, the French, supported by remarkable 
masses of artillery, had fought vigorously." 

Battle of Cambrai. — The battles of Flanders and on the French 
front had caused the weakening of the German II Army in the 
vicinity of Cambrai and this weakening had been observed by Gen- 
eral Byng, who had relieved General Allenby. Byng planned an at- 
tack on this front and requested reinforcements to carry it through ; 
it was not until the battle of Flanders was practically over that 
these could be sent him and then not as many divisions as requested. 

The part of the enemy's front to be attacked was about 71/2 miles 
southwest of Cambrai and was in the angle between the Cambrai- 
Bapaume road and the St. Quentin canal. Behind the advance posts 
was the main Hindenburg line with the equally strong reserve line 



175 

about a mile in rear. Behind and between the lines were strong 
posts consisting of intrenched villages, farms, woods, etc. The Hin- 
denburg trenches were 15 feet wide and 9 feet deep. 

The main attack was to be made between the Canal du Nord and 
the St. Quentin canal on a front of about six miles. For the attack 
General Byng employed six divisions in the front line and had one 
in reserve. Unlike previous attacks, there was to be no prolonged 
artillery bombardment; it was to be surprise attack in which the 
infantry was to be assisted by eight tank battalions equipped with 
nearly 350 fighting tanks. These were to destroy the wires, fight 
machine gun nests and assist the infantry by enfilading the trenches. 
In order to enable them to cross the trenches, each was provided 
with a huge drum of fascines which was to be dropped into the 
trench. The tank battalions formed three brigades each of which 
had 18 supply and 3 wireless signal tanks. Besides capturing the 
Hindenburg lines, one of the features of the attack was to make a 
pathway for a cavalry corps which was in reserve to cross the Ger- 
man lines and the St. Quentin canal and make a raid on Cambrai 
and the German communications. To aid the' cavalry, 32 tanks were 
supplied with towing gear to remove the wire for the cavalry, and 
two tanks with bridging supplies; another tank carried a cable for 
signal service with 3d Army headquarters. In all there were 476 
tanks. The tanks were brought to the front by rail at night and con- 
cealed in the woods in rear. 

The attack began without warning at 6 :20 a. m. November 20 
when the tanks followed by infantrj^ moved forward under a heavy 
barrage and the long ranged guns opened on the rear area. The 
Germans were completely surprised and in some respects the British 
as well, as most of the infantry got well beyond the Hindenburg 
reserve line on the first day and on the second day had reached 
objectives five miles in advance of the starting point. The cavalry 
did not fare as well as the bridge over which they expected to cross 
was broken down and the arrival of a German division from Russia 
that day prevented the British from developing their front here. 
The cavalry raid had to be given up as only one squadron succeeded 
in crossing the canal. From the 22d to the 30th, reserves were 
brought up by both sides and severe fighting took place in a contest 
to secure a ridge of high ground around Bourlon due west of Cam- 
brai which commanded the ground both north and south. 

The loss of the Hindenburg line was a shock to German G. H. Q. 
and immediate steps were taken to send reinforcements from other 
parts of the line to redeem the situation. The plan evolved was a 



176 

good one and consisted in attacking the British lines in a manner 
to cut off the salient they had captured. The attack on November 
30 in the north was easily defeated but that made across the St. 
Quentin canal penetrated the British line about two miles before it 
was stopped. As the British had been unable to capture the Bour- 
lon ridge they withdrew from the salient to the Hindenburg reserve 
line. 

In the Cambrai attack the British claim to have taken 11,000 
prisoners and either captured or destroyed 145 guns ; the Germans 
claim to have taken in their counter-attack 6,000 prisoners and 
100 guns. 

The main feature of the Cambrai attack was that it, established 
the value of tanks to infantry in an attack on favorable ground. 
The attack had not only justified the tanks but also the tank tactics 
employed. Thereafter the moral effect of the tanks on the Allied 
and German troops was apparent. 

The tanks employed with the infantry were the heavy tanks, male 
and female ; the former w^ere equipped with 2 6-pounder guns and 4 
light machine guns and the latter with 6 light machine guns. In ad- 
dition to these, gun-carrying or supply tanks and wireless signal 
tanks were used as stated. The tank corps was organized into bri- 
gades, each composed of 3 battalions of four fighting sections each. 
The normal strength of fighting sections was 6 fighting tanks. None 
of the battalions employed were completely equipped. 



177 



CHAPTER XII. 

OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN, RUMANIAN, ITALIAN 
AND SALONIKA FRONTS IN 1917. 

Russian Front. — The operations on the Russian front were great- 
ly influenced by the political changes during the year. At the begin- 
ning of the year the reactionary government was in control and the 
discontent in the country and the army was steadily increasing. 
This period terminated on March 15 with the abdication of the Czar 
and the organization of the first provisional government. In this 
government Alexander Kerensky was the leading figure being first 
Minister of Justice and in later reorganizations, Minister of War 
and Marine and finally Prime Minister. Kerensky's government 
was overthrown on the 8th of November when the Council of the 
People's Commissioners under Lenin and Trotsky came into power. 

During the first period, there were no important military opera- 
tions. At its close General Alexieff succeeded the Czar as com- 
mander in chief of the Russian Army and Generals Russky and 
Brusilov retained their commands of the northern and southern 
groups. General Ewerts resigned the command of the central group 
and was replaced by General Gourko. In order to win over the 
soldiers of the army to the new government, various orders were 
issued to make the army hiore democratic and soldiers' committees 
were formed in the armies which gradually undermined discipline. 
In May both Generals Alexieff and Russky were relieved from com- 
mand and General Brusilov was made commander in chief ; General 
Guter was assigned to command of the southern armies. The Cen- 
tral Powers took advantage of the demoralization of the Russian 
Army to shift their troops. The best divisions serving on the Rus- 
sian front were replaced by worn-out divisions from the west front 
and by divisions of an inferior character. These Powers were care- 
ful to avoid any operations that might arrest the progress of the 
revolution and assisted it by propaganda in the Russian armies. 
The Allies who had at first encouraged the revolution in the belief 
that it would lead to a more vigorous prosecution of the war soon 
realized their mistake. As a result of the urgent demands of the 
Allied Powers the Russian government consented to resume the 
offensive all along the Russian front on the 1st of July. On the 
front of the northern and central groups attacks were to be made 
on small fronts as the armies were in no condition for a general of- 



178 

fensive. Brusilov planned to make his principal offensive with his 
old group now under General Guter which consisted of the 11th, 
7th, 8th and 2d Russian armies and occupied the front facing mainly- 
Austrian troops from Brody on the north to the Carpathian Moun- 
tains on the boundary of Bukowina. His aim was to advance on a 
wide front on both banks of the Dniester River. 

The operations in the south began on July 1 and during the first 
two weeks of July the Russians advanced some thirty miles on a 
front of one hundred miles. The difficulty of supply and the general 
condition of the armies prevented any further advance as the op- 
ponents were bringing up reinforcements. This attack compelled the 
German G. H. Q. to take action and shock divisions were sent from 
the west front to reinforce the armies attacked and enable them to 
counter-attack. The counter-attack with the shock troops was 
directed against the right wing of the 11th Army on the right flank 
of the long Russian line. The counter-attack was delivered on July 
19 and by the end of the month the Russian armies were back across 
the frontier of east Galicia for the first time since the beginning of 
th^ war and Bukowina which had changed hands many times was 
again in possession of the Austrians. The 11th army had become 
thoroughly demoralized and its retreat compelled the withdrawal 
of the other armies that were also showing signs of disintegration. 
As a result of the Russian retreat General Guter was succeeded in 
command of the southern group by General Kornilov commanding 
the 8th Army; Kornilov later succeeded General Brusilov as com- 
mander in chief of the Russian Army. 

In the north the Russians at first had some local successes of 
little importance. In the last days of August the VIII German 
Army in the extreme north took the offensive and early in Septem- 
ber captured Riga the Baltic port that had resisted successfully 
during the last half of 1916. The 12th Russian Army retreated to- 
ward Petrograd. This was followed by the capture of the islands 
at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga in October from which the Germans 
could advance on Petrograd. In the latter part of October German 
forces debarked on the mainland east of the islands. Shortly after 
this the Kerensky government fell and on the 7th of December an 
armistice was declared between the Central Powers and the Bolshe- 
vik government. Military operations ceased on the Russian front 
in October. 

The failure of the Russian armies to cooperate in a vigorous man- 
ner was largely responsible for the lack of greater success on the 
west front and the collapse of the Italian offensive. 



179 

Rumanian Front. — After the collapse of the Rumanian Army in 
1916, the Rumanian front was taken over by the 9th, 4th and 6th 
Russian armies while the Rumanian Army was thoroughly organ- 
ized by French officers and military supplies were forwarded through 
Russia by Great Britain, France and the United States. It was not 
until the latter part of July that the Rumanians were ready to under- 
take offensive operations and by that time the Russian armies were 
beginning to disintegrate. 

Just about the time the Germans made their counter-attack in 
Galicia, the Rumanians assisted by the Russians began an offensive 
movement from the Sereth River about forty to fifty miles north 
of Galatz which was to be extended southward to that town. The 
opening operations were successful against the Austrian troops 
against whom they were directed, but a few days later the Russian 
general who was in command of the combined operations was 
directed by Kerensky to cease his operations in view of the critical 
situation farther north. In the meantime General Mackensen had 
moved German troops up to the point of attack and there attempted 
to force the crossing of the Sereth River. His attempt was unsuc- 
cessful and all operations on this front ceased in the latter part of 
August as the Russian armies were no longer in a condition to assist. 
Two days after the Russian armistice the Rumanians felt compelled 
to agree to a similar armistice with the Central Powers December 9. 

Italian Front. — During the Somme drive of 1916, Italy declared 
war against Germany and General Cadorna was apprehensive of the 
appearance of German troops on the Italian front ; he therefore re- 
quested reinforcement by British or French divisions. In the latter 
part of March General Foch and the Chief of Staff of the 
British Army visited Italy to confer on the general situation. As 
the Italians were still much stronger than the Austrians on that 
front and the Allied plan would keep the Germans engaged, it was 
decided not to reinforce the Italian Army which was to continue its 
Isonzo offensive simultaneously with the Allied attacks on the west 
front. The Italians had some 50 divisions under arms but were still' 
relatively weak in artillery. In aircraft the Italians were now 
superior to the Austrians. 

First Italian Attack, May-June. — The Italian plan was to attack 
along the Isonzo with the 2d and 3d armies. The 2d Army was to 
seize the heights on the east bank of the Isonzo from Gorizia about 
six miles northward ; at the time the Italians had only the bridge- 
head at Plava on this front. When the Austrians concentrated here 
the 3d Army was again to press forward in the main attack along 



180 

the Carso Plateau in the south. According to the Allied plan the 
attack was to begin in April when the Allies attacked on the west 
front, but for various reasons the operations did not begin until May. 

The first stage of the attack began on May 12 by a heavy bombard- 
ment of the Austrian heights north of Gorizia and at noon on the 
14th the infantry advanced. The battle here lasted until May 22 
and at its end the Austrian first line was captured over a length of 
about three miles. The second Austrian line was however on heights 
which commanded the first. 

The second stage af the attack on the Carso plateau began by a 
heavy bombardment on May 22 and at 4 p. m. on the following day 
the infantry left their trenches. Between this and May 30 when the 
attack died out, the Italians had advanced their line on an average of 
about two miles. The attack however had not accomplished all that 
was hoped for as the key-point of the Austrian position was some 
two miles beyond the front reached. 

In the meantime Austrian troops had been rushed westward from 
the Russian front and on June 1 a counter-attack was made on the 
Carso plateau which lasted until the 5th. Over a front of four miles 
the Italians were driven back at most about a mile and a quarter. 

In view of the situation on the Russian front after the defeat of 
Brusilov's attack in July and the demoralization of the Russian 
armies, during the summer of 1917 General Cadorna again appealed 
to the French and British governments for reinforcements but as 
the armies of both of these powers were engaged on the west front 
his request could not be granted. He was therefore compelled to 
continue operations with his own troops which had lost heavily in 
the spring operations. The Austrians who had also lost heavily had 
the Russian front to draw on. * 

■i 

Second Italian Attack, August-September. — From the town of 
Plava on the Isonzo River the river valley runs northeastward for 
ten miles and southeastward for five miles. On the east side of the 
river along these fifteen miles is the Bainsizza plateau about five 
miles wide separated from the mountains to the east by a valley. 
In the spring attack south of Plava the Italians had secured a foot- 
hold on the plateau but could not advance from it. 

The new plan of Cadorna consisted in crossing the Isonzo in the 
ten miles north of Plava and advancing southward to make himself 
master of this plateau from which the heights in rear of Gorizia 
could be attacked ; this was the task assigned to the 2d Army. At 
the same time the 3d Army was to renew its attacks on the Carso 
plateau to secure the key-point — Mount Hermada. 



181 

On August 18 the new attack was begun by an intense bombard- 
ment all along the Italian lines from Tolmino to the Adriatic. That 
night bridges were thrown over the Isonzo at various points north 
of Plava and in the morning before the fog rose from the river 
valley the Italians attacked and in succession captured the Austrian 
lines and reached the crest of the plateau. Once on the plateau the 
progress was rapid and as the Austrian lines all along the Isonzo 
to the vicinity of Gorizia were turned ; the Austrians retreated from 
the plateau fighting only rear guard actions. Monte Santo, the 
crowning peak at the southern end of the plateau fell on August 24 
and the Italians were four miles northeast of Gorizia. South of the 
Bainsizza plateau and separated from it by a wide valley was an- 
other plateau which terminated near the Isonzo in a high mountain 
called St. Gabrielle which overlooked Gorizia. This was the next 
objective and although the attacks on it lasted through September 
and were made with great determination the summit could not be 
reached. 

On the Carso plateau the 3d Army had in its opening attack on 
August 18 reached the line which it had taken in May but had 
been unable to hold. Here it remained subject to counter-attacks 
which it warded off until the early part of September when it again 
lost some of the ground gained. 

At the end of September General Cadorna reported to his allies 
that his offensive of 1917 was ended. In the attacks north and south 
of Gorizia his losses in killed, wounded and missing were 350,000 ; 
with losses due to sickness, his casualties were about 700,000. The 
2d Army especially suffered from the latter cause. It is probable 
that the Austrian losses were about as great as they appealed to the 
German G. H. Q. for assistance. 

Austro-German Counter-Attack, October-December. — From the 
northern end of the Bainsizza plateau the Isonzo valley runs in a 
northwesterly direction for about twenty miles. In this stretch are 
the towns of Tolmino where the Austrians still held the river valley 
for several miles above and below and where their lines were in the 
mountains to the west, and Caporetto or Karfreit where the Italians 
held the river valley for several miles above and below and where 
the lines were in the mountains east of the river. 

It was in the mountains to the east of this stretch of the Isonzo 
that in October the XIV German Army, consisting of six or seven 
divisions, was assembled for the purpose of breaking the Italian line 
opposite and reaching the plains of Italy behind the main body of 
the 2d Italian Army and the entire 3d Army. The II Austrian Isonzo 



182 

Army facing the 2d Italian Army on the Bainsizza plateau and the 
I Austrian Army facing the 3d Italian Army were to cooperate on 
the left of the German Army and the X and XI Austrian armies 
facing the 4th and 1st Italian armies were to cooperate on the right 
of the German Army. The concentration of the German Army had 
been discovered by the Italian air service but no particular steps 
were taken to meet the attack as General Cadorna felt confident 
that the Italian line would hold. 

The attack began on October 24 after a short preliminary bom- 
bardment of the Italian position by artillery and trench mortars 
with high explosives and gas shells. While one part of the German 
force attacked the Italian lines east of the Isonzo another pushed up 
the valley of the Isonzo in the rear of these lines. On the 25th the 
Germans were across the valley of the Isonzo on the mountain crests 
west of the Isonzo and began to move down the various valleys to- 
ward the plain the left wing being directed on the town of Udine, 
and the right on the headwaters of the Tagliamento. 

The left of the Italian 2d Army being turned on the 25th, that 
army evacuated the Bainsizza plateau and retired across the fron- 
tier followed by the II Austrian Isonzo Army. From the 25th of 
October to the 1st of November it was a race between the opposing 
forcjes as to which would reach the Tagliamento River first. In this 
race the Italians were successful, but at a very heavy cost. Artil- 
lery, trains and stores were abandoned or destroyed and the Italian 
armies reached the river with a loss of 250,000 to 300,000 men and 
1,800 pieces of artillery captured by the enemy. The 3d Italian 
Army, although it had lost heavily was still in fighting trim but the 
2d Army was no longer a unit. The Italians halted a few days on 
the Tagliamento which gave time for a partial reorganization and 
when this line was turned in the north the troops retired to the 
Piave River which was reached on November 10. 

As soon as the news of the Italian reverses reached the Allies, 
the 12th French corps, 6 divisions, and the 14th British corps, 5 
divisions, were started for Italy and in the last days of October the 
French were already crossing the Alps at Mount Cenis. The line 
eventually taken up by the Italians ran along the Piave River from 
the Adriatic to the foothills of the mountains, thence westward 
across the Mount Grappa group of mountains to the Brenta River 
where it connected with the lines of the 1st Italian Army, which 
prolonged the line across the Asiago plateau and through the moun- 
tains to Lake Garda. The 4th Italian Army, strengthened by some 
of the divisions of the 2d Army, held the line between the two rivers 



183 

while the 3d Italian Army held the line along the Piave. On their 
arrival the British and French corps were disposed at the most 
dangerous points of the line. The Austro-German attack had how- 
ever by this time exhausted itself and neither the X or XI Austrian 
armies in the north nor the German and Austrian Isonzo armies 
were able to make any impression on the new line. During Decem- 
ber therefore some of the German divisions were withdrawn. 

The disaster that occurred on the Italian front led to the forma- 
tion in November, 1917, of the Supreme War Council to coordinate 
operations on the west and Italian fronts. Its principal members 
were the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy — Lloyd 
George, Clemenceau and Orlando and the military representatives 
of those countries. Generals Wilson, Foch and Cadorna. The Ameri- 
can members Mr. House and General Bliss later joined the council. 
The military representatives under the leadership of General Foch 
advised the council but had no direct control of troops. A plan was 
proposed to make these representatives a directing war staff but 
this was not carried out and the army commanders retained their 
independence. When Cadorna was appointed military representa- 
tive of Italy to the Supreme War Council, General Diaz succeeded 
to the command of the Italian armies. 

Salonika Front. — The opposing lines on the Salonika front re- 
mained practically unchanged during the winter months of 1916- 
1917 after the capture of Monastir. The British held the line nearly 
ninety miles long from the Vardar River via Lake Doiran and the 
Struma River to the Aegean Sea. French, Russian, Serbian and 
Italian forces held the line about two hundred miles long extending 
from the Vardar River to Avlona on the Adriatic Sea. The II 
Bulgarian Army held the line of the Struma River in front of the 
British, the III Army of Bulgarians with some Germans held the 
center on either side of the Vardar River, and the I Bulgarian Army 
held the right of the line. Austrian troops occupied Montenegro. 

In the spring General Serrail, who still commanded the Allied 
force, ordered a general attack but little progress was made as the 
opposing lines were well intrenched and his force was not strong 
enough to break through. The operations ceased at the end of a 
month. It was now evident that with the calls for troops on other 
fronts the Salonika force would be unable to advance without the 
assistance of the entire Greek Army. As it had been represented 
to the Allied Powers that the greater part of the Greek people were 
in favor of war on the side of the Allies but were restrained by the 
government in power, it was decided to force the abdication of King 



184 

Constantine and place the late Prime Minister Venizelos in power. 
On June 11 the King was requested to abdicate in favor of one of 
his sons selected by the Allies, and on the following day the King 
agreed to withdraw from Greece. Venizelos again became Prime 
Minister with full power as he had the support of two thirds of the 
members of the new Greek Chamber. On July 16, diplomatic re- 
lations with the Central Powers were broken off and Greece was at 
war. The remainder of the year was spent in mobilizing and re- 
organizing the army for active operations. 



185 



CHAPTER XIII. 

OPERATIONS IN TURKEY IN 1917. 

At the close of 1916 the military situation was anything but prom- 
ising as viewed by Turkish Headquarters, In the east the Russians 
occupied Turkish Armenia on a line running roughly from Trebizond 
via Erzingan and Mush to the Arabian frontier. In the south Gen- 
eral Maude had just begun his advance on Bagdad and it was evident 
that the Turkish troops in this section were dealing with a highly 
organized, well equipped force unlike that which had been defeated 
in the early part of the year. In the west the British forces were 
on the borders of Palestine with a well equipped army based on the 
railway which had been constructed across the desert in that year. 
In Hedjaz the Arabs were preparing to attack the railway to Medina 
and cooperate with the British. Notwithstanding these various 
threats troops had been withdrawn from Turkey for operations in 
Galicia and Rumania and the general condition of the army and 
country was chaotic. 

"The people of Turkey were heartily sick of the war. Starvation 
and pestilence had raged throughout the land and Syria had not suf- 
fered the least. The Lebanon and even Damascus were depopulated 
by famine. Supplies of all kinds for the troops were hopelessly in 
arrear. Men came unwillingly to arms and desertion became an 
epidemic. One division that left Constantinople at full strength lost 
3,000 deserters on the road. A regiment reached Mesopotamia with 
the loss of 500 deserters out of a total of 1,300 men. In the previous 
October, out of 2,000 sent in reinforcements from Constantinople to 
Aleppo only 966 arrived at their destination. In such conditions it 
was hard to make a plan of campaign." — Nelson's History of the 
War. 

In the spring of 1917, when the British had captured Bagdad and 
were threatening an advance into Palestine, General Falkenhayn, 
the former Chief of Staff of the German Army with some German 
troops was sent to Turkey to reorganize the Turkish Army and 
direct operations. He established his headquarters at Aleppo the 
junction of the roads and railways running toward the Tigris River 
at Bagdad and into Palestine. 

Palestine. — At the close of 1916 the British Eastern Column from 
Egypt under General Dobell had almost reached the boundary of 
Palestine and early in January, 1917, its advance guard reached the 
frontier town of Rafa. The railway head was still some distance in 



186 

rear and did not reach Rafa until March. The Eastern Cokimn con- 
sisted of three divisions of Infantry, two divisions of mounted troops 
and the Imperial Camel Corps. It was well equipped with aircraft, 
armored cars and had a few tanks and a force of heavy artillery. 
Its operations were under the direct control of General Archibald 
Murray commanding the British forces in Egypt. 

Two Turkish divisions and some cavalry, all that was left of the 
original forces that attempted to invade Egypt in 1915, was in its 
front under the original German commander. General Kress von 
Kressenstein. This force had been compelled to fall back from one 
position to another fighting rear guard actions as the British ex- 
tended their railroad upon which the British troops were compelled 
to rely for supplies. No large British force could operate far from 
the railway and its water supply system because of lack of water 
in the desert. With the capture of Gaza on the coast twenty miles 
from Rafa the principal difficulties of the campaign would be over 
as the British would then reach the coastal plain of Palestine and 
be out of the desert. 

Between Rafa and Gaza was a wide deep arroya called Wadi 
Ghuzze extending in a southeasterly direction far into the desert. 
On the west side of this the Turks had intrenched a ridge of sand 
dunes upon which they had been working for some months. How- 
ever when the British captured the shore village which formed the 
right flank of the position in the latter part of February, the Turks 
withdrew behind the arroya and took up a position on some ridges 
of sand dunes in rear. The new line covered the approaches to Gaza 
and the road to Beersheba on a front of ten miles. The line was 
not continuous but consisted of detached strong points not thorough- 
ly organized. 

When it was learned that the Turks were falling back it was de- 
cided to attack them as soon as possible in order to capture Gaza 
before it was too strongly organized or the Turkish troops received 
reinforcements. As the railhead was still in rear and there was no 
abundant supply of water nearer than Gaza it took some time to pre- 
pare for the attack which could not be made until March 26. This 
was shortly after the British troops in Mesopotamia had entered 
Bagdad and the attention of the Turks was directed to that point. 

Confident in the superiority of his command the British com- 
mander decided to send his mounted troops around the Turkish posi- 
tion to ward oflf any reinforcements that might be moving on Gaza 
and cut off the retreat of its garrison while he made a direct attack 
on the Turkish lines with two of his infantry divisions holding one 



187 

in reserve. The principal attack was to be made directly on the 
town of Gaza. Although the troops started before dawn they had 
to cross the Wadi Ghuzze and were delayed by a thick fog which 
covered the country before sunrise. As a result while the mounted 
troops fulfilled their mission and some of them entered the suburbs 
from the north and east the infantry was unable to penetrate the 
Turkish lines sufficiently to capture the town. The position reached 
that day was deemed untenable as the mounted troops could find 
no water and reinforcements were moving on the town. The 
mounted troops were therefore withdrawn across the arroya and the 
infantry fell back to the arroya, which was now held as the advance 
line. * 

The second attempt on the same general lines was made three 
weeks later. In the meantime the Turkish force had been increased 
to five divisions and a cavalry division and the British had been re- 
inforced by one infantry division. The railway had in the meantime 
been extended to the British front and reservoirs of water had been 
constructed in the arroya for future operations. 

The attack was begun on April 17 and was to be made in two 
stages in which the British infantry was to consolidate the positions 
gained the first day. As the Turkish position in front of Gaza was 
now much stronger than before and consisted of more than one line 
it was not expected to reach Gaza the first day. In this attack 
British monitors and other vessels assisted by bombarding Gaza 
from the sea. Tanks were used and some of the mounted troops dis- 
mounted to assist the infantry. 

On the first day the three infantry divisions to whom was as- 
signed the main attack made considerable progress and on the sec- 
ond day consolidated their positions. The third day's attack how- 
ever met with little success and at several points the troops were 
driven back by counter-attacks. The attempt to carry the Turkish 
position with the troops available was therefore considered imprac- 
ticable and the infantry retired to the line which had been con- 
solidated. 

The attempt to reach Gaza was now postponed until the latter 
part of October. In June General Allenby who had commanded the 
3d British Army in the Arras attack assumed command of the troops 
in Egypt. General Chetwode who had been in command of the 
mounted troops had in the meantime been assigned to the command 
of the Eastern Column. The British force had been increased to 
seven divisions of infantry and four divisions of mounted troops 
organized as the 20th and 21st army corps and the Desert Mounted 



188 

Corps. The naval force was also increased to more effectively bom- 
bard Gaza and the positions nearby. The transport service had in 
addition to its motor trucks 30,000 pack camels. 

The Turkish force encountered during the progress of the cam- 
paign that followed consisted of nine infantry divisions and one 
cavalry division probably of much reduced strength. 

After study of the situation Allenby decided to leave a part of his 
forces to threaten the strong position of the Turks at Gaza and with 
his mounted troops and part of his infantry to capture Beersheba 
and roll up the left of the Turkish line which was neither so strongly 
intrenched nor held in such force as the position near Gaza. The 
plan involved much labor ; the railway was extended in the direction 
of Beersheba some ten miles where it connected with a light jrailway 
extending some ten miles farther. 

The attack began October 27 when the heavy guns began bom- 
barding the Gaza positions; on the 30th both British and French 
battleships joined in the bombardment. That day the troops for the 
attack on Beersheba were organized for a night march. 

Beersheba held by a Turkish division was captured on the 31st 
and 2,000 Turkish troops and 13 guns were taken. Mounted troops 
surprised the garrison by riding into the town through a gap in the 
defense'line to the east where no attack was expected and prevented 
the destruction of many valuable wells. 

A frontal attack was made at Gaza on the 2d to prevent troops 
from being detached to meet the flanking movement but the Turks 
held their ground. By the 6th however the flanking movements 
from Beersheba had developed to such an extent that the Turks were 
withdrawn on the night of the 6th and on the 7th the British oc- 
cupied the town. 

The Turks now retreated northward fighting rear guard actions 
as a rule and occasionally holding positions to enable the retreat to 
be effected without too great a loss. The main British force pursued 
up the Palestine plain, while one small column remained on the 
direct road from Beersheba to Jerusalem over the mountains. By 
the 16th of November the British occupied the seaport of Jaffa or 
Joppa and were ready to advance directly on Jerusalem. Some of 
the Turks had retired northward and some on Jerusalem. 

The city of Jerusalem is 2,500 feet above sea level and the range 
upon which it stands terminates in the west in a series of rocky 
spurs separated by narrow valleys; through one of these runs the 
main highway from Jaffa to Jerusalem. This highway was the 
directrix of the movement on the city. Mounted troops were de- 



189 

tached to protect the movement from attacks from the north. The 
British troops of the right wing fought their way up the slopes of the 
mountains and on the 9th of December they cut off all communica- 
tion with the city from the north, west and south. The Turks 
evacuated the town which was surrendered that day and retired 
eastward toward the Jordan River. 

In order to more thoroughly protect Jaffa, toward the end of De- 
cember the British attacked the Turks to the north and drove back 
their line to a distance of eight miles from the city. About the same 
time the Turks under German command made a counter-attack to 
recover Jerusalem. It was made with fresh troops along the road 
running north from Jerusalem to Nablus. The attack was repulsed 
and in the counter-attack the British advanced their line here to a 
point about eight miles from Jerusalem. The British line now ran 
from the Mediterranean coast eight miles north of Jaffa across the 
plain and hills to the point reached on the road from Jerusalem to 
Nablus and thence southward about three miles east of Jerusalem. 

During this year the operations of the Arabs of Hedjaz were con- 
fined to raids on small posts along the railway as far north as the 
Dead Sea. A few large posts like Medina, Maan and Amman were 
still held by the Turks. 

Mesopotamia. — General Maude, who was assigned to the com- 
mand of the British troops in Mesopotamia in August, 1916, spent 
the months of September, October and November in reorganizing 
his command and his lines of supply. He states: 

"By the end of November preliminary operations were well ad- 
vanced. A steady stream of reinforcements had been moving up the 
Tigris for some weeks, and drafts were joining their units making 
good the wastage of the summer. The troops had shaken off the 
ill-effects of the hot weather and their war training had improved. 
Stores, ammunition and supplies were accumulating rapidly at the 
front, our communications were assured, and it seemed clear that 
it was only a matter of days before offensive operations could be 
justifiably undertaken. Training camps at Amara were broken up 
and the generaL concentration up stream of Sheikh Sa'ad was com- 
pleted." 

During the summer the Turks had reduced their force at Kut and 
at the same time shortened their line south of the Tigris east of Kut 
but extended it westward to guard against an attack from the south. 
The outer line ran from the Magasis redout on the Tigris to Atab 
on the Hai and thence to the Tigris above Kut at the Shumran bend. 
Behind the outer line was a network of interior lines. On the north 
bank of the Tigris the Sannaiyat position was strengthened and con- 



190 

sisted of seven or more distinct lines. The entire position was held 
by the XVIII army corps estimated by the British to have a strength 
of about 20,000 men. 

General Maude's army for active operations consisted of four divi- 
sions of infantry organized into two corps and a division of cavalry. 
On the north bank of the river the troops left at the front were fac- 
ing the Sannaiyat position and those on the south bank were occupy- 
ing the Turkish lines which had been unsuccessfully attacked in the 
spring but from which the Turks had later withdrawn. This posi- 
tion was connected with Shiekh Sa'ad with a light railway con- 
structed during the summer. 

General Maude's plan of operations was to employ one of his corps 
in attacking the Turkish lines on either side of the Tigris River 
while the other corps with the cavalry moved to the Hai River in 
the vicinity of Atab and attacked the Turkish lines on both sides 
of that river. On the night of December 13 the cavalry with two 
infantry divisions moved out from the British lines and reached the 
Hai River in the vicinity of Atab in the morning and deployed on 
both banks of the stream. On December 20th began the attack of 
the Turkish lines east of Kut between the Tigris and Hai. In suc- 
cessive assaults the Turks were driven out of this area by the mid- 
dle of January and the British reached the Tigris as far up as Kut. 
During the following month the British were engaged in driving the 
Turks out of the area south of the river between the Hai and the 
Shumran bend. By the middle of February the Turks were all on 
the north bank of the Tigris and the British were ready for the final 
operation of crossing the river. This was no easy matter as the 
river was in flood and about 350 yards wide. The most favorable 
location was the Shurman bend and here it was decided to cross. 
If the crossing could be effected the Turks would be compelled to 
retreat up the river or run the risk of being captured. 

On February 23, under feints of crossing at various points, several 
battalions crossed the river in boats and with the assistance of cover- 
ing artillery secured the bend on the north side. By 4 p. m. a bridge 
was constructed and the British began to cross the river. At this 
time the Turks were already in retreat and left only a rear guard to 
defend the exit from the bend. This rear guard retired during the 
night. During the operations on the south side of the Tigris the 
British force on the north bank continued its pressure on the San- 
naiyat position and finally captured the last line of intrenchments 
on the day those on the south side effected a crossing. 



191 

On the 25th the cavalry aided by gunboats took up the pursuit 
and followed the Turks for some 50 miles when the column was 
halted to await the organization of the line of supply. The advance 
was then resumed and with little opposition the British forces en- 
tered Bagdad on March 11. 

The recapture of Kut and the occupation of Bagdad restored the 
prestige of the British forces in Mesopotamia and had an immediate 
effect on the Turkish operations in Persia. The XIII Turkish cori^s 
which had advanced into Persia after the surrender of Kut and had 
reached Kermanshah and Hamadan immediately began its retreat. 
A British column was pushed up the Diala valley to cut off its re- 
treat, but by a skillful maneuver the Turks succeeded in eluding this 
column and joined the XVIII corps in the Tigris valley between 
Bagdad and Mosul. As the Russian revolution took place about this 
time conlbined operations were no longer practicable and the re- 
mainder of the year was spent by the British forces in extending 
the sphere of British control around Bagdad. British columns ad- 
vanced up the valleys of the Euphrates, Tigris and Diala and held 
the country in all directions for about 100 miles from Bagdad. 

General Falkenhayn had planned an expedition for the recovery 
of Bagdad to move down from Aleppo but the British operations 
around Gaza compelled him to abandon this movement and send his 
troops into Palestine. In November, 1917, General Maude died at 
Bagdad and was succeeded by one of his corps commanders. General 
Marshall. 



192 



CHAPTER XIV. 

GENERAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS ON THE WEST 

FRONT IN 1918. 

As a result of the weakening of the Allied effort on the Russo- 
Rumanian front the operations of the Allies in 1917 were not as suc- 
cessful as had been hoped for at the beginning of the year. On the 
west front the Germans had been obliged to surrender a large area 
of the occupied territory when they retreated to the Hindenburg 
line in March and this had been added to by the British attacks at 
Arras, Cambrai and in Flanders and by the French attacks at Ver- 
dun and along the Chemin des Dames front. In their attempts to 
break the German line at Arras and on the Aisne front and later to 
clear the Belgian coast the Allies had not been successful. 

In Italy by a sudden counter-attack under German leadership the 
Italian Army had not only lost the positions along the Isonzo gained 
through the hard fighting in 1915, 1916 and 1917 but had lost very 
heavily in men and war material and had been obliged to evacuate 
the country as far back as the Piave River and the mountain fron- 
tier east of Lake Garda almost to the Italian plain. However with 
the assistance of British and French troops the Austro-German ad- 
vance had been definitely stopped. 

An armistice had been arranged between Russia and the Central 
Powers and it was certain that no further direct assistance could be 
expected by the Allies from the Russian Army. The Russian con- 
tingents that had fought in France and with the Salonika Army had 
been withdrawn from the front as their discipline had been de- 
stroyed by the revolution. The only effective aid from Russia would 
be due to the desire of the Central Powers to hold the provinces 
then in their power in order to utilize their resources to supply their 
countries, prevent the spread of Bolshevism, and exploit in case of 
eventual victory. This would hold a considerable Austro-German 
force on this front. 

In Rumania the army had been neutralized by the armistice with 
the Central Powers and it was improbable that it could again take 
up arms unless Bulgaria or Austria made peace. 

While little had been accomplished by the Allied force at Salonika 
the Greek government had now declared war on the side of the 
Allies and the Greek Army was being mobilized and prepared for 
the campaign against Bulgaria. 



193 

In Turkey most of Palestine and all of Mesopotamia were in the 
possession of the British and it was quite certain that the Turkish 
Army would offer little resistance to the further advance of the 
British armies although reinforced by a few German battalions. 
The collapse of Turkey would probably occur early in 1918 unless 
some of the British troops were withdrawn. 

Allied Plans.— During the winter of 1917-1918 the military rep- 
resentatives on the Supreme War Council made an estimate of the 
general military situation on all fronts. The estimate was as fol- 
lows : (At the Supreme War Council— Wright.) 

WEST FRONT. 

Allied Divisions. German Divisions. 

167 178 

97 French, 57 British, 10 Belgian, Rifles 1,232,000 

2 Portuguese and 1 American. Sabers 24 000 

Rifles 1,480,000 Field Guns 8,000 

Sabers 74,000 Heavy Guns 5,500 

Field Guns 8,000 

Heavy Guns 6,800 

3 American combat divisions 
were in training areas in 
France. 

RUSSIAN AND RUMANIAN FRONTS. 
Allied Divisions. Central Divisions. 

92 

Russian — unknown but of little German 58 

value. Austrian 34 

Rumanian, 18 infantry, 2 cavalry 

ITALIAN FRONT. 

Allied Divisions. Austro-German Divisions. 

61 461/2 

6 French, 5 British and 50 Italian 3 German and 431/:) Austrian. 

Rifles 633,000 Rifles "... 439 000 

Sabers 6,400 Sabers 3,400 

Field Guns 3,700 Field Guns 3,000 

Heavy Guns 2,100 Heavy Guns 1,500 

SALONIKA FRONT. 
Allied Divisions. Central Divisions. 

23-5/6 - 27 

8 French, 4 British, 2-5/6 Italian, 2 German, 2 Austrian and 23 
3 Greek and 6 Serbian. Bulgarian. 

Rifles 219,000 Rifles 228,000 

Sabers 7,000 Sabers 3,000 

Field Guns 1,100 Field Guns 972 

Heavy Guns 380 Heavy Guns 353 



194 

PALESTINE-TURKEY FRONT. 

Allied Divisions. Central Divisions. 

8 12 

7 British and 1 Indian. 1 German and 11 Turkish. 

Rifles 100,000 Rifles 29,000 

Sabers 16,000 Sabers 9,000 

Field Guns 410 Guns 200 to 300 

Heavy Guns 93 

MESOPOTAMIA-TURKEY FRONT. 

Allied Divisions. Turkish Divisions. 

6 5 

1 British and 5 Indian. 

Rifles 125,000 Rifles 18,000 

Sabers 9,000 Sabres 1,000 

Field Guns 300 Guns 100 

Heavy Guns 50 

While the general situation of the Allies was not so good as in the 
beginning of 1917 when the great Russian Army was in the field, 
the Allies still had numerical superiority in all arms on the west 
and Italian fronts, about equal strength on the Salonika front, a 
great superiority on the Turkish fronts and had been greatly 
strengthened in morale by the declaration of war by the United 
States. It was assumed that the Germans would probably transfer 
more divisions to the west front and assume the offensive with 
numerical superiority in which case the Allies must ward off this 
attack until reinforcements arrived in such numbers as to enable 
them to assume the offensive. The Allied reinforcements expected 
were mainly the divisions of the American Army; of these a few 
had already reached France but' only one was deemed sufficiently 
trained to take a place in the line. Similarly on the Italian front it 
was assumed that the Austrians would probably transfer more divi- 
sions to the west front and attack the Piave line. To reinforce this 
line the shattered divisions of the Italian Army were being reorgan- 
ized and an additional army was to be formed. As some of the Ger- 
man divisions had been withdrawn there was little danger of the 
Austrians breaking the Piave line so long as the British and French- 
divisions remained to strengthen the front. On the Salonika front 
the Bulgarians had shown no disposition to attack and it was not 
probable that there would be any active operations here until the 
Greek Army was mobilized and the Allies were ready to assume the 
offensive. In Turkey the British had great superiority both in 
Palestine and Mesopotamia ; to utilize these troops it was advisable 
to continue the offensive. 



195 



The plan of the Allies was therefore to remain on the defensive 
on all fronts except the Turkish fronts until a sufficient numerical 
superiority could be secured to assume the offensive. The time when 
the offensive could be renewed would depend on the rapidity with 
which the American troops could be brought across the Atlantic 
and fully trained and equipped abroad to take their place in line. 
It was assumed at the time that 1,000,000 American combatants 
about 30 divisions with corps and army troops would enable the 
Allies to assume the offensive with confidence of success. 

Although the defeat of the Italian Army had led to a permanent 
Supreme War Council of the Allied Premiers with military repre- 
sentatives of high rank it had not resulted in a supreme commander 
of the Allied forces. The proposition to make the military repre- 
sentatives an interallied supreme general staff did not receive the 
approval of the council nor did the proposition of General Foch that 
a general reserve should be constituted to be at the disposition of 
these representatives to be employed as seemed best for the general 
good. The armies of the various countries were still under the 
absolute control of their commanders in chief. 

Toward the close of 1917 there was another ministerial crisis in 
France as a result of dissatisfaction in that country resulting from 
the Italian defeat and Mr. Clemenceau was appointed Prime Minis- 
ter ; like Lloyd George he became practically a temporary dictator. 
As a result of the unrestricted U-boat warfare which was de- 
clared by the Germans in February, 1917, and the destruction of 
American vessels, on April 6, 1917, Congress declared that a state 
of war existed between the United States and the Imperial German 
Government. War with Austria was declared in December, 1917, 
when the Italians had fallen back to the Piave, but war was not 
declared with the other two Central Powers. 

When war was declared with Germany the American Army num- 
bered only 200,000 men two thirds Regulars and the remainder 
National Guardsmen who had been called into the service for duty 
along the Mexican frontier. The authorized strength of the Regular 
Army was at once increased and the new and old regiments were 
recruited as much as possible by voluntary enlistment. The Na- 
tional Guard regiments of the various States were recruited in a 
similar manner. The units of both were later filled to war strength 
by men drafted under the Selected Service Act of May 19, 1917. 
Under this act the first registration June 5, 1917, covered the ages 
of 21 to 31 ; the second registration July 5 and August 24, 1918, 
covered all who had reached the age of 21 since the first registra- 



196 

tion. The total number registered numbered 10,000,000 of whom 
2,600,000 were drafted into the service. From these the Regular 
and National Guard divisions were completed and the divisions of 
the National Army were formed. As soon as possible 32 divisional 
cantonments were erected for the training of the troops and schools 
were established for the training of officers. 

General Pershing was sent as commander in chief of the American 
forces abroad and in conference with foreign officers decided the 
elements which were to compose the divisions and the higher units 
of the new army as well as the organizations needed for the Service 
of Supply. At the request of the foreign missions a number of 
Regular regiments of the army and one of the Marine Corps were 
at once sent to France there to be organized with additional regi- 
ments to follow as the 1st and 2d divisions. The other divisions 
were to be sent abroad as soon as they had received sufficient pre- 
liminary training and were to complete their training abroad be- 
fore being sent as divisions into the line. The training abroad was 
to consist of a period in the training areas and a period in the 
trenches as battalions or regiments. 

The American infantry division, about 28,000 men, was to con- 
sist of four regiments of infantry each with a machine gun com- 
pany with 16 pieces, three regiments of artillery, two field and one 
heavy, three machine gun battalions each of four companies, a regi- 
ment of engineers, a signal battalion, trains, etc.; its total rifle 
strength was about equal to a British division of 13 battalions. 

For the Service of Supply a large number of special troops were 
sent as soon as organized: such as engineers for constructing and 
operating railways, for wharf construction, for forestry operations, 
for road building and labor battalions for general labor. Air, 
hospital, chemical warfare, tank and camouflage services were or- 
ganized at home and abroad. 

Under the assumption that the war might last until 1920 and re- 
quire an army of several million men, a vast program of construction 
was undertaken much of which proved unnecessary due to the early 
termination of the war. Due to the German offensive, the divisions 
were shipped earlier than had been planned and therefore they were 
equipped with artillery, machine guns, trench mortars, tanks, etc., 
from the French and British depots after they reached Europe. 

German Plans. — The following extracts from Ludendorff gives 
the military situation as it appeared to the German G. H. Q. in the 
autumn of 1917 when the German G. H. Q. decided to attack on the 
west front: 



197 

» 

"In the late autumn, 1917, General Headquarters was confronted 
by a decisive question: should it utilize the favorable conditions of 
the spring to the defensive and make only subsidiary attacks, say 
in Macedonia or Italy? 

"The Quadruple Alliance was held together only by the hope of 
a victory by the Germans; 

"The Austro-Hungarian Army was worn out ; it had lost 1,800,000 
prisoners; it was short of recruits. Its fighting value was slight, 
though against Italy it had, on the whole, sufficed. If Russia 
actually dropped out we might hope that the army would continue 
equal to the task that fell to it. Whether it could spare forces for 
other objects was doubtful. In 1917 we had already received an in- 
timation from the Imperial and Royal Government that the army 
could go on fighting only for a limited period ; we might anticipate 
something similar in 1918. We had to take into consideration that 
Austria-Hungary might actually arrive at the end of its military 
power. It was clear that its political power would not last one hour 
longer. Nothing but the army held the Dual Monarchy together. 

"The Bulgarian Army had sufficient recruits; it was, however, 
found necessary to enroll numerous men of other races. In 1917 
the troops had fought tolerably well ; their spirit had improved. The 
communications had been put in order behind their whole front. . . . 
The training of the army as a whole was furthered by means of 
schools established by Group Headquarters. Thanks to its past 
work, the latter could anticipate the coming struggle with some 
confidence. I often conversed with General Gantshev, and requested 
him to do his part in promoting the improvement of the Bulgarian 
Army. In view of the events of the previous year he considered its 
position secure. It was only the mobilization of the Greek Army 
that made him anxious 

"Bulgaria had occupied all the territory it wanted to keep when 
peace came; it was sure of its gains — it thought no more of war, 
but only of enjoying in peace and quietness what it had won. The 
people and the army were tired of war 

"The only conclusion I could come to about Bulgaria was that it 
would remain faithful to us as long as all went well with us. But 
if the prospects of victory diminished, or still worse, if we suffered 
failure, then things were bound to turn out just as in fact they 
have 

"Turkey was faithful to the alliance, but at the end of its strength ; 
whether through its own fault or that of others was immaterial. 
Its man-power was greatly reduced, and the army existed to a certain 
extent only on paper. Palestine was sure to fall an easy prey to 
England unless the troops were reinforced. Turkey's disintegration 
was bound to produce political results over a wide area, and must, 
therefore, be prevented, even though the decision of the war might 
be brought about elsewhere. 

"In Germany the national spirit appeared to be better than with 
our Allies ; nevertheless, it had sunk very low and feeling had be- 
come worse. I must admit I formed too favorable an estimate of 
our remaining energy. I hoped that the recruiting question would 
be put in order. 



198 

"The army had come victoriously through 1917 ; but it had become 
apparent that the holding of the Western front purely by a defensive 
could no longer be counted on, in view of the enormous quantity of 
material of all kinds which the Entente had now at its disposal. 
Even where tactical conditions had been absolutely normal we had 
lost ground and suffered heavily. These losses had indeed been 
greater than we had incurred in well conducted attacks. The enor- 
mous material resources of the enemy had given his attack a con- 
siderable preponderance over our defense, and this condition would 
become more and more apparent as our infantry approximated more 
nearly in character to a militia, as our best men became casualties, 
and as discipline declined 

"The troops had borne the continuous defensive with uncommon 
difficulty. Skulkers were already numerous. They reappeared as 
soon as the battle was over, and it had become quite common for 
divisions which came out of action with desperately low effectives, 
to be considerably stronger after only a few days. Against the 
power of the hostile weapons the troops no longer displayed their 
old stubborness in defense; they thought with horror of fresh de- 
fensive battles and longed for the war of movement. In this the 
Germans had achieved brilliant success in Rumania, eastern Galicia, 
Italy and at Cambrai, and had once more proved their superiority 
although their staying power was no longer what it had been in 
1914. There had been incidents, too, which indicated that their co- 
hesion was no longer the same. As they were depressed by defense, 
their spirits rose in the offensive. The interests of the army were 
best served by the offensive ; in defensive it was bound gradually to 
succumb to the ever-increasing hostile superiority in men and ma- 
terial. This feeling was shared by everybody. In the west it 
wanted to attack and after Russia's collapse expected it with the 
most intense relief. Such was the feeling of the troops about at- 
tack and defense. It amounted to a definite conviction w^hich pos- 
sessed them completely that nothing but an attack could win the war. 
Many generals, among them the most distinguished, spoke in the 
same strain 

"The condition of our allies and of ourselves and that of the army 
all called for an attack that would bring about an early decision. 
This was possible only on the Western front. All that had gone be- 
fore was merely a means to the one end of creating a situation that 
would make it a feasible operation. Until now this situation had not 
arisen. We had been able to strike a blow at Italy with six or seven 
divisions, but for the Western front that was not a sufficient force. 
I set aside all idea of attacking in Macedonia or Italy. All that 
mattered was to get together enough troops for an attack in the 
West. 

"For this we needed enormous material resources and strong 
troops who, with their leaders, had been trained for the attack. If 
this could be effected in time we could — indeed, we must, attack. 
The attack is the strongest form of combat; it alone is decisive; 
military history proves it on every page. It is the symbol of superi- 
ority. Delay could only serve the enemy, since he was expecting 
reinforcements. 



199 

"That the attack in the West would be one of the most difficult 
operations in history, I was perfectly sure, and I did not hide the 

J-CLL^L* • • • • 

"It was not necessary to leave German troops on the Italian front, 
and preparations were made for their departure about the new year," 
As to the situation on January 1, 1918, he says: 

"Owing to the breakdown of Russia the military situation was 
more favorable to us at New-Year's 1918 than one could ever have 
expected. As in 1914 and 1915, we could think of deciding the war 
by an attack on land. Numerically we had never been so strong in 
comparison with our enemies." 

In preparation for the offensive he says: 

"The training of the army for the offensive was another tre- 
mendous task. For this we had to utilize the winter of 1917-1918, 
as the previous one had been devoted in training for the defense. 

"In the same way in which tactical theories had been summarized 
in the 'Defensive Battle', so now the 'Offensive Battle in Position 
Warfare' came into being. We had to revive in the minds of the 
fighting forces all those excellent offensive principles which had in- 
spired our pre-war regulations. They had to be supplemented by 
more recent experiences in actual battle. Without checking the 
vigor of the attack we had to keep down losses as much as possible. 
The whole line of thought had to be diverted from trench warfare 
back to the offensive. 

"While in the defense the forces in a given sector were more evenly 
distributed, in the attack the problem was to discover some decisive 
point and arrange distribution accordingly. In defense, commanding 
ground had lost much of its value. The battle of Arras (1917) had 
once more demonstrated it. Positions were held which were com- 
pletely open to the enemy's view. Often the troops had thought 
they could not exist without the possession of some height or other, 
but if they did not get it they managed to continue the fight. In 
the attack, in the war of movement, the capture of some high 
ground brought about a tactical decision. Its possession must there- 
fore be striven for as a matter of principle. 

"It was necessary to create anew a thorough understanding of the 
extent of front to be allotted in attack and to emphasize the prin- 
ciple that men must do the work not with their bodies alone, but 
with their weapons. The fighting line must be kept thin, but must 
be constantly fed from behind. As in the defense it was necessary 
in the attack to adopt loose formations and work out our infantry 
group tactics clearly. We must not copy the enemy's mass tactics, 
which offer advantages only in case of untrained troops. 

"In the infantry company the light machine gun had to become 
a thoroughly familiar weapon. It was, however, still regarded as an 
auxiliary weapon. The fact that the light machine gun was now the 
true 'infantryman', while the 'infantrym.an' of yesterday was noth- 
ing more that a 'rifle-carrier' had not yet sunk deep into the mind 
and conscience of the infantry, let alone the rest of the army. Ow- 
ing to its power compared with that of the rifle, the light machine 



200 

gun, as its introduction became more general, was bound to become 
the main infantry weapon. This did not mean that the rifleman 
was not to shoot. Quite the contrary. The greatest stress was laid 
on that part of his duties. 

"The light machine gun and the rifleman formed the infantry 
group, which had to hang together in trouble and danger and the 
life-and-death struggle. Its fire power was further increased by 
quick-firing weapons of all kinds and various sorts of rifle grenades. 

"To the heavy machine gun, with its longer range and greater 
effect, fell the task of facilitating the approach of the groups to the 
enemy's position by keeping the latter under fire. Of course it had 
to accompany the advance of the infantry. Therefore, although it- 
self 'infantry' it had become a sort of 'companion' or auxiliary arm 
to the infantry. 

"The second auxiliary arm, of special use at short ranges against 
targets offering more than usual resistance, was the light trench 
mortar. Originally evolved for trench warfare, it had now to be 
made mobile and capable of direct fire by means of suitable sights. 
The light trench mortar was part of the infantry battalion, which 
became more and more the tactical unit of the division just as the 
group within was the tactical unit of the battalion. 

"These auxiliary arms were not yet effective enough to enable 
infantry to advance on its arduous way without excessive losses. 
Of course massed artillery prepared that attack. It could however, 
do so only in a general way and left untouched too many of the 
enemy's strong points, which had to be dealt with later in detail 
at the shortest ranges. In each division, therefore, field guns were 
withdrawn from their units for short-range work, and were at- 
tached to battalions or regiments as infantry guns. 

"In addition, each division had a company of medium trench mor- 
tars, which were also made as mobile as possible and allotted to 
battalions as required. Finally, there were flame projectors which 
could be brought into action at the shortest ranges against an 
enemy in blockhouses, dugouts and cellars. 

"We had no tanks. They were merely an offensive weapon and 
our attacks succeeded without them * * * * 

"At Cambrai the tanks were very effective. But there they ran 
into a position held only lightly, chiefly by older men, and poorly 
equipped with artillery. In all other cases, although they had been a 
nuisance, they had achieved no decisive results. In the fighting 
around Bourlon and in Bourlon Wood our infantry disposed of tanks 
at close quarters with multiple grenades. Our artillery shot them 
to pieces. Even the steel-cored bullets used by our machine guns 
had been good enough. The best weapons against tanks were good 
nerves, discipline and intrepidity, which enabled many brave men 
to climb on them or destroy them by short-range fire. Not until 
our infantry lost its discipline and fighting capacity did the em- 
ployment of massed tanks, combined with artificial smoke, produce 
a fatal effect on the course of events. 

"We formed detachments of captured tanks. I had a look at the 
first one in February, 1918, at an exercise by one of the assault 



201 

battalions. It did not impress me. Our own tank detachments suf- 
fered heavy losses in the fighting which followed without effecting 
anything." 

It is stated that the Germans had only 15 tanks of their own 
manufacture which were very heavy and first used in the spring of 
1918; these were begun in 1917. 

"In order to provide aircraft support for the infantry, special 
battle airplane flights were formed. As had been done by individual 
airmen, they dived down from great heights and flew along at a low 
level, attacking with machine guns and light bombs the infantry 
lines, the artillery and, as the practice became extended, the enemy's 
reserves and transport columns, as well as columns of troops coming 
up further in rear. Originally intended to be an 'auxiliary' arm to 
the infantry, these battle flights were finally given important tac- 
tical tasks. The airmen, in the course of their duties, were not only 
reconnaissance troops who had to fight, but they had like the in- 
fantry, artillery and all the other arms, to take part in the fighting 
on the ground. Like the other combatant forces, they were a de- 
structive arm in the great battle on land. This, indeed, became 
their main object and the aerial combat was only a means of attain- 
ing it. 

"For the advance of the infantry in the offensive battle, the con- 
centrated preparation by massed artillery was the most important. 
It was necessary to bring up twenty or thirty batteries, about one 
hundred guns to each kilometer of front to be attacked. These 
masses of guns and ammunition had to be got up close to our fore- 
most lines; only then could they engage targets far behind the 
enemy's front line without having to change position as the battle 
progressed. At the same time they had to be covered from view 
both from the front and the rear. In these positions in the open 
it was not intended to fight an artillery duel for days on end ; both 
guns and ammunition would have been annihilated. Nor was it pos- 
sible to range as we used to do; this would have attracted the 
enemy's attention, and the artillery action would have started before 
the battle itself under conditions unfavorable to us. At shortest 
ranges the effect of the artillery was to be supplemented by trench 
mortars. 

"General Headquarters intended that after a short artillery bom- 
bardment, lasting only a few hours, the infantry, which was held in 
readiness in the forward positions, should advance to the assault. 
This short storm of fire was expected to neutralize the enemy's artil- 
lery by means of gas, which spread over large areas, and kept his 
infantry in the dugouts. At the beginning of the infantry assault, 
the artillery, while continuing to keep down that of the enemy, was 
to lay down a barrage in front of the infantry and pave the way for 
it like a gigantic roller. As the range increased, the barrage became 
thinner as the shorter range guns dropped out, and finally at extreme 
ranges, it ceased, and the infantry lost its protection. By this time, 
some artillery must be already in more forward positions, from 
which to support the further advance. In spite of all auxiliary arms 
and 'infantry guns' the infantry could not do without it. 



202 

"The farther infantry advanced, the more clearly its character 
approximated to open warfare. Finally, as our operations pro- 
gressed, we would come up against a new front, which for a time 
we would not be able to overcome, as happened in Rumania, Italy and 
eastern Galicia. Then we should have to return to the defensive 
and distribute our forces in depth, 

"Our big attacks had clearly demonstrated the importance of sup- 
ply, and attention was directed to it as a matter of course. All prep- 
arations had to be made to follow the attack across the fortified 
zones with railways, roads and telephone lines. 

"In preparation for attack we did not forget defense, as counter- 
attacks were to be expected. The principles of defense were re- 
tained ; we only laid greater stress on anti-tank measures. Both in 
attack and defense the auxiliary arms served this purpose also. In 
the artillery, especially in the case of field guns and light trench 
mortars, training in individual fire against tanks was considered of 
decisive importance. The allotment of special ammunition to the 
heavy machine guns was increased more extensively. Our positions 
were examined as to their liability to attack by tanks; traps and 
stops were made, barricades constructed, mines put down, and anti- 
tank guns dug in at many points. 

"During January and February the divisions in the West that 
were intended for the attack were taken out of line ; some of them 
were replaced by those that had come from other theaters. From 
this time on they had to devote themselves entirely to training and 
equipment. We were unable to equip all the divisions equally with 
stores and horses, and had in the beginning to confine ourselves to 
those who were to open the attack. Similar action was taken in 
regard to the formations not included in the divisions, such as army 
field artillery, heavy artillery, trench mortars, etc. The horses of 
the shock divisions were given extra forage rations. 

"General Headquarters regretted that the distinction between 
'shock' and 'trench' divisions became established in the army. We 
tried to eradicate it, without being able to alter the situation which 
gave rise to it. 

"In the meantime we had gradually got up everything that could 
be thought of as required for the attack. Some divisions were still 
on their way from the East." 

Selecting the Front of Attack. — Ludendorff states: 

"We hoped that the forces we were collecting from all quarters 
would enable us to attack on a continuous front of over 50 kilometers 
(31 miles) allotting twenty to thirty batteries, without trench mor- 
tars to each kilometer of front. By thinning at suitable places we 
could extend the front still more ; we had at that time 25 to 30 divi- 
sions more than the enemy on the whole western front. . . . We 
thought of carrying out the attack with 50 or 60 divisions. In order 
to effect this, the corresponding weakening of other parts of the 
line was unavoidable. 

"It was difficult to decide where to attack, but it was necessary 
to do so early. It took weeks, and required considerable foresight 



203 

and the most detailed preliminary work, to concentrate the troops in 
a confined area, bring up by rail the tremendous quantities of am- 
munition and other stores of all kinds, carry out the work allotted 
to the troops themselves, such as preparing battery positions, screen- 
ing roads, constructing anti-aircraft shelters, and preparing gear for 
crossing the trenches, and finally to deploy for battle. 

''Of course all this increased the danger of discovery. It was 
therefore necessary to commence dummy works on the fronts re- 
mote from the attack, which, as a matter of fact, served as the 
basis of attack later on. But most of the available labor troops were 
required on the front of attack at an early date. The preparations 
on other fronts could not be extensive, but there was some chance 
of misleading the enemy, and the deception was to be completed by 
skilfully conducted defensive measures. 

"I discussed the selection of the front of attack with the chiefs 
of staff of the army groups, and with the officers of my staff, and 
heard their opinions. Three sectors were considered — Flanders be- 
tween Ypres and Lens, between Arras and St. Quentin or La Fere, 
and on both sides of Verdun, leaving out the fortress. As is always 
the case, there was a great deal to be said for and against each 
proposal. 

"The enemy was in great strength about Ypres and Arras, in front 
of the Ailette position, and farther to the east, as far as Verdun; 
the weakest part was on both sides of St. Quentin; north of that 
town the enemy line had been denser since the battles of Cambrai. 

*Tn the north the ground was difficult. The condition of the Lys 
valley, west of Lille, across which the main force of the attack would 
pass, depended to an extraordinary degree upon the season and the 
weather; before the middle of April its passability away from the 
roads was doubtful. That was very late, in view of the Americans. 

"In the center the ground itself caused no difficulties, but further 
progress would be hampered by the crater areas of the Somme 
battle. 

"The attack at Verdun would lead us into very hilly country. 

"These two attacks could take place at any time of year. 

"Tactical conditions, therefore, favored the center sector; here 
the attack would strike the enemy's weakest point, the ground of- 
fered no difficulties, and it was feasible at all seasons. 

"Strategically the northern attack had the advantage of a great, 
though limited, objective. It might enable us to shorten our front 
if we succeeded in capturing Calais and Boulogne. The attack on 
Verdun might also lead to an improvement in our front, though more 
of a tactical nature. The center attack seemed to lack any definite 
limit. This could be limited by directing the main effort on the area 
between Arras and Peronne, toward the coast. If this blow suc- 
ceeded the strategic result might indeed be enormous, as we should 
cut the bulk of the English Army from the French, and crowd it up 
with its back to the sea. 

"I favored the center attack; but I was influenced by the time 
factor and by tactical considerations, first among them being the 
weakness of the enemv. Whether this weakness would continue I 



204 

could not know. Tactics had to be considered before purely strate- 
gical objects, which it is futile to pursue unless tactical success is 
possible. A strategical plan which ignores the tactical factor is 
foredoomed to failure. Of this the Entente's attacks during the first 
three years of the war afforded numerous examples. 

"After determining the divisions and other forces available for 
the attack, it was decided to strike between Croisilles, southeast of 
Arras, and Moeuvres, and omitting the Cambrai re-entrant, between 
Villers-Guislain and the Oise, south of St. Quentin. It was to be 
supported on its left by a subsidiary attack from La Fere. 

"The preliminary work and the conduct of the attack made it 
necessary to interpolate two army headquarters, and new lines-of- 
communication inspectorates. The Seventeenth Army formerly the 
Fourteenth in Italy, was put in between the Sixth and Second op- 
posite Arras, and the Eighteenth, between the Second and Seventh 
Armies, opposite St. Quentin and La Fere. The boundary between 
the Seventeenth and Sixth was about half-way between Lens and 
Arras, that between the Seventeenth and Second approximately at 
Moeuvres. The boundary between the Second and Eighteenth 
Armies was formed, roughly, by the Omignon brook, that between 
the Eighteenth and Seventh was just south of La Fere 

"For the decisive operation the Seventeenth and Second Armies 
were to remain under the orders of the army group of Crown Prince 
Rupprecht. The Eighteenth Army joined that of the German 
Crown Prince. ... It was desirable to make the fullest possible 
use of the resources of the group of the German Crown Prince, and 
this was facilitated by the organization adopted 

"The possibility of broadening the attack on the north toward 
Arras, and on the south toward the left bank of the Oise, was 
anticipated. 

"Feints and preparation for further attack were made; between 
Ypres and Lens ; between Reims and the Argonne ; on the old battle- 
fields of Verdun and between Saarburg in Lorraine and Ste. Marie- 
aux-Mines, and also in the Sundgau 

"All fronts maintained their defensive arrangements in case the 
enemy should himself attack. In some places it was intended to re- 
tire in that case. 

"Work had been carried on along these lines according to program 
and with the greatest devotion from the middle of January. By the 
beginning of February the attack was fixed to commence on March 
21, although the situation in the East was still quite obscure. The 
military situation, however, made a decision imperative. Later on 
we could always make changes, but we would be unable to make a 
fresh start." 

Allied Line in the West. — After the operations in Flanders m 
1917, the 5th British Army took post between the 3d British Army 
and the 3d French Army on the front between Cambrai and St. 
Quentin. During January and February it relieved the 3d French 
Army and extended its flank to Barasis south of the Oise where it 
connected with the 6th French Army. General Haig now held a 



205 

front of about 125 miles of which the 5th Army held 42 miles and 
the 2d, 1st and 3d armies each about 28 miles. With its two Portu- 
guese divisions, the British Army had about 60 divisions which were 
nearly equally distributed among the four armies. The 5th Army 
had 14 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions organized into 4 army corps 
and a cavalry corps ; of the infantry divisions 11 were in the trenches 
and 3 in reserve. The 3d Army on its left had also 4 army corps, 
16 divisions, with 10 divisions in the trenches and 6 in reserve. 

"The general principle of our defensive arrangements on the front 
of these Armies was the distribution of our troops in depth. With 
this object three defensive belts, sited at considerable distances 
from each other, had been constructed or were approaching com- 
pletion in the forward area, the most advanced of which was in the 
nature of a ligfitly held outpost screen covering our main positions. 

"Behind the forward defenses of the 5th Army, and in view of the 
smaller resources which could be placed at the disposal of that 
Army, arrangements had been made for the construction of a strong 
and carefully-sited bridge-head position covering Peronne and the 
crossings of the Somme south of that town. Considerable progress 
had been made in the laying out of this position, though at the out- 
break of the enemy's offensive its defenses were incomplete." 

The defense system was constructed by labor organizations con- 
sisting of prisoners of war, Italians, Chinese, East Indians and 
British. From the latter part of December until the time of the 
attack these labor organizations on the 5th Army front were in- 
creased from 27,000 to 68,000 men. 

"Battle Zone. — Planned for defense of great depth, varying from 
2,000 to 3,000 yards, with good successive lines carefully sited and 
combined. Diagonal switch trenches gave support to strong points 
and wired strategical places. It was hoped that they would stop the 
foe from spreading outwards and rolling up our position if he man- 
aged to penetrate at dangerous spots in our defenses. The most 
important localities were always garrisoned. Plans and prepara- 
tions for the best use of the troops both in defensive battle and in 
counter-attack were worked out with skill, partly for the service of 
those men who were chosen to guard the various sectors and partly 
for the proper handling of reinforcements arriving from elsewhere. 

"Forward Zone. — Its defensive scheme was ordered also in depth, 
and of course its garrison was always on guard against surprise, 
to break up the foe's attacks, and to force him to waste large quan- 
tities of ammunition and to bleed an increasing number of his brig- 
ades. The backbone of the defense in this zone was a combination 
of wire entanglements with machine guns very well hidden in 
dugouts. 

"Rear Zone. — Ludendorff struck when the rear lines were very im- 
perfect, ranging in depth from a foot to thirty-six inches. A foot 
seems to have been about the average in most places. These lines 



206 

were placed from four to eight miles behind the battle zone and 
G. H. Q. did all that could be done in a few weeks, always in con- 
junction with our armies, to choose the best positions, and to spit- 
lock their projected defenses. They formed very good halting 
places for stern rearguard actions, but not for a defensive stand 
by weak numbers against superior forces constantly renewed. 

"The work to be done being enormous, priority had to be given as 
follows to certain essentials: 

1. Wire. 

2. Shell-proof accommodations, including machine gun emplace- 

ments, observation posts, and battle headquarters. 

3. Communications, including roads, tracks, railways and com- 

munication trenches. 

4. Earthworks. 

"On March 21, the battle zone in most sectors wa^ finished — that 
is to say, a decisive grapple could have been fought in it by a defense 
reasonably manned." (The Fifth Army in March, 1918 — W. Shaw 
Sparrow.) 

After the close of operations in 1917, due to the severe losses in 
the operations of the year, the British infantry divisions were re- 
duced to ten battalions in order to strengthen the battalions and the 
brigades were reduced from four to three battalions. The British 
War Office hoped that a fourth battalion for the brigades in France 
would be furnished by the American government but this plan was 
not approved by our government. For defense, each division had 
two brigades in the forward and battle zone and one in reserve; of 
the former, one battalion was in the outpost line and forward zone 
and two in the battle zone. Of the three divisions in the reserve of 
the 5th Army, two were far in rear and temporarily held under the 
control of the British G. H. Q. 

On the right of the British was the 6th French Army and thence 
the French line extended to the Swiss frontier ; about two thirds of 
the French divisions were in line and about one third in reserve. 
The line was strongly held as far as St. Mihiel and thence more 
thinly to the Swiss frontier. As a general reserve, General Petain 
had selected the 3d French Army, General Humbert, whose divi- 
sions were generally in the area between the Oise and Marne rivers 
and certain divisions of the 1st French Army, General Debeney, in 
the Toul area. 

The Allies labored under the disadvantage of not knowing where 
the blow would come as the German reserves were assembled far in 
rear and only moved up during the last days before the attack. 
Demonstrations were made by the Germans all along the front from 
the Channel to Verdun and it was not certain which of the demon- 
strations would develop into the main attack. General Haig was 



207 

naturally concerned about the left of his line which protected the 
Channel ports and had this part been weakened it is certain that 
the attack would have been made here as Ludendorff says an attack 
here would have given the greatest strategic results. General Petain 
was naturally concerned mainly with his own front and wanted his 
reserves where they could be employed on his own front. As a 
result, the right of the British line, the 5th Army, was the weakest 
part of the Allied front and the weakest part of the line of the 5th 
Army was its extreme right where a corps of three divisions with 
two cavalry divisions in support held nearly a half of the front of 
that army. This particular front was under ordinary conditions 
protected by the Somme River and its marshes but at this time 
these marshes were unusually dry and the river low. To strengthen 
his line General Haig needed some of the British divisions that were 
at the time in Italy and Turkey. To support the 5th Army in case 
of attack he was obliged to depend on General Petain ; both com- 
manders assumed that the 5th Army would be able to hold out long 
enough to permit the French forces to reach it in time. 

Of the indications of the German offensive, General Haig says : 

"Towards the middle of February, 1918, it became evident that 
the enemy was preparing for a big offensive on the Western front. 
It was known from various sources that he had been steadily in- 
creasing his forces in the Western theatre since the beginning of 
November, 1917. In three and a half months 28 infantry divisions 
had been transferred from the Eastern theatre and 6 infantry divi- 
sions from the Italian theatre. There were reports that further 
reinforcements were on their way to the West, and it was also known 
that the enemy had greatly increased his heavy artillery in the 
Western theatre during the same period. These reinforcements 
were more than were necessary for defense, and, as they were mioved 
at a time when the distribution of food and fuel to the civil popula- 
tion in Germany was rendered extremely difficult through lack of 
rolling stock, I concluded that the enemy intended to attack at an 
early date. 

"Constant air reconnaissances over the enemy's lines showed that 
rail and road communications were being improved and ammunition 
and supply dumps increased along the whole front from Flanders to 
the Oise. By the end of February, 1918, these preparations had be- 
come very marked opposite the front held by the Third and Fifth 
Armies, and I considered it probable that the enemy would make 
his initial effort from the Sensee River southwards. As the 21st 
March approached it became certain that an attack on this sector 
was imminent, and counter-preparations were carried out nightly 
by our artillery on the threatened front. By the 21st March the 
number of German* infantry divisions in the Western theatre had 
risen to 192, an increase of 46 since the 1st November, 1917. 



208 

"On the 19th of March my Intelligence Department reported that 
the final stages of the enemy's preparations on the Arras-St. Quen- 
tin front were approaching completion, and that from information 
obtained it was probable that the actual attack would be launched 
on the 20th or 21st of March. On our side our dispositions to meet 
the expected offensive were as complete as the time and the troops 
available could make them. 

The Attack. — The order for the opening of the attack was a brief 
one. In substance it was as follows: 

1. The attack will take place 21.3. Penetration of enemy's first 

line 9:40 a. m. 

2. Army group Crown Prince Rupert will cut off the British sali- 

ent at Cambrai as their first tactical objective and reach 
the line Croisilles-Bapaume-Peronne. If the attack pro- 
gresses favorably, the right wing (XVII Army) beyond 
Croisilles will advance. Further instructions for this army 
group contemplate that the left wing will hold the line of 
the Somme at Peronne, that the center will advance to the 
line Arras-Albert, the right will attack in flank the British 
line in front of the VI Army cause it to fall back and re- 
lease more German troops from trench warfare and per- 
mit them to advance. 

3. Army group German Crown Prince will reach the Somme south 

of Omigon Creek and the Crozat canal. If it succeeds in ad- 
vancing rapidly the XVIII Army will seize the crossings of 
the Somme and canal. 

As planned the XVII Army, General Otto Below, which held the 
front from beyond the Scarpe to Cambrai was to make its first at- 
tack on the center of the 5th British Army between the Sensee 
River and the Canal du Nord or between Croisilles and Moeuvres 
on a front of ten miles and break through the center of that army. 
The II Army, General Marwitz, was to attack the left wing of the 
5th British Army and advance westward with his center directed 
on Peronne. By a rapid advance of these two armies, it was hoped 
to cut off the retreat of the 5th corps of the 3d British Army which 
occupied the Cambrai salient. The XVIII Army was to attack the 
right wing of the 5th British Army and advance to the Somme and 
the Crozat canal protecting the left flank of the II Army. The gen- 
eral plan was to drive the British out of their trenches first from 
the Sensee River to the Oise, if possible capturing the 5th British 
corps, and then extend the action northward until the entire British 
Army had evacuated its trenches, at least as far as the Lys River. 
Open warfare would result and with the German superiority it was 
hoped to win a decisive victory before the French reinforcements 
arrived. 



209 

On the morning of the attack, the 3d British Army, General Byng, 
from north to south consisted of the 17th, 6th, 4th a^id 5th corps 
and the attack of the XVII Army fell on the 6th and 4th corps. The 
left wing of the 5th British Army, General Gough, which was at- 
tacked by the II Army consisted of the 7th and 19th corps and the 
right wing attacked by the XVIII Army consisted of the 18th and 
3d corps. On the fronts of attack, the Germans were naturally very 
much stronger than the British and had sufficient reserves it was 
thought to keep up the attack. 

"On the 21st, just before 4 a. m. the battle began with a tremend- 
ous crash on the front of forty-five miles between Croisilles and La 
Fere For about two hours the whole of our artillery en- 
gaged the enemy's batteries mainly with gas shells; then it was 
switched to trench bombardment in which the trench mortars also 
took part. A little before 9 a. m. most of our fire, only a portion 
being kept on hostile batteries and special points, was concentrated 
to form a barrage. Our infantry advanced to the assault." 

On March 21 there was a heavy fog which covered the entire area 
and did not clear up until noon. It was favorable for surprise but 
interfered with air and artillery service and general cooperation. 
According to British accounts the front of the attacking divisions 
was about 2,000 yards and each of the three regiments had two 
battalions in the front line and one in reserve. The leading bat- 
talions were in several lines ; the first was formed of infantry groups 
with light machine guns and was fairly continuous ; next came a line 
of riflemen then heavier machine guns; next came the battalion 
headquarters with light trench mortars either in batteries of six 
or distributed two to each battalion; next came the reserve bat- 
talions each with a battery of field guns attached. 

The British troops were prepared for the attack and the XVII, II 
and XVIII armies succeeded only in capturing the forward zone and 
penetrating in places the battle zone. On the extreme right of the 
5th Army the British 3d corps was withdrawn to the Crozat Canal. 
The 22d again opened with a fog and on this day the XVII Army 
captured the battle zone on the front of attack and the 5th British 
corps began to withdraw from the Cambrai salient pursued by the 
right of the II Army. On the front of the 5th Army the II and 
XVIII armies captured the battle zone and the third zone and the 
British began to withdraw to the Somme River. On the right of the 
5th Army the XVIII Army crossed the Crozat Canal. On the 23d, 
the XVII Army was held up by the British in the third zone; the 
right wing of the II Army reached and near Peronne crossed the 
Canal du Nord and the left wing reached the Somme at and above 



210 

Peronne. The XVIII Army crossed the Crozat Canal and advanced 
about five miles beyond it. As the advance of the right wing of the 
II Army threatened the rear of the British troops facing the XVII 
Army, on the 24th the 3d British Army began its retreat all along 
the front from Croisilles southward and to the north withdrew to its 
rear position between Croisilles and the Scarpe, That night the 
XVII Army and the right wing of the II Army was on a north and 
south line just west of Bapaume while the left wing of the II Army 
was held up at the Somme where the British had destroyed most of 
the bridges. French reinforcements began to arrive on the 23d to 
support the right wing of the 5th British Army and General Hum- 
bert of the 3d French Army took command of these and the 3d 
British corps on the right. This somewhat delayed the advance 
of the left wing of the XVIII Army but its right wing crossed the 
Somme in the vicinity of Ham and advanced some miles to the west. 
On the 25th all the British troops north of the Somme were placed 
under the command of General Byng of the 3d Army who found 
himself compelled to withdraw his right to the Ancre River pivoting 
on his left. The XVII and the right wing of the II Army moved 
forward in pursuit and reached the Ancre west of Peronne that 
night. The left wing of the II Army crossed the Somme this day 
and reached a line four miles to the west. The right of the XVIII 
Army was marching on Roye while the left captured Noyon. 

After the second day, the German G. H. Q. realized that due to the 
stubborn resistance of the British forces which had prevented the 
capture of the troops in the salient and compelled the use of reserves, 
the original plan could not be carried out and directed the com- 
manders of the II and XVIII armies to take as their objective the 
capture of Amiens the great railway center through which ran the 
main lines connecting the British and French areas. In accordance 
with the new plans, the right wing of the II Army made an effort 
to reach Amiens via Albert while its left wing advanced south of the 
Somme River. The XVIII Army sought to reach Amiens via Mont- 
didier. The XVII Army by attacks all along its front was to prevent 
troops from being withdrawn from its front. On the 26th, the 
critical situation on the west front led the British and French 
governments to 'select General Foch as commander in chief of the 
armies to coordinate operations. As soon as the attack developed 
General Haig sent for reserve divisions from his 1st and 2d armies 
and by the 26th five of these had reached the front ; of these four 
were employed north of the Somme and one to the south; other 
divisions were on the way. French divisions of the 1st Army were 
also reaching the front under the command of General Debeney and 



211 

they were brought to the Montdidier front. General Fayolle was 
placed in command of the 1st and 3d French armies and such other 
divisions as could be assembled. The German attempt to reach 
Amiens failed as the right of the II Army could not pass Albert 
nor the left pass the line Hamel-Moreuil. The XVIII Army cap- 
tured Montdidier and crossed the Avre River but there its advance 
was stopped on April 4 after an advance of nearly 40 miles in about 
two weeks. During the last days of the battle, the XVII Army 
attacked on its extreme right north of the Scarpe but was repulsed 
by the right of the 1st British Army. During the early days of 
April the lines were consolidated but towards the end of the month 
the Germans made a last attempt to gain possession of the high 
plateau east of Villers Bretonneux between the Somme and Luce 
rivers from which to bombard Amiens some ten miles to the west ; 
in this they were unsuccessful. Towards the close of the battle 
the G. H. Q. of the 5th British Army was withdrawn and the 
British troops between the Somme and Avre rivers became the 4th 
Army under General Rawlinson. 

In a tactical sense the attack had been a great success but in a 
strategic sense it was a failure. It had resulted in a vast extension 
of the German lines which it now became necessary to strengthen 
and in the possession of an area in which it would take time and 
labor to construct the necessary communications to the rear. The 
Germans claim to have captured 90,000 unwounded prisoners but in 
so doing their total casualties were as high if not higher than the 
Allies. These casualties fell on their best troops — the shock divi- 
sions — and lowered the standard of the entire army. It was dur- 
ing the battle that the long range gun mounted in the Gobain forest 
in the angle of the Gise and Ailette opened fire on Paris. 

The only American force engaged in these operations was a 
battalion of the 6th Engineers which was attached to the British 
Army and engaged on bridgework near Peronne. In his report Gen- 
eral Haig mentions it as "rendering gallant service" in the retreat 
in which it acted as infantry. 

American Troops in France. — At the beginning of the great offen- 
sive there were six American divisions in France undergoing dif- 
ferent stages of training. The general method of training was as 
follows : 

On arrival in France the artillery of the division was detached 
and sent to a special camp where it received its guns and had special 
training. The infantry was sent to its special area for preliminary 
training before it entered the line during which many of its officers 



212 

were detached to the army schools of the Alhes and at the close of 
the tour spent a short time with Allied troops in the trenches. The 
division was then sent to some part of the Allied line where a bat- 
talion of each regiment was put in line with a company in the first 
line and the others in reserve for a short period of training in de- 
fense. If the artillery brigade was through preliminary work at 
this time it took part in this training. After the three battalions 
had been in the line, the division returned to its training area and 
took part in divisional training for the offensive. The division as a 
whole finally returned to the line and relieved a French division and 
took part in raids. 

A complete course in training could not be given the American 
divisions which arrived in 1918 after the beginning of the German 
offensive; some divisions were engaged before their artillery had 
joined them from the artillery training schools. Corps schools were 
established for the training of officers and a central training school 
was established at Langres for the training of officers for the general 
staff and for the training of officers in all the special arms and 
engines which had been introduced into the Allied armies since the 
beginning of the war. 

Of the six divisions in France at this time, the 1st division was 
holding a part of the French front in the Toul sector ; the 26th and 
42d divisions had just finished their first tour in the trenches and 
the 2d was about finishing this tour. The 32d division and 41st 
division had not been in the trenches as they had been assigned as 
replacement and depot divisions. 

The American Army was placed under the orders of General Foch 
on March 28th, and on General Pershing's suggestion, the 1st divi- 
sion was relieved in the Toul sector by the 26th division and the 1st 
division was sent to the reserves north of Paris where it later en- 
tered the line near Montdidier. The 42d division returned to the 
front and relieved a French division near Baccarat where it had its 
first training. 

April Attack on the West Front.— By the end of March, German 
G. H. Q. realized that the offensive of the XVII, II and XVIII 
armies had reached its limit and at best these armies could only hold 
the ground gained until the divisions that had been first engaged 
had been reorganized and had time to rest and the lines of supply 
over the battle area had been thoroughly organized. North of the 
XVII Army the VI Army, General Quast, between the Scarpa and 
Lys rivers and the IV Army, General Arnim, between the Lys and 
the Channel had not yet been engaged, while the British armies in 



213 

their front, the 1st and 2d, Generals Home and Plumer, had un- 
doubtedly sent reinforcements to the 3d and 5th armies. Prepara- 
tions had already been made for an attack by the VI Army and early 
in April orders were given for its execution. The opening attack was 
to be made by the VI Army between the Lys River and the Bethune- 
Bassee Canal. The results of this attack would determine whether 
the aim would be to turn the position of Arras from the north or 
Ypres from the south. The IV Army was to be ready to attack north 
of the Lys on the right of the VI Army. The troops in both Ger- 
man armies were inferior to those employed in the March attack. 

The British line between the Lys River and the Bethune-Bassee 
Canal, about a 12 mile front, was held by four divisions of which the 
two northern divisions had already been engaged in the battle of 
March. The next was a Portuguese division which had occupied the 
line for some time and was about to be relieved. On the front north 
of the Lys where the IV Army was to attack were three divisions 
which had been engaged in the March battle. In reserve, south of 
the Lys were two divisions also previously engaged; north of the 
Lys were two fresh divisions. 

The preliminary bombardment began on the evening of April 7 
with gas shells on the entire front of the 1st Army. The infantry 
attack was launched on the morning of April 9 in a thick fog by the 
right wing of the VI Army and in the course of the day the Ger- 
mans broke through the Portuguese division at Neuve Chapelle 
and crossed the Lys River between Estaires and Armentieres ; in 
the direction of Bethune the attack was held up. The general line of 
attack thereafter was made in the direction of Hazebrouck. On 
April 10 the left wing of the IV Army attacked the Messines- 
Wytschaete ridge which was taken on the 11th and this army then 
attacked the Kemmel ridge, the divide between the Lys and Yser 
rivers, while the VI Army attacked on either side of the Lys River. 
It was on the 11th as the first reserves arrived from the 3d and 4th 
British armies that General Haig issued his famous order: 

'There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every 
position must be held to the last man ; there must be no retirement. 
With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, 
each one of us must fight on to the end. The safety of our homes 
and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each 
one of us at this critical moment." 

After the 12th the lines south of the Lys became more or less 
stabilized as the Germans could make no further advance and the 
fighting became confined to the front north of the Lys. On the 16th 
the left wing of the 2d British Army retired from the Passchendale 



214 

ridge to the line close to Ypres held before the attack in 1917, and on 
the 17th the right wing of the IV Army made an unsuccessful attack 
north of Ypres. The struggle for Kemmel ridge southwest of Ypres 
continued to the end of the month during which time the center of 
the Allied line between the Lys and Ypres was gradually taken over 
by French divisions sent by General Foch. 

The attack like that south of Arras was a tactical success but 
without strategic results. The British line had been pierced on a 
front of 20 miles to a maximum depth of 12 miles and the attack 
had caused the 2d Army to retire from the Passchendale ridge which 
had been secured by the desperate fighting of 1917. The salient 
gained with heavy losses by the German armies was of no strategic 
value and was an element of weakness in their line. 

May-June Attack on the West Front. — In the March and April 
attacks German G. H. Q. had employed all the armies between the 
Channel and the Oise River which with the exception of the XVIII 
Army constituted the group of armies under Prince Rupert of 
Bavaria. The attacks were made on the front held by the British 
Army but as a result of the penetration of the British front a large 
number of French troops became involved in the resulting battles, 
first on the southern face of the Somme salient and later on the 
northern front of the Lys salient. This had resulted in a weakening 
of the French front which extended originally from the Oise to 
Switzerland and the employment of practically all the French re- 
serves. The first effect which resulted from this was the penetra- 
tion of the line held by the left wing of the 6th French Army 
between the Oise and Ailette rivers which ran through Barasis. 
This line was attacked by the right wing of the VII German Army, 
General Boehn, early in April and the French were compelled to 
retire behind the Ailette River. 

The greater part of May was a comparatively quiet one on the 
west front as both Allied and German armies were resting and re- 
organizing the divisions that had been engaged in the March and 
April offensives. By the end of May due to the reorganization of 
the shipping scheme, six more American divisions were in France. 
The 4th, 28th, 35th and 77th were receiving preliminary training 
in the British area and the 3d and 5th in the American area. Of the 
divisions previously in France, the 1st division had entered the 
front near Montdidier where on May 28th it captured and held the 
town of Cantigny and established the reputation of the division as 
a shock division. The 2d division was moved from the St. Mihiel 
front to the north of Paris in order to relieve the 1st division. The 



215 

32d division was assigned as a combat division and went to the 
Vosges front for training. At the end of May therefore there were 
eleven American combat and one replacement division in France. 
Immediately after it became evident that the Flanders attack had 
failed to reach its objective the German G. H. Q. in order to retain 
the initiative began to plan an attack on a new front. Thus far all 
the armies of the group of Prince Rupert had been engaged and 
nothing further could be accomplished on their front until these 
armies were rested and reorganized and the Allied troops in their 
front had been reduced. Thus far only the XVIII Army of the 
group of the German Crown Prince had been engaged and its losses 
had not been excessive. It was therefore planned that the next at- 
tack should be on the front of this group from which Allied troops 
had been withdrawn to reinforce the armies north of the Oise. The 
program decided on was: 

"1. Attack by the VII and I armies from the front Anizy on !,he 
Ailette River to Berry au Bac on the Aisne at the crossing 
of the Laon-Reims road. 

2. Prolongation of the attack to the right across the Ailette to- 

ward the Oise and on the left as far as Reims. 

3. Attack by the XVIII Army west of the Oise with the principal 

effort toward Compiegne." 

The second part of the program was to follow immediately after 
the first if the attack was successful but the third would take place 
later as there was not sufficient artillery to conduct an offensive on 
the entire front without reducing the artillery on the front of the 
group of Prince Rupert to a dangerous degree. Several weeks were 
required to make the necessary preparations and the attack did not 
take place until the latter part of May. 

The front selected for the first attack was the famous Chemin 
des Dames ridge which had been captured from the Germans during 
1917. It was held by a corps of the 6th French Army, General 
Duchesne, which occupied the line between the Oise and Reims ; on 
the right of the corps attacked was a British corps and on the left 
another French corps. Many of the divisions of these three corps 
had been engaged in the operations in March and April and were 
sent to this sector which was considered a quiet one. The German 
plan was discovered through prisoners the day before the attack 
but adequate preparations could not be made to meet it. 

The attack made on the morning of May 27 after the usual short 
artillery preparation met with unusual success and by night the 
6th French Army was swept off the Chemin des Dames ridge and 
across the Aisne River. The troops at the center of the attack even 



216 

reached the Vesle River at Fismes. On the 28th the attack was ex- 
tended to the right and left as planned as far as the Oise and Reims 
while the center advanced southward toward the Marne. On the 
29th Soissons was taken on the right, the center reached the Ourcq 
River and the left reached the Vesle. On the 30th the attack was 
extended westward to the Oise where the right wing of the VII 
Army crossed the Ailette and the French withdrew toward the 
Aisne ; southwest of Soissons the Germans could make no headway 
as the French made a strong stand on the hills southwest of the 
town ; in the center the Germans reached the Marne east of Chateau 
Thierry and on the extreme right they reached the difficult hill 
region southwest of Reims. 

On June 1 the main attempt of the Germans was to gain ground 
to the west and this day they entered Chateau Thierry on the north 
bank of the Marne but were unable to secure the bridges across the 
river. North of Chateau Thierry their line ran roughly through 
Vaux, Bouresches, Belleau and Torcy to the bend of the Ourcq. 
North of the Ourcq the Germans were stopped at the edge of the 
forest of Cotterets and on the Aisne five miles below Soissons. North 
of the Aisne they were unable to drive the French back to the Aisne 
in the area between the Oise and Aisne rivers. 

The success of the Germans in their attack had been greater than 
the German G. H. Q. had anticipated but the area gained was a 
difficult one to supply as the main railway running into it from Laon 
to Soissons ran through a tunnel between Anizy and Soissons which 
was partly destroyed by the German cavalry in 1914. It was also a 
difficult one to extend as the Marne was on the south, the hilly 
country southwest of Reims on the east, and the forest of Cotterets 
with the hilly country southwest of Soissons on the west. 

General Foch was a great believer in strategic reserves which 
could be employed on any threatened front. As soon therefore as 
he assumed command he began the formation of strong reserves 
under General Fayolle behind the Allied front from Amiens to the 
Ourcq. From these reserves assistance was sent to the British and 
now they were employed to stop the German advance. Due to the 
excellent system of transportation organized by the French some of 
these divisions were on the front in a short time both on the west 
and south fronts of the German salient. For the east front he 
temporarily drew the reserve divisions of the 4th French Army east 
of Reims. Among the divisions employed by General Foch to stop 
the German advance were the 2d and 3d American divisions although 
the latter division had had no training in the trenches. Of these 
divisions General Pershing says: 



217 

"The 2d division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing 
to relieve the 1st division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of 
Meaux on May 31, and early on the morning of June 1, was deployed 
across the Paris-Chateau Thierry road near Montreuil aux Lions in 
a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German advance on 
Paris. At the same time, the partially trained 3d division was 
placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its 
motorized machine gun battalion succeeded in reaching Chateau 
Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending the river crossing. 

"The enemy having been halted^ the 2d division commenced a 
series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the capture 
of Belleau Woods after severe fighting. The village of Bouresches 
was taken soon after and on July 1, Vaux was captured." 

It would probably be more correct to say, it would have stopped 
the German advance, as there was still a thin screen of French 
troops between the 2d division and the Germans when they halted ; 
the French withdrew June 4th. 

The first and second parts of the German plan were over on June 1. 
The attack of the XVIII Army and the right wing of the VII oc- 
curred on June 9. General Foch knew that such an attack must 
follow the German advance into the Marne salient and the 3d French 
Army west of the Oise as well as the French troops between the Oise 
and Aisne were well prepared to meet it. The attack on the front of 
the 3d French Army made some headway on the 9th and 10th but 
when the French counter-attacked on the 11th and regained some 
of the ground, while the German force east of the Oise could make no 
headway, orders were issued to stop the offensive. 

A few days after the repulse of the XVIII German Army, oc- 
curred the last attack of the Austrian troops in Italy ; it met with 
defeat and restored the morale of the Italian Army which hence- 
forth looked forward to a renewal of the offensive. As the Austrians 
were now reduced to the defensive, German G. H. Q. requested that 
some of its divisions be sent to the west front to reinforce the Ger- 
mans there; four divisions were sent. 

Notwithstanding the three great offensives, the Allied situation 
was improving from day to day. Since the beginning of the war a 
relatively large force was retained in Great Britain in view of a 
possible invasion in addition to the troops being trained there. This 
force was now released and sent to General Haig. In addition two 
divisions were withdrawn from Italy and as rapidly as possible 
white troops were withdrawn from Palestine and replaced by Indian 
troops. The British divisions in France were being reorganized and 
trained for attack. General Foch withdrew four of the French divi- 
sions from Italy and received two Italian divisions to replace the 



218 

French divisions left in Italy. French divisions were also relieved by- 
American divisions on quiet fronts and the trained American divi- 
sions were incorporated in the French armies on the active fronts. 

As a result of the successful defense against the attack of the 
XVIII Army and the defeat of the Austrian attack in Italy, there 
had been a great change of feeling at the Allied G. H. Q. since the 
first days of June when the Premiers of Great Britain, France and 
Italy united in a cablegram to the President of the Uuited States re- 
questing that the American contingent be increased to 100 divisions. 
Now the Allied commanders were confident that the worst was over 
and that any further oflfensive by the Germans could be met with 
confidence. It was assumed that as the Germans had failed to widen 
their dangerous Marne salient on the west they would soon try and 
widen it on the east and General Gouraud who commanded the 4th 
French Army east of Reims was warned to be ready for it. 

In the meantime, the west and south front of the Marne salient 
were reorganized. The 10th French Army under General Mangin 
now held the front between the Oise and Ourcq rivers and to this 
army was assigned the 1st and 2d American divisions both tem- 
porarily in reserve. The 6th French Army under General Degoutte 
held the front from the Ourcq to the Marne and along the south side 
of the Marne. The 26th division which relieved the 2d division early 
in July was in the front line of the 6th French Army between the 
Marne and the Ourcq and the 4th division was in reserve in the same 
sector. South of the Marne the 3d division still held the front from 
Chateau Thierry to the Surmelin River and in reserve near Montmi- 
rail was the 28th division. The 5th French Army, General Berthe- 
lot, held the front from the Marne to Reims and the 4th French 
Army held the front as far east as the Argonne. The 42d division 
was now in the reserve of the 4th Army. The 5th, 32d, 35th, 77th 
and 82d divisions were occupying quiet sectors on the French front 
from the vicinity of Toul to the Swiss frontier. Eight American 
divisions, the 29th, 30th, 33d, 37th, 78th, 80th, 89th and 92d were 
in British or American training areas and in addition there were two 
replacement divisions the 41st and 83d whose artillery was being 
trained for corps artillery. Early in July the actual strength of the 
American forces in France was given as about 900,000 men of whom 
650,000 were combatant troops. 

Last German Offensive. — The situation as it appeared to the Ger- 
man G. H. Q. at the beginning of July, 1918, was as follows: 

"The long rest gradually improved the condition of the troops, 
The battalions of the Crown Prince Rupprecht's group reached a 



219 

fairly satisfactory level of strength, not much below the English 
standard. The army group of the German Crown Prince had, of 
course, been heavily taxed in the constant fighting ; but there were 
sufficient reserves at hand to make me hopeful that during the lull 
the battalions might, with few exceptions, be brought up to the 
French standard. 

"The battalion strength had been reduced, but was still high 
enough to allow us to strike one more blow that should make the 
enemy ready for peace; there was no other way. 

"Again and again our thoughts returned to the idea of an offen- 
sive in Flanders. Strong English reserves were still assembled here, 
even after the French divisions had been withdrawn under the 
pressure of the battles with the army group of the German Crown 
Prince. But an offensive at this point still presented too difficult a 
problem. We had to postpone it. 

"The bulk of the enemy's reserves was the arc described by the 
Eighteenth and Seventh Armies in the direction of Paris, while the 
line from Chateau Thierry- Verdun was only weakly held. General 
Headquarters again decided to attack the enemy at his weak point. 
Accordingly, an attack on both sides of Reims was planned for the 
middle of July, whereby the rear communication of the Seventh 
Army between the Aisne and the Marne would be incidentally 
greatly improved. Immediately following this operation we meant 
to concentrate artillery, trench-mortars, and flying squadrons on 
the Flanders front, and possibly attack that a fortnight later. There 
were hopes that if the offensive at Reims succeeded, there would be 
a very decisive weakening of the enemy in Flanders. 

"In order to reduce transportation movements to a minimum and 
accumulate enough artillery for the two offensives, the fifth and 
sixth guns were in many places reissued to the field artillery from 
the reserve of guns. For a short tiihe this increased number of 
guns had to be served by the batteries, although their personnel 
was not increased for the purpose. Batteries were also transferred 
from the East. 

"General Headquarters was in a very difficult position as regards 
fixing a time for the offensive. By the middle of July the movement 
of troops and other preparations for the attack on both sides of 
Reims would have been completed, but for the sake of the troops I 
should like to have waited a little longer. At a pinch, however, it 
would do, and postponement would have been of advantage to the 
enemy also. So we decided to stand by our schedule, and keep the 
first days of August in view for the Flanders offensive, 

"The preparations for the fourth great offensive in the West were 
carried out on exactly the same lines as those for the battles of 
March 21 and May 27. 

"The Seventh Army was to effect a crossing of the Marne east of 
Chateau Thierry and then advance on both sides of the river in the 
direction of Epernay, while the First and Third attacked from the 
east of Reims to Tahure. These armies were to bring their right 
wing past the Foret de la Montague de Reims to Epernay, and make 
Chalons-sur-Marne their principal objective. The offensive of this 



220 

army group left untouched the enemy line approximately from the 
Ardre to the east of Reims, and thereby gained a considerable 
breadth that seemed to favor its chances of success. The junction 
of the two attacking groups in the direction of Epernay might pro- 
duce great results. The attack was to be made chiefly by those divi- 
sions that had carried out the advance across the Chemin des Dames. 
This made great demands upon our troops, but in our position there 
was no other course possible, and it allowed the divisions of the 
army group of Crown Prince Rupprecht all the more rest before the 
work that lay in front of them, the offensive of Flanders. 

"In order to relieve the Seventh Army Headquarters, the Ninth 
Army Headquarters from Rumania was pushed into the line on both 
banks of the Aisne, between the Oise and the Ourcq. 

"In the attack on Reims we reckoned on an enemy counter-offen- 
sive between the Aisne and the Marne, with Soissons as its principal 
objective, and we organized the Ninth Army and the right wing of 
the Seventh accordingly. 

"Originally the attack of the army group of the German Crown 
Prince was to be carried out on July 12, but, in order to make 
thorough preparations possible it had unfortunately to be postponed 
until the 15th. On the 11th or 12th, while the preparations were in 
full swing, a deserter brought news that a big tank offensive from 
the forest of Villers-Cotterets was imminent and this report gave 
us additional reason to re-examine and perfect our defensive meas- 
ures. At the most critical point, southwest of Soissons, we had 
placed a division that had fought with special success in the East, 
and which had always met the demands made upon it in the West. 
This division had not taken part in the May battles, and was there- 
fore as much rested as could be allowed to any division. In this 
respect, at any rate, we were no worse off than the enemy. Farther 
south, two divisions, not fully rested, and whose battalion strength 
was not up to the standard required, held that space along the front 
that was usually allotted to one division only. The other divisions 
were good trench divisions, and held normal divisional fronts ; a few 
were kept behind the lines as reserves. The fortification of our posi- 
tions was, of course, not far advanced ; high ground obstructed the 
view in front of and still more within them. Influenza was prevalent, 
but not more so here than anywhere else along the front. The at- 
tack that had been announced never took place, but I hoped that the 
news would have thoroughly aroused the men 

"We attacked early on the 15th. Our crossing of the Marne was 
a remarkable achievement, which succeeded, although the enemy 
were fully prepared for it. The Seventh Army, between the Marne 
and the Ardre, also penetrated the most obstinately defended posi- 
tions. The Italian divisions stationed there suffered particularly. 

"About five kilometers south of the Marne the attacking troops 
came upon an enemy force so strong that it could be overcome only 
by bringing a large number of batteries over the river, and so the 
attack at this point came to a standstill. On the 16th, by hard fight- 
ing, we slowly gained ground up the Marne and toward the Ardre. 



221 

"According to plan, the enemy (4th French Army) had with- 
drawn in front of the First and Third Armies, to their second posi- 
tion, and held us firmly all along the line. 

"By noon of the 16th General Headquarters had given orders for 
the suspension of the offensive of the First and Third Armies, and 
for their organization for defense by withdrawing certain divisions 
for this purpose. A continuation of the offensive would have cost 
us too much. We had to content ourselves with the improvement 
in our position brought about by regaining possession of the heights 
we had lost in the spring of 1917, and we had even secured a deep 
forward zone. The troops that had been withdrawn were at the 
disposal of the group of the German Crown Prince or of General 
Headquarters as reserves, I considered it of the greatest importance 
that they should be available as soon as possible. 

"Once the difficult decision to suspend the offensive of the First 
and Third Armies had been made it was useless to attempt to ad- 
vance farther across the Marne or to leave our troops on the south- 
ern bank. It seemed out of the question to withdraw the troops 
immediately, as the few bridges were under incessant artillery fire, 
and were constantly bombed or machine-gunned by enemy planes. 
We had to make arrangements for crossing before the retreat could 
even begin. On the 17th the retreat was fixed for the night between 
the 20th and 21st." 

The last great German offensive was checked on all fronts. At 
this time the French system of defense was somewhat similar to 
that of the British heretofore described. On the front of the 4th 
French Army there were three zones, a forward zone, an intermedi- 
ate zone and the battle zone. The forward zone was designed to 
break up the waves of attack and compel the waste of artillery fire ; 
the second zone answered the same purpose ; the battle zone was the 
zone of counter-attack. As the attacking troops struggled forward 
between the forward and intermediate zones in more or less disorder 
they were to be exposed to destructive barrage fire. General 
Gouraud was informed of the hour of attack by deserters and was 
thoroughly prepared. The German shock divisions having suffered 
severe loss at the forward zone and even more heavily by artillery 
fire in the intermediate zone was unable to conquer the intermediate 
position and the attack was called off about noon on the second day. 
In the defense of the front of the 4th French Army the 42d Amer- 
ican division took a prominent part being moved from the reserve 
to the intermediate position where it resisted all attacks on its front. 

South of the Marne two American divisions were engaged, the 3d 
and 28th. The 3d division had been on this front since the first Ger- 
man attack and was guarding the Marne from Chateau Thierry to 
the Surmelin River with its main line along the railway and its out- 
posts near the river. On its front the troops were not withdrawn 



222 

to the second position about two miles in rear but a successful de- 
fense was made in the first line and the Germans that succeeded in 
crossing were soon driven back. Due to a bend in the river and the 
crossing of the Germans to the east, the right regiment of the divi- 
sion was peculiarly exposed but maintained its position against 
great odds. 

The 28th division had been posted near Montmirail in rear of 
the 3d di\ision but was employed by the French commander to 
strengthen his line on the right of the 3d division. Some of its com- 
panies were in the forward zone but most of the division was in the 
second zone some two miles south of the river where the German 
attack was stopped as stated by Ludendorff. 

Immediately after the attack, the line south of the Marne where 
the Germans had crossed the river was strengthened by additional 
French troops and the whole placed in command of General Mitry 
in preparation for a counter-attack. 

July Counter-Attack. — Early in July General Foch had decided to 
make a counter-attack as soon as the military situation became clear. 
When he had learned definitely that the Germans were concentrat- 
ing for an attack on either side of Reims, preparations were made 
to launch an attack with the 10th and 6th armies as soon as it be- 
came evident that the German attack had failed. The preparations 
for the attack were made between the 15th and 17th and the attack 
was launched on the morning of July 18th. It was planned to make 
a great wheel to the right with the 10th and 6th armies pivoting 
near Chateau Thierry and cut off the retreat of the Germans south 
of the Marne. 

In this attack tanks were employed by the French for the first 
time on a large scale. Tlie tank development in France had started 
somewhat later than in Great Britain but on the same general lines. 
The first tanks constructed were heavy tanks (St. Chamond and 
Schneider types) and were later followed by the lighter tank 
(Reynault type) . The hea\y tanks were first employed in Nivelle's 
attack in 1917 and had not given complete satisfaction. It was 
not until after the Cambrai attack in November, 1917, that the value 
of the tank was universally admitted. By July, 1918, the French 
tank service was well developed. In this attack mustard gas shells 
were employed in attack by the French artillery for the first time. 

In the front line of the 10th French Army between the Aisne and 
Ourcq were the 1st and 2d American divisions with a French divi- 
sion between them forming the French corps which was the center 
of the attack ; French divisions were on either flank. To these five 



223 

divisions were assigned 6 heavy tank battalions with about 200 
tanks. In reserve were British and French divisions and 3 light 
tank battalions with about 125 tanks. In the front line of the 6th 
French Army on either side of Bouresches was the 26th division; 
the 4th division was in reserve of the corps farther north. 

On the morning of July 18 in a light fog the 10th French Army 
surprised the IX German Army which was not expecting an attack. 
Of the part taken by the 1st and 2d American divisions, General 
Pershing says: 

"The 1st division, throughout four days of constant fighting, ad- 
vanced 11 kilometers, capturing Berzy Le Sec and the height above 
Soissons, taking some 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from seven 
German divisions employed against it. 

''The 2d division advanced 8 kilometers in 26 hours and by the end 
of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners 
and 66 field guns." 

Both divisions were then relieved by French and British divisions 
of the second line. Of this attack, Ludendorff says: 

"After a short and sharp artillery preparation and a smoke screen, 
he attacked with massed infantry and a stronger force of tanks 
than had ever been concentrated in one place. For the first time, 
small, low, flat tanks that allowed the use of machine guns above 
the grain were used ; our machine guns were hindered by it except 
when they were mounted on special tripods. Tanks were also 
observed which were used solely for the transport of men. These 
passed through our line, put down passengers with machine guns 
to form machine gun nests, and then promptly returned for rein- 
forcements." 

The left of the 6th French Army also attacked on the 18th and the 

attack developed towards its right where the 26th division became 
engaged on the 21st. A part of the 4th division became engaged on 
the 18th. On the night of the 20th, the Germans recrossed the 
Marne and began to retreat from the salient ; in the meantime they 
rushed reinforcements to check the advance of the 10th French 
Army. The German plan was to hold the French north of the Ourcq 
in the west and north of the Ardre in the east with the IX and I 
armies while the VII Army retired between the two wings. 

As soon as the retreat of the VII Army began, the Allied troops 
took up the pursuit on all faces of the salient. Due to the resistance 
offered by the Germans to the left wing of the 10th Army after 
July 24th, the original maneuver planned for the 10th and 6th 
armies could not be executed and these armies began to wheel to the 
left instead of to the right. The 26th American di\asion being now 
on the marching flank instead of pivot advanced in the direction of 
Fismes on the Aisne and the 3d American division on its right 



224 

moved parallel to it separated by a French division. In the advance 
to the Vesle, the 26th division was relieved by the 42d and this in 
turn by the 4th division. These divisions temporarily constituted 
the first American corps under Maj. General Liggett. The 3d divi- 
sion with the 28th division and a French division formed a corps. 
In the advance to the Vesle, the 32d division replaced the French 
division and the three American divisions then formed the 3d Amer- 
ican corps under JM^aj. General Bullard. 

On August 3d Soissons was retaken by the 10th French Army 
and on the 4th of August the German Army consolidated its posi- 
tion along the Aisne and Vesle and stopped its retreat. The retreat 
had been skillfully conducted but not without severe loss,. Other 
fronts were weakened by withdrawing from them reserves which 
were essential to their safety. Ludendorff says: 

"As in every other engagement, the losses we had suffered since 
July 15 had been very heavy. July 18 and the defensive battles 
arising with it had in particular been expensive, although we got 
our wounded back and did not lose any considerable number of 
prisoners. 

"The losses through the battle had been so heavy that we were 
compelled to break up about ten divisions and use their infantry as 
replacements for others. The other branches, generally speaking 
were not broken up. Those divisions that had been withdrawn from 
the battle, and other troops, were distributed behind the whole 
western front. This was the beginning of a vast railway transporta- 
tion movement. It began at the end of July and increased consider- 
ably at the beginning of August. The troops, who were very much 
exliuusted, had to be brought up to establishments, rested, and given 
time to recuperate. 

"The attempt to make the nations of the Entente inclined to peace 
before the arrival of the American reinforcements by means of Ger- 
man victories had failed* The energy of the army had not sufficed 
to deal the enemy a decisive blow before the Americans were on the 
spot in considerable force. It was quite clear to me that our general 
situation had thus become very serious. 

"By the beginning of August we had stopped our attack, and had 
reverted to the defensive on the whole front. When the divisions 
that had taken part in the last attack had been rested, we should be 
able to make new plans. A pause in the operations was not unusual ; 
it had occurred after the cessation of the great offensive of March 
31, and again after May 27. The fighting since July 18 had been no 
less costly than had those attacks. The desire for rest was legiti- 
mate now as it had been then. Whether the enemy would let us 
have it was the question. 

"Early in August I decidedly hoped that we should be able to 
defeat the imminent attacks and deliver counter-strokes, though on 
a smaller scale than heretofore. Even in critical situations we had 
hitherto always succeeded in discovering a strategic remedy, and I 
had no reason to assume that we should not do so again." 



225 

After the retreat, the left wing of the IX Army south of the Aisne 
was again assigned to the VII Army and the IX Army now under 
General Carlowitz was confined to the Oise-Aisne front. In view 
of a possible attack by the British and French on the front between 
the Aisne River on the south and Albert on the north, the IX, 
XVIII and II armies on this front were united into a new group 
under General Boehn, who had been in command of the VII Army. 

For his success in driving the Germans out of the Marne salient 
and in thus removing all danger of an advance on Paris, General 
Foch was awarded the grade of Marshal of France. General Foch 
and the Allied commanders Generals Petain, Haig and Pershing now 
realized that the Germans had practically exhausted their reserves 
and it was advisable to keep up the offensive and prevent the re- 
covery of their armies. General Haig says: 

"The definite collapse of the ambitious offensive launched by the 
enemy on the 15th of July, and the striking counter-offensive south 
of the Aisne effected a complete change in the whole military situa- 
tion. The German Army had made its effort and failed. The period 
of maximum strength had been passed, and the bulk of the reserves 
accumulated during the winter had been used up. On the other 
hand, the position of the Allies in regard to reserves had greatly 
improved. The fresh troops made available during the late spring 
and early summer had been incorporated and trained. The British 
Army was ready to take the offensive; while the American Army 
was growing rapidly and had already given proof of the high fight- 
ing quality of its soldiers. 

"At a conference held on the 23d of July, when the success of the 
attack of the 18th of July was well assured, the methods by which 
the advantage already gained could be extended were discussed in 
detail. The Commander-in-Chief asked that the British, French and 
American armies should each prepare plans for local offensives, to 
be taken in hand as soon as possible, with certain definite objectives. 
These objectives on the British front were the disengagements of 
Amiens and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens railway by an attack 
on the Albert-Montdidier front." 

While the German offensives were in progress on the French front 
during June and July, the British front was comparatively quiet 
which gave the necessary time for reorganizing the British divisions 
that had suffered in the March and April attacks. 

Haig's Counter-Attack August 8-15. — The local offensive as- 
signed to General Haig was designed to force back the German lines 
between Albert and Montdidier and for this purpose the 1st French 
Army was placed under his orders. His plan was to penetrate the 
German line between the Somme and Avre rivers and extend the 
attack both north and south. The opening attack between the 



226 

Somme and Avre rivers was assigned to the Australian and Canadian 
corps, 4 divisions each. A British corps north of the Somme and the 
1st French Army to the south were to co-operate in the attack. The 
Austrahan and Canadian corps were each given 4 battalions of tanks 
and in rear in addition to the usual divisions of the second line was 
a cavalry corps to which was assigned 3 battalions of light tanks for 
the pursuit. The French troops were also supplied with tanks. 

The opening attack was made on the left wing of the II Army but 
soon the XVIII Army on its left became involved in the battle. Gen- 
eral Haig says of the attack: 

"At 4:20 a. m. on the 8th of August our massed artillery opened 
intense fire on the whole front of attack, completely crushing the 
enemy's batteries, some of which never succeeded in coming into 
action. Simultaneously British infantry and tanks advanced to the 
assault. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and under 
cover of a heavy ground mist our first objectives * * * were gained 
rapidly. 

"After a halt of two hours on this line, by the leading troops, in- 
fantry, cavalry and light tanks passed through and continued the 
advance, the different arms working in co-operation in the most 
admirable manner. At the close of the day's operations, our troops 
had completed an advance of between six and seven miles. * * * 
Cavalry and armored tanks were in action east of the line. 

"East of the line of our advance, the enemy at nightfall was blow- 
ing up dumps in all directions, while his transports and limbers 
were streaming eastward toward the Somme. * * * Over 13,000 
prisoners, between 300 and 400 guns and vast quantities of am- 
munition and stores of all kinds remained in our possession." 

Ludendorff confirms the success of this attack: 

' "Early on August 8, in a dense fog, rendered still thicker by arti- 
ficial means, the British, mainly the Australian and Canadian divi- 
sions, and the French attacked between Albert and Moreuil with 
strong squadrons of tanks, but otherwise in no great superiority. 
The divisions in line at that point allowed themselves to be com- 
pletely overwhelmed. Divisional staffs were surprised in their 
headquarters by enemy tanks. The breach very soon extended 
across the Luce; the troops that were still gallantly resisting at 
Moreuil were rolled up. To the north, the Somme imposed a halt. 
Our troops north of the river had successfully parried a similar as- 
sault. The exhausted divisions that had been relieved a few days 
earlier, and that were resting in the region southwest of Peronne, 
were immediately alarmed and set in motion by the commander of 
the II Army. At the same time he brought forward to the breach 
all other available troops. The XVIII Army threw its reserves 
directly into the battle from the southeast and pushed other forces 
forward in the region northwest of Roye. The Rupprecht Army 
group despatched reserves thither by train. On an order from me, 
the IX Army, too, although itself in danger, had to contribute. 



227 

"Six or seven divisions that were quite fairly to be described as 
effective had been completely broken. Three or four others, together 
with the remnants of the battered divisions, were available for clos- 
ing the broad gap between Bray and Roye. 

"August 8 was the black day of the German Army in the history 
of the war." 

In the succeeding days, the II German Army with its reinforce- 
ments was able to check the advance of the troops in its front on 
the old line held by the Germans from 1914 to the spring of 1917. 
To the south, the XVIII Army had to swing back to the same line, 
actively pursued by the 1st and 3d French armies. 

The results and effects of the battle are given by General Haig: 

"The result of the battle of Amiens may be summarized as fol- 
lows. Within a space of five days, the town of Amiens and the rail- 
way centering upon it had been disengaged. Twenty German divi- 
sions had been heavily defeated by thirteen British infantry and 
three cavalry divisions, assisted by a regiment of the 33d American 
division and supported by some four hundred tanks. Nearly 22,000 
prisoners and over 400 guns had been taken by us and our line 
pushed forward to a depth of twelve miles in a vital sector. Further 
our deep advance, combined with the attacks of the French armies 
on our right, had compelled the enemy to evacuate hurriedly a wide 
extent of territory south of us. 

"The effect of this victory, following so closely after the Allied 
Victory of the Marne, upon the morale both of the German and 
British troops was very great. Buoyed by the hope of immediate 
and decisive victory, to be followed by an early and favorable peace, 
constantly assured that the Allied reserves were exhausted, the Ger- 
man soldiery suddenly found themselves attacked on two fronts and 
thrown back with heavy losses from large and important portions 
of their early gains. The reaction was inevitable and of a lasting 
character. 

"On the other hand, our troops felt that at last their opportunity 
had come, and that, supported by a superior artillery and numerous 
tanks, they could now press forward resolutely to reap the reward 
of their patient, dauntless and successful defense of March and 
April." 

After this attack, the 1st French Army was returned to General 
Petain. 

Haig's Counter-Attack August 21-September 1. — As soon as as- 
sured of the success of his first counter-attack. General Haig de- 
cided to attack the left of the XVII German Army of the group of 
Prince Rupert of Bavaria west of Bapaume where its line was west 
of the Ancre River. His reasons were: 

"The enemy did not seem to be prepared to meet an attack in this 
direction and owing to the success of the 4th Army, he occupied a 
salient the left flank of which was already threatened from the 



228 

south. A further reason for my decision was that the ground north 
of the Ancre River was not greatly damaged by shell fire, and was 
suitable for the use of tanks. A successful attack between Albert 
and Arras in the southeasterly direction would turn the line of the 
Somme south of Peronne, and gave promise of producing far-reach- 
ing results. It would be a step forward towards the strategic ob- 
jective St. Quentin-Cambrai." 

The opening attack was begun on the British front opposite 
Bapaume on August 21 and after the Germans were driven back at 
this point, the attack was developed all along the British and French 
front from the Scarpe to the Oise. By the 6th, the Germans had 
been driven back out of the angle between the Ancre and Somme 
rivers and across the battle field of the Somme drive of 1916 with 
a loss of 34,000 prisoners and 270 guns. The British also advanced 
between Bapaume and the Scarpe. Of the British tactics in these 
advances Ludendorff says: 

"The characteristic of their tactics was narrow but deep penetra- 
tion by tanks after short but extremely violent artillery preparation, 
combined with artificial fog. Mass attacks by tanks and artificial 
fog remained thereafter our most dangerous enemies. The danger 
increased as the morale of the troops deteriorated and as our divi- 
sions grew weaker and more exhausted. The depth of the penetra- 
tion was soon known but not the length of the front attacked. 
Well-timed counter-attacks by reserves generally succeeded in re- 
storing the situation. There remained the danger, however, of the 
local command throwing in its troops too hurriedly and piecemeal." 

Petain's Counter-Attacks in August. — Between the Oise and 
Somme, the 1st and 3d French armies followed up the attack of 
August 8 making determined attacks on the XVIII Army. Luden- 
dorff says: 

"The fighting between the Somme and the Oise was still continu- 
ing in the middle of August ; the center of the attack lay on both 
sides of Roye, which was held through severe fighting." 

Between the Oise and the Aisne, General Mangin again made a 
brilliant attack and forced the left wing of the IX Army northward 
across the Oise and the center back to the Ailette about 10 miles in 
rear. The attack began August 18 and by the 20th the Germans 
were in full retreat. It was in the latter part of August that the 
32d American division attached to General Mangin's 10th Army 
captured Juvigny north of Soissons. Of the attack Ludendorff says : 

"The battle had again an unfavorable turn in spite of all our pre- 
cautions ; the nerves of the army had suffered. In some places the 
men would no longer stand a tremendous artillery barrage and tank 
attacks which had become still more severe. Again we suffered 
heavy and irreplacable losses. August 20 was another black day." 



229 

The British advance north of the Somme and the French advance 
south of the Oise made the position of the German line between the 
Somme and Oise dangerous and on August 26th, the Germans began 
to withdraw their troops to a new line. 

German Retreat on the Somme. — "As a result of the course of 
events east of Albert and south of the Oise the position of the Ger- 
man troops between the Somme and Oise was by no means so secure 
as the general military situation demanded. It would be fatal to run 
risks at this point. 

"The army groups of the Crown Prince Rupprecht and Von Boehn 
were therefore ordered to retire during the last days of August to 
the line already reconnoitered east of Bapaume — in front of 
Peronne — line of Somme River — in front of Ham — heights north- 
east of Noyon. As their reserve line the Siegfried (Hindenburg) 
line was now to be put in order. Von Boehn's army group had at- 
tached importance to the retention of the left bank of the Somme 
in front of Peronne, because from there favorable flanking move- 
ments against the area north of Peronne were possible. Between 
Ham and Noyon, a canal (Vesle-Noyon) which offered a good 
obstacle to tanks, determined the position of the line. These move- 
ments were carried through about the night of the 26th. 

"The XVn Army, which had only a short wheel to perform, and 
the XVin Army carried out the retirement without a hitch and in 
good order, and held their new positions against enemy attacks. The 
n Army was less fortunate, northwest of Peronne the new line 
failed to hold. The division to the southwest of the town let the 
enemy gain the left bank, thus rendering the situation very difficult 
for the troops on the northern bank. Again some divisions failed, 
putting a terrible strain on other gallant troops." — Ludendorff. 

It was troops of the British 4th Army which attacked in the vicin- 
ity of Peronne. The British and French troops reached the new line 
about September 1st. Here the G. H. Q. of the 3d French Army 
was withdrawn and the 1st Army took over the French front north 
of the Oise. The line to which the right wing of the XVII Army 
retired was the Wotan or Drocourt-Queant line which the Germans 
had strengthened after the battle of Arras in the spring of 1917. 
It joined the main Siegfried or Hindenburg line near Queant a few 
miles south of the Arras-Cambrai road. 

Haig's Counter-Attack of September 2. — On the 2d of Septembei-, 
troops of the 1st and 3d British armies attacked and penetrated the 
Wotan line on either side of the Arras-Cambrai road on a front of 
about 8 miles. This attack compelled the German armies as far 
south as the Oise to give up the last of the Amiens or Somme salient 
and retire to the Hindenburg line from which their March attack 
started. 



230 

"On September 2, a strong assault by British tanks overran ob- 
stacles and trenches in this (Wotan) line and paved the way for 
their infantry. Shortly after 2 o'clock in the afternoon General von 
Kuhl and the Chief of Staff of the XVII Army reported that it would 
no longer be wise to form a new line in front of the Arleaux- 
Moeuvres canal. They requested permission from G. H. Q. to with- 
draw the XVII Army to that line, while holding the position north of 
the Scarpe. We had to admit the necessity of the measure." — 
Ludendorff. 

The Arleaux-Moeuvres canal or Canal du Nord ran from Arleaux 
on the Sensee River to Peronne ; it crossed the Arras-Cambrai road 
about 6 miles in rear of the Wotan line and the Hindenburg line at 
Moeuvres. North of the Scarpe River the Wotan line was still held. 
A new line was established between the Scarpe and Sensee rivers. 
The retreat of the XVII Army exposed the right flank of the II 
Army. 

German Retreat from Somme and Lys Salients. — "With von 
Boehn's army group (II, XVIII and IX armies) we had to take an- 
other important step on account of the position of the II Army, 
withdrawing its line and that of the XVIII Army to the Sigfried 
(Hindenburg) line. The IX Army, and also the right wing of the 
VII Army, had to conform to the movement, the latter abandoning 
the Vesle and taking up a position behind the Aisne, while the left 
wing of the same army continued to hold the Vesle to the northeast 
of Fismes. 

"It was no easy decision to withdraw the entire front from the 
Scarpe to the Vesle, but it shortened our line and economized men, 
which, considering our huge wastage, was an advantage worth some 
sacrifice, notwithstanding it was shared with the enemy. Condi- 
tions were easier for the troops in and to the east of the Siegfried 
line, while the enemy was compelled to occupy ground rendered 
desolate by the withdrawal in the spring of 1917. 

"The center of the XVII Army was to be withdrawn behind the 
Arleaux-Moeuvres canal during the night of the 3d, while in general 
the retirement was to be undertaken as one movement, the detailed 
orders being prepared by the army groups. 

"In addition the long-prepared evacuation of the Lys salient 
by the IV and VI armies was now carried out to economize man- 
power. 

"At the same time G. H. Q. gave orders, after consulting the com- 
manders of the army groups, for the reconnaissance and strength- 
ening of a new line, the Hermann line, behind the two northern 
groups. The line was to start on the Holland frontier east of 
Bruges, follow the Eccloo Canal southward to the Lys, continue up- 
stream to the east of Courtrai, and then along the Scheldt to the 
southwest of Valenciennes. Further south it was to follow the 
Solesmes-Le Cateau-Guise line. South of Marie (on the Serre River 
southeast of Guise) the Hermann line joined the Hunding-Brunhild 
position, which, constructed in 1917, passes Sissonne to the Aisne 
and continued upstream along that river." — Ludendorff. 



231 

The Hermann-Hunding-Brunhild line was a canal and deep river 
line from the Holland frontier to the mouth of the Selle River south- 
west of Valenciennes. Thence it followed the Selle via Solesmes to 
Le Cateau and the Sambre-Oise canal to the bend of the Oise west 
of Guise. Thence it ran across country to the Aisne just west of 
Rethel and followed the Aisne and Aire rivers to Grand Pre in a 
gap of the Argonne Forest. 

"We had a second reserve position reconnoitered, running west of 
the Antwerp-Brussels-Namur line, then upstream along the Meuse ; 
this was called the Antwerp-Meuse line. The fortresses of Alsace- 
Lorraine were put in state of defense. Lastly orders were given that 
all military material not required for immediate use should be re- 
moved from the region west and south of the Hermann-Hunding- 
Brunhild line, while preparations were to be made for the thorough 
demolition of railways and roads and for putting the coal mines out 
of working order. Villages were not to be interfered with unless 
for urgent tactical reasons. Large scale evacuations to Germany 
were undertaken." 

The British and French troops followed up the retreat between 
the Sensee and Oise rivers with great vigor and captured a number 
of strong points which the Germans attempted to hold in front of 
their main line between the two rivers in preparation for their at- 
tack on this formidable front. 

Capture of the St. Mihiel Salient. — On the 1st of August there 
were 24 American combat divisions in France. Up to this time they 
had served in the Allied armies and not as a separate army. On 
August 10 the first American Army was formed and General Persh- 
ing assumed command. The task he had selected for this army was 
the capture of the St. Mihiel salient. For this purpose 15 American 
divisions were brought to this front during August and the first 
days of September and with four French Colonial divisions formed 
the army of attack. Of the attack General Pershing says: 

"The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was important, as it would 
prevent the enemy from interfering with traffic on the Paris-Nancy 
railroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leading north 
through St. Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us with an ad- 
vantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-Sedan 
railroad system, which was vital to the German armies west of Ver- 
dun, and against the Briey iron basin which was necessary for the 
production of German armament and munitions. 

"The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against the 
flanks of the salient. * * * * 

"On the night of September 11, the troops of the 1st Army were 
deployed in position. On the southern face was the 1st corps, Maj. 
Gen. Liggett commanding, with the 82d, 90th, 5th and 2d divisions 



232 

in line extending from the Moselle westward. On the left was the 
4th corps, Maj. Gen, Dickman commanding, with the 89th, 42d and 
1st divisions. * * * * These two army corps were to deliver the 
principal attack, the line pivoting on the center division of the 1st 
corps. The 1st division on the left of the 4th corps was charged 
with the double mission of covering its own left flank, while advanc- 
ing some 20 kilometers due north toward the heart of the salient 
where it was to make contact with the troops of the 5th corps. 

"On the west face of the salient laj^ the 5th corps, Maj. Gen. 
George H. Cameron commanding, with the 26th division, the French 
Colonial division and the 4th division in line. Of these three divi- 
sions, the 26th alone was to make a deep advance directly south- 
east. * * * In the center was the 2d French Colonial corps of three 
small divisions. * * * These troops were to follow up the retire- 
ment of the enemy from the tip of the salient. 

"The French independent air force was at my disposal which to- 
gether with the British bombing squadrons and our own air force, 
gave the largest assembly of aviation that had been engaged in one 
operation. 

"At dawn, of September 12, after four hours of violent artillery 
fire of preparation and accompanied by small tanks, the infantry of 
the 1st and 4th corps advanced. The infantry of the 5th corps com- 
menced its advance at 8 a. m. The operation was carried out with 
entire precision. Just after daylight on September 13, elements of 
the 1st and 26th divisions made a junction at Hattonchatel and 
Vigneulles, 18 kilometers northeast of St. Mihiel. The rapidity 
with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy and all 
objectives were reached by the afternoon of September 13. The 
enemy had apparently started to withdraw some of his troops from 
the tip of the salient on the eve of our attack, but had been unable 
to carry it through. We captured nearly 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, 
and large stores of material and supplies. The energy and swiftness 
with which the operation was carried out enabled us to smother op- 
position to such an extent that we suffered less than 7,000 casualties 
during the actual period of advance. 

"During the next few days, the right of our line west of the 
Moselle River was advanced beyond the objective laid down in the 
original order. This completed the operation for the time being and 
the line was stabilized to be held by the smallest practicable force. 
* * * The strength of the 1st Army in this battle totaled 500,000 
men, of whom 70,000 were French." 

When the St. Mihiel attack was made, the German line from the 
Argonne to the Moselle was held by an army group consisting of 
the V Army and Army Detachment C, both under the command of 
General Gallwitz. On the Lorraine front east of the Moselle was the 
XIX Army under Prince Albert of Wurtemburg. The 2d French 
Army held Verdun and the line west of it to the Argonne. General 
Pershing's attack was made on Army Detachment C. Of this at- 
tack Ludendorff says: 



233 

"In front of Von Gallwitz's army group, between St. Mihil 
and the Moselle much movement had been noticed as early as the 
end of August, and an American offensive seemed probable there. 
G. H. Q. pushed up reserves. I discussed with the Chief of Staff of 
the army group and of Army Detachment C, which was exposed to 
attack, the evacuation of the salient, which had long ago been 
planned and prepared. Local commanders were confident in spite 
of my demur. G. H. Q. was reluctant to evacuate the salient, on 
account of the industrial centers lying behind it, and, unfortunately, 
did not order the step until September 8. At the same time, the 
southern front of Detachment C was to increase its distance from 
the enemy, much as had been the case with the XVII Army in 
August. Advance guards only were to be left in the foremost 
trenches. 

"The work of evacuation had not been carried very far when, on 
September 12, the attack developed between the Rupt and Moselle, 
accompanied by a secondary offensive movement against the north- 
ern end of the salient on the Combres heights. The enemy pene- 
trated our line in both places. On the southern sector he broke 
through a Prussian division, and the reserves were not close enough 
to restore the position immediately. On the Combres heights there 
was an Austrian division that might have fought better. As early 
as noon the local G. H. Q. ordered the evacuation of the salient. I 
was dissatisfied with myself but also with the local command. The 
earlier reports indicated that the evacuating was proceeding satis- 
factorily, this being facilitated by the enemy not following up. I 
found my official communique, which turned out later to be too 
favorable, on these reports. 

"On the Woevre plain the evacuation of the salient was carried 
through, though with heavy losses, and the Michel position was oc- 
cupied. The fighting was dying out by the 13th. According to re- 
ports that reached me, the continuation of the offensive against the 
Michel position seemed probable. After the 22d the situation 
changed in front of Von Gallwitz's group. The likelihood of an 
offensive here diminished and a battle on both sides of the Argonne 
seemed probable." 

The Michel line ran along the base of the St. Mihiel salient and 
was prepared during 1917 to provide for a withdrawal from the 
salient. 

"WTiile General Pershing was engaged in his attack on the St. 
Mihiel salient with the 1st, 4th and 5th American corps, the 2d corps. 
General Read, 27th and 30th divisions, was with the 4th British 
Army, and the 3d corps, General Bullard, 28th, 32d and 77th divi- 
sions, was with the 5th and 10th French armies. 

The Final Campaign. — In the counter-offensive operations above 
described beginning July 18, the Allies had met with unexpected 
success and had captured about 100,000 prisoners and about 1,300 
guns. It was evident that the German Army had passed its zenith 



234 

in morale and reserves and could no longer withstand the attacks 
of the Allies. The time had come for substituting for operations 
with limited objectives, strategic operations on a grand scale whose 
aim was to free France and Belgium of the German armies. Opera- 
tions on the St. Mihiel front were therefore suspended and prepara- 
tions were made by all the Allied armies for what proved to be the 
final campaign. 

The plan finally adopted provided for three simultaneous offensive 
operations on widely separated sectors and constant pressure on the 
intermediate parts of the German line to prevent the shifting of 
troops along the line. In the north, between the Channel and the 
Lys River, the off"ensive operations were to be undertaken by the 
Belgian Army, the 6th French Army and the left wing of the 2d 
British Army. Their aim was to drive the Germans out of the ter- 
ritory between the Channel and the Lys, clear the Belgian coast and 
threaten the rear of the German line between the Lys and Sensee 
rivers. Between the Sensee and Oise rivers the British and French 
armies were to break through the Hindenburg line and advance in 
the direction of Mons-Maubeuge-Hirson threatening the rear of the 
German lin^ between the Sensee and the Lys and secure possession 
of all the railways running from northern Belgium down to the 
Aisne front. The American Army was to leave a sufficient force to 
hold the St. Mihiel salient and with the remaining available troops 
relieve the 2d French Army along its line extending from the west 
of the Argonne to the Meuse River. When this army was in posi- 
tion, it and the 4th French Army between Reims and the Argonne, 
were to attack the I, III, and V German armies and press northward 
in order to seize the railway running through Mezieres and Sedan 
which was the principal line of supply of the German armies on the 
Aisne front. If any one of these offensives met with success, it 
would compel the retreat of the Germans on a wide front. Between 
these main offensive sectors, the Allied troops were to attack when- 
ever there was any sign of weakening in their front. 

The general situation on the other fronts was even more satis- 
factory. On the Salonika front, the Allies began an offensive on 
September 15 and at this time the Bulgarian armies were in full re- 
treat and the government was suing for peace. In Palestine, General 
Allenby began an offensive on September 19, and at this time he had 
captured or dispersed all the Turkish forces opposed to him. The 
Italian Army had been thoroughly reorganized and it was directed 
to assume the offensive at the same time as the offensive on the west 
front as it was known that the Austrian Army had been greatly 



235 

demoralized by the retreat of the German armies and the situation 
in Bulgaria ; the latter released the Allied Army of Salonika which 
might be expected on the Danube. 

At this time, the German G. H. Q. had so little confidence in its 
ability to continue the struggle that on September 28 General Hin- 
denburg and General Ludendorff requested the German government 
to seek an armistice before the situation became more hopeless. 

Offensive in Flanders. — For the operations in Flanders the Bel- 
gian Army, the 6th French Army and the left wing of the 2d British 
Army north of the Lys River were placed under the orders of the 
King of Belgium. In their front was the IV German Army which 
was holding practically the same line it held before the Messines- 
Passchendale campaign of 1917. The army had however been 
greatly reduced in strength due to its desperate attacks in April and 
May, 1918, and to the withdrawal of troops to reinforce the broken 
lines farther south. As a result, when the Allies attacked on the 
28th of September between Dixmuide and the Lys River, they ad- 
vanced farther in five days than they had in five months in 1917. 
In the first phase of the operations the Germans were driven back off 
the ridge they occupied into the low ground on the line Dixmuide- 
Roulers-Menin. 

The Allies in this sector spent two weeks in preparing roads over 
the old battlefield and in preparing for their next attack. This took 
place on October 14 and on the 17th the IV German Army was 
directed to evacuate the Belgian coast and fall back slowly to the 
Herman line along the Eccloo canal and the Lys River below 
Courtrai. The Allied troops followed up the retreat. On the ap- 
proach of the Allies the right wing of the IV Army retired across 
the Scheldt and the Belgians were in Ghent when the armistice took 
effect November 11. The 6th French Army was reinforced on the 
east bank of the Lys River by the 27th and 91st American divisions 
in the latter part of October and between October 31 and November 
2 these divisions drove the Germans across the Scheldt in the vicin- 
ity of Oudenarde. After a few days' rest they were ordered to carry 
the attack beyond the Scheldt on November 11 but because of the 
armistice the attack did not take place. South of the 6th French 
Army, the 2d British Army reached the line Oudenarde-Mons on 
November 11. 

The Cambrai-St. Quentin Offensive. — From the Sensee River to 
a point two miles south of the Cambrai-Bapaume road, the German 
front was along the Canal du Nord. This canal was dry. It varied 



236 

in width from 36 to 50 feet and was 12 feet deep with steep slopes 
at many points. It formed a serious obstacle to tanks which was 
the main reason why it was adopted as the line of defense. From 
the end of the canal line, the Hindenburg line ran southeastward 
to the St. Quentin Canal ; it consisted of the same trench lines that 
were captured by the British in the Cambrai attack of November, 
1917. This sector was held by the left of the XVII Army and the 
right of the II Army. In rear of this line was a strong second posi- 
tion consisting of the Scheldt River north of Cambrai and the St. 
Quentin Canal south of Cambrai. At Cambrai itself this second line 
was about eight miles in rear of the first. Along this sector was the 
1st British Army astride the Cambrai- Arras road and on its right 
the 3d Army extended the line almost to the St. Quentin Canal. 

In his attack on the Hindenburg line General Haig decided to make 
his first attack in the sector described, as the German artillery on 
the line between the Canal du Nord and the St. Quentin Canal en- 
filaded the front farther south in front of the 4th British Army 
where the main attack was to be delivered. 

On the night of September 26-27 the artillery preparation began 
all along the front from the Scarpe to the Oise on the British and 
French fronts and at 5:20 a. m. on the 27th, the 1st and 3d British 
armies launched their attack accompanied by a strong force of 
tanks. The Canal du Nord was captured that day with some 10,000 
prisoners and the Germans were compelled to fall back to their sec- 
ond position behind the Scheldt River and St. Quentin Canal. 

The Hindenburg line in front of the 4th British Army is described 
by General Haig as follows: 

"Between St. Quentin and the village of Bantouselle (about 16 
niles north of St. Quentin), the principal defenses of the Hindenburg 
system lie sometimes to the west, but more generally to the east 
of the line of the Scheldt (St. Quentin) Canal. 

"The canal itself does not appear to have been organized as the 
enemy's main line of resistance, but rather as an integral part of the 
deep offensive system, the outstanding characteristics of which was 
the skill with which it was sited so as to deny us effective artillery 
positions from which to attack it. The chief roll of the canal was 
that of affording cover to resting troops and to the garrisons of the 
main defensive trench lines during the bombardment. To this end 
the canal lent itself admirably, and the fullest use was made by the 
enemy of its possibilities. 

"The general configuration of the ground through which this sec- 
tor of the canal runs produces deep cuttings of a depth in places of 
some sixty feet, while between Bellicourt and the neighborhood of 
Vendhuille the canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of 
6,000 yards. In the sides of the cuttings the enemy had constructed 



2^1 

numerous turaieled dugouts and concrete shelters. Along the top 
edge of them he had concealed well sited concrete or armored ma- 
chine gun emplacements. The tunnel itself was used to provide 
living accommodations for troops, and was connected by shafts with 
the trenches above. South of Bellicourt the canal cutting gradually 
became shallow till at Bellinglise the canal lies almost at ground 
level. South of Bellinglise the canal is dry. 

"On the western side of the canal south of Bellicourt two 
thoroughly organized and extremely heavily wired lines of continu- 
ous trench run roughly parallel to the canal, at average distances 
from it of 2,000 and 1,000 yards respectively. Except in the tunnel 
sector the double line of trenches known as the Hindenburg line 
proper lies immediately east of the canal, and is linked up by numer- 
ous communication trenches with the trench lines west of it. 

"Besides these main features, numerous other trench lines, 
switch trenches and communication trenches, for the most part 
heavily wired, had been constructed at various points to meet local 
weaknesses or to take advantage of local command of fire. At a dis- 
tance of about 4,000 yards behind the most easterly of these trench 
lines lies a second double line of trenches known as the Beaurevoir- 
Fonsomme line, very thoroughly wired and holding numerous con- 
crete shelters and machine gun emplacements. The whole series of 
defenses, with the numerous defended villages contained in it, 
formed a belt of country varying from 7,000 to 10,000 yards in 
depth, organized by the employment of every available means into 
a most powerful system, well meriting the reputation attached 
to it." 

Because of the strength of the position, the bombardment com- 
menced on the night of September 26-27 was kept up until the 
morning of the 29th when at 5 :50 a. m. the attack of the 4th British 
Army was launched. The attack of the tunnel sector was assigned 
to the 2d American corps, the 27th and 30th divisions, supported by 
three Australian divisions; a British corps attacked on either side 
of the American corps. According to the plan of attack, the Amer- 
ican divisions were to capture the Hindenburg trenches at the tun- 
nel and hold them while the Australian divisions passed through 
to objectives beyond. This part of the plan could not be executed 
as the 30th division alone was able to cross the tunnel line ; the 27th 
division met with such strong resistance that it was held up at the 
village of Bony west of the tunnel. The greatest success was 
secured by the British 9th corps on the right which succeeded in 
crossing the canal and reached the villages some distance beyond. 
Of the part taken by the American divisions General Haig says : 

"North of Bellenglise (captured by the British 9th corps), the 
30th American division (Major General E. M. Lewis) having broken 
through the deep defenses of the Hindenburg line stormed Bellicourt 
and seized Nauroy. On their left, the 27th American division 



23£ 

(Major General J. F. O'Ryan) met with very heavy enfilade fire, 
but pressed with great gallantry as far as Bony, where a bitter 
struggle took place for the possession of the village. 

"Fighting on the whole front of the II American corps was severe, 
and in Bellicourt, Nauroy, Gillemont Farm, and at a number of 
other points amid the intricate defenses of the Hindenburg Line, 
strong bodies of the enemy held out with great obstinacy for many 
hours." 

During this attack the British forces in the Cambrai sector and 
the 1st French Army on the right were also engaged. 

On the night of the 29th the American troops were withdrawn and 
on the entire front, from the Sensee River to the Oise, the Allies 
advanced steadily but slowly until the night of the 9th of October 
when the Germans gave up the struggle and began their retire- 
ment to the Hermann line and the line of the Oise River. In the 
operations on this front from the opening attack to the German re- 
treat, the British captured 36,000 prisoners and 380 guns. 

Of these operations General Ludendorff says: 

"The XVII Army had to undergo a difficult time after the enemy 
break-through at Cambrai on September 27. Up to October 8 there 
were violent battles with varying fortunes on both sides of Cambrai 
but we succeeded in holding the town. The II Army was not so 
successful being pressed farther and farther back on Catelet (on 
east side of St. Quentin Canal midway between Cambrai and St. 
Quentin) in the early days of October. Toward Bohain (northeast 
of St. Quentin) the enemy gained ground. The right wing of the 
XVIII Army, which was also engaged in heavy fighting (with the 
1st French Army) was affected by this loss. On October 8, it (II 
Army) met another heavy blow in the neighborhood of Le Catelet 
and southward therefrom which it repulsed. In the night of Octo- 
ber 9 we were compelled to withdraw the II Army into the Hermann 
line, as there were no reserves to aid it. To conform to this move- 
ment the XVII Army had to move its left wing and center back to 
a line midway between Cambrai and Valenciennes, the right wing 
for the present being posted immediately wfest of Douai. The XVIII 
Army had, like the II Army to fall back to the Hermann line. Its 
left remained at La Fere (on the Oise) . 

"The decision that the II and XVHI Armies should occupy the 
Hermann line, whose construction was but little advanced, was a 
great disappointment to us. I had hoped that the Siegfried line 
would have held for much longer. Already in the fighting at the 
beginning of October to the north of St. Quentin we had been gradu- 
ally forced out of the position at many spots, but we had, generally 
speaking, kept the line. We had not even completed the evacuation 
of the ground in front of the Hermann line. 

"The retirements were carried out smoothly. On the 10th the 
enemy had already attacked the new positions and was beaten off. 
On the 11th, to the northeast of Cambrai, he had a local success 



239 

against the XVII Army, which was prevented from extending. Dur- 
ing the days following up to the 17th there was new fighting on the 
front of the II and XVIII armies, which, on the whole, were suc- 
cessful for us." 

Retreat of the Germans Between the Oise and Reims. — Between 
the Oise and Reims the IX and VII German armies were facing the 
10th and 5th French armies. The 5th French Army was now under 
General Guillaumat as General Bertholet had been sent to Salonika. 
On this front, the Germans began to retreat in the latter part of 
September. 

"The necessity for economizing forces had hastened the German 
Crown Prince's group to abandon the Laffaux salient which had 
caused so many losses, and withdraw to the position behind the 
Oise-Aisne canal (in the valley of the Ailette River) which had 
been occupied after the disasterous engagements of October 22, 
1917. 

*'0n October 2, as had been arranged, the left wing of the VII and 
the right wing of the I Army fell back to the position from which 
the attack of May 27, 1918, had started. Unfortunately, before this 
movement was carried out one division was, in a wholly unexpected 
manner, crushed on the heights north of Fismes. The center of the 
VII Army held the Chemin des Dames firmly in the face of many 
attacks." — Ludendorff. 

However the German forces did not remain long on this front as 
the Allied thrust farther east of the 4th French Army made it im- 
possible to do so. 

"The continued and violent assaults on the left wing of the I 
and on the III Army caused the army group of the Crown Prince 
to decide in the early days of October to break off the fight and to 
withdraw all the troops to the Hunding-Brunhild line. General 
Headquarters was unable to give this group, which husbanded its 
m.en carefully, any new troops. It approved the proposal which was 
carried out as arranged in the days ending with October 13. 

"The army group of the German Crown Prince began in the early 
days of October to withdraw the troops before Reims behind the 
Suippe. In the night of the 10th the whole front from the Chemin 
des Dames to the Argonne was, after strong attacks, beaten off by 
the III Army. By the morning of October 13, the VII, III and I 
armies stood ready for defensive in their new and well constructed 
line and the evacuation of the ground had been almost completed." — 
Ludendorff. 

The retreat of the Germans between the Oise and Reims was 
followed by the advance of the 10th and 5th French armies and on 
October 12, the French entered Laon, This compelled the XVIII 
Army to retreat from the Oise between Guise and La Fere and 
perm.itted the 1st French Army to cross the Oise, connect with the 
10th Army and advance in the general direction of Hirson., 



240 

Attack on the Hermann Line. — When the Germans retreated to 
the Hermann Hne the armies were regrouped. The IV, VI, XVII 
and II armies again became the group of the German Crown Prince. 
The IX Army was absorbed by the VII. In the French armies, 
General Mangin's G. H. Q. was replaced by that of General Humbert 
of the 3d Army and General Mangin was detached to organize a 
new offensive in Lorraine. The 1st and 3d armies constituted a 
group under General Fayolle and the 5th and 4th constituted a 
group under General Maistre. 

On October 17, the 4th British and 1st French armies broke the 
Hermann line in their front and on the 20th, the 1st and 3d British 
armies forced it farther north. The final battle on this front took 
place on November 4 with the Germans on the line Conde-Guise 
after which they began to retreat toward the Antwerp-Meuse line. 
"'ATien the armistice of November 11 took effect the center of the 
British front was at Mons where the Expeditionary Force had 
fought its first battle in 1914. The 3d and 4th British armies with 
the 1st and 3d French armies were on the Belgian frontier with their 
right at Rocroi. 

German Retreat Between the Lys and Sensee Rivers. — The last 
front from which the Germans retired was that held by the VI 
Army west of Lille and the right of the XVII Army west of Douai 
where they were facing the right wing of the 2d British Army, the 
5th Army now under General Broadwood, and the left of the 1st 
Army. 

"As a result of the withdrawal of the IV Army behind the Lys, 
we were now compelled to withdraw the VI and XVII armies into 
the Hermann line behind the Scheldt. On the 17th of October, the 
VI Army was still west of Lille, and was to evacuate that town on 
the 18th ; farther south the right wing of the XVIII and later the 
v/hole of that army had to conform to the movement." — Ludendorff . 

By the morning of the armistice the opposing armies in this sec- 
tor were on the general front of the armies to the north and south. 

The Champagne-Meuse Offensive. — The offensive of the 4th 
French and American Army on the front extending from the 
Reims-Rethel road to the Meuse River was a renewal of the great 
French offensive of October, 1915, on a much wider front and with 
a much larger force than was available in 1915. Its ultimate ob- 
jective was the railway running along the Belgian frontier from 
Luxemburg and Metz to Mezieres and thence to Rethel and Laon. 

"The strategical importance of this portion of the line was sec- 
ond to none on the western front. All supplies and evacuations of 
the German armies in northern France were dependent upon two 



241 

Kreat railway systems — one in the north passing through Liege, 
while the other in the south with lines coming from Luxemburg, 
Thionville and Metz, had as its vital section the line Carignan- 
Sedan-Mezieres. No other important lines were available to the 
enemy, as the mountainous masses of the Ardennes made the con- 
struction of east and west lines through that region impracticable. 
The Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres line was essential to the Germans 
for the rapid strategical movement of troops. Should this southern 
.system be cut by the Allies before the enemy could withdraw his 
forces through the narrow neck between Mezieres and the Dutch 
frontier, the ruin of his armies in France and Belgium would be 
complete." — Pershing's Report. 

The definite decision to employ the American Army in coopera- 
tion Vv^ith the 4th French Army on this front was decided on Septem- 
ber 2 at a conference of Generals Foch, Petain and Pershing and 
preparations for taking over the front from the Argonne to the 
Meuse by American troops was made in conjunction with the attack 
on the Mihiel salient. 

"The choice between the two sectors, that east of the Aisne in- 
cluding the Argonne Forest or the Champagne sector was left to me. 
In my opinion no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive 
spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the 
Meuse-Argonne sector and our plans and installations had been 
prepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So the 
Meuse-Argonne sector was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilo- 
meters of front extending from Port sur Seille east of the Moselle 
west to include the Argonne Forest was accordingly placed under 
my command including all the French divisions then in that zone. 
The First American Army was to proceed with the St. Mihiel opera- 
tion after which the operation between the Meuse and the western 
edge of the Argonne Forest was to be prepared and launched not 
later than September 25. 

"When the First American Army became engaged in the simul- 
taneous preparation for two major operations, an interval of 14 
days separated the initiation of the two attacks. During this short 
period the movement of the immense number of troops and the 
amount of supplies involved in the Meuse-Argonne battle over the 
few roads available and confined entirely to the hours of darkness 
was one of the most delicate and difficult problems of the war. The 
concentration included 15 divisions of which 7 were involved in the 
pending St. Mihiel drive, 3 were in sectors in the Vosges, 3 in the 
neighborhood of Soissons, 1 in a training area and 1 near Bar le Due. 
Practically all the artillery, aviation and other auxiliaries to be em- 
ployed in the new operations were committed to the St. Mihiel attack 
and therefore could not be moved until the success was assured. 
The concentration of all units not to be used at St. Mihiel was com- 
menced immediately and on September 13, the second day of St. 
Mihiel, reserve divisions and army artillery units were withdrawn 
and placed in motion toward the Argonne front. 



242 

"That part of the American sector from Fresnes en Woevre south- 
east of Verdun to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, while 
nominally under my control did not actively become a part of my 
command until September 22 on which date my headquarters were 
established at Souilly, southwest of Verdun. Of French troops, in 
addition to the 2d French Colonial corps composed of 3 divisions, 
there was also the 17th French Corps of 3 divisions holding the 
front north and east of Verdun." — Pershing. 

The front of the 4th French Army which was to attack west of 
the Argonne extended from that ridge as far west as the Reims- 
Rethel road. In front of General Gouraud was the left wing of the 
I German Army, General Mudra, and the entire III German Army, 
General Einem. The Germans held practically the line that was 
stabilized after the attack of October, 1915, and from which they 
had launched their attack of July 15, 1918. The position had been 
greatly strengthened during the long period of occupation and con- 
sisted of a forward zone only lightly held as was customary at that 
time with a much stronger position in rear. For the attack General 
Gouraud had at his disposal six army corps and a powerful force of 
artillery. 

The offensive front of the American Army extended from the 
western limit of the Argonne to the Meuse River. This part of the 
German line was held by the V Army. In the Argonne the front 
occupied by the Germans was that reached in the spring of 1915. 
Between the Argonne and the Meuse it was the front held by the 
Germans in 1914 and 1915 and from which the attack on the west 
side of the Meuse was made in 1916 in the attack on Verdun, and to 
which the Germans were compelled to retire when the French 
counter-attacked in August, 1917. The outpost line ran roughly 
from the mouth of Forges Creek on the Meuse to Boureuilles on the 
Aire River south of Varennes. Due to the importance of this front 
it had been elaborately fortified during the long period of occupation 
and consisted generally of two zones of defense. The forward zone 
extended back to Montfaucon and consisted of a number of organized 
lines and switch lines covering this deep zone. Some distance in 
rear was the rear zone called the Kriemhilde position or line with 
its left resting on the Meuse and its right on the Argonne north of 
Grand Pre. 

"In addition to the artificial defenses, the enemy was greatly aided 
by the natural features of the terrain. East of the Meuse the 
dominating heights not only protected his left but gave him posi- 
tion from which his powerful artillery could deliver an oblique fire 
on the western bank. Batteries located in the elaborately fortified 
Argonne Forest covered his right flank and could cross their fire 



243 

with that of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse. Midway be- 
tween the Meuse and the Forest, the heights of Montfaucon offered 
perfect observation and formed a strong natural position which had 
been heavily fortified. The east and west ridges abutting on the 
Meuse and Aire River valleys afforded excellent machine gun posi- 
tions for the desperate defense which the importance of the posi- 
tion required him to make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded 
and rugged heights constituted natural features favorable to de- 
fensive fighting." — Pershing. x 

The great advantage which the Germans had in the defense of 
this sector was the thorough knowledge of all its features for de- 
fense acquired during the long occupation ; unlike the Allies on other 
fronts, the American officers had little opportunity to become ac- 
quainted with the terrain and were obliged to rely on the French 
for information as to the nature of the terrain and its defensive 
system. As was usual at this stage of the war, the Germans held 
their front zone lightly and depended on their rear zone and counter- 
attacks for their main defense. 

For the opening attack in the American sector. General Pershing 
employed three corps: 

Left — 1st Corps Center — 5th Corps Right — 3d Corps 

General Liggett General Cameron General Bullard 

77th, 28th, 35th divs. 91st, 37th, 79th divs. 4th, 80th, 33d divs. 
Reserve 1st div. Reserve 3d div. Reserve 32d div. 

General Reserve 29th, 82d and 92d divs. 

"About 2,700 guns, 189 small tanks, 142 manned by Americans, 
and 821 airplanes, 604 manned by Americans, were concentrated to 
support the infantry. We thus had a superiority in guns and avia- 
tion and the enemy had no tanks." — Pershing. 

Generals Gouraud and Pershing hoped that the offensive on either 
side of the Argonne could be continued without intermission after 
the jump-off until the two armies joined their flanks in the vicinity 
of Grand Pre. This would compel the Germans to evacuate the 
Argonne which was to be taken over by the 77th division. Neither 
army was able to accomplish this feat but both were temporarily 
held by the second German position. 

First Phase. — The preliminary bombardment began at 11 p. m. on 
September 25 and at 5 :30 a. m. September 26 the infantry attack was 
launched. As a result of the preparation, the American Army ad- 
vanced on an average of about 4 miles the first day, capturing 5,000 
prisoners and almost the entire forward zone of the German defense 
system. The occupation of the first zone was completed on the 29th ; 
it was realized that the advance could not be continued without 
further preparation. 



244 

"The critical problem during the first few days of the battle was 
the restoration of communications over 'no man's land'. There were 
but few roads available across this deep zone and the violent artil- 
lery fire of the previous period of the war had virtually destroyed 
them. The spongy soil and the lack of materials increased the dif- 
ficulty, but the splendid work of our engineers and pioneers soon 
made possible the movement of the troops, artillery and supplies 
most needed. By the afternoon of the 27th all the divisional artil- 
lery except a few batteries of heavy guns, had effected a passage 
and was supporting the infantry section." — Pershing. 

On the nights of the 29th and 30th, the three divisions in the 
corps reserves relieved three of the most exhausted divisions of the 
first line and preparations were made for a new general attack. 

"We were no longer engaged in a maneuver for the pinching out 
of a salient (the Argonne) but were necessarily committed, generally 
speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong hostile positions 
fully manned by a determined enemy." — Pershing. 

West of the Argonne, the 4th French Army had also captured the 
forward zone of defense and was held up by the second or reserve 
position. 

As previously stated, the effect of the first attack of the 4th 
French and American armies was the withdrawal of the entire Ger- 
man line between the Oise and Reims to the line occupied by the 
Germans before their Marne offensive. 

Second Phase. — The second phase of the Meuse-Argonne offen- 
sive covered the period from October 4 to October 31st and resulted 
in the penetration of the Kriemhilde position upon which the Ger- 
mans relied for their main defense. It was begun on October 4 in 
a general attack on the southern limit of the Kriemhilde position. 

ATTACKING DIVISIONS. 

1st Corps 5th Corps 3d Corps 

77th, 28th and 1st 32d and 3d 80th and 4th 

"Of all the Meuse-Argonne fighting, the second, phase was the 
hardest and the fighting there between October 4 and 14 was the 
hardest which the American Army encountered during the war. 
The terrain was almost insurmountable. Between the Argonne 
Forest and the Meuse River, a distance of 15 miles, the First Ameri- 
can Army had in line October 4, from the Meuse River west toward 
the forest, the 33d division (facing along the river), 4th, 80th, 3d, 
32d, 1st, 28th, and 77th divisions (the latter in the forest). The 
American front stretched in a straight line from Brieulles on the 
Meuse to Apremont on the Aire. In front of it lay the Kriemhilde 
Stellung, the last of the German lines in this sector. It was ideally 
sited for defense 



245 

"The Germans were not holding a line of trenches but instead 
their line of defense was merely a host of machine guns hidden under 
cover of the plentiful small woods and defiles. For this reason it 
was practically impossible to determine in so short a time the exact 
location of these positions, and consequently any artillery prepara- 
tion before the attack would be futile. All the available guns of the 
Army, however, were ordered into simultaneous action for the roll- 
ing barrage which was to protect the attacking troops, and at 5 -30 
am. on October 4 the quiet of the early morning was blasted and 
the assault began."— The History of the A. E. F. 

The assault met with strong resistance and in general little pro- 
gress was made except in the Aire valley on the front of the 1st 
division. This was followed by a series of more or less local actions 
lasting until the 12th during which the Americans reached the rear 
zone of the Kriemhilde position upon which a general attack was 
ordered on the 14th. 

On October 3, General Gouraud launched his second attack against 
the second and last defensive German position north of Somme Py 
creek in which the 2d American division, which had been assigned to 
his army, took a prominent part. The objective of the 2d division 
was the Blanc Mont ridge astride the road running northwest from 
Somme Py and the key-point of the German position. The division 
was supported by two battalions of French tanks. The position was 
taken in a four-day attack in which the Germans made desperate 
attempts to hold this line and recapture it by counter-attack. As a 
result of this attack and the advance of the French troops on either 
side, the Germans lost their last defensive position in Champagne 
and retired from the entire front between Reims and the Argonne ; 
on October 13 the 4th French Army reached the Aisne and Aire west 
of Grand Pre, The Germans in the Argonne therefore retired north- 
ward to the vicinity of Grand Pre. In the pursuit the 36th Ameri- 
can division relieved the 2d division. 

Of the situation at this time Ludendorff says : 

"The continued and violent assaults on the left wing of the I 
Army and on the III Army caused the Army group of the Crown 
Prince to decide in the early days of October to break off the fight 
and to withdraw all the troops to the Hunding-Brunhild line, i. e., 
midway between Laon and Marle-Sissonne-Aisne River from Rethel 
upstream to Grand Pre 

"The army group of the German Crown Prince began in the early 
days of October to withdraw the troops in front of Reims behind the 
Suippe. In the night of the 10th the whole front from the Chemin 
des Dames to the Argonne was given up after strong attacks were 
beaten off by the III Army. By the morning of October 13, the VII, 
I and III armies stood ready for defensive fighting in their new and 
well constructed line and the evacuation of the ground in front there- 
of had been almost completed 



246 

"The enemy followed up the retirement of the German Crown 
Prince's group energetically between the Oise and Aisne (10th and 
5th French armies) and heavy fighting soon developed round our 
new positions. In the bend of the Aisne toward Rethel the enemy 
advanced more cautiously. On the other hand he soon attempted, 
at first without success, to capture the Vouziers-Grand Pre bend of 
the Aisne. In the Aire valley, west of the Meuse, the American 
pressure against our V Army (1st American division) was unusually 
severe." 

During the second phase of the attack General Pershing extended 
his offensive front to include the Cote de Meuse or high plateau on 
the east bank of the Meuse in order to prevent German troops from 
being sent from this sector across the Meuse to assist in the de- 
fense of their main front, and also to silence the batteries on that 
bank. For this attack which began on October 8, the 29th and 33d 
divisions were attached to the 17th French corps occupying the lines 
to the north and east of Verdun. 

Although the German armies west of the Argonne had been 
obliged to retreat the V German Army now under General Marwitz 
was reinforced and stubbornly -held on in what was left of the 
Kriemhilde line. The situation about the time the 4th French Army 
reached the Aisne is given as follows: 

"Throughout the entire front west of the Meuse the First Ameri- 
can Army lay facing the last line of the Kriemhilde Stellung. This 
consisted for the most part in a single trench system, protected by 
a heavy series of belts of barbed wire. In itself this would have been 
but a slight obstacle, but this line was supported by a line of wooded 
crests and the whole so thickly sewn with machine guns and artil- 
lery that it presented a formidable obstacle to assault. Held as it 
was by determined German infantry and machine gunners, sup- 
ported by ample excellent artillery, special preparations had to be 
made by the First American Army to insure success in the attack. 
These consisted mainly in placing fresh divisions in the line and the 
regrouping of those divisions that were to remain over so as to give 
the maximum force on the strongly held lines. Then, too, artillery 
ammunition had to be moved forward, and all these operations con- 
sumed the 12th and 13th of October." 

ATTACKING DIVISIONS. 
1st Corps 5th Corps Sd Corps 

77th, 82d and 42d 32d and 3d 5th and 4th 

At this time the German line ran from Brieulles on the Meuse 
through Romagne to Grand Pre. On the morning of October 14th 
the principal attack was to be made. The 5th, 32d and 42d divisions 
were to break through the center of the German front. On the ex- 
treme left the 82d and 77th divisions were to take part in the attack. 



247 

Romagne was taken by the 32d division and the other divisions 
made some progress but the German line was not broken and the 
general attack was again followed by more or less local actions to 
straighten out the line preparatory to a general attack. For this 
attack several new divisions were brought to the attacking line. On 
the east bank of the Meuse the Germans were slowly driven back ; 
on this front the 26th division relieved a French division. 

About the middle of the second phase, the American Army was 
divided by General Pershing into the 1st and 2d armies. General 
Liggett was assigned to the command of the 1st Army and the front 
from the Argonne to Fresnes en Woevre; General Bullard was as- 
signed to the command of the 2d Army and the front from Fresnes 
to the Moselle. The corps commanders of the 1st, 3d, 4th and 5th 
corps were now Generals Dickman, Hines, Summerall and Muir. 

Last Phase and Pursuit. — "On the 21st my instructions were is- 
sued to the First Army to prepare thoroughly for a general attack 
October 28 that would be decisive if possible. In order that the at- 
tack of the First Army and that of the 4th French Army on its left 
should be simultaneous our attack was delayed until November 1. 

"On this occasion and for the first time the Army prepared for 
its attack under normal conditions. We held the front of attack and 
were not under the necessity of taking over a new front with its 
manifold installations and services. Our own personnel handled the 
communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and water service; our 
divisions were either on the line or close in rear ; the French artillery, 
aviation and technical troops which had previously made up our de- 
ficiencies had been largely replaced by our own organizations; and 
our army, corps and divisional staffs were by actual experience sec- 
ond to none." — Pershing. 

On the morning of November 1, the attacking line of the First 
Army was 

Left — 1st Corps Center — 5th Corps Right — 3d Corps 

General Dickman General Summerall General Hines 

78th, 77th and 80th divs. 2d and 89th divs. 90th and 5th divs. 

East of the Meuse 
French Colonial Corps including the 26th, 79th and 81st divs. 

During the last days of October the position of the Germans had 
become hopeless as the Austrian armies had been decisively beaten 
in Italy and the government was suing for peace, revolutions had 
broken out in Germany and on October 28 the Emperor abdicated. 
General Hindenburg was now at the head of the army which he was 
trying to save from utter defeat in order to secure the best terms 
in the armistice for which the government had been forced to plead 



248 

■ 

on October 6. On the American front west of the Meuse toward the 
end of October the German V Army began to withdraw to the Meuse 
leaving only strong rear guards in its intrenched positions. 

"On the night of October 31, there were no indications on the front 
of the First American Army that the Germans were about to retire 
along the whole front. The slightest attempt to advance, each 
patrol, encountered a sharp fire. 

"On the morning of November 1, the final attack began. Follow- 
ing the most dense protective barrage that had ever been put down 
on the front of the American Army, the seven divisions moved for- 
ward to the attack. For the first hour the German resistance was 
bitter and then suddenly weakened, and it was found that the Ger- 
mans had retreated leaving but a strong rearguard to check the 
assault. There were small local attacks which in some cases became 
sanguinary encounters but for the most part the pursuit was pushed 
with great vigor by the veteran American divisions. Each day was 
marked by large advances by the Americans. . . . During these 
eleven days (November 1 to 11) the enemy of necessity fought a 
rear guard action. The resistance on a certain line would be stiff in 
the afternoon, but the next m.orning it would be found that the line 
had been withdrawn during the night. It was one of the most 
skilfully executed retreats in all history, for it cost the Allies dearly 
to attack those rearguards without their strong artillery supports, 
but it also cost the Germans much in materials which in their haste 
they were forced to leave behind." — History of the A. E. F. 

As soon as it was discovered that the Germans were retreating 
the American forces took up the pursuit and the offensive was ex- 
tended to the east bank of the Meuse. When the 1st Army was 
halted by the armistice, November 11, it was across the Meuse above 
Sedan and in possession of all the plateau on the east bank of the 
Meuse above Verdun. On its left the 4th French Army occupied 
Sedan and Mezieres and the 5th and 3d French armies extended 
the line to Hirson via Rocroi. 

The task assigned to General Bullard's 2d American Army was 
to make the necessary preparations to take part in a great offensive 
movement which General Foch had directed General Castelnau to 
organize for an invasion of Lorraine on the general front from which 
the offensive of the 1st and 2d French armies was made in August, 
1914. General Mangin was in command of the French contingent 
which formed the 10th Army. The 2d American Army consisted of 
the 4th American corps. General Muir, the 6th American corps, 
General Menoher, and the 17th French corps; each corps had four 
divisions. The American divisions on this front were the 33d, 28th. 
7th and 92d in the front line and the 88th, 4th, 35th and 62d in 
reserve. The 2d American Army was to begin the offensive by an 
attack on the Verdun-Moselle front on November 10th. The at- 



249 

tack on November 10 was made in conjunction with the right of the 
1st Army north of Fresnes where the 81st division was employed. 
Satisfactory progress was made when the armistice stopped opera- 
tions on the 11th. 

On Armistice Day, 42 American divisions had either reached 
France or were en route ; of these 29, including replacements from 
the other divisions, were actually engaged in combat. Of the latter 
7 were Regular divisions, 11 National Guard divisions, and 11 were 
National Army divisions. The total American forces sent to France 
is given as 2,084,000 of whom it is estimated that 1,390,000 took 
part in campaign; of the latter 1,100,000 as divisional troops 
240,000 as corps and army troops and 50,000 in the service of supply. 

The casualties in the American Army were about 260,000 of whom 
about 50,000 were battle deaths. As the army met with no serious 
reverses, the number of prisoners taken by the enemy was small, 
only 4,500. The casualties occurred mainly between May 28, 1918, 
when the 1st division attacked Cantigny and November 11. In its 
operations it captured 63,000 prisoners and about 1,400 pieces of 
artillery in addition to other arms and stores. 

In accordance with the terms of the armistice, the Allies were to 
occupy the valley of the Rhine with its fortresses until final dis- 
position by the treaty of peace. To the American Army was as- 
signed the Coblenz sector and on November 13, the 3d Army, or 
Army of Occupation, was organized under the command of General 
Dickman to take possession as the German armies were withdrawn. 
As the terms of the armistice made it impossible for the Germans 
to renew hostilities, the war on the west front closed November 
11, 1918. 



250 



CHAPTER XV. 

OPERATIONS IN RUSSIA, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, ITALY 

AND TURKEY IN 1918. 

Russia. — In accordance with the terms of the armistice of Decem- 
ber, 1917, the delegates of the Bolshevik government of Russia and 
those of the four Central Powers met at Brest-Litovsk in the latter 
part of that month to discuss the terms of a permanent peace. It 
soon became evident that the Central Powers intended to insist on 
a dictated peace to which the Bolshevik delegates would not submit. 
After prolonged discussions the Central Powers decided to resume 
hostilities in order to force the Bolshevik government to accept the 
terms submitted to it. In the middle of February the northern 
German armies again advanced in the direction of Petrograd and 
Moscow meeting with little opposition as the Russian Army had 
practically disintegrated. When these armies reached the line run- 
ning from Reval on the Gulf of Finland, one hundred and fifty miles 
from Petrograd, to Orsha on the Dnieper River on March 3, the 
Bolshevik government fearing the effects of a further advance ac- 
cepted the terms offered. In accordance with these terms, the 
Baltic provinces of Esthonia, Livonia and Courland, and the central 
provinces of Lithuania and Poland ceased to be Russian territory. 

The peace of Brest-Litovsk released the German and Austrian 
prisoners in Russia and many returned to the armies. To offset 
this advantage, many troops had to be left in the east for political 
and strategic reasons. Some of these troops were sent to Finland 
to assist the government of that state against Bolshevik uprisings. 

Farther south, the state of Ukrainia declared its independence in 
1917 ; this state extended from Poland and Galicia to the Black Sea 
and the Sea of Azov. Its independence had not been recognized by 
Russia and in January, 1918, Bolshevik forces were in possession 
of its capital, Kiev, and its seaport, Odessa. Early in February, 
1918, the Central Powers recognized this new state and made with 
it a treaty of peace. When, therefore, in the middle of February the 
northern German armies advanced toward Petrograd and Moscow, 
the southern German armies advanced against Kiev and the Aus- 
trian Army against Odessa in order to free Ukrainia of Bolshevik 
forces and secure the grain promised by the Ukrainian government. 

The Allied governments feared both the German influence in 
Russia and the effects of the Bolshevik propaganda on other coun- 



251 

tries. The Supreme War Council therefore decided to send troops 
to the Russian seaports of Murmansk and Archangel northeast of 
Petrograd to check German operations in Finland, to protect the 
supplies previously landed for the use of the Russian armies, and 
also to serve as a base for a Russian counter-movement against the 
Bolshevik government. It was assumed that this government did 
not have the support of the Russian people as it had not been rati- 
fied by a national assembly. The principal landing was made at 
Archangel to which point a small American force was sent in 
August, 1918. 

When the German and Austrian prisoners were released, there 
were among the Austrian prisoners a large number of Czecho- 
slovaks who did not wish to return to Austria during the war; these 
the Bolshevik government permitted to go eastward to Vladavostock. 
The detachments of this force had some difficulty in getting through 
due to interference of Bolshevik forces aided by German and Aus- 
trian prisoners. Allied troops were therefore landed at Vladavostock 
not only to protect supplies as at Archangel but also to aid the 
Czecho-Slovaks. 

"Whether from Vladavostock or from Murmansk and Archangel, 
the only present object for which American troops will be employed 
will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed 
by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the 
Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. 

"With such objects in view the Government of the United States 
is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great 
Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The 
United States and Japan are the only powers which are just now 
in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even 
such modest objects as have been outlined. The Government of the 
United States had, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan 
that each of the two governments send a force of a few thousand 
men to Vladavostock with t,he purpose of co-operating as a single 
force in the occupation of Vladavostock and in safeguarding, so far 
as it may, the country in the rear of the westward moving Czecho- 
slovaks." 

It was proposed at that time to take the Czecho-Slovaks by sea to 
the west front to be employed against the Central Powers. These 
expeditions were only incidentally connected with the defeat of the 
Central Powers and were maintained for some time after their sur- 
render but they form a part of the operations in Russia in 1918. 

Rumania. — When in December, 1918, Russia made an armistice 
with the Central Powers, Rumania felt compelled to do the same; 
the treaty of peace was signed May, 1918, at a meeting of the dele- 



252 

gates at Bucharest. This treaty was never formally ratified and 
upon the surrender of Bulgaria, Rumania again entered the war. 

Bulgaria. — The Bulgarians were very much dissatisfied with the 
terms of the treaty of Bucharest and resented the action of the Ger- 
man and Austrian governments who had dictated the terms. Of the 
Bulgarian Army at this time Ludendorff says: 

"The Bulgarian Army had time for rest and training. But it 
could not be denied that since about March its spirit had visibly 
deteriorated, owing to bad food and clothing. The irritation against 
Germany was cleverly fomented by hostile propaganda and by Bul- 
garians who favored the Entente. The peace of Bucharest and the 
withdrawal of a few German units to the West added fresh fuel 
to it." 

The declaration of war by the United States against Germany 
and Austria and also the entry of Greece on the side of the Allies 
had a great effect on Bulgaria. The failure of the German offensive 
in March, April and May to win a decision in France combined with 
the defeat of the Austrian attack in Italy in May resulted in the fall 
of the ministry in Bulgaria. It was certain now that the war could 
not be won by the Central Powers. The Bulgarian armies were no 
longer buoyed up by the hope of ultimate victory. 

In December, 1917, General Sarrail, who had been in command of 
the French Army and later of the Allied armies since their landing 
at Salonika in 1915, was relieved by General Guillaumat and he by 
General d'Esperey in June, 1918 ; the latter commanded the 5th 
French Army in the battle of the Marne. By mid-summer, 1918, 
the Greek contingent was the largest force in the Allied Army on 
this front. The general situation in September, when the Germans 
were in full retreat in France oh all fronts and the morale of the 
Bulgarian troops was at a low ebb, warranted an attempt to break 
the Bulgarian resistance and General d'Esperey was directed to 
make an attack. The Bulgarian position was known to be strong 
after its long occupation and there seemed little prospect of success 
by opening the attack either east of the Vardar River or around 
Monastir. General d'Esperey therefore decided to open the attack 
on the front between the Vardar and Monastir on the front occupied 
by French and Serbian troops. If successful here the attack could 
be extended right and left. 

The artillery preparation began September 14 and on the follow- 
ing day the French and Serbs attacked on a seven mile front and 
captured the first and second lines that day, advancing some five 
miles. It is probable that the general retreat west of the Vardar 
began that night as the French and Serbs now advanced rapidly 



253 

although the country is mountainous. A few days after the first 
attack the British and Greeks penetrated the Hnes around Lake 
Doiran and the retreat became general. The Allied armies now ad- 
vanced on Uskub from Monastir and up the Vardar valley fighting 
rear guards. On the 26th, a Bulgarian staff officer appeared on the 
British front under a flag of truce requesting a suspension of hostili- 
ties until the arrival of properly authorized delegates. The sus- 
pension was however not granted until the 29th when the armistice 
was signed at Salonika. On September 30th, 1918, hostilities ceased ; 
at that time the Allies had reached Uskub, an advance of some 80 
miles in an air line in fifteen days. 

Some of the Allied troops now advanced northward driving back 
small columns of German and Austrian troops and at the end of 
October the whole of Serbia was in the possession of the Allies. 
Bulgaria was the first of the Central Powers to surrender. 

Italy. — From December 1917 until the final Austrian offensive on 
May 19, 1918, there was no material change in the fronts of the op- 
posing armies in Italy. During the winter the German divisions 
were withdrawn to form the XVII army on the west front and the 
Austrian armies were strengthened by troops drawn from other 
fronts and from the prisoners released by Russia. 

"The situation of the Austro-Hungarian Army in Italy had im- 
proved, inasmuch as several hundred thousand prisoners of war had 
rejoined from Russia. The army had thus been strengthened and 
felt equal to making an attack on the Italians. General Von Arz 
(Chief of Staff) had sent officers to witness our attacks and was kept 
informed of our tactical experiences. He intended to assume the of- 
fensive in the first half of June, that is to say, soon after our attack 
on the Chemin des Dames. Thus, at the end of May and in the 
beginning of June, there was to be a great combined effort against 
the Entente." — Ludendorff. 

The Italian armies had also been thoroughly reorganized and re- 
equipped. Before the Austrian attack, several British and French 
divisions which had been sent to Italy in 1917 were sent to France to 
meet the German offensive and with them were sent two Italian di- 
visions. Three British and two French divisions were left in Italy. 

The Italian line consisted of three sectors ; the right sector was 
along the Piave river from the Adriatic to Quero where the river 
enters the plain ; the center sector ran westward from Quero over 
Monte Grappa to the Brenta river ; the left sector ran from the 
Brenta westward via Asiago and Arsiera. Two Austrian and two 
Italian armies faced each other along the Piave river and two Aus- 
trian and two Italian armies faced each other along the center and 



254 

left sectors. The Italians had greatly strengthened their lines dur- 
ing the months of occupation and had a decided advantage in oc- 
cupying interior lines with good communications between the sectors 
and with their reserves in rear. 

The Austrian Chief-of -Staff probably hoped to make a surprise at- 
tack similar to the first attack by the Germans in March, but from all 
accounts it appears that the Italians were prepared for the attack 
through information received from deserters. The Austrian attack 
was preceded by a strong demonstration, May 13, made in the moun- 
tain passes west of Trent to attract the attention of the Italian com- 
mander and cause him to send reserves to this front ; it however had 
no such effect. The real attack began with a powerful artillery pre- 
paration at 3:30 a. m. May 15 with gas and other shells which was 
kept up for four hours. The infantry attack was launched between 
6:30 and 7 a. m. 

The most critical point of the Italian front was its left sector on 
the Asiago plateau between the Brenta and Astico rivers. If the 
line were penetrated here it would turn the entire Italian line in the 
same manner that the Isonzo line was turned in the latter part of 
October 191 7. This front attacked was held by the French and Bri- 
tish corps with Italian troops on either flank. In the attack in this 
sector the Austrians penetrated the first line but were held by the 
second. On the second day however by the use of reserves the line 
was reestablished and although fighting was continued in this sector 
it was not serious. Between Piave and Brenta rivers the line was 
also penetrated but the Austrians were thrown back by the Italian 
reserves. 

Along the Piave River the fighting was most desperate and lasted 
from May 15 until the night of May 22. Here both of the Austrian 
armies forced the crossing of the river and slowly pressed back the 
Italians until the afternoon of the 18th when a flood in the river car- 
ried away ten of the fourteen Austrian bridges and flooded the low 
ground along the river. The Italians now engaged in a fierce coun- 
ter-attack and the fighting was of a desperate character until the 
night of the 22d when the Austrians began to recross the river. The 
withdrawal was effected without serious loss and the armies again 
faced each other in the original lines. 

After the battle in May there were no important operations until 
the end of October when the war was practically over. At that time 
the German armies had been decisively defeated and were retreat- 
ing to their last line. The Bulgarian armies had surrendered and 



255 

the Allies were approaching the Danube in Serbia ; Rumania had 
again taken up arms. The Italian army was now ordered to make 
an attack. 

At this time, the line of the Piave river was still held by two 
Austrian armies forming the old Isonzo group, one army held the 
line astride the Piave and between the Piave and Brenta rivers and 
another between the Brenta and Astico rivers. The plan of General 
Diaz, the commander in chief of the Italian armies, was to cross the 
Piave river on the front of the northern Austrian army on that front 
and thus penetrate the Austrian center in the general direction of 
Vittorio. In accordance with his plan the old 3d Italian Army was 
to hold the lower part ot the Piave River, two other Italian armies 
were to hold the fronts between the Piave and Brenta and the Brenta 
and Astico rivers. The remaining available troops including the 
two French and two British divisions were to form three armies 
which were to cross the Piave and force the Austrian center. Of 
these the left army was commanded by General Graziana of the 
French Army and the right army by the Earl of Cavan of the 
British Army. In order to faciliate the crossing of the left army, 
a preliminary attack was to be made between the Piave and Brenta 
by the Italian army on that front. 

The battle was opened on October 24 by an attack between the 
Piave and Brenta rivers accompanied by demonstrations in the sec- 
tor to the west. In the meantime on the main front preparations 
were being made to cross the Piave which was a formidable task. On 
the Earl of Cavan's front, the river was divided by a large island 
occupied by the Austrians ; the main channel was on the west of the 
island. This island was secured by British troops by night attack 
and connected with the west bank by bridges. The main attack was 
to be made on the morning of the 25th but was delayed by a sudden 
rise in the Piave until the 27th. 

On the night of October 26-27, the bombardment on the main front 
of attack was opened and that night the three armies began the con- 
struction of bridges to span the river and secure bridgeheads on the 
east bank. The crossing of the river proved more difficult than had 
been anticipated and only in front of the right of the three armies 
were the Allies able to cross and maintain all of their bridges. The 
center army experienced the greatest difficulty and here one of the 
corps used the bridges of the Earl of Cavan's army. However by 
the 28th the river was crossed and by the 30th, the three armies had 
penetrated the Austrian center and the Austrian armies on the 
Piave front were in full retreat which soon changed into a rout. 



256 

West of the Brenta the Austrian armies also began to retreat pur- 
sued by the Italians. On the 30th an Austrian corps commander 
with instructed delegates entered the Italian lines requesting an 
armistice ; the terms offered were accepted on November 3 and war 
on the Italian front closed on the afternoon of November 4th. In the 
pursuit the Italian Army captured some 300,000 prisoners and 5,000 
guns. In the Earl of Cavan's army was the only American force 
engaged on this front. 

"On the 4th of November the 332d American regiment had their 
baptism of fire when forcing the passage of the Tagliamento. They 
took over 100 prisoners and suffered a few casualties when attacking 
the enemy's rear guards, an operation which they carried out with 
the same dash as has always been shown by American troops." — The 
Earl of Cavan's report. 

Austria was the third of the Central Powers to surrender. 

Turkey. — On the Armenian front the Russian armies began to dis- 
integrate and withdraw toward the end of 1917. As a result the 
Turkish troops advanced and in February 1918 reoccupied Tre- 
bizond where the Russians had left large supplies. In the treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, March 3d, the Bolshevik government of Russia had 
agreed to withdraw her troops from the Russian provinces of Batum 
Kars and Erivan on the Armenian frontier and the Turks at once 
advanced to take possession. From Trebizond the Turks advanced 
on Batum which was occupied in April. Farther south, Ezerum was 
reoccupied in March and the troops advanced to Kars which was oc- 
cupied in April. Still farther south, the Turks advanced into Persia 
and occupied Tabriz in June and from there made their way across 
the mountains to Baku on the Caspian Sea in July. To prevent the 
capture of the oil field of Baku, a British force from the Mesopota- 
mian force was sent across the northern part of Persia south of 
Tabriz to the Caspian port of Ensili to assist a small Russian force 
still believed loyal to the Allies. The Turks began their attack on 
Batum held by the Russians in the latter part of July and a small 
British force was sent to assist them. Batum however was cap- 
tured about the middle of September ; before its fall the British sur- 
vivors reembarked for Ensili. 

In the Bagdad zone of operations, in 1918 the British forces ex- 
tended their zone of occupation both up the Euphrates and Tigris 
valleys. The only serious engagement occurred on the Tigris River 
some seventy miles south of Mosul, where the Turks were occupying 
a strong position to bar the road to that city. This position was at- 
tacked by a British column consisting of two divisions of infantry 



257 

and one of cavalry on the last days of October. By skillful maneu- 
vers, the Turks were surrounded and October 30 the entire force of 
about 7,000 men surrendered. As a general armistice with the 
Turks was signed that day, when the British forces reached Mosul 
a few days later they took possession without opposition. 

In Syria, at the beginning of 1918, the British were strengthening 
the line which they had taken at the close of 1917 running from the 
coast north of Jaffa across the plain and hills and around the north 
and east of Jerusalem. After their rapid advance through south- 
ern Palestine it became necessary to halt before a further advance. 

"Any further advance northwards on my part was out of the ques- 
tion for the time being. Besides the construction of roads and the 
improvement of communications in the forward areas, stores of sup- 
plies and ammunition had to be accumulated. Until the railway had 
reached a point considerably nearer my front, this was of necessity 
a difficult task, and one rendered still more difficult by frequent spells 
of bad weather. Moreover, before a further advance could be made, 
it was necessary to drive the enemy across the River Jordan to ren- 
der my flank secure. The possession of the crossings over the Jordan 
offered other advantages. These were: 

(a) The enemy would be prevented from raiding the tract of 

country to the west of the Dead Sea. 

(b) Control of the Dead Sea would be obtained. 

(c) A point of departure would be gained for operations east- 

wards, with a view to interrupting the enemy's lines of 
communications to Hedjaz, in conjunction with the Arabs 
based on Akaba." — Allenby's report. 

Akaba is a small town at the northeastern extremity of the Red 
Sea on the northern boundary of Hedjaz. 

In February the Turks were driven from the hills east of Jerusa- 
lem across the Jordan and in the early part of March, the general 
line to the north of Jerusalem was advanced several miles to secure 
a larger frontage on the Jordan. An expedition to cross the Jordan 
and raid the Hedjaz railway was organized in the latter part of 
March. The column reached the railway but was able to effect little 
damage and recrossed the Jordan about the 1st of April. A second 
expedition east of the Jordan in April met with no greater success 
and recrossed about the 1st of May. 

In April, General Allenby's operations were temporarily brought 
to a close by the calls for troops to meet the German advance in 
France. Two of his divisions were withdrawn and replaced by 
Indian divisions withdrawn from. Mesopotamia. Nine regiments of 
volunteer cavalry and ten battalions of British infantry were with- 
drawn and replaced by a corresponding number of Indian troops. In 
May and July twenty-four additional battalions of British troops 



258 

were withdrawn and replaced by Indian troops. During the summer 
therefore the time was spent largely in reorganizing his army which 
was not ready to advance until the middle of September. 

The military situation at the beginning of the final campaign was 
as follows: 

"At the beginning of September, I estimated the strength of the 
IVth, Vllth and Vlllth Turkish Armies to be 23,000 rifles, 3,000 
sabres and 340 guns. The IVth Army, 6,000 rifles, 2,000 sabres and 
74 guns faced my forces in the Jordan valley. The Vllth Army held 
a front of some 20 miles astride of the Jerusalem-Nablus road with 
7,000 rifles, and 111 guns, while the Vlllth Army front extended 
from Furkhah to the sea (20 miles) and was held by 10,000 rifles 
and 157 guns. 

"In addition, the garrison of Maan and the posts on the Hedjaz 
railway north of it consisted of some 6,000 rifles and 30 guns. 

"The enemy's general reserve, only 3,000 rifles m strength with 
30 guns was distributed between Tiberias, Nazereth and Haifa. * * * 
_ "I had at my disposal two cavalry divisions, two mounted divi- 
sions, seven infantry divisions, an Indian infantry brigade, four un- 
allotted battalions, and the French detachment (the equivalent of an 
infantry brigade, with other arms attached), a total, in the fighting 
line, of some 12,000 sabres, 57,000 rifles and 540 guns. 

"I had thus a considerable superiority in numbers over the enemy, 
especially in mounted troops." — Allenby. 

After a careful study of the situation. General Allenby decided to 
make his main attack on the VIII Turkish Army which he hoped to 
destroy and by means of his cavalry cut off the retreat of this and 
the other armies. 

"By reducing the strength of the troops in the Jordan Valley to 
a minimum, and by withdrawing my reserve from the hills north of 
Jerusalem, I was able to concentrate some 36,000 rifles, against 
8,000, and 383 guns against 130. In addition two cavalry and one 
Australian mounted division were available on this front." 

Two divisions were left in front of the VII Turkish Army with 
orders to be ready to attack ; a mounted division with the unassigned 
troops was left in front of the IV Turkish Army. The troops with- 
drawn from the right and center reached their destinations by night 
marches. 

The attack was to be preceded by a raid on the railway south of 
Damascus by an Arab raiding column assisted by British armored 
cars under Prince Faisal which had been secretly concentrated some 
fifty miles east of the railway. British bombing planes were also to 
take part in this raid. 

The raids took place on the 16th and 17th of September tem- 
porarily stopping traffic and the movement of troops. The infantry 



259 



attack on the VIII Army began at 4:30 a. m. September 19 after a 
nlteen mmutfe bombardment. 

The Turkish Army was still under the command of the same Ger- 
man officer who had been in command since the advance on the Suez 
Canal in January, 1915, but the troops no longer had the morale that 
enabled them to defeat the first attacks on Gaza. They had been 
greatly demoralized by Allenby's operations in his advance on Jeru- 
salem and were really an army only in name. The three armies 
were under the command of General Sanders, who had commanded 
the Turks m the defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula 

General Allenby gives the following summary of his last 
campaign : 

"The operations which followed fell into five phases The first 
^^^^7^' f '\^'^ ^T.^^""- ^" ^^ h«"^« betweenMo a. m. on the 
par? of the Vmfh ^T^ l^'^k "" ^^t ^^^^ ^^ September, the greate? 
troons of thJ VTf^ I"'^''^ ^'''^^ 1^^? ^^^"^ overwhelmed, and the 
troops ot the Vlth Army were in full retreat through the hills of 
Samaria, whose exits were already in the hands of our cavalry " 

The first phase began by an attack on the VIII Turkish Army and 
as soon as it became evident that the Turkish line was broken the 
two divisions in front of the VII Turkish Army were ordered to'join 
in the attack. The cavalry, massed near the coast, at once rode 
northward to cut off the retreat of the Turkish forces. 
^ "In the second phase, the fruits of this success were reaped The 
infantry, pressing relentlessly on the heels of the retreltfn^g enemy 
drove him into the arms of the cavalry, with the result that DrS' 
cally the whole of the Vllth and Vlllth TurkisrA?m es wer^cap^^ 

caXreTof Haffa/TI ""' '^T'"'''- ™' ^^^^^ witnessed th'e 
captures of Haifa and Acre and the occupation of Tiberias, and of the 

country to the south and west of the Sea of Galilee As a result of 

east'of \hf T'''7"'\""^j;"^h ^™^-' *he mh Tur'ktsh'ArLv 
east of the Jordan, retreated, and Maan was evacuated." 

This phase ended about September 24. Maan was a fortified post 
on the Hedjaz railway about 40 miles south of the Dead Sea Haifa 
Acre and Tiberias were all fortified towns. 

rh2!iL^^'^^ phase commenced with the pursuit of this army by 
Chaytor s Force and closed with the capture of Amman, and the in- 
terception of the retreat of the garrison of Maan whi?h surren- 

This phase ended September 29 when the garrison of Maan 5 000 
men reached Amman, on the railway east of the Jordan and surren- 
dered to the British force then in possession. Maj. Gen. Chaytor 
commanded a mounted division of Australian and New Zealand 
troops and was in temporary command of the forces facing the IV 
Turkish Army. 



260 

"The fourth phase witnessed the advance by the Desert Mounted 
Corps to Damascus, the capture of the remnants of the IVth Turkish 
Army, and the advance by the 21st corps along the coast from Haifa 
to Beirut." 

This phase ended October 1 when the cavalry divisions on the left 
of the army and the Arab column under Prince Faisal entered 
Damascus. 

"In the fifth phase my troops reached Horns and Tripoli without 
opposition. My cavalry then advanced on Aleppo, and occupied that 
city on the 26th of October," 

Homs is a station on the railway between Damascus and Aleppo. 

The great success which attended the operation of the army under 
General Allenby was due to his superiority in mounted troops, in 
leadership and training. 

After the surrender of Bulgaria at the end of September, 1918, 
and the destruction of the Turkish armies in Palestine, the situation 
of Turkey was hopeless. In the latter part of October, negotiations 
were opened with the Admiral of the British fleet in the Aegean for 
an armistice which was finally signed October 30 and on the 31st 
the war with Turkey ceased. Turkey was the second of the Central 
Powers to surrender. 



261 



CHAPTER XVI. 

STRATEGY OF THE WAR. 

Diplomatic Strategy. — The diplomatic strategy leading up to the 
World War covered a long period of years whose incidents it is un- 
necessary to relate as they belong to the history of the period be- 
ginning with the Franco-German War of 1870-1871. The exact 
status of the alliances and understandings in force at the beginning 
of the war are known only in a general way. Immediately after war 
had broken out between the Allied and Central Powers both sides 
sought to strengthen their military forces by further alliances. 

On August 23, Japan declared war against Germany as a result 
of pre-war alliance with Great Britain. The Japanese Army was at 
once employed in the siege of the German port of Tsingtau in China 
which was captured before the end of 1914. The Japanese Army 
was not employed in further military operations until a Japanese 
force with American and Allied troops was landed in Vladavostock. 
As Japanese troops were not employed on any of the principal fronts 
they had little effect on the general operations of the war. 

About the end of October, 1914, Turkey joined the Central Powers 
probably also as a result of pre-war engagements with Germany. 
The intervention of Turkey resulted in the seizure of Egypt as a 
British Protectorate and the Dardanelles, Mesopotamia, Palestine 
and Armenia operations. Germany no doubt expected great results 
from this alliance on the Mohammedan subjects of Great Britain in 
India and Egypt but in this the German government was disap- 
pointed as the British authorities found no difficulty in maintaining 
their authority. Several British territorial divisions were sent to 
India to replace divisions of the Indian Army which contributed the 
main force that was employed in the Mesopotamian campaign and 
the final campaign in Palestine. From Egypt minor campaigns were 
conducted against uprisings in Sudan and against the Senussi tribes 
occupying territory under Italian control west of Egypt. As a minor 
offset to the Turkish alliance, the Allies secured the alliance of the 
Arabs of Hedjaz in 1917 who took part in the campaigns in Palestine 
and Syria. 

The Turkish alliance probably prolonged the war due to the em- 
ployment of Allied troops, that might have been utilized on the west 
and east fronts, in the various operations in Turkey. Outside of this 



262 

the principal advantage that accrued to the Central Powers from 
the Turkish alliance was the closing of the Dardanelles. 

What the military policy of the Allies should have been with re- 
gard to Turkey will always be a subject of dispute as it was during 
the war. Notwithstanding great expense in men and money, the 
surrender of Turkey was brought about only when the war was 
practically over; the principal objective, the openijig of the Darda- 
nelles was not accomplished in time to have any effect on the mili- 
tary operations ; the expensive Mesopotamia operations had only an 
after-war effect. The principal effect of the operations was to keep 
the greater part of the Turkish Army at home and prevented it from 
being employed on other fronts. To what extent it could have been 
employed on the east and west fronts is problematical in view of the 
unwillingness of the Turk to serve in distant lands and the lack of 
efficiency in the recruiting and supply branches of the army. It is 
probable that the sea power of the Allies which enabled them to 
make a descent at any part of the Turkish coast would have pre- 
vented any great force from being sent to the east and west fronts. 
The Turkish Army could engage in no important offensives from its 
own frontiers; Egypt was protected by the desert and Suez Canal 
and no ultimate result would have resulted from the invasion of 
Russian Armenia or Persia if the Allies were successful in their 
operations against Germany. 

The Allies scored their first important diplomatic success when on 
May 23, 1915, Italy declared war on Austria. The Italian Army was 
an important accession to the Allied forces since it could immediately 
exert pressure on the Austrians and relieve the pressure on the Rus- 
sians. The effect of the intervention of Italy was not as great in the 
spring of 1915 as was expected mainly due to the fact that Italy did 
not declare war until the Austrians had time to thoroughly intrench 
their frontier which caused a deadlock at once. Due to the in- 
credible efforts of the Italian government 50 divisions were eventual- 
ly placed in the field which caused the Austrians to move more and 
more troops to this front. In 1915 it was the Austrian forces with- 
drawn from the Russian front which prevented the Central Powers 
from driving the Russians wholly out of Galicia ; in 1916 the forces 
thus withdrawn enabled Brusilov to carry out his successful offen- 
sive. The withdrawal of the Austrians also compelled the Germans 
to weaken their west front in order to replace the Austrians during 
1916 when the situation became critical due to the intervention of 
Rumania. Although the Italians were compelled to retreat to the 
Piave in 1917, the effect of this retreat was overcome in May, 1918, 



26S 

when the Austrian Army was repulsed in its last attack. As this 
occurred at the very time the Germans were repulsed in their attack 
on either side of Reims, it had a very discouraging effect on the 
Central Powers and greatly increased the confidence of the Allies. 
The final victory of the Italians in October, 1918, had no impor- 
tant effect on the war as by that time the war was won on the west 
front. 

The Central Powers scored their second diplomatic success when 
in November, 1915, Bulgaria allied herself with the Central Powers. 
This alliance was the immediate result of the successful drive 
against the Russians. Its effects were very important since it en- 
abled the Central Powers to invade Serbia without hesitation and 
secure a much needed railway connection with Turkey to supply her 
with munitions of war. The invasion of Serbia caused the Allies to 
land troops at Salonika and thus another front of operations was 
introduced. The advisability of continuing the occupation of Salo- 
nika after the Central Powers had complete possession of Serbia 
was also a subject upon which the military authorities of the Allies 
did not wholly agree. 

The British authorities were inclined to withdraw from Salonika 
as there seemed to be no immediate prospect of the Allies assuming 
the offensive on this front with any great hope of success and 
British troops were already engaged on three other fronts in addi- 
tion to Gallipoli which was about to be abandoned. The French 
however were insistent on holding the front as a base for future 
operations. Without this base, the Serbian Army which was to be 
reorganized could not be utilized and all hope of securing the alli- 
ance of Greece and Rumania would have to be abandoned. There 
was also a difference of opinion among the Central Powers as to the 
advisability of continuing the offensive for the possession of Salo- 
nika. It was at the request of the German G. H. Q. that the Bul- 
garians halted on the Greek frontier. General Falkenhayn, the 
German Chief of Staff, says: 

"At the end of Decemiber and the beginning of January, 1916, the 
question of an attack on Salonika was again thoroughly examined 
more than once. The Austrian G. H. Q. was more favorably inclined 
toward the proposal than the Bulgarians although the former were 
unable to provide troops for the enterprise. The Bulgarians ap- 
peared less enthusiastic as they had already achieved their main 
war aim, the conquest of Macedonia. 

"(German) G. H. Q. took up a less favorable attitude to the con- 
tinuation of the offensive against Salonika with the aid of any sub- 
stantial body of German troops so soon as it appeared that such an 
offensive was unnecessary to compel the Entente to renounce their 
designs on the Dardanelles," 



264 . ' 

Even had it been possible to capture Salonika its occupation would 
have been resented by Greece and would have caused friction be- 
tween the Austrians and Bulgarians, neither of whom would have 
yielded to the other. On the other hand: 

"The Entente troops that would be released in this way would be 
available for employment in other theatres of war, while the Bul- 
garians would not. They were not fitted for such employment, nor 
was the government bound to supply them. Any alteration of the 
convention on this point would have been very difficult to secure 
under the pressure of Bulgarian public opinion which was wholly 
unfavorable to such foreign undertakings. The Bulgarian people 
could only be favorably influenced in their attitude by feeling they 
were still threatened and under duty to fight, and by having an 
attractive war aim before their eyes. ... If the Bulgarians kept 
strong detachments of the Entente forces occupied by this means, 
they would be rendering a great service to a common cause. . . . 
We had no need to fear a defeat, even if the Bulgarians were left 
with the smallest possible support of German troops. The lie of the 
ground was extraordinarily favorable to defense." 

In view of the above statement as to the nature of the Bulgarian 
alliance it would appear that the Central Powers profited more by 
the Allied occupation of Salonika than the Allies themselves. A 
considerable force of British and French troops was maintained on 
this front in an almost purely defensive attitude until the middle 
of September, 1918, when the German armies had been decisively 
beaten on the west front. The force concentrated here no doubt 
influenced Rumania to declare war, but it was unable to prevent the 
Rumanian Army from being overwhelmed. In view of the sea 
power of the Allies, it is doubtful if Greece would have joined the 
Central Powers even if this force had been withdrawn. It influenced 
Greece to finally join the Allied Powers but too late to have any 
material effect on the war. At no time after 1915 was there any 
large German or Austrian force on this front. In 1916 all the 
German forces but about one division were withdrawn according 
to Ludendorff and even this was reduced in the winter of 1917-1918 
to strengthen the west front. 

The Allies scored their second diplomatic success when on August 
27, 1916, Rumania declared war on Austria. The situation of 
Austria at the time was very critical as she was being fiercely at- 
tacked by the Italians on the Isonzo front and Brusilov had just 
broken through her lines on the east on a wide front practically 
destroying one of her armies. The Germans it was thought could 
off'er little assistance as they had lost heavily in their unsuccessful 
attack on Verdun and were at the time engaged with the British and 
French in the great battle of the Somme in which they were being 



265 

steadily driven back. On their east front the northern Russian 
armies had resumed the offensive but not with the same spirit as 
Brusilov. Unfortunately the Rumanians had delayed too long in 
assuming hostilities and the offensive of Brusilov to the north of 
the Carpathians had reached its limit. The lines were again stabil- 
ized and the Central Powers were still able to find reserves that could 
be released. The offensive of the Salonika Army was not sufficiently 
successful to prevent German and Bulgarian troops from being em- 
ployed against Rumania. The intervention of Rumania was deemed 
sufficiently critical to cause the Emperor of Germany to replace his 
Chief of Staff General Falkenhayn by General Hindenburg and to 
cause the Central Powers to give to the German Chief of Staff gen- 
eral control over the allied operations. The intervention of the 
Rumanian Army did not produce the results hoped for by the Allies 
but instead the army was overwhelmed and the province of Wal- 
lachia with its supplies fell into the hands of the Central Powers. 
On the whole, outside of its moral effect, the Allies were little 
benefited by the intervention of Rumania while its food supplies 
were of great value to the Central Powers. Ludendorff says: 

"In the year 1917 only Rumania enabled Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, and Constantinople to keep their heads above water." 

At this time the Allied blockade and other war conditions made it 
difficult for the Central Powers to feed their armies and people and 
there was great discontent in all the countries. 

Portugal also joined the Allies in 1916 but only furnished two 
divisions for the principal fronts ; these divisions were attached to 
the British Army. Other Portuguese troops were employed in 
Africa. 

In 1917 after the first revolution in Russia, the German govern- 
ment sent Lenin from Switzerland through Germany to Russia to 
foment further insurrection. Through the influence of Lenin and 
Trotsky the demoralization of the Russian Army was completed and 
in December a truce was declared on the east front. Had the Central 
Powers sought only the military advantages accruing to them from 
the new situation they might now have withdrawn practically all 
of their troops from the Russian front for operations in the west 
for which their armies were then being trained. But at this stage 
they seemed to forget the maxim of Napoleon: 

"The first principle of war is that a battle should be fought only 
with all the troops that can be assembled on the field. 

"When you are resolved to fight a battle collect your whole force. 
Dispense with nothing, a single battalion sometimes decides the 
day." 



266 

In the desire to gain after-war advantages, they prolonged the 
war on the east front far into 1918 to secure concessions from the 
Bolshevik government that were absolutely valueless unless the war 
were won. The harsh conditions of the peace of Brest-Litovsk and 
the unnecessary warfare were condemned even by many of the 
people of the Central Powers and weakened the government. Every 
diplomatic step taken by the Central Powers after the establishment 
of the truce benefited the Allies instead of themselves. 

In April, 1917, the Allies received their principal material and 
moral reinforcement when the United States declared herself to be 
at war with Germany. This declaration was the direct' result of 
war made on American commerce by the German U-boats. It was 
the United States that finally so reinforced the west front that the 
war was won on that front in the following year. 

In June, 1917, Greece declared war on Bulgaria but as the Greek 
Army had been demobilized it was not until the middle of September, 
1918, that the Greeks were able to sufl^ciently reinforce the Allied 
Army at Salonika to justify it in taking the offensive. By that time 
the war had been practically won on the west front. 

Shortly after the United States declared war, the following States 
either severed diplomatic relations with Germany or declared war 
on her: Cuba, Panama, Costa Rica, Guatamala, Nicaraugua, Hon- 
duras, Haiti, Brazil, Liberia, Siam and China. None of these states 
had any influence on the military operations but they had an in- 
fluence on the morale of the people of Germany, Austria and Bul- 
garia thus contributing to the effect of the successful operations of 
the Allied armies. 

Military Strategy. — To understand the distribution of the German 
forces at the outbreak of the World War, it is necessary to go back 
a half century to the time, when after the defeat of Austria, General 
von Moltke made his plans for a possible war on two fronts against 
the combined forces of France and Austria. 

"Should Austria take part in a war declared by France against 
Prussia the division of our forces into two equal parts would give 
us a preponderance of force neither on our western nor on our south- 
ern frontier. The first question to be decided is therefore against 
which army shall we assume the defensive at the outset with a weak 
force so that we may be able to assume the offensive against the 
other with a strong one. 

"The Rhine and its fortresses make a much stronger defensive 
line against France than any we can organize along the Austrian 
frontier ; should we adopt the defensive against France we can count 
with certainty that the Rhine held by 100,000 men can check any 
French advance for six or eight weeks. To offset this, a passive de- 



267 

f ense of the Rhine would cause the South German States to remain 
neutral or take up arms against us. The French could also turn the 
left flank of our Rhine front by operating on Berlin via Worms and 
Franconia; while our offensive army in Austria, even if successful 
might in the meantime be brought to a standstill before the fortress 
of Olmutz or at the Danube. It is not improbable that the Austrians 
would abstain from undertaking operations in Bohemia and Moravia 
and await the arrival of their allies in the fortified camp of Olmutz 
or behind the Danube. 

"Should we assume the offensive against France, we should proba- 
bly have six or eight weeks in which we could operate with a free 
hand before Austria would be in a condition to interfere ; she is now 
in financial straits and has a weak skeleton army organization which 
would require a much longer time to mobilize than our own. Should . 
we invade French soil, the French will be too proud to wait for the 
assistance of Austria and we shall be attacked at once. Here we are 
sure to find an opponent. The size of the armies, the narrowness of 
the front of operations, and the difficulty of subsisting troops will 
compel each to seek a prompt decision and it is almost certain that 
inside the first week a battle must take place. If we are successful 
in this battle Austria will almost be compelled to sheath her half 
drawn sword. In the meantime should Austria invade Silesia and 
even our Mark provinces, so long as our fortresses hold out and 
our defensive army retires without being beaten, nothing is definite- 
ly lost. It is probable that in France, after the first lost battle, a 
change of dynasty will result; as we desire nothing of France the 
new powers would probably be willing to make peace. 

"For all these reasons, I hold that teti army corps should be 
concentrated for the offensive in the Palatinate and three for the 
defensive be detached to operate against Austria. . . . It is under- 
stood that all our armed force is to be employed against France 
should we engage that power alone' or for a considerable time." 

The essential features of the concentration of the German forces 
at the opening of the World War followed the above plan substitut- 
ing Russia for Austria. The German military authorities in 1914 
were influenced by the same general considerations as Moltke in 
1868, the certainty of battle on the French frontier and the possi- 
bility of a general retreat of the Russian armies into the interior 
declining a decisive action at the beginning of the war. Of the Ger- 
man active corps therefore 22 were concentrated against France and 
only 3 were left on the Russian front. 

The fatal mistake made by the German General Staff in its plan 
of operations was the invasion of Belgium which caused Great 
Britain to take up arms at once and led practically all neutral powers 
to fear the results of the war should Germany be successful. This 
might have been avoided had the Germans assumed the defen- 
sive in the west and the offensive against Russia. The elder von 



268 

Moltke in the later years of his life seems to have considered this 
plan as possibly the best as the Rhine front with its fortresses and 
railways would be able to defeat any effort of the French until the 
war on the Russian front was concluded. In view of what occurred 
during the war, it is certain that an offensive campaign in the east 
by strong Austro-German forces at the beginning of the war would 
have been successful and might have resulted in the revolution of 
1917 taking place in 1914. In the meantime, although the entire 
French Army was concentrated on the Franco-German frontier, it 
is probable in view of what occurred in 1915, that a deadlock might 
have resulted in the west had only half the German forces been con- 
centrated in the west. In commenting on Moltke's later views, 
General Falkenhayn says: 

"The creator of the scheme carried out in 1914, General von 
Schlieffen, had on the contrary to take England's intervention very 
seriously into consideration. If this were done, then scarcely any 
other method of conducting the war was imaginable than that which 
was actually chosen. In view of the almost unlimited power of the 
Russians to evade a final decision by arms as long as they pleased, 
there was no hope of finishing with them before the enemies in the 
west had either won a decisive success or had strengthened them- 
selves with their almost unlimited resources as to leave little pros- 
pect of any German success over them. The fact that the Russians 
in 1914 acted contrary to the intentions here ascribed to them, 
probably fully aware of the German scheme of concentration, is no 
proof to the contrary." 

It is very, probable that Great Britain would have intervened at 
a later stage had Germany sought to destroy France but it is doubt- 
ful if Great Britain would have intervened at once. In Russia, the 
German General Staff considered only the delay in securing a mili- 
tary decision and omitted any consideration of the internal condi- 
tions that had interfered with the military authorities in carrying 
out the Russo-Japanese war. 

The scheme of concentration made by General Schlieffen differed 
from that actually carried out by his successor. Schlieffen provided 
a much weaker force in Alsace and Lorraine intending to make his 
main defense along the Rhine and with a maneuvering army based 
on Metz. He provided a much stronger force for the invasion of 
France via Belgium and Luxemburg. He assumed that if the French 
armies invaded Alsace and Lorraine, they would soon have to return 
to meet the great threat on their rear. In the scheme actually car- 
ried out the invading force was weakened in order to afford better 
protection for Alsace and Lorraine and perhaps with a view of break- 
ing through the Toul-Epinal gap as was attempted. It is probable 



269 



that greater results would have been secured had the original plan 
been carried out since the invading force proved too weak for the 
task imposed on it. 

The German General Staff evidently considered it impossible to 
invade France by concentrating between Luxemburg and Switzer- 
land and they were probably right as the entire French Army was 
concentrated on this front. They were unable to break through the 
Toul-Epinal gap in 1914 and were unable to capture Verdun in 1916. 

Having invaded Belgium and caused Great Britain to declare war^ 
a decision on the west front was inevitable. It is not improbable 
that a successful decision on this front might have been secured in 
1914 had not General Joffre followed the reasoning of Moltke that 

"So long as our fortresses hold out and our defensive army retires 
without being beaten nothing is definitely lost." 

The retreat of the French and British armies from the frontier 
until their flanks were protected by Paris and Verdun when they 
could assume the offensive without endangering these flanks proved 
the correctness of Moltke's reasoning. Only once did the Germans 
have an opportunity of winning a decision during the retreat and 
that was immediately after the battle of Le Gateau. Had Kluck 
after that battle immediately wheeled his army to the left to assist 
Bulow in his operations against the 5th French Army, it is probable 
that the 5th French Army would have been decisively beaten. This 
opportunity was lost when he moved in the direction of Paris. 

The battle of the Marne ended the hopes of the Germans to win 
an early decisive victory on the west front as in the war of 1870- 
1871 and the failure of the battle of Flanders compelled the German 
G. H. Q. to content itself for the time being with assuming the de- 
fensive on this front to relieve the pressure in the east notwith- 
standing the fact that the offensive in the west would become more 
difficult from month to month due to the growth of the British 
Army. 

It has been suggested that the Germans made a mistake in not 
taking the Channel ports in their first invasion of France. This does 
not seem a just criticism as the principal objective at the outbreak 
of any war is the enemy's army. To have taken and held these ports 
would have required a considerable force and would have greatly 
reduced the strength of the I Army which had already been obliged 
to detach troops to hold the Belgian Army in check. 

The French plan of concentration has been criticised because it 
did not provide for a more thorough protection of the Belgian fron- 
tier between the Channel and the Sambre River ; this does not seem 



270 

to be warranted. It is quite certain that the French had reason to 
expect British protection of the left of their line in case Belgium was 
invaded, and it was not foreseen that the Belgian-Meuse fortifica- 
tions would fall so quickly. Before the actual concentration of the 
German armies on the frontier, it was by no means certain that the 
Germans would assume the offensive against France and the de- 
fensive against Russia although that seemed probable. Had the 
Germans adopted the opposite plan, it became the duty of the French 
to invade Germany as rapidly as possible to compel the Germans to 
weaken their east front. Even should Germany assume the offen- 
sive in the west, it was by no means certain that she would be able 
to maintain it until a decision was reached if the Russian armies 
were quickly mobilized and invaded East Prussia. Had the armies 
of Rennencamp and Ssamsanow been conducted with greater skill, 
it is quite possible that the Germans might have been obliged to 
withdraw their entire I Army from the west instead of two corps 
and a cavalry division only. Even the withdrawal of these troops 
seriouslj'- impaired the German plan of operations. Whatever the 
German plan, it was essential for General Joffre to concentrate his 
forces in such a manner that his front could not be easily penetrated. 
It was by this means that he prevented the Germans from penetrat- 
ing the Toul-Epinal gap and encircling his right after the first re- 
verse in Lorraine, and it prevented the Germans from penetrating 
any other part of his front after the battles on the frontier. It also 
enabled him after his retreat to the Marne to resume the offensive 
without delay when the opportunity offered. Had the French 
armies been deployed on a more extensive front at the beginning 
of operations, it seems probable that they would have met with 
disaster. 

The Russian plan of operations was a good one as the invasion of 
the provinces of East Prussia and Galicia was the essential first 
operation of the war and was the best means of rendering aid to 
the French and Serbian armies. The failure of the East Prussian 
campaign was due to inferior generalship which destroyed to a large 
extent the advantage gained by the initial offensive. The German 
victory of Tannenberg made it possible for the Germans to go to the 
relief of the Austrians sorely pressed in Galicia, and prevented the 
Russians from exploiting their success in that province. 

The Austrian plan of concentration was very defective. As soon a3 
it became evident that Russia was mobilizing for war, the attempt 
to conduct an offensive campaign in Serbia should have been aban- 
doned and all her available forces should have been concentrated on 



271 



her Russian frontier. The failure to unite her forces resulted in the 
two disastrous campaigns in Serbia and the heavy losses experienced 
by her armies in their vain attempt to prevent the Russian invasion 
of Gahcia and Bukowina. It also compelled the Germans to halt 
their offensive in the north or to transfer trcops from the west fton 
m order to prevent the Russians from further exploiting their suc- 
cesses on the Austrian front. With the addition of the forces un- 
necessarily concentrated against Serbia, it is not improbable that the 
Austrians might have held their own against the Russian forces con- 
centrated for an invasion of Galicia and Bukowina 

The conduct of the war after 1914 was based on the followino- 
broad principles The war could be won by the Central Powers onl^ 
If the German Army could by military victories compel the British 
and French governments to make peace. In favor of the Central 
powers the war had to be won on the west front. The only result 
that could be hoped from success against Russia was to strengthen 
the German forces on the west front. Any success achieved by the 
Austrians in Italy, by the Bulgarians on the Salonika front, or by 
Turkey would have only transient effect. 

The Allies on the contrary might achieve success not only by 
decisively defeating the German Army but also by defeating her 
allies in succession. The sea power of the Allies gave them the op- 
portunity of landing and supplying troops at any point of the 
theatre of war which could be reached by their shipping The gen- 
eral policy therefore was to employ the mass of British, French and 
Russian armies in an attempt to destroy the German Army while 
small forces were at the same time detached to attack her allies 
in Turkey and at Salonika. 

In 1915, due to the thorough way the west front was intrenched 
the German forces were employed mainly in relieving the pressure 
of the Russians on the east front. Greater results on that front 
might possibly have been secured had the German Chief of Staff 
General Falkenhayn, permitted Generals Hindenburg and Luden' 
dOrff to have free hand. They were more familiar with local 
conditions and the character of the Russian troops and their com- 
manders. Falkenhayn was too cautious to secure the maximum 
results and was disinclined to engage in war to the finish with 
Russia. In support of his view he could point to the French attack 
in Champagne which just failed of being a great success. 

At the close of 1915, the defensive situation was sufficiently 
satisfactory to the Central Powers to permit General Falkenhayn 
to again attempt to secure a decision on the west front by an attack 



272 

on the French. Verdun was an attractive objective, which he be- 
lieved would be defended by the French to the limit of endurance 
and in the struggle he hoped to exhaust the French Army. In his 
attempt to capture Verdun or at least to exhaust the French Army 
he was defeated and when relieved in August of that year he was 
engaged in a defensive battle with the British and French in the 
west and with the Russians in the east in which the German armies 
were being driven back in the west and the Austrians in the east. 
The latter part of 1916 was spent by his successor, General Hinden- 
burg, in defense on the west and east fronts and in the offensive 
campaign against Rumania. 

The offensive begun on the west front in the middle of 1916 was 
continued throughout the year 1917 with the general result of ex- 
haustion on both sides. The whole east front was practically quiet 
due to revolutions in Russia ending in suspension of hostilities in 
December. . 

For the third time therefore German G. H. Q. returned to the 
west front in 1918 to secure a decision. What the result might have 
been had the Germans withdrawn all their troops from the east 
front or had the American reinforcements not reached France, can 
only be conjectured. The supreme effort failed and the war was 
over. 

As previously stated, no Allied victory was secured on any other 
front in time to affect the final result. Had the Germans remained 
on the defensive on the west front in 1918, the operations on these 
fronts might have had an important influence. Whether the Allies 
could have shortened the war by the employment of the forces as- 
sembled in the Balkans and in Turkey had they been concentrated 
on the west front is an open question. The Gallipoli operation was 
sound strategically but as Ludendorff says unless such an opera- 
tion is tactically possible its strategic value is of no avail. Whether 
the operation should have been tactically possible at the time it was 
undertaken is still a subject of dispute. 



CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS. 

Page 

9 In second line above table after "concentration" add "as modified about 
the middle of Augnst". 
In table insert the numbers of the corps as follows: — 
Army of Alsace, 7th and 19th corps. 
First Army, 8th, 13th, 14th, 21st corps. 
Second Army, 9th, 15th, 16th, 18th and 20th corps. 
Third Army, 4th, 5th and 6th corps. 
Fourth Army, 2d, 11th, 12th, 17th and Colonial corps 
Fifth Army, 1st, 3d and 10th corps. 
Erase "2 cavalry corps". 

Paragraph under table should read "Of the ten cavah-y divisions, three 
formed the 1st cavalry corps, operating- on the left, two formed the 2d 
cavalry corps with the 2d Army, and one division was with each of the 
other five armies". 
12 In table in.sert the numbers of the corps as follows: — 

I Army, 2d, 3d, 4th and 9th corps. 

3d and 4th reserve corps. 

II Army, 7th, 10th and Guard corps. 

7th, 10th and Guard reserve corps. 

III Army, 11th, 12th and 19th corps. 

12th reserve corps. 

IV Army, 6th, 8th and 18th corps. 

8th and 18th reserve corps. 

V Army, 5th, 13th and 16th corps. 

5th and 6th reserve corps. 

VI Army, 1st, 2d and 3d Bavarian corps and 21st corps. 

1st Bavarian reserve corps. 

VII Army, 14th and 15th corps. 

14th and 15th reserve corps. 

Sub.stitute for three lines under the table the following-: 

German Cavalry corps. 
1st corps, 5th and Guard divisions with II Army. 
2d corps, 2d, 4th and 9th divisions with I Army. 
3d corps, 7th, 8th and Bavarian division with VI Army. 
4th corps, 3d and 6th divisions with V Army. 

22 Next to the last line, change "left" to 'right". 

23 Second line, change "left" to "right". 
25 First line of second paragraph, change 'second" to "first". 

29 Next to last paragraph, third line, change "2d" to "3d". 

30 Eighth line from bottom, change "I" to 'IV". 
36 In lower half of page after (b) second and third lines should read "Pont 

sur Yonne-Nogent sur Seine-Arcis sur Aube-Brienne le Chateau- 
Joinville etc". 

44 In paragraph beginning- "The III corps", substitute "Grand" for "Petit". 

45 Next to last paragraph, change "Orne" to "Ornain". 

47 Under 5th Army, substitute "3d corps" for "2d corps". 

48 Last line of second paragraph, substitute "8th" for "7th". 
The paragraph beginning "On the 7th" should end with the sentence 

"On this day Bulow was obliged to release the III corps at noon and 
the IX corps at night which required constant changes in his line". 
This sentence should be stricken out of the paragraph beginnine- "On 
the 8th". 

48 Fourth line from bottom change 
"Grand" to "Petit" 

49 In table change "C.P.of Bavaria" • 
to "C.P.of Turtemberg" 



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